The Experts below are selected from a list of 267 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Muireann A Lynch - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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The impacts of demand response participation in Capacity markets. ESRI Research Bulletin 2019/10
2019Co-Authors: Muireann A Lynch, Mel T Devine, Sheila Nolan, Mark O'malleyAbstract:Electricity demand varies over the course of a day or a year, with very high levels of electricity demand being seen for only a few hours per year. However, there must be sufficient electricity generation installed on the system to meet the total demand at these few hours per year, in order to avoid blackouts or brownouts, where electricity supply is disconnected for all or some customers, respectively. As electricity generation from variable renewable sources, such as wind and solar, increases, electricity market revenues decrease, which renders conventional generators less profitable. In order to ensure that there is sufficient conventional generation available to meet demand at the hours of highest demand per year, a separate market Payment is made to generators, called a Capacity Payment.
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investment vs refurbishment examining Capacity Payment mechanisms using stochastic mixed complementarity problems
The Energy Journal, 2017Co-Authors: Muireann A Lynch, Mel T DevineAbstract:Capacity remuneration mechanisms exist in many electricity markets. Capacity mechanism designs do not explicitly consider the effects of refurbishment of existing generation units in order to increase their reliability. This paper presents a stochastic mixed complementarity problem to examine the impact of refurbishment on electricity prices and generation investment. Capacity Payments are found to increase reliability when refurbishment is not possible, while Capacity Payments and reliability options yield similar results when refurbishment is possible. Final costs to consumers are similar under the two mechanisms with the exception of the initial case of overCapacity.
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Competition and the single electricity market: Which lessons for Ireland?
Utilities Policy, 2016Co-Authors: Valeria Di Cosmo, Muireann A LynchAbstract:This paper examines the evolution of the Irish Single Electricity Market in order to comply with the European Target Model for electricity. In particular, this work focuses on the challenges raised by the high concentration in the generation sector of the Irish electricity market. We examine the theoretical and empirical conditions under which forward markets promote competition in the spot and retail markets. We also investigate the impact of market concentration on the new Capacity Payment mechanism. In order to ensure a competitive outcome for consumers, the regulatory authorities should promote competition in the forward market; moreover, the regulator should extend regulation to the price and quantity that the dominant firm bids for holding new reliability options.
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investment vs refurbishment examining Capacity Payment mechanisms using mixed complementarity problems with endogenous probability
2015Co-Authors: Muireann A Lynch, Mel T DevineAbstract:Capacity remuneration mechanisms exist in many electricity markets. Capacity mechanism designs do not explicitly consider the effects of refurbishment of existing generation units in order to increase their reliability. This paper presents a mixed complementarity problem with endogenous probabilities to examine the impact of refurbishment on electricity prices and generation investment. Capacity Payments are found to increase reliability when refurbishment is not possible, while Capacity Payments and reliability options yield similar results when refurbishment is possible. Final costs to consumers are similar under the two mechanisms with the exception of the initial case of overCapacity.
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Competition and the Single Electricity Market: Which Lessonsfor Ireland?. ESRI WP497. March 2015
2015Co-Authors: Valeria Di Cosmo, Muireann A LynchAbstract:This paper examines the redesign of the Irish Single Electricity Market in order to comply with the European Target Model for electricity. In particular, this work focuses on the challenges raised by the high concentration in the generation sector which exists in the Irish electricity market. We examine the theoretical and empirical conditions under which forward markets promote competition in the spot and retail markets; in addition, we investigate the impact of concentration in the market on the new Capacity Payment mechanism. In order to ensure a competitive outcome for consumers, the regulatory authorities should continue to regulate the directed forward contracts made by the dominant firm; moreover, our analysis suggests that the regulator should extend regulation to the price and quantity which the dominant firm bids for holding new reliability options.
Hamed Mohsenian-rad - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Optimal Bidding in Performance-Based Regulation Markets: An MPEC Analysis With System Dynamics
IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, 2017Co-Authors: Ashkan Sadeghi-mobarakeh, Hamed Mohsenian-radAbstract:In this paper, we address the problem of optimal bidding in performance-based regulation markets for a large price-maker regulation resource. Focusing on the case of the California Independent System Operator (ISO), detailed market components are considered, such as regulation Capacity Payment, regulation mileage Payment, performance accuracy adjustment, automatic generation control dispatch, and participation factor. Our analysis also incorporates system dynamics of the regulation resource for different resource types and technologies. In principle, our problem formulation is a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC). However, our fundamentally new formulations introduce several new challenges in solving the MPEC problem in the context of performance-based regulation markets that are not previously addressed. In fact, global optimization techniques fail to solve the original nonlinear program due to its complexity. Therefore, we undergo several innovative steps to transform the problem into a mixed-integer linear program which is solved with accuracy, reliability, and computational efficiency. Insightful case studies are presented using data from a California ISO regulation market project.
Xuejuan Su - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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design of an economically efficient feed in tariff structure for renewable energy development
Energy Policy, 2008Co-Authors: Jonathan A Lesser, Xuejuan SuAbstract:Evidence suggests, albeit tentatively, that feed-in tariffs (FITs) are more effective than alternative support schemes in promoting renewable energy technologies (RETs). FITs provide long-term financial stability for investors in RETs, which, at the prevailing market price of electricity, are not currently cost-efficient enough to compete with traditional fossil fuel technologies. On the other hand, if not properly designed, FITs can be economically inefficient, as is widely regarded to have been the case under the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA). Under PURPA, too high a guaranteed price led to the creation of so-called "PURPA machines"--poorly performing generating units that could survive financially only because of heavy subsidies that came at the expense of retail customers. Similarly, because of their adverse impacts on retail electricity rates, German FITs have been subject to increasing political pressure from utilities and customers. In this paper, we propose an innovative two-part FIT, consisting of both a Capacity Payment and a market-based energy Payment, which can be used to meet the renewables policy goals of regulators. Our two-part tariff design draws on the strengths of traditional FITs, relies on market mechanisms, is easy to implement, and avoids the problems caused by distorting wholesale energy markets through above-market energy Payments. The approach is modeled on forward Capacity market designs that have been recently implemented by several regional transmission organizations in the USA to address needs for new generating Capacity to ensure system reliability.
Joe Gardner - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Development of Performance-Based Two-Part Regulating Reserve Compensation on MISO Energy and Ancillary Service Market
IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, 2015Co-Authors: Yonghong Chen, Ryan Leonard, Marc Keyser, Joe GardnerAbstract:FERC Order 755 requires each RTO/ISO to use market-based mechanisms to select and compensate frequency regulation resources based on a two-part Payment methodology, i.e., a Capacity Payment to keep the Capacity in reserve and a performance Payment to reflect the amount of work each resource performs in real-time in response to the system operator's dispatch signal. This paper discusses how MISO enhanced its market rules to implement a market-based regulation performance Payment. The market enhancement includes four key areas: quantifying the movement of regulation, modifications to the market clearing processes, performance accuracy measurement, and performance-based two-part regulation compensation.
Yonghong Chen - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Development of Performance-Based Two-Part Regulating Reserve Compensation on MISO Energy and Ancillary Service Market
IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, 2015Co-Authors: Yonghong Chen, Ryan Leonard, Marc Keyser, Joe GardnerAbstract:FERC Order 755 requires each RTO/ISO to use market-based mechanisms to select and compensate frequency regulation resources based on a two-part Payment methodology, i.e., a Capacity Payment to keep the Capacity in reserve and a performance Payment to reflect the amount of work each resource performs in real-time in response to the system operator's dispatch signal. This paper discusses how MISO enhanced its market rules to implement a market-based regulation performance Payment. The market enhancement includes four key areas: quantifying the movement of regulation, modifications to the market clearing processes, performance accuracy measurement, and performance-based two-part regulation compensation.
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Two-part regulating reserve compensation formulation under energy and ancillary service co-optimization
2013 IEEE Power & Energy Society General Meeting, 2013Co-Authors: Yonghong ChenAbstract:FERC Order 755 required each RTO/ISO to use market-based mechanisms to select and compensate frequency regulation resources based on a two-part Payment methodology, i.e. a Capacity Payment to keep the Capacity in reserve and a performance Payments to reflect the amount of work each resource performs in real-time in response to the system operator's dispatch signal. This paper discusses the formulations to accommodate the two-part regulation compensation under co-optimized energy and ancillary service market.
