The Experts below are selected from a list of 62343 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Kevin Featherstone - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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external conditionality and the Debt Crisis the troika and public administration reform in greece
Journal of European Public Policy, 2015Co-Authors: Kevin FeatherstoneAbstract:Levering domestic reform via external conditionality has become crucial to the rescues of European Union member states in the context of the eurozone Crisis. This article examines a critical case – Greece – and a problematic sector – reform of the central state administration – to assess the applicability of three hypotheses advanced by Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier. New data on the trends in reform activity before and during Greece's Debt Crisis are assessed, as well as their content and paradigmatic frames, to assess the extent of a break with the inherited domestic model. They highlight the contrast between aggregate activity and the substance of reform in sensitive areas. They attribute reform failures to the crafting of the conditionality strategy and to conflicting interests, administrative traditions and cultural norms. The case highlights key challenges for the EU in its handling of the diversity of administrative systems across the eurozone, an agenda neglected at Maastricht.
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external conditionality and the Debt Crisis the troika and public administration reform in greece
Journal of European Public Policy, 2015Co-Authors: Kevin FeatherstoneAbstract:Levering domestic reform via external conditionality has become crucial to the rescues of European Union member states in the context of the eurozone Crisis. This article examines a critical case – Greece – and a problematic sector – reform of the central state administration – to assess the applicability of three hypotheses advanced by Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier. New data on the trends in reform activity before and during Greece's Debt Crisis are assessed, as well as their content and paradigmatic frames, to assess the extent of a break with the inherited domestic model. They highlight the contrast between aggregate activity and the substance of reform in sensitive areas. They attribute reform failures to the crafting of the conditionality strategy and to conflicting interests, administrative traditions and cultural norms. The case highlights key challenges for the EU in its handling of the diversity of administrative systems across the eurozone, an agenda neglected at Maastricht.
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the greek sovereign Debt Crisis and emu a failing state in a skewed regime
2011Co-Authors: Kevin FeatherstoneAbstract:The Greek sovereign Debt Crisis of 2010 exposed the weaknesses of governance of both the ‘euro area’ and of Greece. Successive governments in Athens had failed to overcome endemic problems of low competitiveness, trade and investment imbalances, and fiscal mismanagement placing the economy in a vulnerable international position. Once the market Crisis erupted, the European Union’s Council of Ministers and the European Central Bank failed to provide a timely and effective response. The implications are threefold: the constraints on domestic reform proved immutable to EU stimuli; the ‘euro’ is more vulnerable to Crisis than previously acknowledged; and the early discussion on ‘euro’ governance reform suggests that its underlying philosophy has not shifted significantly towards more effective ‘economic governance’. This article explores the antecedents and management of the Crisis and assesses the outcome. At the EU level, a paradox was evident in the denial of agency and resources that might limit the obligation of states to rescue an errant peer. Domestically, within Greece, the unprecedented external monitoring and policing of its economy – though matched by some initial successes – raises in the longer term sensitive issues of legitimacy and governability, with uncertain prospects for avoiding further crises.
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the jcms annual lecture the greek sovereign Debt Crisis and emu a failing state in a skewed regime
Journal of Common Market Studies, 2011Co-Authors: Kevin FeatherstoneAbstract:The Greek sovereign Debt Crisis of 2010 exposed the weaknesses of governance of both the ‘euro area’ and of Greece. Successive governments in Athens had failed to overcome endemic problems of low competitiveness, trade and investment imbalances, and fiscal mismanagement placing the economy in a vulnerable international position. Once the market Crisis erupted, the European Union's Council of Ministers and the European Central Bank failed to provide a timely and effective response. The implications are threefold: the constraints on domestic reform proved immutable to EU stimuli; the ‘euro’ is more vulnerable to Crisis than previously acknowledged; and the early discussion on ‘euro’ governance reform suggests that its underlying philosophy has not shifted significantly towards more effective ‘economic governance’. This article explores the antecedents and management of the Crisis and assesses the outcome. At the EU level, a paradox was evident in the denial of agency and resources that might limit the obligation of states to rescue an errant peer. Domestically, within Greece, the unprecedented external monitoring and policing of its economy – though matched by some initial successes – raises in the longer term sensitive issues of legitimacy and governability, with uncertain prospects for avoiding further crises.
Alexandros Kontonikas - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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whatever it takes to resolve the european sovereign Debt Crisis bond pricing regime switches and monetary policy effects
Journal of International Money and Finance, 2018Co-Authors: Antonio Afonso, Michael Georgiou Arghyrou, Maria Dolores Gadea, Alexandros KontonikasAbstract:This paper investigates the role of unconventional monetary policy as a source of time-variation in the relationship between sovereign bond yield spreads and their fundamental determinants. We use a two-step empirical approach. First, we apply a time-varying parameter panel modelling framework to determine shifts in the pricing regime characterising sovereign bond markets in the euro area over the period January 1999 to July 2016. Second, we estimate the impact of ECB policy interventions on the time-varying risk factor sensitivities of spreads. Our results provide evidence of a new bond-pricing regime following the announcement of the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) programme in August 2012. This regime is characterised by a weakened link between spreads and fundamentals, but with higher spreads relative to the pre-Crisis period and residual redenomination risk. We also find that unconventional monetary policy measures affect the pricing of sovereign risk not only directly, but also indirectly through changes in banking risk. Overall, the actions of the ECB have operated as catalysts for reversing the dynamics of the European sovereign Debt Crisis.
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the emu sovereign Debt Crisis fundamentals expectations and contagion
Journal of International Financial Markets Institutions and Money, 2012Co-Authors: Michael Georgiou Arghyrou, Alexandros KontonikasAbstract:We offer a detailed empirical investigation of the EMU sovereign-Debt Crisis. We find a marked shift in market pricing behaviour from a ‘convergence-trade’ model before August 2007 to one driven by macro-fundamentals and international risk thereafter. We find evidence of contagion effects, particularly among EMU periphery countries. The EMU Debt Crisis is divided into an early and current Crisis period. Unlike the former where contagion was mainly originating from Greece, the latter involves multiple sources of contagion. Finally, the escalation of the Greek Debt Crisis since November 2009 is due to an unfavourable shift in country-specific market expectations.
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the emu sovereign Debt Crisis fundamentals expectations and contagion
European Economy - Economic Papers 2008 - 2015, 2011Co-Authors: Michael Georgiou Arghyrou, Alexandros KontonikasAbstract:We offer a detailed empirical investigation of the European sovereign Debt Crisis based on the theoretical model by Arghyrou and Tsoukalas (2010). We find evidence of a marked shift in market pricing behaviour from a ‘convergence-trade’ model before August 2007 to one driven by macro-fundamentals and international risk thereafter. The majority of EMU countries have experienced contagion from Greece. There is no evidence of significant speculation effects originating from CDS markets. Finally, the escalation of the Greek Debt Crisis since November 2009 is confirmed as the result of an unfavourable shift in country specific market expectations. Our findings highlight the necessity of structural, competitiveness-inducing reforms in periphery EMU countries and institutional reforms at the EMU level enhancing intra-EMU economic monitoring and policy co-ordination.
Marcel Fratzscher - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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euro area government bonds fragmentation and contagion during the sovereign Debt Crisis
Journal of International Money and Finance, 2017Co-Authors: Michael Ehrmann, Marcel FratzscherAbstract:The paper analyzes the integration of euro area sovereign bond markets during the European sovereign Debt Crisis. It tests for contagion (i.e., an intensification in the transmission of shocks across countries), fragmentation (a reduction in spillovers) and flight-to-quality patterns, exploiting the heteroskedasticity of intraday changes in bond yields for identification. The paper finds that euro area government bond markets were well integrated prior to the Crisis, but saw a substantial fragmentation from 2010 onward. Flight to quality was present at the height of the Crisis, but has largely dissipated after the European Central Bank's (ECB's) announcement of its Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) program in 2012. At the same time, Italy and Spain became more interdependent after the OMT announcement, providing our only evidence of contagion. This suggests that countries have been effectively ring-fenced, and Italy and Spain benefited from the joint reduction in yields following the OMT announcement.
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euro area government bonds integration and fragmentation during the sovereign Debt Crisis
2015Co-Authors: Michael Ehrmann, Marcel FratzscherAbstract:The paper analyzes the integration of euro area sovereign bond markets during the European sovereign Debt Crisis. It tests for contagion (i.e., an intensification in the transmission of shocks across countries), fragmentation (a reduction in spillovers) and flight-to-quality patterns, exploiting the heteroskedasticity of intraday changes in bond yields for identification. The paper finds that euro area government bond markets were well integrated prior to the Crisis, but saw a substantial fragmentation from 2010 onward. Flight to quality was present at the height of the Crisis, but has largely dissipated after the European Central Bank’s (ECB’s) announcement of its Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) program in 2012. At the same time, Italy and Spain became more interdependent after the OMT announcement, providing our only evidence of contagion. While this suggests that countries have been effectively ring-fenced, and Italy and Spain benefited from the joint reduction in yields following the OMT announcement, the high current degree of fragmentation poses difficult challenges for policy-makers, since it leads to an unequal transmission of the ECB’s monetary policy to the various countries.
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the pricing of sovereign risk and contagion during the european sovereign Debt Crisis
Journal of International Money and Finance, 2013Co-Authors: John Beirne, Marcel FratzscherAbstract:The paper analyses the drivers of sovereign risk for 31 advanced and emerging economies during the European sovereign Debt Crisis. It shows that a deterioration in countries' fundamentals and fundamentals contagion – a sharp rise in the sensitivity of financial markets to fundamentals – are the main explanations for the rise in sovereign yield spreads and CDS spreads during the Crisis, not only for euro area countries but globally. By contrast, regional spillovers and contagion have been less important, including for euro area countries. The paper also finds evidence for herding contagion – sharp, simultaneous increases in sovereign yields across countries – but this contagion has been concentrated in time and among a few markets. Finally, empirical models with economic fundamentals generally do a poor job in explaining sovereign risk in the pre-Crisis period for European economies, suggesting that the market pricing of sovereign risk may not have been fully reflecting fundamentals prior to the Crisis.
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the pricing of sovereign risk and contagion during the european sovereign Debt Crisis
Research Papers in Economics, 2012Co-Authors: John Beirne, Marcel FratzscherAbstract:The paper analyses the drivers of sovereign risk for 31 advanced and emerging economies during the European sovereign Debt Crisis. It shows that a deterioration in countries JEL Classification: E44, F30, G15, C23, H63
Michael Georgiou Arghyrou - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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whatever it takes to resolve the european sovereign Debt Crisis bond pricing regime switches and monetary policy effects
Journal of International Money and Finance, 2018Co-Authors: Antonio Afonso, Michael Georgiou Arghyrou, Maria Dolores Gadea, Alexandros KontonikasAbstract:This paper investigates the role of unconventional monetary policy as a source of time-variation in the relationship between sovereign bond yield spreads and their fundamental determinants. We use a two-step empirical approach. First, we apply a time-varying parameter panel modelling framework to determine shifts in the pricing regime characterising sovereign bond markets in the euro area over the period January 1999 to July 2016. Second, we estimate the impact of ECB policy interventions on the time-varying risk factor sensitivities of spreads. Our results provide evidence of a new bond-pricing regime following the announcement of the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) programme in August 2012. This regime is characterised by a weakened link between spreads and fundamentals, but with higher spreads relative to the pre-Crisis period and residual redenomination risk. We also find that unconventional monetary policy measures affect the pricing of sovereign risk not only directly, but also indirectly through changes in banking risk. Overall, the actions of the ECB have operated as catalysts for reversing the dynamics of the European sovereign Debt Crisis.
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the emu sovereign Debt Crisis fundamentals expectations and contagion
Journal of International Financial Markets Institutions and Money, 2012Co-Authors: Michael Georgiou Arghyrou, Alexandros KontonikasAbstract:We offer a detailed empirical investigation of the EMU sovereign-Debt Crisis. We find a marked shift in market pricing behaviour from a ‘convergence-trade’ model before August 2007 to one driven by macro-fundamentals and international risk thereafter. We find evidence of contagion effects, particularly among EMU periphery countries. The EMU Debt Crisis is divided into an early and current Crisis period. Unlike the former where contagion was mainly originating from Greece, the latter involves multiple sources of contagion. Finally, the escalation of the Greek Debt Crisis since November 2009 is due to an unfavourable shift in country-specific market expectations.
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the emu sovereign Debt Crisis fundamentals expectations and contagion
European Economy - Economic Papers 2008 - 2015, 2011Co-Authors: Michael Georgiou Arghyrou, Alexandros KontonikasAbstract:We offer a detailed empirical investigation of the European sovereign Debt Crisis based on the theoretical model by Arghyrou and Tsoukalas (2010). We find evidence of a marked shift in market pricing behaviour from a ‘convergence-trade’ model before August 2007 to one driven by macro-fundamentals and international risk thereafter. The majority of EMU countries have experienced contagion from Greece. There is no evidence of significant speculation effects originating from CDS markets. Finally, the escalation of the Greek Debt Crisis since November 2009 is confirmed as the result of an unfavourable shift in country specific market expectations. Our findings highlight the necessity of structural, competitiveness-inducing reforms in periphery EMU countries and institutional reforms at the EMU level enhancing intra-EMU economic monitoring and policy co-ordination.
Matias Vernengo - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the euro imbalances and financial deregulation a post keynesian interpretation of the european Debt Crisis
Social Science Research Network, 2012Co-Authors: Esteban Perezcaldentey, Matias VernengoAbstract:Conventional wisdom suggests that the European Debt Crisis, which has led to severe adjustment programs sponsored by the European Union (EU) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in Greece and Ireland so far, was caused by fiscal profligacy on the part of peripheral or non-core countries and a welfare state model, and that the role of the common currency, the Euro, was at best minimal. This paper tries to show that contrary to conventional wisdom, the Crisis in Europe is the result of an imbalance between core and non-core countries inherent to the Euro economic model. Underpinned by a process of monetary unification and financial deregulation core-countries in the Euro Zone pursued export led growth policies or more specifically ‘beggar-thy-neighbor policies’ at the expense of mounting disequilibria and Debt accumulation in the non-core countries or periphery. This imbalance became unsustainable and this surfaced in the course of the Global Crisis (2007-2008).
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the euro imbalances and financial deregulation a post keynesian interpretation of the european Debt Crisis
Research Papers in Economics, 2012Co-Authors: Esteban Perezcaldentey, Matias VernengoAbstract:Conventional wisdom suggests that the European Debt Crisis, which has thus far led to severe adjustment programs crafted by the European Union and the International Monetary Fund in both Greece and Ireland, was caused by fiscal profligacy on the part of peripheral, or noncore, countries in combination with a welfare state model, and that the role of the common currency-the euro-was at best minimal. This paper aims to show that, contrary to conventional wisdom, the Crisis in Europe is the result of an imbalance between core and noncore countries that is inherent in the euro economic model. Underpinned by a process of monetary unification and financial deregulation, core eurozone countries pursued export-led growth policies-or, more specifically, "beggar thy neighbor" policies-at the expense of mounting disequilibria and Debt accumulation in the periphery. This imbalance became unsustainable, and this unsustainability was a causal factor in the global financial Crisis of 2007-08. The paper also maintains that the eurozone could avoid cumulative imbalances by adopting John Maynard Keynes's notion of the generalized banking principle (a fundamental principle of his clearing union proposal) as a central element of its monetary integration arrangement.
