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David B. Wexler - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • not such a party pooper an attempt to accommodate many of professor quinn s concerns about therapeutic jurisprudence Criminal Defense lawyering
    Boston College Law Review, 2007
    Co-Authors: David B. Wexler
    Abstract:

    This Article responds to Professor Mae C. Quinn's critique of the author's piece, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Rehabilitative Role of the Criminal Defense Lawyer, published in a 2005 symposium issue of the St. Thomas Law Review. This Reply Article suggests that Professor Quinn has badly misread or distorted the author's St. Thomas article. This Article takes serious issue with her characterization of the author's work, contends that the author and Professor Quinn are closer on many issues than her critique suggests, and points out areas of agreement and disagreement. Therapeutic Jurisprudence can be incorporated into the role of the Criminal Defense lawyer and, as a simple "add-on," it can be transformative of Criminal law practice. I have had a very interesting—but, at the same time, frustrating— dialogue with Professor Quinn. It began when she sent a draft of her article to which I am now responding. In an email message, I replied that I thought she had (unintentionally) constructed a "strawperson," and had then proceeded skillfully to tear it down. I tried to explain why what Professor Quinn thought I was saying was not actually what I said or proposed—that, despite some obvious differences, we were, in fact, much closer on many issues than she had suggested. Her response was puzzling to me. Basically, she responded, "Nape, that's not what you're saying!" My reaction to that reminded me of an incident that happened in San Juan to my friend, Tony, who, accompanied by his mother, attended the funeral of a family friend. Arriving a bit late, not atypical for Tony, he entered during the eulogy. The priest spoke of the deceased's fine character, of what a terrific father and husband he had been, of * 2007, David B. Wexler, Lyons Professor of Law and Professor of Psychology, University of Arizona, and Professor of Law and Director, International Network on Therapeutic Jurisprudence, University of Puerto Rico. The author may be contacted at DavidBWexlerlaryahoo.corn.

  • Not Such a Party Pooper: An Attempt to Accommodate (Many of) Professor Quinn's Concerns About Therapeutic Jurisprudence Criminal Defense Lawyering
    Boston College Law Review, 2006
    Co-Authors: David B. Wexler
    Abstract:

    This Article responds to Professor Mae C. Quinn's critique of the author's piece, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Rehabilitative Role of the Criminal Defense Lawyer, published in a 2005 symposium issue of the St. Thomas Law Review. This Reply Article suggests that Professor Quinn has badly misread or distorted the author's St. Thomas article. This Article takes serious issue with her characterization of the author's work, contends that the author and Professor Quinn are closer on many issues than her critique suggests, and points out areas of agreement and disagreement. Therapeutic Jurisprudence can be incorporated into the role of the Criminal Defense lawyer and, as a simple "add-on," it can be transformative of Criminal law practice.

Hannah Miller-kim - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

Darryl K Brown - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • rationing Criminal Defense entitlements an argument from institutional design
    Columbia Law Review, 2004
    Co-Authors: Darryl K Brown
    Abstract:

    This essay takes as its premise that the widespread and long-term underfunding of indigent Criminal Defense is, for practical purposes, a permanent fixture of the political and constitutional landscape. From this assumption, it makes two points, one theoretical, the other practical. The theoretical point is that consistent underfunding of constitutional entitlements can be a legitimate legislative response to judicial specification of constitutional rights. Courts define constitutional rights, but many of those entitlements are unfunded mandates to legislatures. Entitlements such as the right to Defense counsel, require money to become reality. Legislatures have responded by underfunding those rights, yet have not specified how limited funds should be allocated—that is, how rights should be rationed. The Supreme Court, in fact, has to a large degree barred legislatures from doing so through constitutional Criminal procedure rules. This legislative-judicial dynamic implicitly delegates, largely to Defense attorneys but also to trial judges, the task of rationing rights that cannot be implemented as fully as formal judicial pronouncement implies. This ongoing interaction between courts, legislatures and the Defense bar (aided by trial judges) looks like a species of Dorf and Sabel’s “democratic experimentalism,” a model that describes a broad array of government actions that define constitutional and sub-constitutional law. Here the twist is that private actors—Defense attorneys—have a large hand in constructing the real, working content of constitutional entitlements. Given this weighty task, the essay sketches a set of practical guidelines by which Defense counsel and other trial-level actors can most sensibly implement the job of rationing rights that has been delegated to them. This essay proposes a set of default rules grounded on two core principles: priority to factual innocence over other instrumental goals of Criminal procedure, and a harm-reduction principle that gives preference to * Associate Professor and Alumni Faculty Fellow, Washington and Lee University School of Law.

  • Rationing Criminal Defense Entitlements: An Argument from Institutional Design
    SSRN Electronic Journal, 2003
    Co-Authors: Darryl K Brown
    Abstract:

    This essay takes as its premise that the widespread and long-term underfunding of indigent Criminal Defense is, for practical purposes, a permanent fixture of the political and constitutional landscape. From this assumption, it makes two points, one theoretical, the other practical. The theoretical point is that consistent underfunding of constitutional entitlements can be a legitimate legislative response to judicial specification of constitutional rights. Courts define constitutional rights, but many of those entitlements are unfunded mandates to legislatures. Entitlements such as the right to Defense counsel, require money to become reality. Legislatures have responded by underfunding those rights, yet have not specified how limited funds should be allocated - that is, how rights should be rationed. The Supreme Court, in fact, has to a large degree barred legislatures from doing so through constitutional Criminal procedure rules. This legislative-judicial dynamic implicitly delegates, largely to Defense attorneys but also to trial judges, the task of rationing rights that cannot be implemented as fully as formal judicial pronouncement implies. This ongoing interaction between courts, legislatures and the Defense bar (aided by trial judges) looks like a species of Dorf and Sabel's "democratic experimentalism," a model that describes a broad array of government actions that define constitutional and sub-constitutional law. Here the twist is that private actors - Defense attorneys - have a large hand in constructing the real, working content of constitutional entitlements. Given this weighty task, the essay sketches a set of practical guidelines by which Defense counsel and other trial-level actors can most sensibly implement the job of rationing rights that has been delegated to them. This essay proposes a set of default rules grounded on two core principles: priority to factual innocence over other instrumental goals of Criminal procedure, and a harm-reduction principle that gives preference to suspects facing greater potential punishments. A set of default rules, drawn largely from the study of wrongful convictions, provides practical guidance for implementing these principles. This practice substantively revises the real meaning of constitutional entitlements and leaves some defendants indisputably with less than judicial pronouncements of constitutional law imply. But when rights are underfunded, that outcome is inevitable, as longstanding practice demonstrates. Explicitly confronting funding limits and allocating rights in light of them yields a more coherent, defensible allocation of entitlements.

Alison Ewing - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

Philip J. Griffin - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Of Laundering and Legal Fees: The Implications of United States v. Blair for Criminal Defense Attorneys who Accept Potentially Tainted Funds
    University of Pennsylvania Law Review Online, 2016
    Co-Authors: Philip J. Griffin
    Abstract:

    “In the common understanding, money laundering occurs when money derived from Criminal activity is placed into a legitimate business in an effort to cleanse the money of Criminal taint.”1 18 U.S.C. § 1957, however, prohibits a much broader range of conduct. Any person who “knowingly engages” in a monetary transaction involving over $10,000 of “Criminally derived property” can be charged with money laundering under § 1957.2 Because § 1957 eliminates the requirement found in other money laundering statutes that the government prove an attempt to commit a crime or to conceal the proceeds of a crime, § 1957 “applies to the most open, above-board transaction,” such as a Criminal Defense attorney receiving payment for representation.3 In response to pressure from commentators,