The Experts below are selected from a list of 360 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform

Bereket Kebede - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • land tenure and Common Pool Resources in rural ethiopia a study based on fifteen sites
    Social Science Research Network, 2011
    Co-Authors: Bereket Kebede
    Abstract:

    The evolution of land tenure in Ethiopia during the Imperial period directed towards private and individualized property is discussed both in general terms and by examining conditions at specific localities. This evolution was brought to an abrupt end by the land reform of 1975 with nationalization. The same logic of subsistence agriculture as in traditional tenures seems to be the basis for the reform. With the abandonment of the socialist transformation of agriculture no vision about future developments in land tenure seems to exist. Privatization is suggested to improve the security of land holding, to increase agricultural investment, to assist the development of other markets as well as preserve Common Pool Resources.

  • land tenure and Common Pool Resources in rural ethiopia a study based on fifteen sites
    African Development Review, 2002
    Co-Authors: Bereket Kebede
    Abstract:

    The evolution of land tenure in Ethiopia during the Imperial period directed towards private and individualized property is discussed both in general terms and by examining conditions at specific localities. This evolution was brought to an abrupt end by the land reform of 1975 with nationalization. The same logic of subsistence agriculture as in traditional tenures seems to be the basis for the reform. With the abandonment of the socialist transformation of agriculture no vision about future developments in land tenure seems to exist. Privatization is suggested to improve the security of land holding, to increase agricultural investment, to assist the development of other markets as well as preserve Common Pool Resources. L’article etudie l’evolution du regime foncier ethiopien sous l’empire, d’un point de vue general et examinant la situation specifique de certaines localites. Cette evolution, vers une propriete privee et individualisee des terres, a ete brutalement interrompue par les nationalisations conduites dans le cadre de la reforme agraire de 1975. Celle-ci semble s’etre appuyee sur la meme logique d’agriculture de subsistance que celle qui sous-tendait les regimes fonciers traditionnels. Aujourd’hui, la transformation socialiste de l’agriculture ayant ete abandonnee, il ne semble exister aucune vision pour l’evolution future du regime foncier. Un programme de privatisation est suggere pour ameliorer la securite du regime de possession des terres, accroitre l’investissement agricole, faciliter le developpement d’autres marches et preserver les ressources communes.

Richard Damania - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • a note on trade liberalization and Common Pool Resources
    Social Science Research Network, 2005
    Co-Authors: Erwin Bulte, Richard Damania
    Abstract:

    When countries share access to a Common resource stock, optimal management is based on strategic considerations. We develop a general equilibrium model and show that regulatory policies are strategic substitutes under autarky. Trade liberalization not only changes relative prices, but may change the qualitative nature of the game between jurisdictions. In the small country case with exogenous prices, regulatory policies become strategic complements. In the context of a two-country model, policies remain strategic substitutes but the factors that drive policy changes differ from those under autarky and the small country case. The implications for conservation and resource management are discussed.

  • a note on trade liberalization and Common Pool Resources
    Research Papers in Economics, 2005
    Co-Authors: Erwin Bulte, Richard Damania
    Abstract:

    .  When countries share access to a Common resource stock, optimal management is based on strategic considerations. We develop a general equilibrium model and show that regulatory policies are strategic substitutes under autarky. Trade liberalization not only changes relative prices, but may change the qualitative nature of the game between jurisdictions. In the small country case with exogenous prices, regulatory policies become strategic complements. In the context of a two-country model, policies remain strategic substitutes but the factors that drive policy changes differ from those under autarky and the small country case. The implications for conservation and resource management are discussed. Une note sur la liberalisation du commerce et les ressources en propriete commune.  Quand des pays se partagent l’acces a un stock de ressources en propriete commune, la gestion optimale est fondee sur des considerations strategiques. Les auteurs developpent un modele d’equilibre general et montrent que des politiques de reglementation sont des substituts strategiques en regime d’autarcie. La liberalisation du commerce change non seulement les prix relatifs mais aussi la nature qualitative du jeu entre les juridictions. Dans le cas d’un petit pays pour qui les prix sont exogenes, les politiques de reglementation sont des complements strategiques. Dans le contexte d’un modele a deux pays, les politiques demeurent des substituts strategiques mais les facteurs qui definissent les changements de politiques sont differents de ceux qui dominent la scene soit dans le regime d’autarcie soit dans le cas d u petit pays. On examine les implications de ces resultats pour la gestion de la ressource et sa conservation.

  • a note on trade liberalization and Common Pool Resources
    Other publications TiSEM, 2005
    Co-Authors: Erwin Bulte, Richard Damania
    Abstract:

    When countries share access to a Common resource stock, optimal management is based on strategic considerations. We develop a general equilibrium model and show that regulatory policies are strategic substitutes under autarky. Trade liberalization not only changes relative prices, but may change the qualitative nature of the game between jurisdictions. In the small country case with exogenous prices, regulatory policies become strategic complements. In the context of a two-country model, policies remain strategic substitutes but the factors that drive policy changes differ from those under autarky and the small country case. The implications for conservation and resource management are discussed. (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Angela C M De Oliveira - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

Abdul H Kidwai - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • threshold and group size uncertainty in Common Pool Resources an experimental study
    Public Finance Review, 2020
    Co-Authors: Abdul H Kidwai, Angela C M De Oliveira
    Abstract:

    Threshold Common-Pool Resources (TCPRs), such as fisheries or groundwater reserves, face irreversible damage if harvesting exceeds a sustainability threshold. Uncertainty about the threshold for su...

  • ours not yours property rights poaching and deterrence in Common Pool Resources
    Social Science Research Network, 2019
    Co-Authors: Lawrence R De Geest, Abdul H Kidwai, Javier E Portillo
    Abstract:

    Governments often allocate property rights to protect Common-Pool Resources (CPR) from over-harvesting and poaching, but it is not clear if one method of allocating property rights is better than another. We use a laboratory experiment to determine whether earned or assigned property rights improve decentralized management and defense of a CPR. In our treatment, subjects competed in a real-effort task to earn the property right to a CPR. In our control, the property right was randomly allocated. We also vary the property-right holders’ ("insiders'') ability to use punishment to deter non-holders ("outsiders'') who could poach the CPR. How property rights were allocated had little effect on insiders' harvest levels, but the allocation method did have a significant effect on CPR defense. We find that insiders who earned the property right were more likely to defend the CPR and impose significantly more deterrence, leading to a significant reducing in extreme poaching. However, lower levels of poaching often went unpunished under both earned and assigned rights. Our results suggest that earned property rights improve coordination to deter extreme poaching relative to assigned property rights. At the same time, we corroborate previous findings on the limited ability of decentralized groups to coordinate deterrence, suggesting that alternative approaches to protecting CPRs from poachers should be explored.

Elinor Ostrom - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • the challenge of Common Pool Resources
    Environment, 2008
    Co-Authors: Elinor Ostrom
    Abstract:

    (2008). The Challenge of Common-Pool Resources. Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development: Vol. 50, No. 4, pp. 8-21.

  • sustainable development of Common Pool Resources
    2008
    Co-Authors: Elinor Ostrom
    Abstract:

    Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis Indiana University Center for the Study of Institutional Diversity Arizona State University The author thanks Gwen Arnold and Frank van Laerhoven for their help in preparing basic statistical materials for this paper; James Acheson, Krister Andersson, Xavier Basurto, Eduardo Brondizio, Burnell Fischer, Helen Ingram, Raul P. Lejano, and Ruth Meinzen-Dick for helpful comments that helped me improve the paper; Sarah Beam for her active encouragement and comments; and Patty Lezotte for her fabulous editing skills. This publication was made possible through support provided by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) for the Sustainable Agriculture and Natural Resources Management Collaborative Research Support Program (SANREM CRSP) under terms of Grant No. EPP-A-00-04-00013-00 to the Office of International Research and Development (OIRED) at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (Virginia Tech).

  • the value added of laboratory experiments for the study of institutions and Common Pool Resources
    Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2006
    Co-Authors: Elinor Ostrom
    Abstract:

    Abstract This article provides an overview of the effects of communication on experimental studies of behavior and outcomes in Common-Pool resource (CPR) dilemmas. Aggregate outcomes in CPR dilemmas without communication approximate predictions of non-cooperative game theory, but allowing cheap talk results in higher outcomes. When exogenous rules are monitored at realistic levels, subjects cheat even though following the rule would generate optimal outcomes. If given the opportunity, experimental subjects will devise their own rule systems and impose sanctions on each other. These findings complement field research on more complex Resources and communities by confirming the critical importance of communication and endogenous rule formation.

  • Common Pool Resources and institutions toward a revised theory
    Handbook of Agricultural Economics, 2002
    Co-Authors: Elinor Ostrom
    Abstract:

    In the conventional theory of Common-Pool Resources, participants do not undertake efforts to design their own governance arrangements. Substantial empirical evidence exists, however, that many Common-Pool Resources are self-governed. Thus, in this chapter, I briefly review the conventional theory of Common-Pool Resources. Then, I provide an overview of the empirical studies that test this theory in experimental laboratories. In the third section, I provide an overview of the empirical studies of this theory conducted in field settings. Since research in the lab and in the field both provide evidence that appropriators from Common-Pool Resources do self-organize, the fourth section is devoted to the presentation of an initial theory of self-organization focusing on the benefit-cost calculus of individual appropriators. Two major theoretical puzzles remain, having to do with the effect of the size of a group and its heterogeneity.

  • chapter 24 Common Pool Resources and institutions toward a revised theory
    Handbook of Agricultural Economics, 2002
    Co-Authors: Elinor Ostrom
    Abstract:

    Abstract In the conventional theory of Common-Pool Resources, participants do not undertake efforts to design their own governance arrangements. Substantial empirical evidence exists, however, that many Common-Pool Resources are self-governed. Thus, in this chapter, I briefly review the conventional theory of Common-Pool Resources. Then, I provide an overview of the empirical studies that test this theory in experimental laboratories. In the third section, I provide an overview of the empirical studies of this theory conducted in field settings. Since research in the lab and in the field both provide evidence that appropriators from Common-Pool Resources do self-organize, the fourth section is devoted to the presentation of an initial theory of self-organization focusing on the benefit-cost calculus of individual appropriators. Two major theoretical puzzles remain, having to do with the effect of the size of a group and its heterogeneity.