The Experts below are selected from a list of 10751811 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
John M. Quigley - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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political and public acceptability of congestion pricing ideology and self interest
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 2010Co-Authors: Björn Hårsman, John M. QuigleyAbstract:Studies of the “stated preferences” of households generally report public and political opposition by urban commuters to congestion pricing. It is thought that this opposition inhibits or precludes tolls and pricing systems that would enhance efficiency in the use of scarce roadways. This paper analyzes the only case in which road pricing was decided by a citizen referendum on the basis of experience with a specific pricing system. The city of Stockholm introduced a toll system for seven months in 2006, after which citizens voted on its permanent adoption. We match precinct voting records to resident commute times and costs by traffic zone, and we analyze patterns of voting in response to economic and political incentives. We document political and ideological incentives for citizen choice, but we also find that the pattern of time savings and incremental costs exerts a powerful influence on voting behavior. In this instance, at least, citizen voters behave as if they value commute time highly. When they have experienced first-hand the out-of-pocket costs and time savings of a specific pricing scheme, they are prepared to adopt freely policies that reduce congestion on urban motorways. © 2010 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.
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political and public acceptability of congestion pricing ideology and self interest
University of California Transportation Center, 2010Co-Authors: Björn Hårsman, John M. QuigleyAbstract:Studies of the “stated preferences” of households generally report public and political opposition by urban commuters to congestion pricing. It is thought that this opposition inhibits or precludes tolls and pricing systems that would enhance efficiency in the use of scarce roadways. This paper analyzes the only case in which road pricing was decided by a citizen referendum on the basis of experience with a specific pricing system. The city of Stockholm introduced a toll system for seven months in 2006, after which citizens voted on its permanent adoption. We match precinct voting records to citizen commute times and costs by traffic zone, and we analyze patterns of voting in response to economic and political incentives. We document political and ideological incentives for citizen choice, but we also find that the pattern of time savings and incremental costs exerts a powerful influence on voting behavior. In this instance, at least, citizen voters behave as if they value commute time highly. When they have experienced first-hand the out-of-pocket costs and time-savings of a specific pricing scheme, they are prepared to adopt freely policies which reduce congestion on urban motorways.
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political and public acceptability of congestion pricing ideology and self interest
Berkeley Program on Housing and Urban Policy, 2010Co-Authors: Björn Hårsman, John M. QuigleyAbstract:Studies of the “stated preferences” of households generally report public and political opposition by urban commuters to congestion pricing. It is thought that this opposition inhibits or precludes tolls and pricing systems that would enhance efficiency in the use of scarce roadways. This paper analyzes the only case in which road pricing was decided by a citizen referendum on the basis of experience with a specific pricing system. The city of Stockholm introduced a toll system for 7 months in 2006, after which citizens voted on its permanent adoption. We match precinct voting records to resident commute times and costs by traffic zone, and we analyze patterns of voting in response to economic and political incentives. We document political and ideological incentives for citizen choice, but we also find that the pattern of time savings and incremental costs exerts a powerful influence on voting behavior. In this instance, at least, citizen voters behave as if they value commute time highly. When they have experienced first-hand the out-of-pocket costs and time-savings of a specific pricing scheme, they are prepared to adopt freely policies that reduce congestion on urban motorways.
Troy D Allen - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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selling out the politics of navigating conflicts between racial group interest and self interest
American Political Science Review, 2014Co-Authors: Ismail K White, Chryl N Laird, Troy D AllenAbstract:Departing from accounts of minority group politics that focus on the role of group identity in advancing group members’ common interests, we investigate political decisions involving tradeoffs between group interests and simple Self-Interest. Using the case of black Americans, we investigate crystallized group norms about politics, internalized beliefs about group solidarity, and mechanisms for enforcing both through social pressure. Through a series of novel behavioral experiments that offer black subjects individual incentives to defect from the position most favored by black Americans as a group, we test the effects of social pressure to conform. We find that racialized social pressure and internalized beliefs in group solidarity are constraining and depress Self-Interested behavior. Our results speak to a common conflict—choosing between maximizing group interests and Self-Interest—and yet also offer specific insight into how blacks remain so homogeneous in partisan politics despite their growing ideological and economic variation.
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defecting from the group norm understanding how african americans make tradeoffs between racial group interest and self interest
2012Co-Authors: Ismail K White, Chryl N Laird, Troy D AllenAbstract:This paper seeks to understand how African Americans are able to maintain group loyalty even in the face of private incentives to defect from group norms of political behavior. Through a series of experiments we offer blacks personal incentives to defect from the position most favored by African Americans as a group (i.e., we incentivize support for a white Republican candidate over that of a black Democratic candidate). We find that while many blacks are willing accept private incentives to defect from the group, social pressure, in particular social pressure from other African Americans, and an understanding of the consequences of defection can effectively prevent defection even in the face of private incentives. The results of this series of experiments speak to the types of internal conflict that many blacks experience every day of their lives (choosing between maximizing racial group interests and Self-Interest) and may give us some insight into why blacks continue to shun Republican efforts to win over black voters.
Björn Hårsman - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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political and public acceptability of congestion pricing ideology and self interest
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 2010Co-Authors: Björn Hårsman, John M. QuigleyAbstract:Studies of the “stated preferences” of households generally report public and political opposition by urban commuters to congestion pricing. It is thought that this opposition inhibits or precludes tolls and pricing systems that would enhance efficiency in the use of scarce roadways. This paper analyzes the only case in which road pricing was decided by a citizen referendum on the basis of experience with a specific pricing system. The city of Stockholm introduced a toll system for seven months in 2006, after which citizens voted on its permanent adoption. We match precinct voting records to resident commute times and costs by traffic zone, and we analyze patterns of voting in response to economic and political incentives. We document political and ideological incentives for citizen choice, but we also find that the pattern of time savings and incremental costs exerts a powerful influence on voting behavior. In this instance, at least, citizen voters behave as if they value commute time highly. When they have experienced first-hand the out-of-pocket costs and time savings of a specific pricing scheme, they are prepared to adopt freely policies that reduce congestion on urban motorways. © 2010 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.
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political and public acceptability of congestion pricing ideology and self interest
University of California Transportation Center, 2010Co-Authors: Björn Hårsman, John M. QuigleyAbstract:Studies of the “stated preferences” of households generally report public and political opposition by urban commuters to congestion pricing. It is thought that this opposition inhibits or precludes tolls and pricing systems that would enhance efficiency in the use of scarce roadways. This paper analyzes the only case in which road pricing was decided by a citizen referendum on the basis of experience with a specific pricing system. The city of Stockholm introduced a toll system for seven months in 2006, after which citizens voted on its permanent adoption. We match precinct voting records to citizen commute times and costs by traffic zone, and we analyze patterns of voting in response to economic and political incentives. We document political and ideological incentives for citizen choice, but we also find that the pattern of time savings and incremental costs exerts a powerful influence on voting behavior. In this instance, at least, citizen voters behave as if they value commute time highly. When they have experienced first-hand the out-of-pocket costs and time-savings of a specific pricing scheme, they are prepared to adopt freely policies which reduce congestion on urban motorways.
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political and public acceptability of congestion pricing ideology and self interest
Berkeley Program on Housing and Urban Policy, 2010Co-Authors: Björn Hårsman, John M. QuigleyAbstract:Studies of the “stated preferences” of households generally report public and political opposition by urban commuters to congestion pricing. It is thought that this opposition inhibits or precludes tolls and pricing systems that would enhance efficiency in the use of scarce roadways. This paper analyzes the only case in which road pricing was decided by a citizen referendum on the basis of experience with a specific pricing system. The city of Stockholm introduced a toll system for 7 months in 2006, after which citizens voted on its permanent adoption. We match precinct voting records to resident commute times and costs by traffic zone, and we analyze patterns of voting in response to economic and political incentives. We document political and ideological incentives for citizen choice, but we also find that the pattern of time savings and incremental costs exerts a powerful influence on voting behavior. In this instance, at least, citizen voters behave as if they value commute time highly. When they have experienced first-hand the out-of-pocket costs and time-savings of a specific pricing scheme, they are prepared to adopt freely policies that reduce congestion on urban motorways.
Doug Lombardi - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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confidence in prior knowledge self efficacy interest and prior knowledge influences on conceptual change
Contemporary Educational Psychology, 2014Co-Authors: Jacqueline R Cordova, Gale M Sinatra, Suzanne H Jones, Gita Taasoobshirazi, Doug LombardiAbstract:This study explored how confidence in prior knowledge, self-efficacy, interest, and prior knowledge interact in conceptual change learning. One hundred and sixteen college students completed an assessment of confidence in prior knowledge, self-efficacy, interest, prior scientific understanding, and prior misconceptions before reading a refutation text on seasonal change. Students’ misconceptions and scientific understanding of seasonal change was then assessed before and after reading a refutation text, and again at a two week delayed posttest. Three profiles of students emerged based on their confidence in prior knowledge, self-efficacy, interest, prior scientific understanding, and prior misconceptions. The profiles included: (1) Low (low confidence, self-efficacy, interest, and prior scientific understanding and high prior misconceptions), (2) mixed (high confidence, self-efficacy, and interest, but low prior scientific understanding and high prior misconceptions), and (3) high (high confidence, self-efficacy, interest, and prior scientific understanding and low prior misconceptions). Results indicated that the mixed profile appeared to be most productive for conceptual change and that learner characteristics most productive for conceptual change learning may differ from those most productive in other learning situations.
Claudia Peus - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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shedding light on leaders self interest theory and measurement of exploitative leadership
Journal of Management, 2019Co-Authors: Ellen Schmid, Armin Pircher Verdorfer, Claudia PeusAbstract:A leader behaving in a way that is exceedingly Self-Interested and exploitative of others is a recurring notion in destructive leadership but also an unexplored aspect that warrants further scrutin...
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shedding light on leaders self interest theory and measurement of exploitative leadership
Academy of Management Proceedings, 2014Co-Authors: Ellen Schmid, Armin Pircher Verdorfer, Claudia PeusAbstract:Several researchers have concluded that destructive leadership is a complex phenomenon (e.g. Schilling, 2009; Thoroughgood et al., 2012) and that current empirical constructs only represent a part ...
