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Simon Bennett - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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The Central Intelligence Agency’s Armed Remotely Piloted Vehicle- Supported Counter-Insurgency Campaign in Pakistan – a Mission Undermined by Unintended Consequences?
2016Co-Authors: Simon BennettAbstract:This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License. This paper views America’s ‘drones-first ’ counter-insurgency effort in Pakistan through the lens of Merton’s theory of the unintended consequences of purposive action. It also references Beck’s Risk Society thesis, America’s Revolution in Military Affairs doctrine, Toft’s theory of isomorphic learning, Langer’s theory of mindfulness, Highly Reliable Organisations theory and the social construction of technology (SCOT) argument. With reference to Merton’s theory, the CIA-directed armed Remotely Piloted Vehicle (RPV) campaign has manifest functions, latent functions and latent dysfunctions. Measured against numbers of suspected insurgents killed, the campaign can be judged a success. Measured against the level of collateral damage or the state of US-Pakistan relations, the campaign can be judged a failure. Values determine the choice of metrics. Because RPV operations eliminate risk to American service personnel, and because this is popular with both US citizens and politicians, collateral damage (the killing of civilians) is not considered a policy-changing dysfunction. However, the latent dysfunctions of America’s drones-first policy may be so great as to undermine that policy’s intended manifest function – to make a net contribution to the War on Terror. In Vietnam the latent dysfunctions of Westmoreland’s attritional war undermined America’s policy of containment. Vietnam holds a lesson for the Obama administration
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the Central Intelligence agency s armed remotely piloted vehicle supported counter insurgency campaign in pakistan a mission undermined by unintended consequences
Journal of terrorism research, 2014Co-Authors: Simon BennettAbstract:This paper views America's 'drones-first' counter-insurgency effort in Pakistan through the lens of Merton's theory of the unintended consequences of purposive action. It also references Beck’s Risk Society thesis, America’s Revolution in Military Affairs doctrine, Toft’s theory of isomorphic learning, Langer’s theory of mindfulness, Highly Reliable Organisations theory and the social construction of technology (SCOT) argument. With reference to Merton’s theory, the CIA-directed armed Remotely Piloted Vehicle (RPV) campaign has manifest functions, latent functions and latent dysfunctions. Measured against numbers of suspected insurgents killed, the campaign can be judged a success. Measured against the level of collateral damage or the state of US-Pakistan relations, the campaign can be judged a failure. Values determine the choice of metrics. Because RPV operations eliminate risk to American service personnel, and because this is popular with both US citizens and politicians, collateral damage (the killing of civilians) is not considered a policy-changing dysfunction. However, the latent dysfunctions of America's drones-first policy may be so great as to undermine that policy's intended manifest function – to make a net contribution to the War on Terror. In Vietnam the latent dysfunctions of Westmoreland’s attritional war undermined America’s policy of containment. Vietnam holds a lesson for the Obama administration.
Jane Harman - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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disrupting the Intelligence community
Foreign Affairs, 2015Co-Authors: Jane HarmanAbstract:The article discusses the methodologies used by the U.S. government's Intelligence services in espionage from 2001 through the mid 2010s, including the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the government's policies on the Intelligence services. Topics, including the U.S. National Security Agency's (NSA's) conducting of electronic surveillance, open source Intelligence, human Intelligence, the leaking of classified information of the NSA contractor Edward Snowden, the U.S.'s policy of data mining, the civil liberties and privacy of Americans and the relationship between U.S. Internet industry and the NSA, are discussed.
Barbara Harff - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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no lessons learned from the holocaust assessing risks of genocide and political mass murder since 1955
American Political Science Review, 2003Co-Authors: Barbara HarffAbstract:This article reports a test of a structural model of the antecedents of genocide and politicide (political mass murder). A case–control research design is used to test alternative specifications of a multivariate model that identifies preconditions of geno-/politicide. The universe of analysis consists of 126 instances of internal war and regime collapse that began between 1955 and 1997, as identified by the State Failure project. Geno-/politicides began during 35 of these episodes of state failure. The analytic question is which factors distinguish the 35 episodes that led to geno-/politicides from those that did not. The case–control method is used to estimate the effects of theoretically specified domestic and international risk factors measured one year prior to the onset of geno-/politicide. The optimal model includes six factors that jointly make it possible to distinguish with 74% accuracy between internal wars and regime collapses that do and those that do not lead to geno-/politicide. The conclusion uses the model to assess the risks of future episodes in 25 countries. This study was commissioned in 1998 by the Central Intelligence Agency's Directorate of Intelligence in response to President Clinton's policy initiative on genocide early warning and prevention. It was designed by the author and carried out using her data with other data and analytic techniques developed by the State Failure Task Force. Statistical analyses reported here were done by Michael Lustik and Alan N. Unger of Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), McLean, Virginia. The author is senior consultant to the Task Force, which was established in 1994 in response to a request from senior U.S. policymakers to design and carry out a data-driven study of the correlates of state failure, defined to include revolutionary and ethnic wars, adverse or disruptive regime transitions, and genocides and politicides (for the latest report on Task Force research see Goldstone et al. 2002). The author acknowledges the advice of other Task Force consultants and analysts throughout the research process. The views expressed here are those of the author and do not represent the official views of the U.S. government, the U.S. Intelligence community, or the Central Intelligence Agency.The author especially thanks Ted Robert Gurr for his critiquing early drafts and using the findings to construct the table that identifies high-risk countries and groups. His insistence about the importance of the study prompted me to revise the manuscript a number of times, despite my initial reluctance, given the years of work that had gone into its preparation. It was especially hard to condense this effort from its original 75 pages. The paper also benefited from a careful reading by Mark I. Lichbach of a previous report and from comments of anonymous reviewers for the American Political Science Review .
David H Price - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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cold war anthropology collaborators and victims of the national security state
Identities-global Studies in Culture and Power, 1998Co-Authors: David H PriceAbstract:This paper examines some of the interactions between anthropologists and America's National Security State during the Cold War. The Human Ecology Fund, an anthropological funding front used by the Central Intelligence Agency in the 1950s and 1960s, is discussed to elucidate one of the ways that the National Security State sponsored and consumed anthropological knowledge Clyde Kluckhohn's secret interactions with the FBI, State Department, and CIA are discussed to exemplify how some scholars covertly interacted with Intelligence agencies during the Cold War. Finally, documents from anthropologist Melville Jacobs’ troubles at the University of Washington for his Marxist political associations indicate ways in which radical anthropologists were persecuted. It is argued that despite the proclaimed end of the Cold War, many of the features of the National Security State are still in place, as are new interfaces between the military‐Intelligence agencies and the academy.
Van Puyvelde Damien - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Women and black employees at the Central Intelligence Agency: from fair employment to diversity management
'Informa UK Limited', 2020Co-Authors: Van Puyvelde DamienAbstract:This article examines US Intelligence through the lens of its personnel and the socio-political and organizational conditions that affect them. In the last decades, the CIA has sought to portray itself as an increasingly diverse organization. But to what extent has the CIA been a genuinely diverse and inclusive organization? When and why did its personnel policies change to improve the situation of marginalized employees? To answer this question the article uses an intersectional approach that combines three levels of analysis (structural, organizational and individual) to study the position of women and black employees from 1947 to today. The history of women and black employees at the CIA shows how the national security establishment has struggled to overcome gender and racial hierarchies in its own workforce, thus producing forms of insecurity in its own midst. Throughout its history, the CIA has largely failed to anticipate social change and struggled to adapt to it. Change, when it occurred, was linked to broader societal shifts, which spurred federal and organizational reforms, and empowered marginalized employees to defend their rights. When it comes to equal opportunity, the CIA has been more reactive than proactive
