cyber physical systems

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Francesco Bullo - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Attack detection and identification in cyber-physical systems
    IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 2013
    Co-Authors: Fabio Pasqualetti, Florian Dörfler, Francesco Bullo
    Abstract:

    cyber-physical systems are ubiquitous in power systems, transportation networks, industrial control processes, and critical infrastructures. These systems need to operate reliably in the face of unforeseen failures and external malicious attacks. In this paper: (i) we propose a mathematical framework for cyber-physical systems, attacks, and monitors; (ii) we characterize fundamental monitoring limitations from system-theoretic and graph-theoretic perspectives; and (ii) we design centralized and distributed attack detection and identification monitors. Finally, we validate our findings through compelling examples.

  • Attack Detection and Identification in cyber-physical systems--Part I: Models and Fundamental Limitations
    arXiv.org, 2012
    Co-Authors: Fabio Pasqualetti, Florian Dörfler, Francesco Bullo
    Abstract:

    cyber-physical systems integrate computation, com- munication, and physical capabilities to interact with the physical world and humans. Besides failures of components, cyber- physical systems are prone to malignant attacks, and specific analysis tools as well as monitoring mechanisms need to be developed to enforce system security and reliability. This paper proposes a unified framework to analyze the resilience of cyber- physical systems against attacks cast by an omniscient adversary. We model cyber-physical systems as linear descriptor systems, and attacks as exogenous unknown inputs. Despite its simplicity, our model captures various real-world cyber-physical systems, and it includes and generalizes many prototypical attacks, in- cluding stealth, (dynamic) false-data injection and replay attacks. First, we characterize fundamental limitations of static, dynamic, and active monitors for attack detection and identification. Second, we provide constructive algebraic conditions to cast undetectable and unidentifiable attacks. Third, by using the system interconnection structure, we describe graph-theoretic conditions for the existence of undetectable and unidentifiable attacks. Finally, we validate our findings through some illustra- tive examples with different cyber-physical systems, such as a municipal water supply network and two electrical power grids.

  • Attack Detection and Identification in cyber-physical systems – Part I : Models and Fundamental Limitations
    arXivorg, 2012
    Co-Authors: Fabio Pasqualetti, Daniel De Florian, Francesco Bullo
    Abstract:

    cyber-physical systems integrate computation, communication, and physical capabilities to interact with the physical world and humans. Besides failures of components, cyber-physical systems are prone to malignant attacks, and specific analysis tools as well as monitoring mechanisms need to be developed to enforce system security and reliability. This paper proposes a unified framework to analyze the resilience of cyber-physical systems against attacks cast by an omniscient adversary. We model cyber-physical systems as linear descriptor systems, and attacks as exogenous unknown inputs. Despite its simplicity, our model captures various real-world cyber-physical systems, and it includes and generalizes many prototypical attacks, including stealth, (dynamic) false-data injection and replay attacks. First, we characterize fundamental limitations of static, dynamic, and active monitors for attack detection and identification. Second, we provide constructive algebraic conditions to cast undetectable and unidentifiable attacks. Third, by using the system interconnection structure, we describe graph-theoretic conditions for the existence of undetectable and unidentifiable attacks. Finally, we validate our findings through some illustrative examples with different cyber-physical systems, such as a municipal water supply network and two electrical power grids.

Alberto Sangiovannivincentelli - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • security aware design for cyber physical systems a platform based approach
    2017
    Co-Authors: Alberto Sangiovannivincentelli
    Abstract:

    Addressing the rising security issues during the design stages of cyber-physical systems, this book develops a systematic approach to address security at early design stages together with all other design constraints. cyber-attacks become more threatening as systems are becoming more connected with the surrounding environment, infrastructures, and other systems. Security mechanisms can be designed to protect against attacks and meet security requirements, but there are many challenges of applying security mechanisms to cyber-physical systems including open environments, limited resources, strict timing requirements, and large number of devices. Designed for researchers and professionals, this book is valuable for individuals working in network systems, security mechanisms, and system design. It is also suitable for advanced-level students of computer science.

  • characterization analysis and recommendations for exploiting the opportunities of cyber physical systems
    Cyber-Physical Systems#R##N#Foundations Principles and Applications, 2017
    Co-Authors: Martin Torngren, Saddek Bensalem, Alberto Sangiovannivincentelli, Fredrik Asplund, John A Mcdermid, Roberto Passerone, Holger Pfeifer, Bernhard Schatz
    Abstract:

    Leveraging on a comprehensive analysis of cyber-physical systems (CPSs) in Europe, this chapter presents overall findings focusing on (1) a characterization of CPS, (2) opportunities and challenges ...

  • taming dr frankenstein contract based design for cyber physical systems
    European Journal of Control, 2012
    Co-Authors: Alberto Sangiovannivincentelli, Werner Damm, Roberto Passerone
    Abstract:

    cyber-physical systems combine a cyber side (computing and networking) with a physical side (mechanical, electrical, and chemical processes). In many cases, the cyber component controls the physical side using sensors and actuators that observe the physical system and actuate the controls. Such systems present the biggest challenges as well as the biggest opportunities in several large industries, including electronics, energy, automotive, defense and aerospace, telecommunications, instrumentation, industrial automation. Engineers today do successfully design cyber-physical systems in a variety of industries. Unfortunately, the development of systems is costly, and development schedules are difficult to stick to. The complexity of cyber-physical systems, and particularly the increased performance that is offered from interconnecting what in the past have been separate systems, increases the design and verification challenges. As the complexity of these systems increases, our inability to rigorously model the interactions between the physical and the cyber sides creates serious vulnerabilities. systems become unsafe, with disastrous inexplicable failures that could not have been predicted. Distributed control of multi-scale complex systems is largely an unsolved problem. A common view that is emerging in research programs in Europe and the US is “enabling contract-based design (CBD),” which formulates a broad and aggressive scope to address urgent needs in the systems industry. We present a design methodology and a few examples in controller design whereby contract-based design can be merged with platform-based design to formulate the design process as a meet-in-the-middle approach, where design requirements are implemented in a subsequent refinement process using as much as possible elements from a library of available components. Contracts are formalizations of the conditions for correctness of element integration (horizontal contracts), for lower level of abstraction to be consistent with the higher ones, and for abstractions of available components to be faithful representations of the actual parts (vertical contracts).

Geethapriya Thamilarasu - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • optimal feature selection for intrusion detection in medical cyber physical systems
    International Conference on Advanced Computing, 2019
    Co-Authors: William Schneble, Geethapriya Thamilarasu
    Abstract:

    Medical cyber physical systems (MCPS) integrate the physical, communication and computation components of medical devices to enhance the quality and reliability of healthcare systems. With the remarkable progress of MCPS technologies in recent years, there is a need to advance the security measures to efficiently detect attacks in this domain. Research on intrusion detection for medical cyber physical systems is still in its infancy. For an efficient intrusion detection system (IDS), it is important to address the problem of feature selection to remove redundant, irrelevant and noisy features. Feature selection is even more relevant to address in MCPS as the use of entire feature space places unnecessary burden on resource constrained systems in this domain. Also since real-time detection of attacks is critical in healthcare systems, the amount of data processed by IDS must be reduced to achieve low detection latency. In this paper, we investigate the problem of feature selection in medical cyber physical systems. Our initial results demonstrate the laplacian scoring techniques are successful in optimal feature selection with reduced memory consumption.

Fabio Pasqualetti - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Attack detection and identification in cyber-physical systems
    IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 2013
    Co-Authors: Fabio Pasqualetti, Florian Dörfler, Francesco Bullo
    Abstract:

    cyber-physical systems are ubiquitous in power systems, transportation networks, industrial control processes, and critical infrastructures. These systems need to operate reliably in the face of unforeseen failures and external malicious attacks. In this paper: (i) we propose a mathematical framework for cyber-physical systems, attacks, and monitors; (ii) we characterize fundamental monitoring limitations from system-theoretic and graph-theoretic perspectives; and (ii) we design centralized and distributed attack detection and identification monitors. Finally, we validate our findings through compelling examples.

  • Attack Detection and Identification in cyber-physical systems--Part I: Models and Fundamental Limitations
    arXiv.org, 2012
    Co-Authors: Fabio Pasqualetti, Florian Dörfler, Francesco Bullo
    Abstract:

    cyber-physical systems integrate computation, com- munication, and physical capabilities to interact with the physical world and humans. Besides failures of components, cyber- physical systems are prone to malignant attacks, and specific analysis tools as well as monitoring mechanisms need to be developed to enforce system security and reliability. This paper proposes a unified framework to analyze the resilience of cyber- physical systems against attacks cast by an omniscient adversary. We model cyber-physical systems as linear descriptor systems, and attacks as exogenous unknown inputs. Despite its simplicity, our model captures various real-world cyber-physical systems, and it includes and generalizes many prototypical attacks, in- cluding stealth, (dynamic) false-data injection and replay attacks. First, we characterize fundamental limitations of static, dynamic, and active monitors for attack detection and identification. Second, we provide constructive algebraic conditions to cast undetectable and unidentifiable attacks. Third, by using the system interconnection structure, we describe graph-theoretic conditions for the existence of undetectable and unidentifiable attacks. Finally, we validate our findings through some illustra- tive examples with different cyber-physical systems, such as a municipal water supply network and two electrical power grids.

  • Attack Detection and Identification in cyber-physical systems – Part I : Models and Fundamental Limitations
    arXivorg, 2012
    Co-Authors: Fabio Pasqualetti, Daniel De Florian, Francesco Bullo
    Abstract:

    cyber-physical systems integrate computation, communication, and physical capabilities to interact with the physical world and humans. Besides failures of components, cyber-physical systems are prone to malignant attacks, and specific analysis tools as well as monitoring mechanisms need to be developed to enforce system security and reliability. This paper proposes a unified framework to analyze the resilience of cyber-physical systems against attacks cast by an omniscient adversary. We model cyber-physical systems as linear descriptor systems, and attacks as exogenous unknown inputs. Despite its simplicity, our model captures various real-world cyber-physical systems, and it includes and generalizes many prototypical attacks, including stealth, (dynamic) false-data injection and replay attacks. First, we characterize fundamental limitations of static, dynamic, and active monitors for attack detection and identification. Second, we provide constructive algebraic conditions to cast undetectable and unidentifiable attacks. Third, by using the system interconnection structure, we describe graph-theoretic conditions for the existence of undetectable and unidentifiable attacks. Finally, we validate our findings through some illustrative examples with different cyber-physical systems, such as a municipal water supply network and two electrical power grids.

H. Vincent Poor - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Multicast routing for decentralized control of cyber physical systems with an application in smart grid
    IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, 2012
    Co-Authors: Hui Li, L Lai, H. Vincent Poor
    Abstract:

    In cyber physical systems, communication is needed for conveying sensor observations to controllers; thus, the design of the communication sub-system is of key importance for the stabilization of system dynamics. In this paper, multicast routing is studied for networking of decentralized sensors and controllers. The challenges of uncertain destinations and multiple routing modes, which are significantly different from traditional data networks, are addressed by employing the theories of hybrid systems and linear matrix inequalities, thus forming a novel framework for studying the communication sub-system in cyber physical systems. Both cases of neglible delay and non-negligible delay are discussed. The proposed framework is then applied in the context of voltage control in smart grid. Numerical simulations using a 4-bus power grid model show that the proposed framework and algorithm can effectively stabilize cyber physical systems.