The Experts below are selected from a list of 74613 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Walid Saffar - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Large shareholders and Corporate Risk-taking: Evidence from French family firms Large shareholders and Corporate Risk-taking: Evidence from French family firms
2020Co-Authors: Sabri Boubaker, Walid Saffar, Yakov Amihud, Pascal Nguyen, Jerry Bowman, Omrane Guedhami, Elaine Hutson, Christoph Schneider, Ewa SlettenAbstract:Abstract We investigate the influence of large shareholders on Corporate Risk-taking. Using hand-collected data on publicly-listed French family firms, we show that the presence, number and voting power of multiple large shareholders (MLS) other than the largest controlling shareholder (LCS) lead to greater variability regarding the firm's operating performance (ROA), market value (Tobin's Q) and stock returns. In contrast, the divergence between the control and cash flow rights of the LCS is associated with lower variability in the same measures of performance. These results suggest that MLS are able to prevent the LCS from imposing a preference for low Risk investments. As a consequence, firms may select better investments regardless of their intrinsic Risks, paving the way for higher performance. MLS are thus confirmed to play a critical monitoring role in Corporate governance. JEL classification: G30, G32, G34 Keywords: Risk-taking, ownership structure, benefits of control, contestability, Corporate governance Evidence from French family firms Abstract We investigate the influence of large shareholders on Corporate Risk-taking. Using handcollected data on publicly-listed French family firms, we show that the presence, number and voting power of multiple large shareholders (MLS) other than the largest controlling shareholder (LCS) lead to greater variability regarding the firm's operating performance (ROA), market value (Tobin's Q) and stock returns. In contrast, the divergence between the control and cash flow rights of the LCS is associated with lower variability in the same measures of performance. These results suggest that MLS are able to prevent the LCS from imposing a preference for low Risk investments. As a consequence, firms may select better investments regardless of their intrinsic Risks, paving the way for higher performance. MLS are thus confirmed to play a critical monitoring role in Corporate governance. JEL classification: G30, G32, G3
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the role of state and foreign owners in Corporate Risk taking evidence from privatization
Journal of Financial Economics, 2013Co-Authors: Jeanclaude Cosset, Walid SaffarAbstract:Using a unique database of 381 newly privatized firms from 57 countries, we investigate the impact of shareholders' identity on Corporate Risk-taking behavior. We find strong and robust evidence that state (foreign) ownership is negatively (positively) related to Corporate Risk-taking. Moreover, we find that high Risk-taking by foreign owners depends on the strength of country-level governance institutions. Our results suggest that relinquishment of government control, openness to foreign investment, and improvement of country-level governance institutions are key determining factors of Corporate Risk-taking in newly privatized firms.
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Political institutions, connectedness, and Corporate Risk-taking
Journal of International Business Studies, 2013Co-Authors: Narjess Boubakri, Sattar A Mansi, Walid SaffarAbstract:We investigate the impact of political institutions on Corporate Risk-taking. Using a large sample of non-financial firms from 77 countries covering the period from 1988 to 2008, we find that sound political institutions are positively associated with Corporate Risk-taking, and that this relation is stronger when government extraction is higher. In a subsample of 45 countries, we also find that politically connected firms engage in more Risk-taking, which suggests that close ties to the government lead to less conservative investment choices. Our results are economically significant, and are robust to alternative Risk-taking measures, various political institution proxies, cross-sectional and country-level regressions, and endogeneity concerns of political institutions. Our results have important implications for governments and Corporate managers by providing direct relevance of political institutions to the Corporate decision-making process. To encourage investment at the firm level, and hence innovation and overall growth, governments need to undertake the necessary reforms to control corruption and enforce contracts better, and thus decrease government predation and extraction.
Hong Zou - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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chief executive officer incentives monitoring and Corporate Risk management evidence from insurance use
Social Science Research Network, 2012Co-Authors: Mike Adams, Chen Lin, Hong ZouAbstract:Corporate governance and Risk management issues have received prominent publicity in recent years following several major company failures such as Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers. While prior studies have examined this issue within the context of derivatives’ trading, little is known regarding the linkage between Corporate governance and alternative Corporate Risk management activities such as insurance. Using a detailed firm survey conducted by the World Bank (2004), we examine the impacts of various governance monitoring mechanisms and CEO characteristics on the Corporate insurance decision. Overall, our results suggest that both monitoring mechanisms and managerial incentives induce the Corporate purchase of property insurance. However, the purchase of property insurance for managerial self-interest is only prevalent in firms subject to lax monitoring and the determinants of insurance purchases are more in line with the prediction of the economic theory in firms with strong monitoring. In addition, our study contributes a number of new insights into the determinants of Corporate purchase of property insurance.
Mike Adams - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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chief executive officer incentives monitoring and Corporate Risk management evidence from insurance use
Social Science Research Network, 2012Co-Authors: Mike Adams, Chen Lin, Hong ZouAbstract:Corporate governance and Risk management issues have received prominent publicity in recent years following several major company failures such as Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers. While prior studies have examined this issue within the context of derivatives’ trading, little is known regarding the linkage between Corporate governance and alternative Corporate Risk management activities such as insurance. Using a detailed firm survey conducted by the World Bank (2004), we examine the impacts of various governance monitoring mechanisms and CEO characteristics on the Corporate insurance decision. Overall, our results suggest that both monitoring mechanisms and managerial incentives induce the Corporate purchase of property insurance. However, the purchase of property insurance for managerial self-interest is only prevalent in firms subject to lax monitoring and the determinants of insurance purchases are more in line with the prediction of the economic theory in firms with strong monitoring. In addition, our study contributes a number of new insights into the determinants of Corporate purchase of property insurance.
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chief executive officer incentives monitoring and Corporate Risk management evidence from insurance use
Journal of Risk and Insurance, 2011Co-Authors: Mike AdamsAbstract:Corporate governance and Risk management issues have received prominent publicity in recent years following several major company failures such as Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers. While prior studies have examined this issue within the context of derivatives’ trading, little is known regarding the linkage between Corporate governance and alternative Corporate Risk management activities such as insurance. Using a detailed firm survey conducted by the World Bank (2004), we examine the impacts of various governance monitoring mechanisms and chief executive officer (CEO) characteristics on the Corporate insurance decision. Overall, our results suggest that both monitoring mechanisms and managerial incentives induce the Corporate purchase of property insurance. However, the purchase of property insurance for managerial self-interest is only prevalent in firms subject to lax monitoring, and the determinants of insurance purchases are more in line with the prediction of the economic theory in firms with strong monitoring. In addition, our study contributes a number of new insights into the determinants of Corporate purchase of property insurance.
Roberto Mura - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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ceo gender Corporate Risk taking and the efficiency of capital allocation
Journal of Corporate Finance, 2016Co-Authors: Mara Faccio, Mariateresa Marchica, Roberto MuraAbstract:We extend the literature on how managerial traits relate to Corporate choices by documenting that firms run by female CEOs have lower leverage, less volatile earnings, and a higher chance of survival than otherwise similar firms run by male CEOs. Additionally, transitions from male to female CEOs (or vice versa) are associated with economically and statistically significant reductions (increases) in Corporate Risk-taking. The results are robust to controlling for the endogenous matching between firms and CEOs using a variety of econometric techniques. We further document that this Risk-avoidance behavior appears to lead to distortions in the capital allocation process. These results potentially have important macroeconomic implications for long-term economic growth.
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large shareholder diversification and Corporate Risk taking
Social Science Research Network, 2011Co-Authors: Mara Faccio, Mariateresa Marchica, Roberto MuraAbstract:Using new data for the universe of firms covered in Amadeus, we reconstruct the portfolios of shareholders who hold equity stakes in private and publicly-traded European firms. We find great heterogeneity in the degree of portfolio diversification across large shareholders. Exploiting this heterogeneity, we document that firms controlled by diversified large shareholders undertake Riskier investments than firms controlled by non-diversified large shareholders. The impact of large shareholder diversification on Corporate Risk-taking is both economically and statistically significant. Our results have important implications at the policy level because they identify one channel through which policy changes can improve economic welfare.
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large shareholder diversification and Corporate Risk taking
Research Papers in Economics, 2010Co-Authors: Mara Faccio, Mariateresa Marchica, Roberto MuraAbstract:Using new data for the universe of firms covered in Amadeus, we reconstruct the portfolios of shareholders who hold equity stakes in private and publicly-traded European firms. We find great heterogeneity in the degree of portfolio diversification across large shareholders. Exploiting this heterogeneity, we document that firms controlled by diversified large shareholders undertake Riskier investments than firms controlled by non-diversified large shareholders. The impact of large shareholder diversification on Corporate Risk-taking is both economically and statistically significant. Our results have important implications at the policy level because they identify one channel through which policy changes aimed at improving capital market development can improve economic welfare.
Syahsena Mada - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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PENGARUH CAPITAL INTENSITY, Corporate GOVERNANCE, Corporate Risk DAN SALES GROWTH TERHADAP TAX AVOIDANCE PADA PERUSAHAAN YANG TERGABUNG DALAM INDEKS LQ45 DI BURSA EFEK INDONESIA
2020Co-Authors: Syahsena MadaAbstract:ABSTRAK Tujuan dari penelitian ini untuk mengetahui pengaruh capital intensity, Corporate governance, Corporate Risk dan sales growth terhadap tax avoidance pada perusahaan yang tergabung dalam indeks LQ45 di Bursa Efek Indonesia priode 2015-2018. Jenis penelitian yang digunakan dalam penelitian ini adalah penelitian deskriptif dengan menggunakan pendekatan kuantitatif. Populasi dalam penelitian ini adalah perusahaan yang tergabung dalam indeks LQ45 di Bursa Efek Indonesia periode 2015-2018. Metode penentuan sampel menggunakan metode purposive sampling, dengan beberapa kriteria yang telah ditentukan maka ada 13 perusahaan dengan pengamatan selama 4 tahun, sehingga jumlah sampelnya adalah 52 data laporan keuangan. Metode analisis yang digunakan dalam penelitian adalah metode analisis regresi linier berganda dengan program SPSS. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa 1) capital intensity tidak berpengaruh terhadap tax avoidance. 2) komite audit tidak berpengaruh terhadap tax avoidance. 3) komisaris independen berpengaruh terhadap tax avoidance. 4) Corporate Risk tidak berpengaruh terhadap tax avoidance. 5) sales growth tidak berpengaruh terhadap tax avoidance. Hal ini menunjukkan ketika kebutuhan jumlah komisaris independen terpenuhi maka dapat memberikan pengaruh yang baik terhadap perusahaan, sehingga ada kemungkinan kecil perusahaan untuk melakukan praktik penghindaran pajak. Kata kunci : Capital Intensity, Komite Audit, Komisaris Independen, Corporate Risk, Sales Growth, Tax Avoidanc
