The Experts below are selected from a list of 1617 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Ėmužis Marius - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Soviet Lithuania Ruling Elite 1944 – 1974: Interpersonal realtions and their expression
Institutional Repository of Vilnius University, 2016Co-Authors: Ėmužis MariusAbstract:This thesis deals with interpersonal relations in soviet Lithuania ruling elite in the years 1944 – 1974 and the expression of those relations. The problem is very relevant to post-soviet society, which is still facing nepotism, Cronyism, clientelism or similar cases. Problem is also relevant in historical perspective. Soviet Union was not entirely ruled according to law, so in many cases unwritten rules and interpersonal relations got their way. So the analysis of interpersonal relations allows us to better understand how the system worked. Thesis deals with individual mutual relations (based on clientelism, Cronyism, favoritism) and network formation. There were a few non-personal (not lead by one leader) networks in this period, in soviet Lithuania. They arise from people who knew each other well and had strengthen the ties in communist underground movement, partisanship or in the fronts of World War II. They could mobilize those connections to do some tasks that were needed to be done (i.e. one of the most general tasks – sovietization of Lithuania). Only one strong clan can be traced in this period – the clan of Antanas Snieckus. It had aims and had the power to imply them. Only the second secretary of the LCP could create a strong opposition to this clan, but because of the status of an outsider, relations with the local nomenclature were quite poor, so not one second secretary managed to form a strong network
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Sovietų Lietuvos valdantysis elitas 1944 - 1974 metais: tarpusavio ryšiai ir jų raiška Santrauka
Institutional Repository of Vilnius University, 2016Co-Authors: Ėmužis MariusAbstract:This thesis deals with interpersonal relations in soviet Lithuania ruling elite in the years 1944 – 1974 and the expression of those relations. The problem is very relevant to post-soviet society, which is still facing nepotism, Cronyism, clientelism or similar cases. Problem is also relevant in historical perspective. Soviet Union was not entirely ruled according to law, so in many cases unwritten rules and interpersonal relations got their way. So the analysis of interpersonal relations allows us to better understand how the system worked. Thesis deals with individual mutual relations (based on clientelism, Cronyism, favoritism) and network formation. There were a few non-personal (not lead by one leader) networks in this period, in soviet Lithuania. They arise from people who knew each other well and had strengthen the ties in communist underground movement, partisanship or in the fronts of World War II. They could mobilize those connections to do some tasks that were needed to be done (i.e. one of the most general tasks – sovietization of Lithuania). Only one strong clan can be traced in this period – the clan of Antanas Snieckus. It had aims and had the power to imply them. Only the second secretary of the LCP could create a strong opposition to this clan, but because of the status of an outsider, relations with the local nomenclature were quite poor, so not one second secretary managed to form a strong network
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Sovietų Lietuvos valdantysis elitas 1944-1974 metais : tarpusavio ryšiai ir jų raiška
2016Co-Authors: Ėmužis Marius, Vilniaus UniversitetasAbstract:This thesis deals with interpersonal relations in soviet Lithuania ruling elite in the years 1944 – 1974 and the expression of those relations. The problem is very relevant to post-soviet society, which is still facing nepotism, Cronyism, clientelism or similar cases. Problem is also relevant in historical perspective. Soviet Union was not entirely ruled according to law, so in many cases unwritten rules and interpersonal relations got their way. So the analysis of interpersonal relations allows us to better understand how the system worked. Thesis deals with individual mutual relations (based on clientelism, Cronyism, favoritism) and network formation. There were a few non-personal (not lead by one leader) networks in this period, in soviet Lithuania. They arise from people who knew each other well and had strengthen the ties in communist underground movement, partisanship or in the fronts of World War II. They could mobilize those connections to do some tasks that were needed to be done (i.e. one of the most general tasks – sovietization of Lithuania). Only one strong clan can be traced in this period – the clan of Antanas Snieckus. It had aims and had the power to imply them. Only the second secretary of the LCP could create a strong opposition to this clan, but because of the status of an outsider, relations with the local nomenclature were quite poor, so not one second secretary managed to form a strong networ
Todd Mitton - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Cronyism and capital controls evidence from malaysia
Journal of Financial Economics, 2003Co-Authors: Simon Johnson, Todd MittonAbstract:The initial impact of the Asian financial crisis in Malaysia reduced the expected value of government subsidies to politically favored firms. Of the estimated $60 billion loss in market value for politically connected firms from July 1997 to August 1998, roughly 9% can be attributed to the fall in the value of their connections. Firing the Deputy Prime Minister and imposing capital controls in September 1998 primarily benefited firms with strong ties to Prime Minister Mahathir. Of the estimated $5 billion gain in market value for Mahathir-connected firms during September 1998, approximately 32% was due to the increase in the value of their connections. The evidence suggests Malaysian capital controls provided a screen behind which favored firms could be supported.
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Cronyism and capital controls evidence from malaysia
Journal of Financial Economics, 2003Co-Authors: Simon Johnson, Todd MittonAbstract:Abstract The onset of the Asian financial crisis in Malaysia reduced the expected value of government subsidies to politically connected firms, accounting for roughly 9% of the estimated $60 billion loss in their market value from July 1997 to August 1998. Firing the Deputy Prime Minister and imposing capital controls in September 1998 primarily benefited firms with strong ties to Prime Minister Mahathir, accounting for roughly 32% of these firms’ estimated $5 billion gain in market value during September 1998. The evidence suggests Malaysian capital controls provided a screen behind which favored firms could be supported.
John K Wald - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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ceo compensation director compensation and firm performance evidence of Cronyism
Journal of Corporate Finance, 2006Co-Authors: Ivan E Brick, Oded Palmon, John K WaldAbstract:Abstract We model CEO and director compensation using firm characteristics, CEO characteristics, and governance variables. After controlling for monitoring proxies, we find a significant positive relationship between CEO and director compensation. We hypothesize that this relationship could be due to unobserved firm complexity (omitted variables), and/or to excess compensation of directors and managers. We also find evidence that excess compensation (both director and CEO) is associated with firm underperformance. We therefore conclude that the evidence is consistent with excessive compensation due to mutual back scratching or Cronyism. The evidence suggests that excessive compensation has an effect on firm performance that is independent of the poor governance variables discussed by previous studies.
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ceo compensation director compensation and firm performance evidence of Cronyism
Social Science Research Network, 2002Co-Authors: Ivan E Brick, Oded Palmon, John K WaldAbstract:We model CEO and director compensation using firm characteristics, CEO characteristics, and governance variables. We find that director compensation is related to variables that proxy for the level of monitoring and effort required by directors. After controlling for monitoring proxies, we find a significant positive relation between CEO and director compensations. We hypothesize that this relation could be due to unobserved firm complexity (omitted variables), and/or to excessive compensation of directors and managers. We find that these excessive compensations are associated with firm underperformance. Thus, we conclude that excessive compensation may be associated with an environment of ineffective monitoring, which we term Cronyism.
Rajah Rasiah - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the malaysian financial crisis capital expansion Cronyism and contraction
Social Science Research Network, 1998Co-Authors: Rajah RasiahAbstract:The Malaysian economy crashed following a sharp drop in the ringgit and the stock market from late 1997, which came in the wake of a regional financial crisis triggered by the baht crisis that started in July 1997. Many have since begun to question the merits of Malaysia as a model of successful development. This paper traces systematically the causes of the late 1980s and early 1990s boom, and the slowdown subsequently. The boom is argued to have been shaped by increased flows of foreign direct investment through a combination of pressures forcing East Asian investment abroad: liberalization of domestic policies, favorable depreciation in exchange rates, and introduction of export‐oriented incentives; which even helped pad crony ventures. The slowdown was triggered by an appreciation of exchange rates, falling tariffs, and scrapping of export‐oriented incentives, (which encouraged imports and discouraged exports), slowdown in foreign investment inflows, slow technological progress in the face of rising costs, expansion in debt‐driven investment into property and real sectors, and unsustainable growth in unproductive crony ventures. The bust consequently took place following speculation, regional contagion effect, and massive capital flight; influenced by herd behavior and confidence-wrecking policy statements.
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the malaysian financial crisis capital expansion Cronyism and contraction
Journal of The Asia Pacific Economy, 1998Co-Authors: Rajah RasiahAbstract:Abstract The Malaysian economy crashed following a sharp drop in the ringgit and the stock market from late 1997, which came in the wake of a regional financial crisis triggered by the baht crisis that started in July 1997. Many have since begun to question the merits of Malaysia as a model of successful development. This paper traces systematically the causes of the late 1980s and early 1990s boom, and the slowdown subsequently. The boom is argued to have been shaped by increased flows of foreign direct investment through a combination of pressures forcing East Asian investment abroad and liberalisation of domestic policies and favourable depreciation in exchange rates and introduction of export‐oriented incentives, which even helped pad crony ventures. The slowdown was triggered by an appreciation of exchange rates, falling tariffs and scrapping of export‐oriented incentives, which encouraged imports and discouraged exports, slowdown in foreign investment inflows, slow technological progress in the face...
Simon Johnson - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Cronyism and capital controls evidence from malaysia
Journal of Financial Economics, 2003Co-Authors: Simon Johnson, Todd MittonAbstract:The initial impact of the Asian financial crisis in Malaysia reduced the expected value of government subsidies to politically favored firms. Of the estimated $60 billion loss in market value for politically connected firms from July 1997 to August 1998, roughly 9% can be attributed to the fall in the value of their connections. Firing the Deputy Prime Minister and imposing capital controls in September 1998 primarily benefited firms with strong ties to Prime Minister Mahathir. Of the estimated $5 billion gain in market value for Mahathir-connected firms during September 1998, approximately 32% was due to the increase in the value of their connections. The evidence suggests Malaysian capital controls provided a screen behind which favored firms could be supported.
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Cronyism and capital controls evidence from malaysia
Journal of Financial Economics, 2003Co-Authors: Simon Johnson, Todd MittonAbstract:Abstract The onset of the Asian financial crisis in Malaysia reduced the expected value of government subsidies to politically connected firms, accounting for roughly 9% of the estimated $60 billion loss in their market value from July 1997 to August 1998. Firing the Deputy Prime Minister and imposing capital controls in September 1998 primarily benefited firms with strong ties to Prime Minister Mahathir, accounting for roughly 32% of these firms’ estimated $5 billion gain in market value during September 1998. The evidence suggests Malaysian capital controls provided a screen behind which favored firms could be supported.