The Experts below are selected from a list of 18 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform

Leah Marrone - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

Rick Ryczek - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

Sacharoff Laurent - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Criminal Trespass and Computer Crime
    William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository, 2020
    Co-Authors: Sacharoff Laurent
    Abstract:

    The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) Criminalizes the simple act of Trespass upon a computer—intentional access without authorization. The law sweeps too broadly, but the courts and scholars seeking to fix it look in the wrong place. They uniformly focus on the term “without authorization” when instead they should focus on the statute’s mens rea. On a conceptual level, courts and scholars understand that the CFAA is a Criminal law, of course, but fail to interpret it comprehensively as one. This Article begins the first sustained treatment of the CFAA as a Criminal law, with a full elaboration of the appropriate mens rea based upon congressional intent, cognate state Criminal Trespass statutes, and recent Supreme Court guidance on federal mens rea in general. A fully realized mens rea sweeps away many of the unjust potential applications of the CFAA on a far more principled basis than does a focus on, and re-writing of, “without authorization.” My interpretative approach limits unjust applications of the provision, but many will remain. In a coda, I briefly show why we should likely abolish the Trespass provision of the CFAA. The flaws of the CFAA, such as Criminalizing ordinary and innocent behavior and arbitrary enforcement, flow from the same pathologies already inherent in Criminal Trespass law

Magoon, Megan E. - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • State v. Thurston: An Examination of Assualt, Self-Defense, and Trespass in Relation to Domestic Violence
    University of Maine School of Law Digital Commons, 2017
    Co-Authors: Magoon, Megan E.
    Abstract:

    Darrell Thurston and Suzanne Harmon were romantically involved on an intermittent basis for five years and had one child together. As a result of an altercation that took place at Harmon’s home in Sullivan, Maine, on September 27, 2007, between Thurston and Harmon, Thurston was charged with assault, Criminal mischief, and obstructing report of crime or injury. The testimony during the trial illuminated the major factual differences between Thurston’s and Harmon’s accounts of the night the incident took place. Thurston requested a self defense jury instruction based on his version of what had happened, which the trial court ultimately denied. Following the jury trial, Thurston was found guilty of assault and Criminal mischief. Thurston appealed the decision to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court, and argued that in regard to the assault charge, the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to warrant a self defense jury instruction and that the trial court erred by failing to provide the instruction. In State v. Thurston the Law Court held that the evidence presented at trial did in fact generate a self-defense instruction, and because the trial court refused to give the instruction, the Law Court vacated Thurston’s assault conviction. Justice Gorman, on behalf of the majority, reasoned that the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the defendant, warranted a self-defense instruction. The majority took a detailed look at the “he said, she said” stories proffered by Thurston and Harmon. Ultimately, the majority decided that because the complaint did not specify which of Thurston’s actions constituted the assault, the jury was free to accept his recitation of the facts and, in doing so, could reasonably come to the conclusion that he only grabbed Harmon once—after she picked up a knife and threatened him. The majority also directly countered the dissent’s interpretation of Maine’s Criminal Trespass statute, and contended that based on the facts, Thurston was licensed and privileged to be in the home, and therefore any actions by Thurston—lawful or unlawful—did not automatically justify Harmon’s use of force. Justice Alexander, writing for the dissent, interpreted the evidence differently. Unlike the majority, the dissent focused on the fact that Harmon did not invite Thurston into her home—in fact, she explicitly told him not to come to her home on the night in question. Justice Alexander reasoned that because Thurston had no right to be in the home, Harmon was justified in using force to eject him, and any actions she took to remove Thurston were lawful. As such, the dissent held that a self-defense instruction, which is only available to individuals acting in defense of unlawful force, was not warranted for Thurston, and therefore would have affirmed Thurston’s assault conviction. The Thurston decision turned on the court’s evaluation of two main factors— the testimony of Thurston and Harmon regarding their relationship, and, in turn, whether or not Thurston was licensed and privileged to enter Harmon’s home that night. While the majority opinion does provide an opinion which is founded on Maine case law, the analysis surrounding the issue of Trespass as it relates to individuals in domestic relationships creates a broad and ambiguous standard for determining whether someone is licensed and privileged to be in their partner’s home. The majority failed to draw a clear line regarding the types of factors (verbal cues, specific living arrangements, or expense sharing, etc.) that they felt would be sufficient to give an individual license and privilege to enter a domestic partner’s home. The dissenting opinion, however, placed more emphasis on the initial factual inquiry—whether Thurston was lawfully in the home. The dissent’s opinion maintained a higher standard of the facts that must be in place to give someone license and privilege to be in a domestic partner’s home. While Maine law is far from settled regarding the “licensed and privileged” status in domestic relationships, the dissenting opinion provides a more cautious and logical approach to interpreting precarious domestic altercations

Daniel B Kelly - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • defining extortion rico hobbs and statutory interpretation in scheidler v national organization for women inc 123 s ct 1057 2003
    Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, 2003
    Co-Authors: Daniel B Kelly
    Abstract:

    I. FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY 955 A. NOW v. Scheidler: Round One 956 B. NOW v. Scheidler: Round Two 957 II. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION 958 III. COMMENT 963 A. Defining Extortion: What Constitutes "Obtaining"? 964 B. What is RICO's Purpose Anyway? 966 C. Catching the Court in a Contradiction? 969 IV. CONCLUSION 971 The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) (1) has recently become the preferred legal weapon for establishing Criminal and civil liability in a panoply of situations involving allegedly extortionate conduct. (2) Prosecutions for extortion under RICO originally targeted so-called "organized crime enterprises" that intimidate legitimate business owners for money. Increasingly, RICO has been applied more expansively, most notably as a tool for alleging extortion against pro-life protesters who block access to abortion clinics. (4) As a result, many organizations, representing perspectives from the entire political spectrum, have become alarmed that the threat of civil RICO litigation might inhibit their ability to engage in political and social protest. (5) Some jurists have even worried that it would seem to follow logically from this expansive interpretation of extortion under RICO that the protesting of invidious racial discrimination and segregated restaurants using "sit-down" demonstrations during the Civil Rights Movement would have constituted extortion. (6) Addressing this ambiguity regarding the definition of extortion, the Supreme Court, in Scheidler v. National Organization for Women, Inc., (7) held that petitioners, Joseph Scheidler and a coalition of pro-life activists, did not commit extortion because they did not obtain property from respondents as required by the Hobbs Act. (8) That is, an extortionate act cannot occur unless the offending party actually acquires the victim's property. (9) In clarifying the definition of extortion, the Supreme Court ensured that the legal system will be able to draw a reasonable distinction between organized Criminals who acquire money by force and civil rights leaders, pro-life activists, and future protesters whose objectives are not profit but the promulgation of their political messages. I. FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY The Supreme Court's decision in Scheidler is the final battle of a tumultuous seventeen-year litigation war waged between the National Organization for Women (NOW) and pro-life activists. The case, initiated in 1986 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, first reached the Supreme Court in 1994. The case was remanded to the trial court, which awarded treble damages of over $257,000 (10) and granted a nationwide injunction against the protesters. (11) The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision in favor of NOW, and the case was again appealed to the United States Supreme Court in 2002. U.S. 1057 (2003). See also Matthew C. Blickensderfer, Note, Unleashing RICO, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 867, 886 n.104 (1994) ("Had RICO ... been conceived in the 1960s, it is possible that RICO could have been used against the civil rights movement."). For a sample of cases during the Civil Rights Movement in which "sit-in" protesters were eventually exonerated but might have been convicted for extortion under RICO, see e.g., Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964) (vacating judgment against students arrested for Criminal Trespass after "sit-in" demonstration at privately-owned restaurant that refused to serve members of their race); Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963) (reversing Criminal convictions of students who refused to leave having been denied service at refreshment counter); Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961) (reversing defendants' convictions for engaging in "sit-in" and refusing to leave lunch counters that were reserved for people of another race). …