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Paul C Wazzan - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the effect of socially activist investment policies on the financial markets evidence from the south african Boycott
The Journal of Business, 1999Co-Authors: Siew Hong Teoh, Ivo Welch, Paul C WazzanAbstract:This article examines the financial effects of shareholder pressure in what activists consider the visible and successful instance of social activism in investment policies, the Boycott of South Africa designed to speed the end of the apartheid regime. It seems that socially activist shareholder pressure on corporations has become a fact of life. In 1987, the American Medical Association called on medical schools and their parent universities to divest tobacco holding stocks. The demand for stocks may be sufficiently elastic so that pressures by social activists merely redistribute ownership from socially active investors to other investors without affecting stock prices. South Africa itself may have switched to trading with other countries not participating in the Boycotts at low cost. The alternative hypothesis is that activism and sanctions imposed measurable costs and constrained unique investment opportunities so that firm value was affected adversely. This alternative predicts that banks and corporations with South African operations and the South African financial markets experienced negative stock price reactions on the announcement of legislative and private investor sanctions.
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the effect of socially activist investment policies on the financial markets evidence from the south african Boycott
Social Science Research Network, 1995Co-Authors: Siew Hong Teoh, Ivo Welch, Paul C WazzanAbstract:Governments and vocal institutional shareholders have been exerting pressure on companies they deem to have objectionable operations (such as tobacco or chemical producers). This paper studies the effect of the most important legislative and shareholder Boycott to date, the Boycott of the South Africa's apartheid regime. We find that the announcement of legislative/shareholder pressure of voluntary divestment from South Africa had little discernible effect either on the valuation of banks and corporations with South African operations or on the South African financial markets. There is weak evidence that institutional shareholdings increased when corporations divested. In sum, despite the public significance of the Boycott and the multitude of divesting companies, financial markets seem to have perceived the Boycott to be merely a "sideshow."
Ivo Welch - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the effect of socially activist investment policies on the financial markets evidence from the south african Boycott
The Journal of Business, 1999Co-Authors: Siew Hong Teoh, Ivo Welch, Paul C WazzanAbstract:This article examines the financial effects of shareholder pressure in what activists consider the visible and successful instance of social activism in investment policies, the Boycott of South Africa designed to speed the end of the apartheid regime. It seems that socially activist shareholder pressure on corporations has become a fact of life. In 1987, the American Medical Association called on medical schools and their parent universities to divest tobacco holding stocks. The demand for stocks may be sufficiently elastic so that pressures by social activists merely redistribute ownership from socially active investors to other investors without affecting stock prices. South Africa itself may have switched to trading with other countries not participating in the Boycotts at low cost. The alternative hypothesis is that activism and sanctions imposed measurable costs and constrained unique investment opportunities so that firm value was affected adversely. This alternative predicts that banks and corporations with South African operations and the South African financial markets experienced negative stock price reactions on the announcement of legislative and private investor sanctions.
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the effect of socially activist investment policies on the financial markets evidence from the south african Boycott
Social Science Research Network, 1995Co-Authors: Siew Hong Teoh, Ivo Welch, Paul C WazzanAbstract:Governments and vocal institutional shareholders have been exerting pressure on companies they deem to have objectionable operations (such as tobacco or chemical producers). This paper studies the effect of the most important legislative and shareholder Boycott to date, the Boycott of the South Africa's apartheid regime. We find that the announcement of legislative/shareholder pressure of voluntary divestment from South Africa had little discernible effect either on the valuation of banks and corporations with South African operations or on the South African financial markets. There is weak evidence that institutional shareholdings increased when corporations divested. In sum, despite the public significance of the Boycott and the multitude of divesting companies, financial markets seem to have perceived the Boycott to be merely a "sideshow."
Siew Hong Teoh - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the effect of socially activist investment policies on the financial markets evidence from the south african Boycott
The Journal of Business, 1999Co-Authors: Siew Hong Teoh, Ivo Welch, Paul C WazzanAbstract:This article examines the financial effects of shareholder pressure in what activists consider the visible and successful instance of social activism in investment policies, the Boycott of South Africa designed to speed the end of the apartheid regime. It seems that socially activist shareholder pressure on corporations has become a fact of life. In 1987, the American Medical Association called on medical schools and their parent universities to divest tobacco holding stocks. The demand for stocks may be sufficiently elastic so that pressures by social activists merely redistribute ownership from socially active investors to other investors without affecting stock prices. South Africa itself may have switched to trading with other countries not participating in the Boycotts at low cost. The alternative hypothesis is that activism and sanctions imposed measurable costs and constrained unique investment opportunities so that firm value was affected adversely. This alternative predicts that banks and corporations with South African operations and the South African financial markets experienced negative stock price reactions on the announcement of legislative and private investor sanctions.
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the effect of socially activist investment policies on the financial markets evidence from the south african Boycott
Social Science Research Network, 1995Co-Authors: Siew Hong Teoh, Ivo Welch, Paul C WazzanAbstract:Governments and vocal institutional shareholders have been exerting pressure on companies they deem to have objectionable operations (such as tobacco or chemical producers). This paper studies the effect of the most important legislative and shareholder Boycott to date, the Boycott of the South Africa's apartheid regime. We find that the announcement of legislative/shareholder pressure of voluntary divestment from South Africa had little discernible effect either on the valuation of banks and corporations with South African operations or on the South African financial markets. There is weak evidence that institutional shareholdings increased when corporations divested. In sum, despite the public significance of the Boycott and the multitude of divesting companies, financial markets seem to have perceived the Boycott to be merely a "sideshow."
Homa Zarghamee - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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is product Boycott a good idea for controlling child labor a theoretical investigation
Journal of Development Economics, 2009Co-Authors: Kaushik Basu, Homa ZarghameeAbstract:A popular form of action to curb child labor and uphold international labor standards in general is a `product Boycott' by consumers. There are labeling agencies that inform us if, for instance, a carpet or a hand-stitched soccer ball is free of child labor. The presence of a consumer Boycott will typically mean that products tainted by child labor will command a lower price on the market than ones certified to be untainted. It is popularly presumed that such consumer activism is desirable. The paper formally investigates this presumption and shows that consumer product Boycotts can, in a wide class of situations, have an adverse reaction that causes child labor to rise rather than fall. This happens under weak and plausible assumptions. Hence, there has to be much greater caution in the use of consumer activism, and one has to have much more detailed information about the context where child labor occurs, before using a Boycott.
Ulku Yuksel - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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non participation in anti consumption consumer reluctance to Boycott
Journal of Macromarketing, 2013Co-Authors: Ulku YukselAbstract:How society affects public welfare and businesses via Boycotts has become increasingly important in a connected world. Yet, research on the topic remains scant and focuses mostly on why consumers Boycott. This study moves beyond motivations of why consumers participate in Boycotts, and examines instead, why individuals are not willing to Boycott. This is important because the accounts for non-participation may not be the exact opposite of the reasons to participate. Informants’ reasons for not Boycotting were classified into three broad themes: “out of sight, out of mind,” “urge for freedom and self-defence,” and “counterarguments – scepticism or accounts.” The hermeneutic analysis provides a framework for understanding Boycott failures.
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An evaluation of strategic responses to consumer Boycotts
Journal of Business Research, 2009Co-Authors: Ulku Yuksel, Victoria MrytezaAbstract:This article documents the relative effectiveness of the various marketing strategies, in particular the public relations strategies, that firms use to combat the likelihood of Boycotts as a politically motivated form of anti-consumption. This study focuses on Boycotts that relate to corporate practices and aims to provide a rationale for appropriate publicity-based responses to the threat of corporate practice related Boycotts. The purpose is to determine whether the techniques that firms use to mitigate the detrimental effects of negative publicity will be similarly effective for a Boycott situation. The authors use two experiments to investigate the influence of publicity-based strategic responses to Boycott requests on consumers' perceptions and behavior.