The Experts below are selected from a list of 213 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Ching Chih Chang - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
Carbon Allowance allocation in the shipping industry under eedi and non eedi
Science of The Total Environment, 2019Co-Authors: Ching Chih Chang, Po Chien HuangAbstract:Abstract The CO2 emissions targets in this study are based on the Paris Agreement, which aims to cut emissions in 2050 to half of the 2005 levels, with a focus on the shipping industry. This study uses data for various kinds of vessels following the guidelines set in the Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI) and examines emission levels and the results of using different strategies during three different business climates. Carbon Allowance allocations and cost benefit ratios (CBR) are included. The results show that the minimal free Carbon Allowances in 2050 for vessels in keeping with EEDI or non-EEDI scenarios should be set so that (1) under prosperous business cycles they are 29% and 14%; (2) under steady business cycles 83% and 42%; (3) under sluggish business cycles 510% and 255%, respectively. In addition, when shipping companies follow the emission cap guidelines, the CBR in 2050 for vessels in both scenarios will be (1) 37.52% and 47.45% during prosperous business cycles; (2) 43.49% and 45.65%during steady business cycles; (3) and 53.60% and 53.83% during sluggish business cycles, respectively. The results indicate that during prosperous business cycles, although the free Carbon Allowance for shipping companies will be greatly insufficient, their profits will still be higher than during sluggish business cycles.
-
Carbon Allowance allocation in the shipping industry under different economic activities
GLOBAL CONGRESS MANUFACTURING & MANAGEMENT, 2019Co-Authors: Ching Chih Chang, Po Chien Huang, Chu Chin HsiehAbstract:Abstract This study utilizes the Federal Fund Rate to identify three business cycles as prosperous, steady and sluggish. Then by combining the emission cap and the trade mechanism, proposes the models considering the different business cycles for the Carbon Allowance allocations problems (CAAP) in the shipping sector. For the CAAP, the critical issues for the decision maker is to decide a free Carbon Allowance level α to achieve the emission target of the Paris Agreement. The results show that the shipping freight rates in the prosperous business cycle are higher. And vessels with higher speed, the fuel costs of the total profit is higher. If comparing with the different business cycles, the proportion is higher in the sluggish business cycles. While if comparing with the different Carbon trading price, the vessels with higher trading price the proportion of the emission costs of the total profit is higher. And if comparing with the different business cycles, the proportion of the shipping companies in the sluggish business cycles is higher. And for the Carbon Allowance allocation, in the prosperous business cycle because vessels emit more CO2, the shipping companies need to buy more Carbon Allowance; while in the sluggish business cycle the shipping companies can sell their Allowances. Therefore, this study suggests that in the sluggish business cycles, shipping companies can save cost by reducing vessels speed.
-
Greenhouse gas mitigation policies in Taiwan's road transportation sectors
Energy Policy, 2018Co-Authors: Ching Chih Chang, Chia-ling ChungAbstract:Abstract The main concept of this paper is derived from the Government of Taiwan's Greenhouse Gas Reduction and Management Act (GGRMA), which mandates that greenhouse gas emissions in 2050 should be reduced to half of the rate of greenhouse gas emissions in 2005. To reach this Carbon emission goal by 2050, this paper examines three potential policy options (each accompanied with four illustrative scenarios). The results show that: (1) it is impossible to reach the goals of the GGRMA solely through the use of Carbon Allowance allocations and the use of alternative fuels if the use of vehicles is allowed to grow. (2) By keeping the increase in the use of vehicles to zero, by encouraging a use of PHEVs, and by implementing a Carbon Allowance allocation, it will be possible to reach the government's 2050 Carbon emissions goals. (3) If the use of vehicles can actually be reduced, it will be possible to achieve Carbon emissions which are lower than the 2050 targets by 1.30–5.18%. The use of alternative fuels proves to be a reliable way to decrease Carbon emission. Carbon emissions could also be lowered by encouraging the use of public transportation.
-
Carbon Allowance allocation in the transportation industry
Energy Policy, 2013Co-Authors: Ching Chih ChangAbstract:This study proposes models for projecting reductions in CO2 emissions of 10%, 20%, 30%, and 40% compared to business as usual (BAU), using a Carbon Allowance allocation policy and both unimodal and intermodal modes of transportation. The results show that for 10% to 80% decreases in free Carbon Allowance, the intermodal ratio increased from 1.01% to 53.44%, which led to decreases in Carbon emissions and demand ranging from 10.41% to 48.19% and 8.45% to 7.57%, respectively. When free Carbon Allowances are decreased, the demand for intermodal systems increases accordingly. These results suggest that a Carbon Allowance allocation policy could mitigate transportation Carbon emissions with a relatively small negative impact on economic activity.
Ronggang Cong - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
experimental comparison of impact of auction format on Carbon Allowance market
Renewable & Sustainable Energy Reviews, 2012Co-Authors: Ronggang CongAbstract:Carbon Allowances auctions are a good way to achieve the Carbon Allowance allocations under international agreements to address global climate change. Based on an economic experiment, this paper compares three possible Carbon Allowance auction formats (uniform price auction, discriminatory price auction and English clock auction) with heterogeneous bidders (coal power plants and gas power plants) from four perspectives (Carbon price, auction efficiency, demand withholding and fluctuations in power supplies). Possibilities of collusion among bidders and impacts of Allowance banking and penalty price on bidders’ behaviors under different auction formats are also examined. The results show that (1) when there are relatively more bidders and there are no obvious communications between them, despite there being some tacit collusion, efficiency of English clock auction is greater than the other two formats; (2) when there are relatively fewer bidders and there are obvious communications between them, explicit collusions are observed under English clock auction. In this case, discriminatory price auction helps prevent collusion to some extents; (3) in the banking scenario, more speculations are observed, while penalty price exacerbates price volatility.
Xianyuan Zhan - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
Determining the Impact of Personal Mobility Carbon Allowance Schemes in Transportation Networks
Networks and Spatial Economics, 2017Co-Authors: H. M. Abdul Aziz, Satish V. Ukkusuri, Xianyuan ZhanAbstract:Personal mobility Carbon Allowance (PMCA) schemes are designed to reduce Carbon consumption from transportation networks. PMCA schemes influence the travel decision process of users and accordingly impact the system metrics including travel time and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. We develop a multi-user class dynamic user equilibrium model to evaluate the transportation system performance when PMCA scheme is implemented. The results using Sioux-Falls test network indicate that PMCA schemes can achieve the emissions reduction goals for transportation networks. Further, users characterized by high value of travel time are found to be less sensitive to Carbon budget in the context of work trips. Results also show that PMCA scheme can lead to higher emissions for a path compared with the case without PMCA because of flow redistribution. The developed network equilibrium model allows to examine the change in system states at different Carbon allocation levels and to design parameters of PMCA schemes accounting for population heterogeneity.
Po Chien Huang - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
Carbon Allowance allocation in the shipping industry under eedi and non eedi
Science of The Total Environment, 2019Co-Authors: Ching Chih Chang, Po Chien HuangAbstract:Abstract The CO2 emissions targets in this study are based on the Paris Agreement, which aims to cut emissions in 2050 to half of the 2005 levels, with a focus on the shipping industry. This study uses data for various kinds of vessels following the guidelines set in the Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI) and examines emission levels and the results of using different strategies during three different business climates. Carbon Allowance allocations and cost benefit ratios (CBR) are included. The results show that the minimal free Carbon Allowances in 2050 for vessels in keeping with EEDI or non-EEDI scenarios should be set so that (1) under prosperous business cycles they are 29% and 14%; (2) under steady business cycles 83% and 42%; (3) under sluggish business cycles 510% and 255%, respectively. In addition, when shipping companies follow the emission cap guidelines, the CBR in 2050 for vessels in both scenarios will be (1) 37.52% and 47.45% during prosperous business cycles; (2) 43.49% and 45.65%during steady business cycles; (3) and 53.60% and 53.83% during sluggish business cycles, respectively. The results indicate that during prosperous business cycles, although the free Carbon Allowance for shipping companies will be greatly insufficient, their profits will still be higher than during sluggish business cycles.
-
Carbon Allowance allocation in the shipping industry under different economic activities
GLOBAL CONGRESS MANUFACTURING & MANAGEMENT, 2019Co-Authors: Ching Chih Chang, Po Chien Huang, Chu Chin HsiehAbstract:Abstract This study utilizes the Federal Fund Rate to identify three business cycles as prosperous, steady and sluggish. Then by combining the emission cap and the trade mechanism, proposes the models considering the different business cycles for the Carbon Allowance allocations problems (CAAP) in the shipping sector. For the CAAP, the critical issues for the decision maker is to decide a free Carbon Allowance level α to achieve the emission target of the Paris Agreement. The results show that the shipping freight rates in the prosperous business cycle are higher. And vessels with higher speed, the fuel costs of the total profit is higher. If comparing with the different business cycles, the proportion is higher in the sluggish business cycles. While if comparing with the different Carbon trading price, the vessels with higher trading price the proportion of the emission costs of the total profit is higher. And if comparing with the different business cycles, the proportion of the shipping companies in the sluggish business cycles is higher. And for the Carbon Allowance allocation, in the prosperous business cycle because vessels emit more CO2, the shipping companies need to buy more Carbon Allowance; while in the sluggish business cycle the shipping companies can sell their Allowances. Therefore, this study suggests that in the sluggish business cycles, shipping companies can save cost by reducing vessels speed.
Brian C Murray - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
Carbon Allowance auction design an assessment of options for the united states
Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, 2011Co-Authors: Giuseppe Lopomo, Leslie M Marx, David Mcadams, Brian C MurrayAbstract:Carbon Allowance auctions are a component of existing and proposed regional cap-and-trade programs in the United States and are also included in recent proposed bills in the U.S. Congress that would establish a national cap-and-trade program to regulate greenhouse gases ("Carbon"). We discuss and evaluate the two leading candidates for auction format: a uniform-price sealed-bid auction and an ascending-bid dynamic auction, either of which could be augmented with a "price collar" to ensure that the price of Allowances is neither too high nor too low. We identify the primary trade-offs between these two formats as applied to Carbon Allowance auctions and suggest additional auction design features that address potential concerns about efficiency losses from collusion and other factors. We conclude that, based on currently available evidence, a uniform-price sealed-bid auction is more appropriate for the sale of Carbon Allowances than the other leading auction formats, in part because it offers increased robustness to collusion without significant sacrifice of price discovery. Copyright 2011, Oxford University Press.
-
Carbon Allowance auction design an assessment of options for the u s
2010Co-Authors: David Mcadams, Giuseppe Lopomo, Leslie M Marx, Brian C MurrayAbstract:Carbon Allowance auctions are a component of existing and proposed regional cap-and-trade programs in the U.S. and are also included in recent bills in the U.S. Congress that would establish a national cap-and-trade program in the U.S. to regulate greenhouse gases (“Carbon”). We discuss and evaluate the two leading candidates for the auction format for Carbon Allowance auctions: a uniform-price sealed-bid auction and an ascending-bid dynamic auction, either of which could be augmented with a “price collar” to ensure that the price of Allowances is neither too high nor too low. We identify the primary trade-offs between these auction formats as applied to Carbon Allowance auctions and suggest auction design choices that address potential concerns about efficiency losses from collusion and other factors. We conclude that a uniform-price sealed-bid auction is more appropriate for the sale of Carbon Allowances than the other leading choices, in part because it offers increased robustness to collusion without significant sacrifice in terms of price discovery.