The Experts below are selected from a list of 2928 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform

Alexander Yarovoy - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Track selection in multifunction radars for multi-target tracking: An anti-Coordination Game
    2016 IEEE International Conference on Acoustics Speech and Signal Processing (ICASSP), 2016
    Co-Authors: Nikola Bogdanović, Hans Driessen, Alexander Yarovoy
    Abstract:

    In this paper, a track selection problem for multi-target tracking in a multifunction radar network is studied using the concepts from Game theory. The problem is formulated as a non-cooperative Game, and specifically as an anti-Coordination Game, where each player aims to differ from what other players do. The players' utilities are modeled using a proper tracking accuracy criterion and, under different assumptions on the structure of these utilities, the corresponding Nash equilibria are characterized. To find an equilibrium, a distributed algorithm based on the best-response dynamics is proposed. Finally, computer simulations are carried out to verify the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm in a multi-target tracking scenario.

  • ICASSP - Track selection in multifunction radars for multi-target tracking: An anti-Coordination Game
    2016 IEEE International Conference on Acoustics Speech and Signal Processing (ICASSP), 2016
    Co-Authors: Nikola Bogdanovic, Hans Driessen, Alexander Yarovoy
    Abstract:

    In this paper, a track selection problem for multi-target tracking in a multifunction radar network is studied using the concepts from Game theory. The problem is formulated as a non-cooperative Game, and specifically as an anti-Coordination Game, where each player aims to differ from what other players do. The players' utilities are modeled using a proper tracking accuracy criterion and, under different assumptions on the structure of these utilities, the corresponding Nash equilibria are characterized. To find an equilibrium, a distributed algorithm based on the best-response dynamics is proposed. Finally, computer simulations are carried out to verify the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm in a multi-target tracking scenario.

Nikola Bogdanović - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Track selection in multifunction radars for multi-target tracking: An anti-Coordination Game
    2016 IEEE International Conference on Acoustics Speech and Signal Processing (ICASSP), 2016
    Co-Authors: Nikola Bogdanović, Hans Driessen, Alexander Yarovoy
    Abstract:

    In this paper, a track selection problem for multi-target tracking in a multifunction radar network is studied using the concepts from Game theory. The problem is formulated as a non-cooperative Game, and specifically as an anti-Coordination Game, where each player aims to differ from what other players do. The players' utilities are modeled using a proper tracking accuracy criterion and, under different assumptions on the structure of these utilities, the corresponding Nash equilibria are characterized. To find an equilibrium, a distributed algorithm based on the best-response dynamics is proposed. Finally, computer simulations are carried out to verify the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm in a multi-target tracking scenario.

Hans Driessen - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Track selection in multifunction radars for multi-target tracking: An anti-Coordination Game
    2016 IEEE International Conference on Acoustics Speech and Signal Processing (ICASSP), 2016
    Co-Authors: Nikola Bogdanović, Hans Driessen, Alexander Yarovoy
    Abstract:

    In this paper, a track selection problem for multi-target tracking in a multifunction radar network is studied using the concepts from Game theory. The problem is formulated as a non-cooperative Game, and specifically as an anti-Coordination Game, where each player aims to differ from what other players do. The players' utilities are modeled using a proper tracking accuracy criterion and, under different assumptions on the structure of these utilities, the corresponding Nash equilibria are characterized. To find an equilibrium, a distributed algorithm based on the best-response dynamics is proposed. Finally, computer simulations are carried out to verify the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm in a multi-target tracking scenario.

  • ICASSP - Track selection in multifunction radars for multi-target tracking: An anti-Coordination Game
    2016 IEEE International Conference on Acoustics Speech and Signal Processing (ICASSP), 2016
    Co-Authors: Nikola Bogdanovic, Hans Driessen, Alexander Yarovoy
    Abstract:

    In this paper, a track selection problem for multi-target tracking in a multifunction radar network is studied using the concepts from Game theory. The problem is formulated as a non-cooperative Game, and specifically as an anti-Coordination Game, where each player aims to differ from what other players do. The players' utilities are modeled using a proper tracking accuracy criterion and, under different assumptions on the structure of these utilities, the corresponding Nash equilibria are characterized. To find an equilibrium, a distributed algorithm based on the best-response dynamics is proposed. Finally, computer simulations are carried out to verify the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm in a multi-target tracking scenario.

Javier Perote - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • within team competition in the minimum effort Coordination Game
    Pacific Economic Review, 2006
    Co-Authors: Enrique Fatas, Tibor Neugebauer, Javier Perote
    Abstract:

    We report the results of an experiment on a continuous version of the minimum effort Coordination Game. The introduction of within-team competition significantly increases effort levels relative to a baseline with no competition and increases Coordination relative to a secure treatment where the pay-off-dominant equilibrium strategy weakly dominates all other actions. Nonetheless, within-team competition does not prevent subjects from polarizing both in the efficient and the inefficient equilibria.

  • within team competition in the minimum effort Coordination Game
    Experimental, 2005
    Co-Authors: Enrique Fatas, Tibor Neugebauer, Javier Perote
    Abstract:

    We report the results of an experiment on a continuous version of the minimum effort Coordination Game. The introduction of within-team competition significantly increases effort levels relative to a baseline with no competition and increases Coordination relative to a secure treatment where the payoff-dominant equilibrium strategy weakly dominates all other actions. Nonetheless, within-team competition does not prevent subjects to polarize both in the efficient and the inefficient equilibria.

Bodo Vogt - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • SmartCity - A Simple Questionnaire Can Change Everything: Are Strategy Choices in the Coordination and Ultimatum Games Stable?
    2015 IEEE International Conference on Smart City SocialCom SustainCom (SmartCity), 2015
    Co-Authors: Siegfried K. Berninghaus, Lora R. Todorova, Bodo Vogt
    Abstract:

    This paper presents the results of an experiment designed to study the effect produced on strategy choices when a subject reports risk preferences on a risk scale before engaging in a 2 × 2 Coordination Game and in an ultimatum Game. The main finding is that the act of stating one's own risk preferences significantly alters strategic behavior in the two Games. In particular, subjects tend to choose the risk dominant strategy in the Coordination Game more often when they have previously stated their attitudes to risk. We also find that self-reporting risk preferences significantly decreases the proposers' offers in the ultimatum Game.

  • A Simple Questionnaire Can Change Everything: Are Strategy Choices in the Coordination and Ultimatum Games Stable?
    2015 IEEE International Conference on Smart City SocialCom SustainCom (SmartCity), 2015
    Co-Authors: Siegfried K. Berninghaus, Lora R. Todorova, Bodo Vogt
    Abstract:

    This paper presents the results of an experiment designed to study the effect produced on strategy choices when a subject reports risk preferences on a risk scale before engaging in a 2 × 2 Coordination Game and in an ultimatum Game. The main finding is that the act of stating one's own risk preferences significantly alters strategic behavior in the two Games. In particular, subjects tend to choose the risk dominant strategy in the Coordination Game more often when they have previously stated their attitudes to risk. We also find that self-reporting risk preferences significantly decreases the proposers' offers in the ultimatum Game.

  • Network Formation in Symmetric 2x2 Games
    2004
    Co-Authors: Siegfried K. Berninghaus, Bodo Vogt
    Abstract:

    A population of players is considered in which each agent can select her neighbors in order to play a symmetric 2x2 Game with each of them. The result of the simultaneous neighborhood choice of each agent is a network on the population from. We analyze all types of 2x2 Games and show how the payoff structure in the 2x2 Games affects the resulting equilibrium networks. Depending on the size of the communication costs the resulting equilibrium networks may be characterized by bipartite graphs if the Coordination Game is of the Hawk/Dove type while networks show a tendency to build complete or disconnected graphs if agents play a pure Coordination Game. Furthermore, for each 2x2 Game we determine the equilibrium strategy distribution which is realized in the equilibrium networks.

  • Network Formation and Coordination Games
    2003
    Co-Authors: Siegfried K. Berninghaus, Bodo Vogt
    Abstract:

    A population of players is considered in which each player may select his neighbors in order to play a 2x2 Coordination Game with each of them. We analyze how the payoffs in the underlying Coordination Game effect the resulting equilibrium neighborhood resp. network structure. Depending on the size of the communication costs the resulting equilibrium networks may be characterized by bipartite graphs if the Coordination Game is of the Hawk/Dove type while networks show a tendency to build complete or disconnected graphs if neighbors play a pure Coordination Game.