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Leonard J. Mirman - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Strategic Exploitation of a Common Property Resource Under Uncertainty
    Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 2013
    Co-Authors: Elena Antoniadou, Christos Koulovatianos, Leonard J. Mirman
    Abstract:

    We construct a game of noncooperative Common-Resource exploitation which delivers analytical solutions for its symmetric Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium. We examine how introducing uncertainty to the natural law of Resource reproduction affects strategic exploitation. We show that the Commons problem is always present in our example and we identify cases in which increases in risk amplify or mitigate the Commons problem. For a specific class of games which imply Markov-perfect strategies that are linear in the Resource stock (our example belongs to this class), we provide general results on how payoff-function features affect the responsiveness of exploitation strategies to changes in riskiness. These broader characterizations of games which imply linear strategies (appearing in an Online Appendix) can be useful in future work, given the technical difficulties that may arise from the possible nonlinearity of Markov-perfect strategies in more general settings.

  • Strategic Exploitation of a Common-Property Resource under Uncertainty
    2007
    Co-Authors: Christos Koulovatianos, Elena Antoniadou, Leonard J. Mirman
    Abstract:

    We study the impact of uncertainty on the strategies and dynamics of symmetric noncooperative games among players who exploit a non-excludable Resource that reproducesunder uncertainty. We focus on a particular class of games that deliver a unique Nash equilibrium in linear-symmetric strategies of Resource exploitation. We show that, for this class of games, the tragedy of the Commons is always present. For various changes in the riskiness of the random primitives of the model we provide general characterizations of features of the model that explain links between the degree of riskiness and strategic exploitation decisions. Finally, we provide a specific example that demonstrates the usefulness of our general results and, within the specific example, we study cases where increases in risk amplify or mitigate the tragedy of the Commons.

Elena Antoniadou - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Strategic Exploitation of a Common Property Resource Under Uncertainty
    Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 2013
    Co-Authors: Elena Antoniadou, Christos Koulovatianos, Leonard J. Mirman
    Abstract:

    We construct a game of noncooperative Common-Resource exploitation which delivers analytical solutions for its symmetric Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium. We examine how introducing uncertainty to the natural law of Resource reproduction affects strategic exploitation. We show that the Commons problem is always present in our example and we identify cases in which increases in risk amplify or mitigate the Commons problem. For a specific class of games which imply Markov-perfect strategies that are linear in the Resource stock (our example belongs to this class), we provide general results on how payoff-function features affect the responsiveness of exploitation strategies to changes in riskiness. These broader characterizations of games which imply linear strategies (appearing in an Online Appendix) can be useful in future work, given the technical difficulties that may arise from the possible nonlinearity of Markov-perfect strategies in more general settings.

  • Strategic Exploitation of a Common-Property Resource under Uncertainty
    2007
    Co-Authors: Christos Koulovatianos, Elena Antoniadou, Leonard J. Mirman
    Abstract:

    We study the impact of uncertainty on the strategies and dynamics of symmetric noncooperative games among players who exploit a non-excludable Resource that reproducesunder uncertainty. We focus on a particular class of games that deliver a unique Nash equilibrium in linear-symmetric strategies of Resource exploitation. We show that, for this class of games, the tragedy of the Commons is always present. For various changes in the riskiness of the random primitives of the model we provide general characterizations of features of the model that explain links between the degree of riskiness and strategic exploitation decisions. Finally, we provide a specific example that demonstrates the usefulness of our general results and, within the specific example, we study cases where increases in risk amplify or mitigate the tragedy of the Commons.

Christos Koulovatianos - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Strategic Exploitation of a Common-Property Resource Under Rational Learning About its Reproduction
    Dynamic Games and Applications, 2015
    Co-Authors: Christos Koulovatianos
    Abstract:

    We build a workable game of Common-Property Resource extraction under rational Bayesian learning about the reproduction prospects of a Resource. We focus on Markov-perfect strategies under truthful revelation of beliefs. For reasonable initial conditions, exogenously shifting the prior beliefs of one player toward more pessimism about the potential of natural Resources to reproduce can create anti-conservation incentives. The single player whose beliefs have been shifted toward more pessimism exhibits higher exploitation rate than before. In response, all other players reduce their exploitation rates in order to conserve the Resource. However, the overall conservation incentive is weak, making the aggregate exploitation rate higher than before the pessimistic shift in beliefs of that single player. Due to this weakness in strategic conservation responses, if the number of players is relatively small, then in cases with Common priors, jointly shifting all players’ beliefs toward more pessimism exacerbates the Commons problem.

  • Strategic Exploitation of a Common Property Resource Under Uncertainty
    Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 2013
    Co-Authors: Elena Antoniadou, Christos Koulovatianos, Leonard J. Mirman
    Abstract:

    We construct a game of noncooperative Common-Resource exploitation which delivers analytical solutions for its symmetric Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium. We examine how introducing uncertainty to the natural law of Resource reproduction affects strategic exploitation. We show that the Commons problem is always present in our example and we identify cases in which increases in risk amplify or mitigate the Commons problem. For a specific class of games which imply Markov-perfect strategies that are linear in the Resource stock (our example belongs to this class), we provide general results on how payoff-function features affect the responsiveness of exploitation strategies to changes in riskiness. These broader characterizations of games which imply linear strategies (appearing in an Online Appendix) can be useful in future work, given the technical difficulties that may arise from the possible nonlinearity of Markov-perfect strategies in more general settings.

  • Strategic Exploitation of a Common-Property Resource under Uncertainty
    2007
    Co-Authors: Christos Koulovatianos, Elena Antoniadou, Leonard J. Mirman
    Abstract:

    We study the impact of uncertainty on the strategies and dynamics of symmetric noncooperative games among players who exploit a non-excludable Resource that reproducesunder uncertainty. We focus on a particular class of games that deliver a unique Nash equilibrium in linear-symmetric strategies of Resource exploitation. We show that, for this class of games, the tragedy of the Commons is always present. For various changes in the riskiness of the random primitives of the model we provide general characterizations of features of the model that explain links between the degree of riskiness and strategic exploitation decisions. Finally, we provide a specific example that demonstrates the usefulness of our general results and, within the specific example, we study cases where increases in risk amplify or mitigate the tragedy of the Commons.

W. Randall Ireson - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Village irrigation in Laos: Traditional patterns of Common Property Resource management
    Society & Natural Resources, 1995
    Co-Authors: W. Randall Ireson
    Abstract:

    Many lowland Lao villages manage traditional paddy rice irrigation systems constructed of local materials. The process of securing agreement to construct such a system, as well as the patterns of mobilizing farmers for operations and maintenance, illustrate the relevance of the Assurance Problem model for understanding collective behavior in managing Common Property Resources. Household cooperation and compliance with irrigation system rules is not isolated behavior, but must be understood in the context of village norms of mutual assistance, social support, and decision‐making by consensus. Comparing Lao patterns of regulating access to other natural Resources with successful and unsuccessful irrigation systems suggests the limits of successful Common Property management, and the situations in which it is likely to occur.

Katharine Coman - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.