The Experts below are selected from a list of 3300 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Jeroen Hinloopen - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
Product market Competition and investments in cooperative R&D
B E Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 2011Co-Authors: Jeroen Hinloopen, Jan VandekerckhoveAbstract:Building on the framework developed by Qiu (1997) we investigate the influence of product market Competition on incentives to invest in cooperative R&D. For that we disentangle the three components that make up the combined-profits externality. The strategic component is always negative and the size component is always positive. The spillover component is negative (positive) with Bertrand (Cournot) Competition. Cournot Competition thus yields more cooperative R&D, which could drive the Cournot-Nash price below the Bertrand-Nash price. Our decomposition also explains why, under Cournot Competition, cooperative R&D exceeds non-cooperative R&D only if spillovers are “high enough.”
-
dynamic efficiency of Cournot and bertrand Competition input versus output spillovers
Journal of Economics, 2009Co-Authors: Jeroen Hinloopen, Jan VandekerckhoveAbstract:We consider the efficiency of Cournot and Bertrand equilibria in a duopoly with substitutable goods where firms invest in process R&D that generates input spillovers. Under Cournot Competition firms always invest more in R&D than under Bertrand Competition. More importantly, Cournot Competition yields lower prices than Bertrand Competition when the R&D production process is efficient, when spillovers are substantial, and when goods are not too differentiated. The range of cases for which total surplus under Cournot Competition exceeds that under Bertrand Competition is even larger as Competition over quantities always yields the largest producers’ surplus.
-
Dynamic Efficiency of Product Market Competition
2007Co-Authors: Jeroen Hinloopen, Jan VandekerckhoveAbstract:We consider the efficiency of Cournot and Bertrand equilibria in a duopoly with substitutable goods where firms invest in process R&D. Under Cournot Competition firms always invest more in R&D than under Bertrand Competition. More importantly, Cournot Competition yields lower prices than Bertrand Competition when the R&D production process is efficient, when spillovers are substantial, and when goods are not too differentiated. The range of cases for which total surplus under Cournot Competition exceeds that under Bertrand Competition is even larger as Competition over quantities always yields the largest producers' surplus.
-
dynamic efficiency of product market Competition Cournot versus bertrand
2007Co-Authors: Jeroen Hinloopen, Jan VandekerckhoveAbstract:We consider the efficiency of Cournot and Bertrand equilibria in a duopoly with substitutable goods where firms invest in process R&D. Under Cournot Competition firms always invest more in R&D than under Bertrand Competition. More importantly, Cournot Competition yields lower prices than Bertrand Competition when the R&D production process is efficient, when spillovers are substantial, and when goods are not too differentiated. The range of cases for which total surplus under Cournot Competition exceeds that under Bertrand Competition is even larger as Competition over quantities always yields the largest producers' surplus.
Jan Vandekerckhove - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
Product market Competition and investments in cooperative R&D
B E Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 2011Co-Authors: Jeroen Hinloopen, Jan VandekerckhoveAbstract:Building on the framework developed by Qiu (1997) we investigate the influence of product market Competition on incentives to invest in cooperative R&D. For that we disentangle the three components that make up the combined-profits externality. The strategic component is always negative and the size component is always positive. The spillover component is negative (positive) with Bertrand (Cournot) Competition. Cournot Competition thus yields more cooperative R&D, which could drive the Cournot-Nash price below the Bertrand-Nash price. Our decomposition also explains why, under Cournot Competition, cooperative R&D exceeds non-cooperative R&D only if spillovers are “high enough.”
-
dynamic efficiency of Cournot and bertrand Competition input versus output spillovers
Journal of Economics, 2009Co-Authors: Jeroen Hinloopen, Jan VandekerckhoveAbstract:We consider the efficiency of Cournot and Bertrand equilibria in a duopoly with substitutable goods where firms invest in process R&D that generates input spillovers. Under Cournot Competition firms always invest more in R&D than under Bertrand Competition. More importantly, Cournot Competition yields lower prices than Bertrand Competition when the R&D production process is efficient, when spillovers are substantial, and when goods are not too differentiated. The range of cases for which total surplus under Cournot Competition exceeds that under Bertrand Competition is even larger as Competition over quantities always yields the largest producers’ surplus.
-
Dynamic Efficiency of Product Market Competition
2007Co-Authors: Jeroen Hinloopen, Jan VandekerckhoveAbstract:We consider the efficiency of Cournot and Bertrand equilibria in a duopoly with substitutable goods where firms invest in process R&D. Under Cournot Competition firms always invest more in R&D than under Bertrand Competition. More importantly, Cournot Competition yields lower prices than Bertrand Competition when the R&D production process is efficient, when spillovers are substantial, and when goods are not too differentiated. The range of cases for which total surplus under Cournot Competition exceeds that under Bertrand Competition is even larger as Competition over quantities always yields the largest producers' surplus.
-
dynamic efficiency of product market Competition Cournot versus bertrand
2007Co-Authors: Jeroen Hinloopen, Jan VandekerckhoveAbstract:We consider the efficiency of Cournot and Bertrand equilibria in a duopoly with substitutable goods where firms invest in process R&D. Under Cournot Competition firms always invest more in R&D than under Bertrand Competition. More importantly, Cournot Competition yields lower prices than Bertrand Competition when the R&D production process is efficient, when spillovers are substantial, and when goods are not too differentiated. The range of cases for which total surplus under Cournot Competition exceeds that under Bertrand Competition is even larger as Competition over quantities always yields the largest producers' surplus.
Adam Wierman - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
on the role of a market maker in networked Cournot Competition
Mathematics of Operations Research, 2019Co-Authors: Subhonmesh Bose, Adam WiermanAbstract:We study Cournot Competition among firms in a networked marketplace that is centrally managed by a market maker. In particular, we study a situation in which a market maker facilitates trade betwee...
-
networked Cournot Competition in platform markets access control and efficiency loss
Conference on Decision and Control, 2017Co-Authors: John Z F Pang, Eilyan Bitar, Adam WiermanAbstract:This paper studies network design and efficiency loss in online platforms using the model of networked Cournot Competition. We consider two styles of platforms: open access platforms and discriminatory access platforms. In open access platforms, every firm can connect to every market, while discriminatory access platforms limit connections between firms and markets in order to improve social welfare. Our results provide tight bounds on the efficiency loss of both open access and discriminatory access platforms. For open access platforms, we show that the efficiency loss at a Nash equilibrium is upper bounded by 3/2. In the case of discriminatory access platforms, we prove that, under an assumption on the linearity of cost functions, a greedy algorithm for optimizing network connections can guarantee the efficiency loss at a Nash equilibrium is upper bounded by 4/3.
-
CDC - Networked Cournot Competition in platform markets: Access control and efficiency loss
2017 IEEE 56th Annual Conference on Decision and Control (CDC), 2017Co-Authors: John Z F Pang, Eilyan Bitar, Adam WiermanAbstract:This paper studies network design and efficiency loss in online platforms using the model of networked Cournot Competition. We consider two styles of platforms: open access platforms and discriminatory access platforms. In open access platforms, every firm can connect to every market, while discriminatory access platforms limit connections between firms and markets in order to improve social welfare. Our results provide tight bounds on the efficiency loss of both open access and discriminatory access platforms. For open access platforms, we show that the efficiency loss at a Nash equilibrium is upper bounded by 3/2. In the case of discriminatory access platforms, we prove that, under an assumption on the linearity of cost functions, a greedy algorithm for optimizing network connections can guarantee the efficiency loss at a Nash equilibrium is upper bounded by 4/3.
-
networked Cournot Competition in platform markets access control and efficiency loss
Measurement and Modeling of Computer Systems, 2017Co-Authors: John Z F Pang, Eilyan Bitar, Adam WiermanAbstract:This paper studies network design and efficiency loss in open and discriminatory access platforms under networked Cournot Competition. In open platforms, every firm connects to every market, while discriminatory platforms limit connections between firms and markets to improve social welfare. We provide tight bounds on the efficiency loss of both platforms; (i) that the efficiency loss at a Nash equilibrium under open access is bounded by 3/2, and (ii) for discriminatory access platforms, we provide a greedy algorithm for optimizing network connections that guarantees efficiency loss at a Nash equilibrium is bounded by 4/3, under an assumption on the linearity of cost functions.
-
CDC - The role of a market maker in networked Cournot Competition
53rd IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, 2014Co-Authors: Subhonmesh Bose, Adam WiermanAbstract:We study the role of a market maker (or market operator) in a transmission constrained electricity market. We model the market as a one-shot networked Cournot Competition where generators supply quantity bids and load serving entities provide downward sloping inverse demand functions. This mimics the operation of a spot market in a deregulated market structure. In this paper, we focus on possible mechanisms employed by the market maker to balance demand and supply. In particular, we consider three candidate objective functions that the market maker optimizes - social welfare, residual social welfare, and consumer surplus. We characterize the existence of Generalized Nash Equilibrium (GNE) in this setting and demonstrate that market outcomes at equilibrium can be very different under the candidate objective functions.
Setareh Maghsudi - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
a new bandwidth allocation scheme for dual hop transmission using virtual oligopoly market model and Cournot Competition
2011 IEEE Swedish Communication Technologies Workshop (Swe-CTW), 2011Co-Authors: Babak Nikfar, Setareh MaghsudiAbstract:We propose a new bandwidth allocation scheme for two-hop transmission. The fixed relay network is modeled as a virtual oligopoly market, and the Cournot game model is exploited in order to solve the resource allocation problem. Two different types of Cournot Competition, namely static and dynamic, are discussed. For the latter case, the stability conditions are analyzed. By using the proposed scheme, the source purchases the optimum amount of bandwidth from each relay, given a specific budget; therefore, the scarce wireless resources are exploited efficiently. Moreover, as the only required signaling among the nodes is the price and the required amount of bandwidth, the feedback and signaling overhead is minimized. In order to evaluate the proposed scheme, analytical and numerical results are presented.
-
Swe-CTW - A new bandwidth allocation scheme for dual-hop transmission using virtual oligopoly market model and Cournot Competition
2011 IEEE Swedish Communication Technologies Workshop (Swe-CTW), 2011Co-Authors: Babak Nikfar, Setareh MaghsudiAbstract:We propose a new bandwidth allocation scheme for two-hop transmission. The fixed relay network is modeled as a virtual oligopoly market, and the Cournot game model is exploited in order to solve the resource allocation problem. Two different types of Cournot Competition, namely static and dynamic, are discussed. For the latter case, the stability conditions are analyzed. By using the proposed scheme, the source purchases the optimum amount of bandwidth from each relay, given a specific budget; therefore, the scarce wireless resources are exploited efficiently. Moreover, as the only required signaling among the nodes is the price and the required amount of bandwidth, the feedback and signaling overhead is minimized. In order to evaluate the proposed scheme, analytical and numerical results are presented.
Corrado Benassi - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
dispersion equilibria in spatial Cournot Competition
Annals of Regional Science, 2014Co-Authors: Corrado BenassiAbstract:We consider the standard model of spatial Cournot Competition and show that for dispersion equilibria to exist, (a) a necessary condition is that the distribution be not unimodal, and (b) a sufficient condition is that the distribution be convex with a unique antimode and that asymmetry is not too strong. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014
-
Dispersion equilibria in spatial Cournot Competition
Annals of Regional Science, 2014Co-Authors: Corrado BenassiAbstract:We consider the standard model of spatial Cournot Competition and show that for dispersion equilibria to exist, (a) a necessary condition is that the distribution be not unimodal, and (b) a sufficient condition is that the distribution be convex with a unique antimode and that asymmetry is not too strong.
-
Spatial Cournot Competition and consumers' heterogeneity: a note
2011Co-Authors: Corrado BenassiAbstract:We consider the standard model of spatial Cournot Competition and show that a necessary condition for dispersion equilibria is that the distribution be not unimodal.
