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Andrew R Lewis - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • baptists and church state advocacy an analysis of the relationship between membership opinion and lobbying the supreme court
    Social Science Research Network, 2009
    Co-Authors: Andrew R Lewis
    Abstract:

    Interest groups provide an opportunity for citizen interests to be represented before the Supreme Court. In recent decades, numerous religious advocacy organizations have formed, seeking to influence the Court. Among these groups, advocacy organizations connected to religious denominations have structural advantages, as they can easily overcome the Collective Action Problem. They have advantages in resources, membership numbers, and leadership autonomy. However, they are constrained because their members do not join for ideological incentives, as denominational group membership comes as a byproduct of their affiliation with a local church. This may reduce their ability to gain influence. Two denominational groups, the Southern Baptist Convention’s Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission (ERLC) and the Baptist Joint Committee (BJC), serve as a useful case study to analyze how the structure of denomination advocacy groups affects political decisions, particularly lobbying the Supreme Court and taking positions on constitutional issues. Using the Baylor Religion Study, this study compares the activities of the BJC and ERLC on church-state issues, evaluating the congruence between their members’ opinions on church-state issues and the groups’ official church-state positions and amicus brief filings. It finds that the members of both the BJC and the ERLC prefer government support and accommodation of religion. These opinions differ from the Actions that the groups take, especially the BJC. The BJC takes positions and Actions that are incongruent with the policy opinions of its membership, and the ERLC takes positions more in line with the views of its membership, though it does not support accommodation as much as its members do. I argue that it is the structure of these denominational groups that allows the members to take positions that are incongruent with the positions of the membership. Particularly, denominational leaders have increased autonomy, because the members do not join for the benefits that the group offers, the members cannot easily leave the group, and the group leaders do not depend on membership dues. This study has implications for the tactics that groups targeting the Court may take and citizen representation before the Court. It also describes the opportunities and constraints of religious denominational advocacy groups, which differ from the opportunities and constraints of other citizen religious groups.

  • baptists and church state advocacy an analysis of the effects of membership opinion on lobbying the supreme court
    Social Science Research Network, 2009
    Co-Authors: Andrew R Lewis
    Abstract:

    Interest groups provide an opportunity for citizen interests to be represented before the Supreme Court. In recent decades, numerous religious advocacy organizations have formed, seeking to influence the Court. Among these groups, advocacy organizations connected to religious denominations have structural advantages, as they can easily overcome the Collective Action Problem. They have advantages in resources, membership numbers, and leadership autonomy. However, they are constrained because their members do not join for ideological incentives, as denominational group membership comes as a byproduct of their affiliation with a local church. This may reduce their ability to gain influence. Two denominational groups, the Southern Baptist Convention’s Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission (ERLC) and the Baptist Joint Committee (BJC), serve as a useful case study to analyze how the structure of denomination advocacy groups affects political decisions, particularly lobbying the Supreme Court and taking positions on constitutional issues. Using the Baylor Religion Study, this study compares the activities of the BJC and ERLC on church-state issues, evaluating the congruence between their members’ opinions on church-state issues and the groups’ official church-state positions and amicus brief filings. It finds that the members of both the BJC and the ERLC prefer government support and accommodation of religion. These opinions differ from the Actions that the groups take, especially the BJC. The BJC takes positions and Actions that are incongruent with the policy opinions of its membership, and the ERLC takes positions more in line with the views of its membership, though it does not support accommodation as much as its members do. I argue that it is the structure of these denominational groups that allows the members to take positions that are incongruent with the positions of the membership. Particularly, denominational leaders have increased autonomy, because the members do not join for the benefits that the group offers, the members cannot easily leave the group, and the group leaders do not depend on membership dues. This study has implications for the tactics that groups targeting the Court may take and citizen representation before the Court. It also describes the opportunities and constraints of religious denominational advocacy groups, which differ from the opportunities and constraints of other citizen religious groups.

Hye Young You - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • ex post lobbying
    The Journal of Politics, 2017
    Co-Authors: Hye Young You
    Abstract:

    Nearly half of all lobbying activity targeting specific bills between 1998 and 2012 happened after the Congress passed legislation, yet existing theories of lobbying generally fail to account for lobbying that occurs after a bill is passed. I argue that ex post lobbying aims to influence the distribution of particularistic benefits that will arise from legislation by targeting regulatory rule-making processes. I develop a model that describes lobbying as a Collective Action Problem among interest groups, who must trade off between spending money to lobby for a bill’s passage and spending money to lobby over the details of its implementation. The implications of the model suggest that bills with high proportions of particularistic provisions draw more ex post lobbying and that trade associations and larger firms bear a disproportionately large share of the ex ante lobbying burden. Empirical analysis of lobbying reports is consistent with these predictions.

  • ex post lobbying
    Social Science Research Network, 2014
    Co-Authors: Hye Young You
    Abstract:

    Existing theories of lobbying do not fully explain lobbying that occurs after a final floor vote on a bill is taken. I show that nearly half of all lobbying activity targeting specific bills between 1998 and 2012 happened after the final vote. Ex post lobbying aims to influence the distribution of private benefits that will arise from legislation by targeting regulatory rulemaking processes that clarify non-specific parts of the bills. I develop a model that describes lobbying as a Collective Action Problem among firms, who must trade off between spending money to lobby for a bill's passage and spending money to lobby over the details of its implementation. The model predicts that bills that have high proportions of nonspecific provisions draw more ex post lobbying and that trade associations and larger firms bear a disproportionately large share of the ex ante lobbying burden. Empirical analysis is consistent with these predictions.

R. M. Wittig - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Intergroup competition enhances chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes verus) in-group cohesion
    'Springer Science and Business Media LLC', 2021
    Co-Authors: Samuni Liran, Mielke Alexander, Preis Anna, Crockford C, R. M. Wittig
    Abstract:

    Core funding for the Taï Chimpanzee Project is provided by the Max Planck Society since 1997. This study was also funded by the Minerva Foundation, Leakey Foundation, and the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (Grant Agreement No 679787).In-group cohesion is an essential component of successful intergroup competition in both human and nonhuman animals, likely facilitating group members access to potential benefits. However, when benefits are equally shared among group members, group defense becomes a Collective Action Problem, which might subvert cohesive participation during intergroup competition. There is a lack of consensus across studies and species with regard to the link between in-group cohesion and intergroup competition, likely as a result of species differences in managing the Collective Action Problem. Here, we examine this link in a species with a striking example of Collective Action during intergroup competition, chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes verus). Using two years of focal-follow data on males and females in two groups at the Taï Forest, Côte d’Ivoire, we investigated the immediate and long-term effects of intergroup competition (border patrols and intergroup encounters) on measures of in-group cohesion, namely modularity, party size, and intergroup aggression. We found that groups’ association patterns were less modular (more cohesive) in months in which they engaged in more border patrols and intergroup encounters. We found that current and greater prior engagement in intergroup competition predicted larger party sizes. Furthermore, current, but not prior engagement in intergroup competition, predicted reduced intragroup aggression by males but not by females. Increased in-group cohesion in chimpanzees likely reduces potential costs of intergroup competition engagement, by facilitating joint participation in current and future intergroup conflicts, overcoming the Collective Action Problem.Publisher PDFPeer reviewe

  • Intergroup Competition Enhances Chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes verus) In-group Cohesion
    International Journal of Primatology, 2019
    Co-Authors: L. Samuni, A. Mielke, A. Preis, C. Crockford, R. M. Wittig
    Abstract:

    In-group cohesion is an essential component of successful intergroup competition in both human and nonhuman animals, likely facilitating group members access to potential benefits. However, when benefits are equally shared among group members, group defense becomes a Collective Action Problem, which might subvert cohesive participation during intergroup competition. There is a lack of consensus across studies and species with regard to the link between in-group cohesion and intergroup competition, likely as a result of species differences in managing the Collective Action Problem. Here, we examine this link in a species with a striking example of Collective Action during intergroup competition, chimpanzees ( Pan troglodytes verus ). Using two years of focal-follow data on males and females in two groups at the Taï Forest, Côte d’Ivoire, we investigated the immediate and long-term effects of intergroup competition (border patrols and intergroup encounters) on measures of in-group cohesion, namely modularity, party size, and intergroup aggression. We found that groups’ association patterns were less modular (more cohesive) in months in which they engaged in more border patrols and intergroup encounters. We found that current and greater prior engagement in intergroup competition predicted larger party sizes. Furthermore, current, but not prior engagement in intergroup competition, predicted reduced intragroup aggression by males but not by females. Increased in-group cohesion in chimpanzees likely reduces potential costs of intergroup competition engagement, by facilitating joint participation in current and future intergroup conflicts, overcoming the Collective Action Problem.

Elino Ostrom - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • polycentric systems for coping with Collective Action and global environmental change
    Global Environmental Change-human and Policy Dimensions, 2010
    Co-Authors: Elino Ostrom
    Abstract:

    The 20th anniversary issue of Global Environmental Change provides an important opportunity to address the core questions involved in addressing ‘‘global environmental’’ Problems—especially those related to climate change. Climate change is a global Collective-Action Problem since all of us face the likelihood of extremely adverse outcomes that could be reduced if many participants take expensive Actions. Conventional Collective-Action theory predicts that these Problems will not be solved unless an external authority determines appropriate Actions to be taken, monitors behavior, and imposes sanctions. Debating about global efforts to solve climate-change Problems, however, has yet not led to an effective global treaty. Fortunately, many activities can be undertaken by multiple units at diverse scales that cumulatively make a difference. I argue that instead of focusing only on global efforts (which are indeed a necessary part of the long-term solution), it is better to encourage polycentric efforts to reduce the risks associated with the emission of greenhouse gases. Polycentric approaches facilitate achieving benefits at multiple scales as well as experimentation and learning from experience with diverse policies.

Bassem Awadallah - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • the economics of the arab spring
    World Development, 2013
    Co-Authors: Adeel Malik, Bassem Awadallah
    Abstract:

    Summary A singular failure of the Arab world is the absence of a private sector that is independent, competitive, and integrated with global markets. This paper argues that private sector development is both a political and regional challenge. In so far as the private sector generates incomes that are independent of the rent streams controlled by the state, it can pose a direct political challenge. It is also a regional challenge, since fragmented markets deny scale economies to firms and entrench the power of insiders. We argue that overcoming regional economic barriers constitutes the single most important Collective Action Problem facing the region since the fall of Ottoman Empire.

  • the economics of the arab spring
    2011
    Co-Authors: Adeel Malik, Bassem Awadallah
    Abstract:

    This article explores the economic underpinnings of the Arab spring. We locate the roots of the regiosn's long-term economic failure in a statist model of development that is financed through external windfalls and rests on inefficient forms of intervention and redistribution. We argue that the rising cost of repression and redistribution is calling into question the long-term sustainability of this development model. A singular failure of tyhe Arab world is that it has been unable to develop a private sector that is independent, competetive and intergrated with global markets. We argue that developing such a orivate sector is both a political as well as a regional challenge. In so far as the private sector genertaes incomes that are independent of the rent streams controlled by the state and can pose a direct political challenge, it is viewed as a threat. And, the Arab world's economic fragmentation into isolated geographic units further undermines the prospects for private sector development. We explain this economic fragmentation as a manifestation of dentralized and segmented administrative structures. Revisiting the polictics and geo-politics of regional trade, we argue that overcoming regional economic barriers constitues the single most important Collective Action Problem that the region has faced since the fall of the Ottoman Empire.