Competition Policy

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Gona Alo Santinha - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • european union Competition Policy and the european territorial cohesion agenda an impossible reconciliation state aid rules and public service liberalization through the european spatial planning lens
    European Planning Studies, 2014
    Co-Authors: Claire Colomb, Gona Alo Santinha
    Abstract:

    The territorial and spatial planning impacts of European Union (EU) economic and Competition policies have remained under-researched in the field of European spatial planning, in contrast to other EU Policy fields. This briefing explores how two elements of the EU Competition Policy, the regulation of "state aid" and the liberalization of "services of general interest (SGI)", have significant implications for the pursuit of the objective of territorial cohesion through spatial planning and territorial development policies at different scales. The paper first reviews the development of the concept of territorial cohesion in the EU discourse and Policy agenda since the mid-1990s, as well as the contribution of public services (Services of General Interest, or SGI in EU jargon) to it. It, then, reviews how the EU state aid rules and liberalization policies affect the state's ability to intervene (i) in support of sub-national territories which are lagging behind or suffering decline, and (ii) in the provision of public services across the national territory, specifically in peripheral regions or areas where the provision is not catered for by the market. The conclusion of the paper outlines the additional challenges to the pursuit of territorial cohesion in the EU posed by the post-2008 economic crisis and suggests avenues for future research.

  • european union Competition Policy and the european territorial cohesion agenda an impossible reconciliation state aid rules and public service liberalization through the european spatial planning lens
    European Planning Studies, 2014
    Co-Authors: Claire Colomb, Gona Alo Santinha
    Abstract:

    The territorial and spatial planning impacts of European Union (EU) economic and Competition policies have remained under-researched in the field of European spatial planning, in contrast to other EU Policy fields. This briefing explores how two elements of the EU Competition Policy, the regulation of “state aid” and the liberalization of “services of general interest (SGI)”, have significant implications for the pursuit of the objective of territorial cohesion through spatial planning and territorial development policies at different scales. The paper first reviews the development of the concept of territorial cohesion in the EU discourse and Policy agenda since the mid-1990s, as well as the contribution of public services (Services of General Interest, or SGI in EU jargon) to it. It, then, reviews how the EU state aid rules and liberalization policies affect the state's ability to intervene (i) in support of sub-national territories which are lagging behind or suffering decline, and (ii) in the provisio...

Claire Colomb - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • european union Competition Policy and the european territorial cohesion agenda an impossible reconciliation state aid rules and public service liberalization through the european spatial planning lens
    European Planning Studies, 2014
    Co-Authors: Claire Colomb, Gona Alo Santinha
    Abstract:

    The territorial and spatial planning impacts of European Union (EU) economic and Competition policies have remained under-researched in the field of European spatial planning, in contrast to other EU Policy fields. This briefing explores how two elements of the EU Competition Policy, the regulation of "state aid" and the liberalization of "services of general interest (SGI)", have significant implications for the pursuit of the objective of territorial cohesion through spatial planning and territorial development policies at different scales. The paper first reviews the development of the concept of territorial cohesion in the EU discourse and Policy agenda since the mid-1990s, as well as the contribution of public services (Services of General Interest, or SGI in EU jargon) to it. It, then, reviews how the EU state aid rules and liberalization policies affect the state's ability to intervene (i) in support of sub-national territories which are lagging behind or suffering decline, and (ii) in the provision of public services across the national territory, specifically in peripheral regions or areas where the provision is not catered for by the market. The conclusion of the paper outlines the additional challenges to the pursuit of territorial cohesion in the EU posed by the post-2008 economic crisis and suggests avenues for future research.

  • european union Competition Policy and the european territorial cohesion agenda an impossible reconciliation state aid rules and public service liberalization through the european spatial planning lens
    European Planning Studies, 2014
    Co-Authors: Claire Colomb, Gona Alo Santinha
    Abstract:

    The territorial and spatial planning impacts of European Union (EU) economic and Competition policies have remained under-researched in the field of European spatial planning, in contrast to other EU Policy fields. This briefing explores how two elements of the EU Competition Policy, the regulation of “state aid” and the liberalization of “services of general interest (SGI)”, have significant implications for the pursuit of the objective of territorial cohesion through spatial planning and territorial development policies at different scales. The paper first reviews the development of the concept of territorial cohesion in the EU discourse and Policy agenda since the mid-1990s, as well as the contribution of public services (Services of General Interest, or SGI in EU jargon) to it. It, then, reviews how the EU state aid rules and liberalization policies affect the state's ability to intervene (i) in support of sub-national territories which are lagging behind or suffering decline, and (ii) in the provisio...

Carsten Grave - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • the changing role of economics in Competition Policy decisions by the european commission during the monti years
    Social Science Research Network, 2005
    Co-Authors: David Evans, Carsten Grave
    Abstract:

    This paper examines the evolution of the use of economics in EC Competition Policy matters and the reforms in the use of economics that occurred in the latter part of EC Competition Commissioner Mario Monti's term (1999-2004). Under his predecessors, the use of economics had been steadily increasing for many years. The revolutionary reforms under Commissioner Monti were triggered when the Court of First Instance (CFI) voided, in quick succession, three merger prohibitions adopted by the European Commission. The CFI criticized the Commission for relying on unverified economic theories. The reforms rapidly had an impact on merger analysis at the Commission. It is unclear, however, whether the Commission will embrace the use of sound economic analysis for abuse of dominance inquiries in the absence of a clear mandate from the EC courts to do so.

  • the changing role of economics in Competition Policy decisions by the european commission during the monti years
    CPI Journal, 2005
    Co-Authors: David Evans, Carsten Grave
    Abstract:

    This paper examines the evolution of the use of economics in EC Competition Policy matters and the reforms in the use of economics that occurred in the latter part of EC Competition Commissioner Mario MontiA¢â‚¬â„¢s term (1999-2004).

William E Kovacic - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • institutional foundations for economic legal reform transition economies the case of Competition Policy and antitrust enforcement
    2011
    Co-Authors: William E Kovacic
    Abstract:

    Since the 1970’s, there has been a progression toward market processes in nations once committed to comprehensive central economic planning. Multinational donors and individual Western countries have expended substantial resources to advise these nations about legal reforms designed to promote this progression. Despite enormous uncertainty and upheaval in the transition from planning to markets, economic liberalization remains the strategy of choice for boosting growth. Competition Policy laws prohibiting various restraints of trade and creating public or private rights of action to enforce such prohibitions are common elements in the transition environment. This article examines questions about the proper scope of form of Competition Policy in transitional markets and about the design of legal reforms in emerging markets generally. While the proper approach to economic development in emerging markets requires analysis of a number of issues, such as identifying priorities in conditions of scarcity, developing supporting institutions, performing a careful initial assessment of existing condition, and determining the rate of change, the first issue to consider is whether Competition Policy — which encompasses the Policy instruments by which a nation can promote business rivalry — deserves a high priority. This requires defining “Competition Policy.” Most agree that transition economies should take affirmative measures to increase business rivalry as a tool for promoting growth and that the creation of an institution to advocate pro-market solutions, including antitrust enforcement, is appropriate. However, there is disagreement over whether Competition Policy in emerging markets should involve the full panoply of antitrust commands found in mature Competition Policy systems. Careful pre-reform analysis of existing conditions in the host country and rigorous attention to how the host country will implement nominal Competition Policy commands is necessary for Competition Policy law reform to be effective. Where statutes in transition countries dictate enforcement of mature Competition Policy systems, there is a significant mismatch between national implementation capabilities and the demands of new Competition laws. This mismatch must be confronted to decide about the correct measure of completeness and complexity in transition economy Competition Policy systems.Emphasis on institutional capability has significant implications for technical assistance. The successful development of Competition Policy institutions in transition environments requires close attention to enhancing the capacity of a wide variety of institutions, such as universities, research institutions, professional societies, and courts. Extensive, sustained contributions from foreign governments in the form of human and physical capital is the key to setting the proper institutional foundation and encouraging sensible application of new laws.

  • Competition Policy and the application of section 5 of the federal trade commission act
    Social Science Research Network, 2010
    Co-Authors: William E Kovacic, Mark Winerman
    Abstract:

    Since the 1970’s, U.S. courts generally have narrowed the range of single-firm behavior subject to condemnation as monopolization under the Sherman Act. This article examines the possibility of applying principles from Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act to address apparent instances of anticompetitive conduct that go beyond the reach of other federal antitrust statutes. The FTC, through Section 5, offers a superior platform for elaborating Competition Policy, has the tools to perform empirical and Policy work that can inform the design of legal rules, and is a specialized tribunal whose Section 5 decisions have no collateral effect in private cases. However, FTC’s application of Section 5 has played a fairly insignificant role in shaping Competition Policy. Its experience with Section 5 has a bleak record of establishing distinctive Competition Policy jurisprudence both because of federal court reluctance to sustain its decisions due to concerns about the absence of limiting principles and doubts about the depth and quality of FTC’s expertise; and hostile legislative reactions to FTC’s use of Section 5 that object to Section 5’s reach. Before Section 5 enforcement can be expanded, the FTC must develop a strategy that rest upon corrections to Section 5’s past failings. This requires (1) using Policy statements or guidelines to state FTC’s views about what constitutes an unfair method, describe how the agency will exercise its enforcement discretion, and establish a high-level framework for analyzing Section 5 cases in adjudication; (2) articulating a framework that accounts for similarities to, as well as differences from, other antitrust laws; and (3) and building institutional competence by using research and Policy instruments to signal to courts that the FTC has a sound basis for specific proposed application of Section 5.

  • Competition Policy rivalries and defense industry consolidation
    Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1994
    Co-Authors: William E Kovacic, Dennis E Smallwood
    Abstract:

    Declining outlays for new weapons programs have triggered a process of consolidation that promises to shrink the U.S. defense industry drastically. Consolidation in the defense industry raises complex Competition Policy issues that are not amenable to conventional antitrust merger analysis. This paper presents a framework for identifying important contractor competencies, assessing rivalries in defense industry segments, and evaluating the competitive effects of mergers and other consolidation events. As applied to antitrust oversight and to Department of Defense funding, program, and acquisition strategy decisions, this framework can help preserve supply alternatives for developing state-of-the-art weapons needed to satisfy national security requirements.

Nicola Giocoli - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Competition vs property rights american antitrust law the freiburg school and the early years of european Competition Policy
    Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 2009
    Co-Authors: Nicola Giocoli
    Abstract:

    This paper investigates the influence of the American antitrust tradition on the foundation and early years of European Competition Policy. Four main propositions summarize my argument made in this paper. First, when one takes the Competition versus property rights dichotomy into account, it becomes evident that the economists' contribution to the historical evolution of U.S. antitrust law has been smaller than usually believed. Second, the American antitrust tradition has had less influence than is commonly claimed over the foundations of European Economic Community (EEC) Competition Policy. Third, a law and economics argument based on the constitutional standing of Competition rules, an argument initially put forward by the highly influential Freiburg School of Ordoliberalism, played a crucial role in the birth of EEC antitrust Policy. Fourth, the ordoliberal origin of EEC Competition rules, when combined with the Community's integration goal, helps explain why the impact of the Competition versus property rights dichotomy on European antitrust law has been limited and, contrary to the U.S. example, solved more favorably to Competition than to property rights.

  • Competition vs property rights american antitrust law the freiburg school and the early years of european Competition Policy
    MPRA Paper, 2008
    Co-Authors: Nicola Giocoli
    Abstract:

    The goal of the paper is to investigate the extent of the influence of American antitrust tradition on the foundation and early years of European Competition Policy. This as part of a wider research program aiming at assessing the role of economic theory in the development of antitrust law and Policy. My argument may be summarized in four propositions. First, by taking into account what I call the “Competition versus property rights” dichotomy, it turns out that the economists’ contribution to the historical evolution of US antitrust law has been smaller than usually believed. Second, as far as the foundation of EEC Competition Policy is concerned, the influence of the American antitrust tradition has, again, been less than what is commonly claimed. Third, a crucial role on the birth of EEC antitrust has been played by a law and economics argument based on the constitutional standing of Competition rules, an argument put forward by the highly influential Freiburg School of Ordoliberalism. Fourth, the ordoliberal origin of EEC Competition rules, when combined with the Community’s integration goal, helps explain why the impact of the “Competition versus property rights” dichotomy on European antitrust law has been limited and, contrary to the US, always solved more favorably to the “Competition” pole than to the “property rights” one.