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Cognitivism
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Stefan Fischer – One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Still a Misty Mountain: Assessing Parfit’s Non-Realist Cognitivism
Zeitschrift für Ethik und Moralphilosophie, 2019Co-Authors: Stefan FischerAbstract:This paper takes stock of Parfit’s latest defence of his meta-ethical view, non-realist Cognitivism. In the third volume of On What Matters , Parfit gives his account a new—as I am going to show: conceptual—spin. Also, quite surprisingly, he takes back much of his earlier criticism of rival theories and claims instead that he and his opponents, Allan Gibbard and Peter Railton, are climbing the same meta-ethical mountain on different sides. Mainly focusing on the new spin in Volume III, I argue for the following four claims. Firstly, non-realist Cognitivism can easily be accepted by all those believing in the irreducibility of normative concepts ( not : facts). Secondly, Parfit succeeds in avoiding Mackie-style queerness objections. However, thirdly, once we fully grasp the conceptual rather than metaphysical core of non-realist Cognitivism, it becomes clear that the view, if successful, would accomplish much less than Parfit’s talk about irreducible, non-natural normative facts may have previously suggested. Finally, I argue that the conceptual spin generates a problem regarding one of the crucial pillars of non-realist Cognitivism, namely the status of normative facts as objective or mind-independent . It remains entirely unclear how the view could account for this status. All in all, non-realist Cognitivism doesn’t clear up the mists covering the heights of the meta-ethical mountain. It is still a long climb to the summit, and in order to reach it, we have to answer many questions Parfit doesn’t address.
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Still a Misty Mountain: Assessing Parfit’s Non-Realist Cognitivism
Zeitschrift für Ethik und Moralphilosophie, 2019Co-Authors: Stefan FischerAbstract:This paper takes stock of Parfit’s latest defence of his meta-ethical view, non-realist Cognitivism. In the third volume of On What Matters, Parfit gives his account a new—as I am going to show: conceptual—spin. Also, quite surprisingly, he takes back much of his earlier criticism of rival theories and claims instead that he and his opponents, Allan Gibbard and Peter Railton, are climbing the same meta-ethical mountain on different sides. Mainly focusing on the new spin in Volume III, I argue for the following four claims. Firstly, non-realist Cognitivism can easily be accepted by all those believing in the irreducibility of normative concepts (not: facts). Secondly, Parfit succeeds in avoiding Mackie-style queerness objections. However, thirdly, once we fully grasp the conceptual rather than metaphysical core of non-realist Cognitivism, it becomes clear that the view, if successful, would accomplish much less than Parfit’s talk about irreducible, non-natural normative facts may have previously suggested. Finally, I argue that the conceptual spin generates a problem regarding one of the crucial pillars of non-realist Cognitivism, namely the status of normative facts as objective or mind-independent. It remains entirely unclear how the view could account for this status. All in all, non-realist Cognitivism doesn’t clear up the mists covering the heights of the meta-ethical mountain. It is still a long climb to the summit, and in order to reach it, we have to answer many questions Parfit doesn’t address.
Hilla Jacobson – One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Against Strong Cognitivism: An Argument from Caring
Dialogue, 2014Co-Authors: Hilla JacobsonAbstract:According to ‘strong Cognitivism’, all reasons for action are rooted in normative features that the motivated subject (explicitly or implicitly) takes objects to have (or lack) independently of her attitudes towards these objects. My main concern in this paper is to argue against strong Cognitivism, that is, to establish the view that conative attitudes do provide subjects with reasons for action. My central argument to this effect is a top-down one that proceeds by an analysis of the complex phenomenon of caring and derives a conclusion regarding the (motivational and normative) nature of more basic mental phenomena—particular desires.
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Against Strong Cognitivism: An Argument from the Particularity of Love
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2014Co-Authors: Hilla JacobsonAbstract:According to the view we may term “strong Cognitivism”, all reasons for action are rooted in normative features that the motivated subject (explicitly or implicitly) takes objects to have independently of her attitudes towards these objects. The main concern of this paper is to argue against strong Cognitivism, that is, to establish the view that conative attitudes do provide subjects with reasons for action. The central argument to this effect is a top-down argument: it proceeds by an analysis of the complex phenomenon of love and derives a conclusion regarding the (motivational and normative) nature of more basic mental phenomena—particular desires. More specifically, its starting point is the crude intuition that the significance conferred by love upon its objects is of a distinctively personal kind—an intuition that is expressed by the apparent non-substitutability of two similar subjects only one of whom is loved with respect to their importance for the lover. I argue that the initial notion of non-substitutability can be refined and modified so as to form a real challenge to all versions of strong Cognitivism and to establish the existence of attitude-dependent reasons.
John R. Wright – One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Moral discourse, pluralism, and moral Cognitivism
Metaphilosophy, 2006Co-Authors: John R. WrightAbstract:: In the face of pluralism, moral constructivists attempt to salvage Cognitivism by separating moral and ethical issues. Divergence over ethical issues, which concern the good life, would not threaten moral Cognitivism, which is based on identifying generalizable interests as worthy of defending, using reason. Yet this approach falters given the inability of the constructivist to provide us a sure path by which to discern generalizable interests in difficult cases. Still, even if this approach to constructivism fails, cognitivist aspirations may not be defeated if we can continue discursively in a project of identifying and appreciating the interests of others. Grasping the interests of others may require a transformation of moral sensibility such that agents recognize values they have not acknowledged before. This view calls for external moral discourse—that is, moral discourse that makes no appeal to an agent’s present interests or desires but rather engages in description of the moral situation in hopes of bringing about a change in moral sensibility.
Josep E. Corbí – One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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THE RELEVANCE OF MORAL DISAGREEMENT. SOME WORRIES ABOUT NONDESCRIPTIVIST Cognitivism
Grazer Philosophische studien, 2002Co-Authors: Josep E. CorbíAbstract:Nondescriptivist Cognitivism vindicates the cognitive value of moral judgements despite their lack of descriptive content. In this paper, I raise a few worries about the proclaimed virtues of this new metaethical framework Firstly, I argue that Nondescriptivist Cognitivism tends to beg the question against descriptivism and, secondly, discuss Horgan and Timmons’ case against Michael Smith’s metaethical rationalism. Although I sympathise with their main critical claims against the latter, I am less enthusiastic about the arguments that they provide to support them.
Yair Levy – One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Why Cognitivism?
Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2018Co-Authors: Yair LevyAbstract:AbstractIntention Cognitivism – the doctrine that intending to V entails, or even consists in, believing that one will V – is an important position with potentially wide-ranging implications, such as a revisionary understanding of practical reason, and a vindicating explanation of ‘Practical Knowledge.’ In this paper, I critically examine the standard arguments adduced in support of IC, including arguments from the parity of expression of intention and belief; from the ability to plan around one’s intention; and from the explanation provided by the thesis for our knowledge of our intentional acts. I conclude that none of these arguments are compelling, and therefore that no good reason has been given to accept IC.