The Experts below are selected from a list of 7050 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Jingqiang Lin - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Evaluating Intrusion-Tolerant Certification Authority Systems†
Quality and Reliability Engineering International, 2011Co-Authors: Jingqiang Lin, Jiwu Jing, Peng LiuAbstract:Various intrusion-tolerant Certification Authority (CA) systems have been proposed to provide attack resilient certificate signing (or update) services. However, it is difficult to compare them against each other directly, due to the diversity in system organizations, threshold signature schemes, protocols and usage scenarios. We present a framework for intrusion-tolerant CA system evaluation, which consists of three components, namely, an intrusion-tolerant CA model, a threat model and a metric for comparative evaluation. The evaluation framework covers system organizations, protocols, usage scenarios, the period of certificate validity, the revocation rate and the mean time to recovery. Based on the framework, four representative systems are evaluated and compared in three typical usage scenarios, producing reasonable and insightful results. The interdependence between usage scenarios and system characteristics is investigated, providing a guideline to design better systems for different usage scenarios. The proposed framework provides an effective and practicable method to evaluate intrusion-tolerant CA systems quantitatively, and helps customers to choose and configure an intrusion-tolerant CA system. Moreover, the comparison results offer valuable insights to further improve the attack resilience of intrusion-tolerant CA systems. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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a decentralized Certification Authority based on real world trust relationships
Computer Science and Software Engineering, 2008Co-Authors: Jiwu Jing, Jingqiang LinAbstract:The public key infrastructure (PKI) provides security services for e-commerce, e-government and other cyber transactions. Certification Authority (CA), a critical component of PKI, acts as a trust third party (TTP) among these applications. A CA is usually controlled and operated by an Authority in real world, which stores and publishes users' public key and other attributes. However, various types of attributes on certificates are always determined by several authorities instead of a single one. Based on the practical experiences, PKI must be built on real world trust relationships [1], but CAs, registration authorities (RAs) and other commodity PKI components cannotreflect these relationships among authorities well. Although some decentralized CA systems [2, 3] are designed and these CAs are operated by several administrators cooperatively, they focus on the security of CApsilas private key but not the trust relationships among administrators. To the best of our knowledge, no systematic work has been conducted to integrate several real world authorities into a CA, reflecting their trust relationships through system structure. We present a decentralized CA system, which is built and operated on real world trust relationships among several authorities, and issues standard X.509 certificates. Different authorities are responsible for different attributes on certificates, which make the certificates more trust and make the CA more similar to real world.
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framework for intrusion tolerant Certification Authority system evaluation
Symposium on Reliable Distributed Systems, 2007Co-Authors: Jingqiang Lin, Jiwu Jing, Peng LiuAbstract:Various intrusion tolerant Certification Authority (CA) systems have been recently proposed to provide attack resistant certificate update/query services. However, it is difficult to compare them against each other directly due to diversity in system organizations, threshold cryptography schemes, protocols and usage scenarios. We present a framework for intrusion tolerant CA system evaluation, which consists of three components, namely, an intrusion tolerant CA model, a threat model and a metric for comparative evaluation. The framework covers system organizations, protocols, usage scenarios, period of certificate validity, revocation rate and mean time to recovery (MTTR). Based on the framework, four representative CA systems are evaluated and compared in three typical usage scenarios, producing reasonable and insightful results. The inter-dependency between usage scenarios and system characteristics is investigated, providing a guideline to design better systems for different usage scenarios. The proposed framework provides an effective method to evaluate intrusion tolerant CA systems quantitatively. Moreover, the comparison results offer valuable insights to further improve the attack resilience of intrusion tolerant CA systems.
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A Framework for Intrusion Tolerant Certification Authority System
2007Co-Authors: Jingqiang Lin, Jiwu Jing, Peng LiuAbstract:Various intrusion tolerant Certification Authority (CA) systems have been recently proposed to provide attack resistant certificate update/query services. However, it is difficult to compare them against each other directly due to diversity in system organizations, threshold cryptography schemes, protocols and usage scenarios. We present a framework for intrusion tolerant CA system evaluation, which consists of three components, namely, an intrusion tolerant CA model, a threat model and a metric for comparative evaluation. The framework covers system organizations, protocols, usage scenarios, period of certificate validity, revocation rate and mean time to recovery (MTTR). Based on the framework, four representative CA systems are evaluated and compared in three typical usage scenarios, producing reasonable and insightful results. The inter-dependency between usage scenarios and system characteristics is investigated, providing a guideline to design better systems for different usage scenarios. The proposed framework provides an effective method to evaluate intrusion tolerant CA systems quantitatively. Moreover, the comparison results offer valuable insights to further improve the attack resilience of intrusion tolerant CA systems.
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ARECA: a highly attack resilient Certification Authority
Proceedings of the 2003 ACM workshop on Survivable and self-regenerative systems in association with 10th ACM Conference on Computer and Communication, 2003Co-Authors: Jiwu Jing, Peng Liu, Dengguo Feng, Ji Xiang, Neng Gao, Jingqiang LinAbstract:Certification Authorities (CA) are a critical component of a PKI. All the certificates issued by a CA will become invalid when the (signing) private key of the CA is compromised. Hence it is a very important issue to protect the private key of an online CA. ARECA systems, built on top of threshold cryptography, ensure the security of a CA through a series of defense-in-depth protections. ARECA systems won't be compromised when a few system components are compromised or some system administrators betray. The private key of a CA is protected by distributing different shares of the key to different (signing) components and by ensuring that any component of the CA is unable to reconstruct the private key. In addition, the multi-layer system architecture of ARECA makes it very difficult to attack from outside. Several threshold-cryptography-based methods are proposed in the literature to construct an intrusion tolerant CA, and the uniqueness of ARECA is that it engineers a novel two phase signature composition scheme and a multi-layer CA protection architecture. As a result, ARECA is (a) practical, (b) highly resilient to both insider and outsider attacks that compromise one or more components, and (c) can prevent a variety of outside attacks.
Saewoong Bahk - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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design of Certification Authority using secret redistribution and multicast routing in wireless mesh networks
Computer Networks, 2009Co-Authors: Jongtack Kim, Saewoong BahkAbstract:Wireless mesh networks (WMNs) should provide authentication and key management without a trusted third party because of their self-organizing and self-configuring characteristics. Several solutions to this problem have been proposed in mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs). But they are not optimal for WMNs because WMNs are with stationary mesh routers (MRs) that do not suffer from the limited power problem. In this paper, we design an architecture of mesh Certification Authority (MeCA) for WMNs. In MeCA, the secret key and functions of Certification Authority (CA) are distributed over several MRs. For secret sharing and redistribution, we develop the fast verifiable share redistribution (FVSR) scheme, which works for threshold cryptography and minimizes the possibility of secret disclosure when some shareholders are compromised by adversaries. MeCA adopts the multicasting based on Ruiz tree, which is optimal in reducing the operation overhead. It can update, revoke, and verify certificates of WMN nodes in a secure and efficient manner. Simulation results show that MeCA does not disclose its secret key even under severe attacks while incurring low overhead compared to other existing schemes in MANETs.
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meca distributed Certification Authority in wireless mesh networks
Consumer Communications and Networking Conference, 2008Co-Authors: Jongtack Kim, Saewoong BahkAbstract:We design an architecture of distributed Certification Authority (MeCA) for wireless mesh networks (WMNs). In MeCA, the secret key and functions of Certification Authority are distributed over several mesh routers. For secret sharing and redistribution, we develop the fast verifiable share redistribution (FVSR) scheme. MeCA adopts the multicasting based on Ruiz tree, which is optimal in reducing the operation overhead. It can update, revoke, and verify certificates of WMN nodes in a secure and efficient manner. Simulation results show that MeCA does not disclose its secret key even under severe attacks while incurring low overhead compared to other existing schemes in mobile ad hoc networks.
Jiwu Jing - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Evaluating Intrusion-Tolerant Certification Authority Systems†
Quality and Reliability Engineering International, 2011Co-Authors: Jingqiang Lin, Jiwu Jing, Peng LiuAbstract:Various intrusion-tolerant Certification Authority (CA) systems have been proposed to provide attack resilient certificate signing (or update) services. However, it is difficult to compare them against each other directly, due to the diversity in system organizations, threshold signature schemes, protocols and usage scenarios. We present a framework for intrusion-tolerant CA system evaluation, which consists of three components, namely, an intrusion-tolerant CA model, a threat model and a metric for comparative evaluation. The evaluation framework covers system organizations, protocols, usage scenarios, the period of certificate validity, the revocation rate and the mean time to recovery. Based on the framework, four representative systems are evaluated and compared in three typical usage scenarios, producing reasonable and insightful results. The interdependence between usage scenarios and system characteristics is investigated, providing a guideline to design better systems for different usage scenarios. The proposed framework provides an effective and practicable method to evaluate intrusion-tolerant CA systems quantitatively, and helps customers to choose and configure an intrusion-tolerant CA system. Moreover, the comparison results offer valuable insights to further improve the attack resilience of intrusion-tolerant CA systems. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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a decentralized Certification Authority based on real world trust relationships
Computer Science and Software Engineering, 2008Co-Authors: Jiwu Jing, Jingqiang LinAbstract:The public key infrastructure (PKI) provides security services for e-commerce, e-government and other cyber transactions. Certification Authority (CA), a critical component of PKI, acts as a trust third party (TTP) among these applications. A CA is usually controlled and operated by an Authority in real world, which stores and publishes users' public key and other attributes. However, various types of attributes on certificates are always determined by several authorities instead of a single one. Based on the practical experiences, PKI must be built on real world trust relationships [1], but CAs, registration authorities (RAs) and other commodity PKI components cannotreflect these relationships among authorities well. Although some decentralized CA systems [2, 3] are designed and these CAs are operated by several administrators cooperatively, they focus on the security of CApsilas private key but not the trust relationships among administrators. To the best of our knowledge, no systematic work has been conducted to integrate several real world authorities into a CA, reflecting their trust relationships through system structure. We present a decentralized CA system, which is built and operated on real world trust relationships among several authorities, and issues standard X.509 certificates. Different authorities are responsible for different attributes on certificates, which make the certificates more trust and make the CA more similar to real world.
-
framework for intrusion tolerant Certification Authority system evaluation
Symposium on Reliable Distributed Systems, 2007Co-Authors: Jingqiang Lin, Jiwu Jing, Peng LiuAbstract:Various intrusion tolerant Certification Authority (CA) systems have been recently proposed to provide attack resistant certificate update/query services. However, it is difficult to compare them against each other directly due to diversity in system organizations, threshold cryptography schemes, protocols and usage scenarios. We present a framework for intrusion tolerant CA system evaluation, which consists of three components, namely, an intrusion tolerant CA model, a threat model and a metric for comparative evaluation. The framework covers system organizations, protocols, usage scenarios, period of certificate validity, revocation rate and mean time to recovery (MTTR). Based on the framework, four representative CA systems are evaluated and compared in three typical usage scenarios, producing reasonable and insightful results. The inter-dependency between usage scenarios and system characteristics is investigated, providing a guideline to design better systems for different usage scenarios. The proposed framework provides an effective method to evaluate intrusion tolerant CA systems quantitatively. Moreover, the comparison results offer valuable insights to further improve the attack resilience of intrusion tolerant CA systems.
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A Framework for Intrusion Tolerant Certification Authority System
2007Co-Authors: Jingqiang Lin, Jiwu Jing, Peng LiuAbstract:Various intrusion tolerant Certification Authority (CA) systems have been recently proposed to provide attack resistant certificate update/query services. However, it is difficult to compare them against each other directly due to diversity in system organizations, threshold cryptography schemes, protocols and usage scenarios. We present a framework for intrusion tolerant CA system evaluation, which consists of three components, namely, an intrusion tolerant CA model, a threat model and a metric for comparative evaluation. The framework covers system organizations, protocols, usage scenarios, period of certificate validity, revocation rate and mean time to recovery (MTTR). Based on the framework, four representative CA systems are evaluated and compared in three typical usage scenarios, producing reasonable and insightful results. The inter-dependency between usage scenarios and system characteristics is investigated, providing a guideline to design better systems for different usage scenarios. The proposed framework provides an effective method to evaluate intrusion tolerant CA systems quantitatively. Moreover, the comparison results offer valuable insights to further improve the attack resilience of intrusion tolerant CA systems.
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ARECA: a highly attack resilient Certification Authority
Proceedings of the 2003 ACM workshop on Survivable and self-regenerative systems in association with 10th ACM Conference on Computer and Communication, 2003Co-Authors: Jiwu Jing, Peng Liu, Dengguo Feng, Ji Xiang, Neng Gao, Jingqiang LinAbstract:Certification Authorities (CA) are a critical component of a PKI. All the certificates issued by a CA will become invalid when the (signing) private key of the CA is compromised. Hence it is a very important issue to protect the private key of an online CA. ARECA systems, built on top of threshold cryptography, ensure the security of a CA through a series of defense-in-depth protections. ARECA systems won't be compromised when a few system components are compromised or some system administrators betray. The private key of a CA is protected by distributing different shares of the key to different (signing) components and by ensuring that any component of the CA is unable to reconstruct the private key. In addition, the multi-layer system architecture of ARECA makes it very difficult to attack from outside. Several threshold-cryptography-based methods are proposed in the literature to construct an intrusion tolerant CA, and the uniqueness of ARECA is that it engineers a novel two phase signature composition scheme and a multi-layer CA protection architecture. As a result, ARECA is (a) practical, (b) highly resilient to both insider and outsider attacks that compromise one or more components, and (c) can prevent a variety of outside attacks.
Stephen Kent - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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adverse actions by a Certification Authority ca or repository manager in the resource public key infrastructure rpki
RFC, 2017Co-Authors: Stephen KentAbstract:This document analyzes actions by or against a Certification Authority (CA) or an independent repository manager in the RPKI that can adversely affect the Internet Number Resources (INRs) associated with that CA or its subordinate CAs. The analysis is done from the perspective of an affected INR holder. The analysis is based on examination of the data items in the RPKI repository, as controlled by a CA (or an independent repository manager) and fetched by Relying Parties (RPs). The analysis does not purport to be comprehensive; it does represent an orderly way to analyze a number of ways that errors by or attacks against a CA or repository manager can affect the RPKI and routing decisions based on RPKI data.
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Certificate Transparency (CT) Certification Authority and Subject Requirements
2016Co-Authors: David Mandelberg, Stephen KentAbstract:This document describes the requirements for Certification Authorities (CAs) and Subjects that elect to participate as elements of the Certificate Transparency (CT) system, focusing on the Web PKI context.
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Certification Authority (CA) Key Rollover in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)
2012Co-Authors: Geoff Huston, George Michaelson, Stephen KentAbstract:This document describes how a Certification Authority (CA) in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) performs a planned rollover of its key pair. This document also notes the implications of this key rollover procedure for Relying Parties (RPs). In general, RPs are expected to maintain a local cache of the objects that have been published in the RPKI repository, and thus the way in which a CA performs key rollover impacts RPs.
Jongtack Kim - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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design of Certification Authority using secret redistribution and multicast routing in wireless mesh networks
Computer Networks, 2009Co-Authors: Jongtack Kim, Saewoong BahkAbstract:Wireless mesh networks (WMNs) should provide authentication and key management without a trusted third party because of their self-organizing and self-configuring characteristics. Several solutions to this problem have been proposed in mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs). But they are not optimal for WMNs because WMNs are with stationary mesh routers (MRs) that do not suffer from the limited power problem. In this paper, we design an architecture of mesh Certification Authority (MeCA) for WMNs. In MeCA, the secret key and functions of Certification Authority (CA) are distributed over several MRs. For secret sharing and redistribution, we develop the fast verifiable share redistribution (FVSR) scheme, which works for threshold cryptography and minimizes the possibility of secret disclosure when some shareholders are compromised by adversaries. MeCA adopts the multicasting based on Ruiz tree, which is optimal in reducing the operation overhead. It can update, revoke, and verify certificates of WMN nodes in a secure and efficient manner. Simulation results show that MeCA does not disclose its secret key even under severe attacks while incurring low overhead compared to other existing schemes in MANETs.
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meca distributed Certification Authority in wireless mesh networks
Consumer Communications and Networking Conference, 2008Co-Authors: Jongtack Kim, Saewoong BahkAbstract:We design an architecture of distributed Certification Authority (MeCA) for wireless mesh networks (WMNs). In MeCA, the secret key and functions of Certification Authority are distributed over several mesh routers. For secret sharing and redistribution, we develop the fast verifiable share redistribution (FVSR) scheme. MeCA adopts the multicasting based on Ruiz tree, which is optimal in reducing the operation overhead. It can update, revoke, and verify certificates of WMN nodes in a secure and efficient manner. Simulation results show that MeCA does not disclose its secret key even under severe attacks while incurring low overhead compared to other existing schemes in mobile ad hoc networks.