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Robert Fulsche - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Correspondence Theory on p-Fock spaces with applications to Toeplitz algebras
Journal of Functional Analysis, 2020Co-Authors: Robert FulscheAbstract:Abstract We prove several results concerning the Theory of Toeplitz algebras over p-Fock spaces using a Correspondence Theory of translation invariant symbol and operator spaces. The most notable results are: The full Toeplitz algebra is the norm closure of all Toeplitz operators with bounded uniformly continuous symbols. This generalizes a result obtained by J. Xia [25] in the case p = 2 , which was proven by different methods. Further, we prove that every Toeplitz algebra which has a translation invariant C ⁎ subalgebra of the bounded uniformly continuous functions as its set of symbols is linearly generated by Toeplitz operators with the same space of symbols.
Marian David - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Oxford Handbooks Online - THE Correspondence Theory OF TRUTH
Oxford Handbooks Online, 2018Co-Authors: Marian DavidAbstract:This work presents a version of the Correspondence Theory of truth based on Wittgenstein’s Tractatus and Russell’s Theory of truth and discusses related metaphysical issues such as predication, facts, and propositions. Like Russell and one prominent interpretation of the Tractatus, it assumes a realist view of universals. Part of the aim is to avoid Platonic propositions, and although sympathy with facts is maintained in the early chapters, the book argues that facts as real entities are not needed. It includes discussion of contemporary philosophers such as David Armstrong, William Alston, and Paul Horwich, as well as those who write about propositions and facts and a number of recent students of Bertrand Russell. It will interest teachers and advanced students of philosophy who are interested in the realist conception of truth and in issues in metaphysics related to the Correspondence Theory of truth and those interested in Russell and the Tractatus.
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Don't Forget About the Correspondence Theory of Truth
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2004Co-Authors: Marian DavidAbstract:Contra Lewis, it is argued that the Correspondence Theory is a genuine rival Theory of truth: it goes beyond the redundancy Theory; it competes with other theories of truth; it is aptly summarized by the slogan 'truth is Correspondence to fact'; and it really is a Theory of truth.
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Correspondence and Disquotation: An Essay on the Nature of Truth
1994Co-Authors: Leon F. Porter, Marian DavidAbstract:Marian David defends the Correspondence Theory of truth against the disquotational Theory of truth, its current major rival. The Correspondence Theory asserts that truth is a philosophically rich and profound notion which needs serious explanation. Disquotationalism is a radically deflationary philosophy of truth inspired by Tarski and propagated by Quine and others. It rejects the Correspondence Theory, insists truth is anemic, and advances an "anti-Theory" of truth that is essentially a collection of platitudes: "Snow is white" is true only if snow is actually white; "Grass is green" is true only if grass is actually green. According to disquotationalists the only profound insight about truth is that it lacks profundity. David contrasts the Correspondence Theory with disquotationalism and then develops the latter position in rich detail - more than has been available in previous literature - to show its faults. He demonstrates that disquotationalism is not a tenable Theory of truth, as it has too many absurd consequences.
Julian Dodd - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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'The world is the totality of things, not of facts': A Strawsonian reply to Searle
Ratio, 2002Co-Authors: Julian DoddAbstract:John R. Searle (1995; 1998, Ch. 9) claims that P.F. Strawson's well known objections to Correspondence theories of truth (Strawson 1950) can be side-stepped, if we regard the Correspondence theorist's facts as ‘conditions in the world’ (1998, p. 392) rather than as complex objects. In response, I claim both that Searle's notion of a ‘condition in the world’ is obscure, and that such conditions cannot be the facts of a Correspondence theorist on account of their being unsuited for truthmaking. The failure of Searle's attempt to come up with a Correspondence Theory which evades Strawson's objections does not indicate that we should seek to formulate a Correspondence Theory in some other way. I argue that that the Correspondence theorists's truthmaker axiom is improperly motivated, and, in the light of this, suggest that facts be treated as true propositions rather than as items which make propositions true. The article ends with a defence of this position against two recent objections.
Andrzej Szalas - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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a fixpoint approach to second order quantifier elimination with applications to Correspondence Theory
1999Co-Authors: Andreas Nonnengart, Andrzej SzalasAbstract:A Fixpoint Approach to Second-Order Quantifier Elimination with Applications to Correspondence Theory
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on the Correspondence between modal and classical logic an automated approach
Journal of Logic and Computation, 1993Co-Authors: Andrzej SzalasAbstract:The current paper is devoted to automated techniques in the Correspondence Theory. The Theory we deal with concerns the problem of finding classical first-order axioms corresponding to propositiona ...
Patricia Marino - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Toward a Modest Correspondence Theory of Truth: Predicates and Properties
Dialogue, 2008Co-Authors: Patricia MarinoAbstract:Correspondence theories are frequently charged with being either implausible — metaphysically troubling and overly general — or trivial — collapsing into deflationism "'P' is true iff P." Philip Kitcher argues for a "modest" Correspondence Theory, on which reference relations are causal relations, but there is no general Theory of denotation. In this article, I start by showing that, understood this way, "modest" theories are open to charges of triviality. I then offer a refinement of modesty, and take the first steps toward articulating a modest Correspondence Theory, giving a particular account of the relation between predicates, properties, and extensions. Finally, I argue that my account does not collapse into a deflationary one.
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What Should a Correspondence Theory Be and Do
Philosophical Studies, 2006Co-Authors: Patricia MarinoAbstract:Correspondence theories are frequently either too vaguely expressed – ‘‘true statements correspond to the way things are in the world,’’ or implausible – ‘‘true statements mirror raw, mind-independent reality.’’ I address this problem by developing features and roles that ought to characterize what I call ‘‘modest’’ Correspondence theories. Of special importance is the role of Correspondence in directing our responses to cases of suspected non-factuality; lack of straightforward Correspondence shows the need for, and guides us in our choice of, various kinds of reconstrual projects. This, I argue, is in contrast to the approaches suggested by deflationism and coherence, and thus modest Correspondence theories are appropriately distinct from rivals.
