The Experts below are selected from a list of 13056 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Matthew K O Lee - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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a theoretical model of Intentional social action in online social networks
Decision Support Systems, 2010Co-Authors: Christy M K Cheung, Matthew K O LeeAbstract:Online social networks (Facebook, MySpace, LinkedIn and the like) have become truly significant new phenomena in human communication and interaction patterns and may have a profound impact in the way people communicate and connect with each other. In this study, the decision to use an online social network is conceptualized as Intentional social action and the relative impact of the three modes of social influence processes (compliance, internalization, and identification) on Intentional social action to use (Collective Intention) is examined. An empirical study of Facebook users (n=389) found that Collective Intention to use a social networking site is determined by both subjective norm and social identity. Further, social identity is found to be a second-order latent construct comprised of cognitive, evaluative, and affective (first-order) components. Implications for research and practice are discussed.
Christy M K Cheung - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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a theoretical model of Intentional social action in online social networks
Decision Support Systems, 2010Co-Authors: Christy M K Cheung, Matthew K O LeeAbstract:Online social networks (Facebook, MySpace, LinkedIn and the like) have become truly significant new phenomena in human communication and interaction patterns and may have a profound impact in the way people communicate and connect with each other. In this study, the decision to use an online social network is conceptualized as Intentional social action and the relative impact of the three modes of social influence processes (compliance, internalization, and identification) on Intentional social action to use (Collective Intention) is examined. An empirical study of Facebook users (n=389) found that Collective Intention to use a social networking site is determined by both subjective norm and social identity. Further, social identity is found to be a second-order latent construct comprised of cognitive, evaluative, and affective (first-order) components. Implications for research and practice are discussed.
Radtke, Allen E - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Personhood, Collective Intention and Corporate Moral Responsibility
2019Co-Authors: Radtke, Allen EAbstract:This study in applied ethics addresses whether the ontology of corporations as rights-bearing artificial legal persons allows them to be held morally responsible as unitary entities and members of the moral community, or if their status requires ascription of moral responsibility to reduce to their individual participants. I argue that moral responsibility is ascribable to corporations not on the basis of their agency as metaphysical natural persons but as irreducible non-agential Intentional systems. The moral issue is illustrated through a case study of the global financial crisis of 2007-08. Legal personhood is essential for understanding corporations because they are legally constructed, not natural. Personhood is fundamental for corporate accumulation of constitutional rights in US law. However, the dominant aggregation legal theory treats corporations as non-entity fictions reducible to only their participants. While the law suffers theoretical indeterminacy about responsibility, corporations act Collectively and Intentionally. There are two views of corporate Collective Intention: 'state-of-mind' (SoM) and 'course-of-action' (CoA). SoM requires that the nature of Collective agents sufficiently conform to a natural agent for ascription of responsibility. CoA concerns itself with what the entity plans and executes and its consequences, even if it is an Intentional system. I argue CoA of Intentional systems resolves problems of corporate moral responsibility because they are conversable members of the moral community. I conclude we may assign moral responsibility to corporations as unitary non-agential Intentional systems, and not only to individual participants. The metaphysical question of the ontology of corporations need not be resolved because as Collective, juristic Intentional systems we can assign moral responsibility to them despite their not having Intentional states of mind or agency. To preserve financial stability and democratic processes financial sector corporations must be susceptible to legal, social and moral responsibility
Margaret Gilbert - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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who s to blame Collective moral responsibility and its implications for group members
Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 2006Co-Authors: Margaret GilbertAbstract:As understood here a Collective action occurs when members of a Collective act in light of a joint commitment to intend as a body to perform some action. Some members may have determined the relevant Collective Intention having been given the authority to do so by the others, who left such matters in their hands. This implies that insofar as Collectives as such can be morally responsible, the responsibility of a given Collective has no logical implications for the moral responsibility of one (or more) individual members of the Collective.
Matthew C Altman - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the decomposition of the corporate body what kant cannot contribute to business ethics
Journal of Business Ethics, 2007Co-Authors: Matthew C AltmanAbstract:Kant is gaining popularity in business ethics because the categorical imperative rules out actions such as deceptive advertising and exploitative working conditions, both of which treat people merely as means to an end. However, those who apply Kant in this way often hold businesses themselves morally accountable, and this conception of Collective responsibility contradicts the kind of moral agency that underlies Kant’s ethics. A business has neither inclinations nor the capacity to reason, so it lacks the conditions necessary for constraint by the moral law. Instead, corporate policies ought to be understood as analogous to legal constraints. They may encourage or discourage certain actions, but they cannot determine a person’s maxim – which for Kant is the focus of moral judgment. Because there is no Collective Intention apart from any Intentions of the individual agents who act as members of the corporation, an organization itself has no moral obligations. This poses a dilemma: either apply the categorical imperative to the actions of particular businesspeople and surrender the notion of Collective responsibility, or apply a different moral theory to the actions of businesses themselves. Given the diffusion of responsibility in a bureaucracy, the explanatory usefulness of Collective responsibility may force business ethicists to abandon Kant’s moral philosophy.