The Experts below are selected from a list of 195519 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Mark A. Lemley - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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intellectual Property Rights and standard setting organizations
California Law Review, 2002Co-Authors: Mark A. LemleyAbstract:Author(s): Lemley, Mark A. | Abstract: The role of institutions in mediating the use of intellectual Property Rights has long been neglected in debates over the economics of intellectual Property. In a path-breaking work, Rob Merges studied what he calls "collective Rights organizations," industry groups that collect intellectual Property Rights from owners and license them as a package. Merges finds that these organizations ease some of the tensions created by strong intellectual Property Rights by allowing industries to bargain from a Property rule into a liability rule. Collective Rights organizations thus play a valuable role in facilitating transactions in intellectual Property Rights.There is another sort of organization that mediates between intellectual Property owners and users, however. Standard-setting organizations (SSOs) regularly encounter situations in which one or more companies claim to own proprietary Rights that cover a proposed industry standard. The industry cannot adopt the standard without the permission of the intellectual Property owner (or owners).How SSOs respond to those who assert intellectual Property Rights is critically important. Whether or not private companies retain intellectual Property Rights in group standards will determine whether a standard is "open" or "closed." It will determine who can sell compliant products, and it may well influence whether the standard adopted in the market is one chosen by a group or one offered by a single company. SSO rules governing intellectual Property Rights will also affect how standards change as technology improves.Given the importance of SSO rules governing intellectual Property Rights, there has been surprisingly little treatment of SSO intellectual Property rules in the legal literature. My aim in this article is to fill that void. To do so, I have studied the intellectual Property policies of dozens of SSOs, primarily but not exclusively in the computer networking and telecommunications industries. This is no accident; interface standards are much more prevalent in those industries than in other fields. In Part I, I provide some background on SSOs themselves, and discuss the value of group standard setting in network markets. In Part II, I discuss my empirical research, which demonstrates a remarkable diversity among SSOs even within a given industry in how they treat intellectual Property. In Part III, I analyze a host of unresolved contract and intellectual Property law issues relating to the applicability and enforcement of such intellectual Property policies. In Part IV, I consider the constraints the antitrust laws place on SSOs in general, and on their adoption of intellectual Property policies in particular. Part V offers a theory of SSO intellectual Property rules as a sort of messy private ordering, allowing companies to bargain in the shadow of patent law in those industries in which it is most important that they do so. Finally, in Part VI I offer ideas for how the law can improve the efficiency of this private ordering process.In the end, I hope to convince the reader of four things. First, SSO rules governing intellectual Property fundamentally change the way in which we must approach the study of intellectual Property. It is not enough to consider IP Rights in a vacuum; we must consider them as they are actually used in practice. And that means considering how SSO rules affect IP incentives in different industries. Second, there is a remarkable diversity among SSOs in how they treat IP Rights. This diversity is largely accidental, and does not reflect conscious competition between different policies. Third, the law is not well designed to take account of the modern role of SSOs. Antitrust rules may unduly restrict SSOs even when those organizations are serving procompetitive ends. And enforcement of SSO IP rules presents a number of important but unresolved problems of contract and intellectual Property law, issues that will need to be resolved if SSO IP rules are to fulfill their promise of solving patent holdup problems.My fourth conclusion is an optimistic one. SSOs are a species of private ordering that may help solve one of the fundamental dilemmas of intellectual Property law: the fact that intellectual Property Rights seem to promote innovation in some industries but harm innovation in others. SSOs may serve to ameliorate the problems of overlapping intellectual Property Rights in those industries in which IP is most problematic for innovation, particularly in the semiconductor, software, and telecommunications fields. The best thing the government can do is to enforce these private ordering agreements and avoid unduly restricting SSOs by overzealous antitrust scrutiny.
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Intellectual Property Rights and standard-setting organizations
California Law Review, 2002Co-Authors: Mark A. LemleyAbstract:The role of institutions in mediating the use of intellectual Property Rights has long been neglected in debates over the economics of intellectual Property. In a path-breaking work, Rob Merges studied what he calls "collective Rights organizations," industry groups that collect intellectual Property Rights from owners and license them as a package. Merges finds that these organizations ease some of the tensions created by strong intellectual Property Rights by allowing industries to bargain from a Property rule into a liability rule. Collective Rights organizations thus play a valuable role in facilitating transactions in intellectual Property Rights. There is another sort of organization that mediates between intellectual Property owners and users, however. Standard-setting organizations (SSOs) regularly encounter situations in which one or more companies claim to own proprietary Rights that cover a proposed industry standard. The industry cannot adopt the standard without the permission of the intellectual Property owner (or owners). How SSOs respond to those who assert intellectual Property Rights is critically important. Whether or not private companies retain intellectual Property Rights in group standards will determine whether a standard is "open" or "closed." It will determine who can sell compliant products, and it may well influence whether the standard adopted in the market is one chosen by a group or one offered by a single company. SSO rules governing intellectual Property Rights will also affect how standards change as technology improves. Given the importance of SSO rules governing intellectual Property Rights, there has been surprisingly little treatment of SSO intellectual Property rules in the legal literature. My aim in this article is to fill that void. To do so, I have studied the intellectual Property policies of dozens of SSOs, primarily but not exclusively in the computer networking and telecommunications industries. This is no accident; interface standards are much more prevalent in those industries than in other fields. In Part I, I provide some background on SSOs themselves, and discuss the value of group standard setting in network markets. In Part II, I discuss my empirical research, which demonstrates a remarkable diversity among SSOs even within a given industry in how they treat intellectual Property. In Part III, I analyze a host of unresolved contract and intellectual Property law issues relating to the applicability and enforcement of such intellectual Property policies. In Part IV, I consider the constraints the antitrust laws place on SSOs in general, and on their adoption of intellectual Property policies in particular. Part V offers a theory of SSO intellectual Property rules as a sort of messy private ordering, allowing companies to bargain in the shadow of patent law in those industries in which it is most important that they do so. Finally, in Part VI I offer ideas for how the law can improve the efficiency of this private ordering process. In the end, I hope to convince the reader of four things. First, SSO rules governing intellectual Property fundamentally change the way in which we must approach the study of intellectual Property. It is not enough to consider IP Rights in a vacuum; we must consider them as they are actually used in practice. And that means considering how SSO rules affect IP incentives in different industries. Second, there is a remarkable diversity among SSOs in how they treat IP Rights. This diversity is largely accidental, and does not reflect conscious competition between different policies. Third, the law is not well designed to take account of the modern role of SSOs. Antitrust rules may unduly restrict SSOs even when those organizations are serving procompetitive ends. And enforcement of SSO IP rules presents a number of important but unresolved problems of contract and intellectual Property law, issues that will need to be resolved if SSO IP rules are to fulfill their promise of solving patent holdup problems. My fourth conclusion is an optimistic one. SSOs are a species of private ordering that may help solve one of the fundamental dilemmas of intellectual Property law: the fact that intellectual Property Rights seem to promote innovation in some industries but harm innovation in others. SSOs may serve to ameliorate the problems of overlapping intellectual Property Rights in those industries in which IP is most problematic for innovation, particularly in the semiconductor, software, and telecommunications fields. The best thing the government can do is to enforce these private ordering agreements and avoid unduly restricting SSOs by overzealous antitrust scrutiny.
Yingyi Qian - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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insecure Property Rights and government ownership of firms
Social Science Research Network, 1996Co-Authors: Jiahua Che, Yingyi QianAbstract:China's remarkable economic growth occurred despite (1) the lack of secure Property Rights; and (2) government ownership of most non-state firms such as township-village enterprises. We unravel these two puzzles with a theory of ownership of firms facing state predation. We distinguish and compare three types of ownerships: state ownership, government ownership, and private ownership. We argue that it may become more credible for the state to prey on government owned enterprises less than private enterprises, as government agencies carry out certain government activities financed by tax revenue for the state. Our theory has several implications: government ownership is an organizational response to imperfect state institutions; balancing power of governments at different levels can be efficiency enhancing; and the efficiency loss from insecure Property Rights could be smaller than conventional theory would predict.
James A Robinson - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Property Rights and the political organization of agriculture
Journal of Development Economics, 2007Co-Authors: Jonathan Conning, James A RobinsonAbstract:We propose a general equilibrium model where the economic organization of agriculture and the political equilibrium determining the security of Property Rights are jointly determined. In particular, because the form of organization may affect the probability and distribution of benefits from future Property challenges, it may be shaped in anticipation of this impact. Property Rights security may then be secured at the expense of economic efficiency. The model provides a framework for understanding why in some contexts land is redistributed primarily via land sales and tenancy markets but via politics and conflict in others. We test some implications of the theory using a five-decade panel dataset that traces changes in the extent of tenancy and tenancy reform across 15 Indian states.
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Property Rights and the political organization of agriculture
2005Co-Authors: Jonathan Conning, James A RobinsonAbstract:The modern theory of agrarian organization has studied how the economic environment determines organizational form under the assumption of stable Property Rights to land. The political economy literature has modelled the endogenous determination of Property Rights. In this paper we analyze a general equilibrium model in which the economic organization of agriculture and the political equilibrium determining the distribution of Property Rights are jointly determined. In particular, because the form of organization may affect the probability and distribution of benefits from agrarian reform, it may be determined in anticipation of this impact. Property Rights may then be secured at the expense of economic efficiency. The model provides a framework for understanding why in some contexts the redistribution of land is chanelled primarily via land sale and tenancy markets but via politics and conflict in others. We test some implications of the theory using a five-decade panel that traces changes in the extent of tenancy over five decades across fifteen Indian states.
Paul M Romer - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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when should we use intellectual Property Rights
The American Economic Review, 2002Co-Authors: Paul M RomerAbstract:The economic analysis of Property Rights proceeds in two steps. The first distinguishes rival from nonrival goods. The second contrasts the welfare effects of Property Rights for these two types of goods. For rival goods, strong Property Rights lead to efficient outcomes. For nonrival goods, Property Rights involve the trade-off formalized by William Nordhaus (1969): Weak Property Rights lead to under-provision. Strong Property Rights create monopoly distortions. Recent discussions of copyright protection for recorded music have obscured the underlying economic issues. Interested firms deny that music-sharing will reduce the incentives for firms to release new recordings. Artists and recording companies never acknowledge the efficiency costs of prices that far exceed marginal cost. It is left to economists with no stake in the outcome to clarify these issues. (Full disclosure: I have not consulted for anyone in the Napster case.) The stakes in the battle over the music business are small enough to get lost in rounding
Brett Mcdonnell - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the goldilocks hypothesis balancing intellectual Property Rights at the boundary of the firm
University of Illinois Law Review, 2007Co-Authors: Dan L Burk, Brett McdonnellAbstract:†Recent scholarship has begun to assess the role of intellectual Property Rights in the theory of the Coasean firm. Some of this scholarship has looked at the effects of intellectual Property on decisions to “make or buy” inputs to production. Other scholarship has looked at the effects of intellectual Property on allocation of resources between employees and the firm. In this article, we integrate these two lines of scholarship, positing a “Goldilocks hypothesis” for the proper disposition of intellectual Property Rights. We argue that to properly allocate resources within the firm, Property Rights must be calibrated so as to avoid on the one hand misappropriation of firm resources when Rights are inadequate, and on the other hand dissipation of employee incentives when Rights are excessive. Similarly, we argue that to properly manage transaction costs at the edge of firms, Property Rights must be calibrated so as to avoid on the one hand inefficient integration into the firm of specialized functions when Property Rights are inadequate, and on the other hand a fragmented anticommons of specialty firms when Property Rights are excessive. Thus, we conclude that in order to contribute to the efficient structure of firms, intellectual Property Rights can be neither too weak nor too strong, but must be constituted “just right.”
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the goldilocks hypothesis balancing intellectual Property Rights at the boundary of the firm
2006Co-Authors: Dan L Burk, Brett McdonnellAbstract:Recent scholarship has begun to assess the role of intellectual Property Rights in the theory of the Coasean firm. Some of this scholarship has looked at the effects of intellectual Property on decisions to "make or buy" inputs to production. Other scholarship has looked at the effects of intellectual Property on allocation of resources between employees and the firm. In this paper, we integrate these two lines of scholarship, positing a "Goldilocks hypothesis" for the proper disposition of intellectual Property Rights. We argue that to properly allocate resources within the firm, Property Rights must be calibrated so as to avoid on the one hand misappropriation of firm resources when Rights are inadequate, and on the other hand dissipation of employee incentives when Rights are excessive. Similarly, we argue that in order to properly manage transactions costs at the edge of firms, Property Rights must be calibrated so as to avoid on the one hand inefficient integration into the firm of specialized functions when Property Rights are inadequate, and on the other hand a fragmented anti-commons of specialty firms when Property Rights are excessive. Thus, we conclude that in order to contribute to the efficient structure of firms, intellectual Property Rights can be neither too weak nor too strong, but must be constituted "just right."
