The Experts below are selected from a list of 165 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Mosad Zineldin - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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bank Corporate Client partnership relationship benefits and life cycle
International Journal of Bank Marketing, 1996Co-Authors: Mosad ZineldinAbstract:Describes the concept of the bank‐Corporate “partnership” relationship, the benefits of this relationship for the bank and the firm, and the life cycle of the relationship. Shows how banks can establish, maintain, and enhance ongoing long‐term multi‐service partnership relationships with Corporate Clients. Four stages of the partnership relationship life cycle (PRLC) have been identified and discussed: the early stage, the development stage, and long‐term stage, and the final stage or ongoing partnership stage. PRLC suggests strategic guidelines for managing and adjusting the product/service and the relationship through the different stages of the life cycle. It requires the banker to make specific efforts to establish and develop a high quality service/product mix. Suggests that a differential strategy will be of great interest to those banks with the strongest capability to differentiate their product/service mix. The bank should understand the process and stages of the relationship of the life‐cycle. Finally, it should continually audit its relationship with each Corporate Client at each stage in the life cycle.
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Bank‐Corporate Client “partnership” relationship: benefits and life cycle
International Journal of Bank Marketing, 1996Co-Authors: Mosad ZineldinAbstract:Describes the concept of the bank‐Corporate “partnership” relationship, the benefits of this relationship for the bank and the firm, and the life cycle of the relationship. Shows how banks can establish, maintain, and enhance ongoing long‐term multi‐service partnership relationships with Corporate Clients. Four stages of the partnership relationship life cycle (PRLC) have been identified and discussed: the early stage, the development stage, and long‐term stage, and the final stage or ongoing partnership stage. PRLC suggests strategic guidelines for managing and adjusting the product/service and the relationship through the different stages of the life cycle. It requires the banker to make specific efforts to establish and develop a high quality service/product mix. Suggests that a differential strategy will be of great interest to those banks with the strongest capability to differentiate their product/service mix. The bank should understand the process and stages of the relationship of the life‐cycle. Finally, it should continually audit its relationship with each Corporate Client at each stage in the life cycle.
M Szenes - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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The network of Corporate Clients: customer attrition at commercial banks
Journal of Statistical Mechanics: Theory and Experiment, 2008Co-Authors: Á Lublóy, M SzenesAbstract:Commercial banks might profit from the adoption of methods widely used in network theory. A decision making process might become biased if one disregards network effects within the Corporate Client portfolio. This paper models the phenomenon of customer attrition by generating a weighted and directed network of Corporate Clients linked by financial transactions. During the numerical study of the agent-based toy model we demonstrate that multiple steady states may exist. The statistical properties of the distinct steady states show similarities. We show that most companies of the same community choose the same bank in the steady state. In contrast to the case for the steady state of the Barabasi–Albert network, market shares in this model equalize by network size. When modeling customer attrition in the network of 3 × 105 Corporate Clients, none of the companies followed the behavior of the initial switcher in three quarters of the simulations. The number of switchers exceeded 20 in 1% of the cases. In the worst-case scenario a total of 688 companies chose a competitor bank. Significant network effects have been discovered; high correlation prevailed between the degree of the initial switcher and the severity of the avalanche effect. This suggests that the position of the Corporate Client in the network might be much more important than the underlying properties (industry, size, profitability, etc) of the company.
Á Lublóy - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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The network of Corporate Clients: customer attrition at commercial banks
Journal of Statistical Mechanics: Theory and Experiment, 2008Co-Authors: Á Lublóy, M SzenesAbstract:Commercial banks might profit from the adoption of methods widely used in network theory. A decision making process might become biased if one disregards network effects within the Corporate Client portfolio. This paper models the phenomenon of customer attrition by generating a weighted and directed network of Corporate Clients linked by financial transactions. During the numerical study of the agent-based toy model we demonstrate that multiple steady states may exist. The statistical properties of the distinct steady states show similarities. We show that most companies of the same community choose the same bank in the steady state. In contrast to the case for the steady state of the Barabasi–Albert network, market shares in this model equalize by network size. When modeling customer attrition in the network of 3 × 105 Corporate Clients, none of the companies followed the behavior of the initial switcher in three quarters of the simulations. The number of switchers exceeded 20 in 1% of the cases. In the worst-case scenario a total of 688 companies chose a competitor bank. Significant network effects have been discovered; high correlation prevailed between the degree of the initial switcher and the severity of the avalanche effect. This suggests that the position of the Corporate Client in the network might be much more important than the underlying properties (industry, size, profitability, etc) of the company.
Enis Dzanic - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Soft Data Modeling Via Type 2 Fuzzy Distributions for Corporate Credit Risk Assessment in Commercial Banking
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2018Co-Authors: Sabina Brkic, Migdat Hodzic, Enis DzanicAbstract:The work reported in this paper aims to present possibility distribution model of soft data used for Corporate Client credit risk assessment in commercial banking by applying Type 2 fuzzy membership functions (distributions) for the purpose of developing a new expert decision-making fuzzy model for evaluating credit risk of Corporate Clients in a bank. The paper is an extension of previous research conducted on the same subject which was based on Type 1 fuzzy distributions. Our aim in this paper is to address inherent limitations of Type 1 fuzzy distributions so that broader range of banking data uncertainties can be handled and combined with the corresponding hard data, which all affect banking credit decision making process. Banking experts were interviewed about the types of soft variables used for credit risk assessment of Corporate Clients, as well as for providing the inputs for generating Type 2 fuzzy logic membership functions of these soft variables. Similar to our analysis with Type 1 fuzzy distributions, all identified soft variables can be grouped into a number of segments, which may depend on the specific bank case. In this paper we looked into the following segments: (i) stability, (ii) capability and (iii) readiness/willingness of the bank Client to repay a loan. The results of this work represent a new approach for soft data modeling and usage with an aim of being inCorporated into a new and superior soft-hard data fusion model for Client credit risk assessment.
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Fuzzy Logic Model of Soft Data Analysis for Corporate Client Credit Risk Assessment in Commercial Banking
2017Co-Authors: Sabina Brkic, Migdat Hodzic, Enis DzanicAbstract:This paper deals with the use of fuzzy logic as a support tool for evaluation of Corporate Client credit risk in a commercial banking environment. It defines possibilistic distribution of soft data used for Corporate Client credit risk assessment by applying fuzzy logic modeling, with a major goal to develop a new expert decisionmaking fuzzy model for evaluating credit risk of Corporate Clients in a bank. Currently, predicting a credit risk of companies is inaccurate and ambiguous, as well as affected by many internal and external factors that cannot be precisely defined. Unlike traditional methods for credit risk assessment, fuzzy logic can easily inCorporate linguistic terms and expert opinions which makes it more adapted to cases with insufficient and imprecise hard data, as well as for modeling risks that are not fully understood. Fuzzy model of soft data, presented in this paper, is created based on expert experience of Corporate lending of a commercial bank in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This market is very small and it behaves irrationally and often erratically and therefore makes the risk assessment and management decision making process very complex and uncertain which requires new methods for risk modeling to be evaluated. Experts were interviewed about the types of soft variables used for credit risk assessment of Corporate Clients, as well as for providing the inputs for generating membership functions of these soft variables. All identified soft variables can be grouped into following segments: stability, capability and readiness/willingness of the Client to repay a loan. The results of this work represent a new approach for soft data usage/assessment with an aim of being inCorporated into a new and superior soft-hard data fusion model for Client credit risk assessment.
Peter J. Henning - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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The New Corporate Gatekeeper
2016Co-Authors: Peter J. HenningAbstract:Regulators and prosecutors are now asking corporations to report any wrongdoing within the organization as quickly and completely as possible. One group increasingly identified with the obligation to report misconduct is Corporate counsel. Traditionally, lawyers had no duty to report misconduct by their Clients under the attorney-Client privilege, but that view has eroded as the government expects attorneys to take on a greater role in identifying violations that can lead to administrative and criminal sanctions against their Clients. This Essay looks at how the role of the Corporate attorney is moving away from the “wise counselor” model of legal representation and toward that of the whistleblower obliged to disclose information about potential violations by the Corporate Client or risk being viewed as a participant in the misconduct, subject to civil and criminal sanctions. This presents especially vexing problems for in-house counsel who represent a single Client: they may find themselves at great financial risk if the gatekeeping requirement is expanded.
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Sarbanes-Oxley Act §§ 307 and Corporate Counsel: Who Better to Prevent Corporate Crime?
Buffalo Criminal Law Review, 2004Co-Authors: Peter J. HenningAbstract:While much of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act concerned the minutiae of Corporate governance, Section 307 of the Act was aspirational by directing the Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) to adopt rules that enlist lawyers in preventing - or at least reporting - Corporate misconduct. In addition to adopting the "up-the-ladder" reporting rules mandated by Congress, the SEC sought to put teeth into the regulation of Corporate lawyers by proposing the "noisy withdrawal" rule that would have required outside Corporate counsel to disclose publicly the reasons for withdrawal if the corporation persisted in a course of misconduct. The reaction of the organized bar was almost wholly negative, focusing on the supposed harm to the confidential lawyer-Client relationship from the disclose of privilege information, and the SEC ultimately withdrew the proposal. The flaw in the SEC's proposed rule was that it coupled "noisy" with "withdrawal." Lawyers are not "gatekeepers" in the same way accountants have a duty to the investing public to ensure that a company conveys accurate information. Compelling disclosure to the public of a lawyer's withdrawal from representation imparts a gatekeeper role that can create more confusion in the market than clarity. The noise is largely superfluous to the goal of preventing Corporate crime, while withdrawal is an important step toward removing lawyers from the process that can lead to criminal conduct. Unfortunately, the Commission missed its chance to fulfill the congressional mandate of Section 307 and take an important step in preventing future Corporate crimes when it failed to require attorneys to withdraw from representation if a Client persists in misconduct. The Article argues that the SEC should adopt the withdrawal portion of the noisy withdrawal rule, and that withdrawal should be mandatory for both outside counsel and in-house lawyers when they become aware of Corporate misconduct and the corporation refuses to take adequate remedial measures. Mandatory complete withdrawal and the required disclosure to successor counsel can make lawyers more effective in preventing or impeding Corporate crimes because the rule makes it significantly more difficult for the corporation to continue a course of conduct without considering the consequences. Much like the public disclosure sought by the Commission, withdrawal is a signal, only to a more limited audience: the corporation and the new lawyer. The rule relies on that second attorney to be as ethical as the first lawyer, and to refuse to accept the Corporate Client if there is "evidence of a material violation" and a refusal to act appropriately.
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sarbanes oxley act 307 and Corporate counsel who better to prevent Corporate crime
Buffalo Criminal Law Review, 2004Co-Authors: Peter J. HenningAbstract:While much of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act concerned the minutiae of Corporate governance, Section 307 of the Act was aspirational by directing the Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) to adopt rules that enlist lawyers in preventing - or at least reporting - Corporate misconduct. In addition to adopting the "up-the-ladder" reporting rules mandated by Congress, the SEC sought to put teeth into the regulation of Corporate lawyers by proposing the "noisy withdrawal" rule that would have required outside Corporate counsel to disclose publicly the reasons for withdrawal if the corporation persisted in a course of misconduct. The reaction of the organized bar was almost wholly negative, focusing on the supposed harm to the confidential lawyer-Client relationship from the disclose of privilege information, and the SEC ultimately withdrew the proposal. The flaw in the SEC's proposed rule was that it coupled "noisy" with "withdrawal." Lawyers are not "gatekeepers" in the same way accountants have a duty to the investing public to ensure that a company conveys accurate information. Compelling disclosure to the public of a lawyer's withdrawal from representation imparts a gatekeeper role that can create more confusion in the market than clarity. The noise is largely superfluous to the goal of preventing Corporate crime, while withdrawal is an important step toward removing lawyers from the process that can lead to criminal conduct. Unfortunately, the Commission missed its chance to fulfill the congressional mandate of Section 307 and take an important step in preventing future Corporate crimes when it failed to require attorneys to withdraw from representation if a Client persists in misconduct. The Article argues that the SEC should adopt the withdrawal portion of the noisy withdrawal rule, and that withdrawal should be mandatory for both outside counsel and in-house lawyers when they become aware of Corporate misconduct and the corporation refuses to take adequate remedial measures. Mandatory complete withdrawal and the required disclosure to successor counsel can make lawyers more effective in preventing or impeding Corporate crimes because the rule makes it significantly more difficult for the corporation to continue a course of conduct without considering the consequences. Much like the public disclosure sought by the Commission, withdrawal is a signal, only to a more limited audience: the corporation and the new lawyer. The rule relies on that second attorney to be as ethical as the first lawyer, and to refuse to accept the Corporate Client if there is "evidence of a material violation" and a refusal to act appropriately.
