The Experts below are selected from a list of 10275 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Lu Yao - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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The Capital Gains Tax System and the Growth of Venture Capital——Also on the Orientations of the Chinese Capital Gains Tax System in the Transition Period
Journal of Nanjing University, 2003Co-Authors: Lu YaoAbstract:The Capital Gains Tax influences both the quantity and the quality of venture Capital investment. A significant negative correlation exists between changes in the Capital Gains Tax and the quantity of venture Capital. On the other hand, the Capital Gains Tax may change the incentive of the venture Capitalist to provide management assistance to affect the added values of venture enterprises and in turn to affect the quality of venture investment. The Chinese government should change its mode of direct venture Capital support arid promote venture Capital growth by establishing a uniform and relatively specific Capital Gains Tax system.
Patric H. Hendershott - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the long run impact on federal Tax revenues and Capital allocation of a cut in the Capital Gains Tax rate
Public Finance Review, 1991Co-Authors: Patric H. HendershottAbstract:Model simulations are run to obtain a range of realistic estimates of the long-run revenue impact of a Capital Gains Tax rate cut to a maximum of 15 percent. The basic vehicle for the simulations is a slightly modified version of the Galper-Lucke-Toder (GLT) general equilibrium model. The key behavioral assumptions affecting the estimates are: (1) the portfolio and tangible Capital reallocations implicit in the structure of the GLT model, and (2) household realization and corporate payout responses based on recent empirical estimates. The essential message of this article is that the strong emphasis in the literature on the realization response to a Capital Gains Tax rate cut has been appropriate. The payout and portfolio redistribution/ reallocation effects do not appear to be large. Moreover, the portfolio responses, within the context of the GLT model, act to raise Tax revenues (substitution of Taxable business Capital for unTaxed household and state and local Capital), not lower them as has been conjectured. Thus these responses offset the payout effects, leaving the realization response as basically the total response. Future research could, of course, modify this finding.
Douglas A Shackelford - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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germany s repeal of the corporate Capital Gains Tax the equity market response
Journal of The American Taxation Association, 2004Co-Authors: Courtney H Edwards, Mark H Lang, Edward L Maydew, Douglas A ShackelfordAbstract:In late 1999, the German government made a surprise announcement that it would repeal the large and long‐standing Capital Gains Tax on sales of corporate crossholdings effective in 2002. The repeal has been hailed as a revolutionary step toward breaking up the extensive web of crossholdings among German companies. The lock‐in effect from the large corporate Capital Gains Tax was said to act as a barrier to efficient acquisition and divestiture of German firms and divisions. Many observers predicted that once the lock‐in effect was removed, Germany would experience a flurry of acquisition and divestiture activity. Several other industrialized countries were poised to follow suit, with similar proposals pending in France, Japan, and the United Kingdom. This paper provides evidence of the economic impact of the repeal by examining its effect on the market values of German firms. While event studies of Tax legislation can be difficult, our study is aided by the fact that the repeal was both a surprise and was...
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the determinants of Capital Gains Tax compliance evidence from the rjr nabisco leveraged buyout
Journal of Public Economics, 2002Co-Authors: Wayne R Landsman, Douglas A Shackelford, Robert J YetmanAbstract:Abstract Inability to observe both actual and reported Capital Gains has impeded studies of Capital Gains Tax compliance. This study overcomes such limitations through access to both confidential Tax returns and internal shareholder records. Tests are conducted at the individual Taxpayer level for associations between compliance rates for Capital Gains Taxes generated by RJR Nabisco shareholders during its leveraged buyout and income, marginal Tax rates, socioeconomic characteristics, and measures of the Taxpayer’s perception of the noncompliance penalty. We find noncompliance decreasing in Taxable income, including RJR Nabisco Capital Gains, first-dollar marginal Tax rates, self-employment income, rental income, and other interest paid.
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stock market reaction to Capital Gains Tax changes empirical evidence from the 1997 and 1998 Tax acts
Tax Policy and the Economy, 2000Co-Authors: Douglas A ShackelfordAbstract:This paper analyzes the impact of changes in Capital Gains Taxes on equity values. Seven necessary conditions are outlined for stock prices to be affected by a change in the Taxation of long-term Capital Gains. Specifically, the marginal investor must be an individual, investing for the requisite holding period, selling in a Taxable disposition, and compliant. His short-term Capital Gains from all investments equal or exceed short-term Capital losses, and his long-term Capital Gains from all investments equal or exceed long-term Capital losses. In addition, the Capital Gains Tax change must alter the investor's expectation of the Taxes that will be generated when he sells in the future, and inelasticities in the supply of Capital must prevent immediate economic readjustment. The paper then reviews four studies that estimate the stock market reaction to Capital Gains Tax changes in the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 and the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998. The recency of these le...
Michael Willenborg - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Capital Gains Tax rates and the cost of Capital for small business evidence from the ipo market
Journal of Financial Economics, 1999Co-Authors: David A Guenther, Michael WillenborgAbstract:Abstract We examine the issue prices of small initial public offerings around the 1993 Tax law change that reduced the Capital Gains Tax on qualified small business stock. We compare the actual issue price of new stock with a benchmark price that is not affected by the change in Capital Gains Tax. We find that, after controlling for IPO underpricing, the issue prices of qualifying small business stock after the Tax rate change are significantly higher than the issue prices before the change. A control sample of nonqualifying firms shows no significant difference in issue prices.
Soren Bo Nielsen - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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start ups venture Capitalists and the Capital Gains Tax
Journal of Public Economics, 2004Co-Authors: Christian Keuschnigg, Soren Bo NielsenAbstract:A model of start-up finance with double moral hazard is proposed. Entrepreneurs have ideas and technical competence, but lack own resources as well as commercial experience. Venture Capitalists (VCs) provide start-up finance and managerial support. Both types of agents thus jointly contribute to the firm's success, but neither type's effort is verifiable. We find that the market equilibrium is biased towards inefficiently low entrepreneurial effort and venture Capital support. In this situation, the Capital Gains Tax is particularly harmful. The introduction of a small Tax impairs effort and advice and leads to a first-order welfare loss. Several other policies towards venture Capital and start-up entrepreneurship are also investigated.
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start ups venture Capitalists and the Capital Gains Tax
2002Co-Authors: Christian Keuschnigg, Soren Bo NielsenAbstract:A model of start-up finance with double moral hazard is proposed. Entrepreneurs have ideas but lack own resources as well as commercial experience. Venture Capitalists provide start-up finance and managerial support. Both types of agents thus jointly contribute to the firm's success, but neither type's effort is verifiable. We find that the market equilibrium is biased towards inefficiently low venture Capital support. In this situation, the Capital Gains Tax is particularly harmful. The introduction of a small Tax impairs managerial advice and leads to first order welfare losses. Once the Tax is in place, limitations on loss off-set may paradoxically contribute to higher quality of venture Capital backed entrepreneurship and welfare.
