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Octavian Buda - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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medical Deontology in psychiatry during the early communist period in romania
European Psychiatry, 2015Co-Authors: Sorin Hostiuc, Octavian BudaAbstract:Immediately after the World War Two, Romanian medical Deontology in general and Psychiatry Deontology in particular suffered a process of dissolution, causing a minimization of the role of the patient and a maximization of the role of the collectivity. This moral dissolution favoured acts of psychiatric abuse, most of them still unknown, against political dissidents, psychiatric patients, or even regular people considered reactionary by the political regime. The basis of medical ethics/Deontology was no longer the relation between physician and patient, but between physician and patient as the member of the collectivity. The basis of the medical ethics “must be beforehand the science of the physicians from a social and political point of view". This approach changed numerous paradigms that were present in medical Deontology for more than half of century in Romania. The purpose of this presentation is to succinctly present the most important elements of communist medical ethics with applicability in psychiatry, structured on the three main pillars of medical Deontology: the relation of the physician with his colleagues, the patient, and society. Acknowledgment This work was supported by a grant of the Romanian National Authority for Scientific Research, CNDI– UEFISCDI, PN-II-RU-TE-2012-3-44
Paul Hurley - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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The International Encyclopedia of Ethics - Paradox of Deontology
International Encyclopedia of Ethics, 2013Co-Authors: Paul HurleyAbstract:Consider a case in which, if some person A1 injures, lies to, kills, or in some other way violates another person P1, she will set in motion a chain of events that will prevent two other persons, A2 and A3, from similarly violating two other persons P2 and P3. Intuitively, it is wrong in such a case for A1 to violate P1: A1 has an obligation not to violate others just as A2 and A3 do, and prevention of their violations of P2 and P3 does not justify A1 in violating her obligation to P1. Rights, for example, are commonly understood as generating such obligations not to violate even in certain cases in which such a violation can prevent more such violations from happening (see Rights). Many moral theories, including deontological theories (see Deontology), attempt to provide rationales for such intuitive moral restrictions. Keywords: Deontology; ethics; normative ethics; philosophy; value
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scheffler s argument for Deontology
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 1993Co-Authors: Paul HurleyAbstract:La quete d'un raisonnement deontologique plausible est devenu l'axe central du debat de l'ethique normative contemporaine. Selon l'A., S. Scheffler a peut etre accompli cette quete dans « The Rejection of Consequentialism » (1982) ou il propose une theorie hybride entre consequentialisme et deontologie
Chelsea Schein - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Two Minds Vs. Two Philosophies: Mind Perception Defines Morality and Dissolves the Debate Between Deontology and Utilitarianism
Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 2012Co-Authors: Kurt Gray, Chelsea ScheinAbstract:Mind perception is the essence of moral judgment. Broadly, moral standing is linked to perceptions of mind, with moral responsibility tied to perceived agency, and moral rights tied to perceived experience. More specifically, moral judgments are based on a fundamental template of two perceived minds—an intentional agent and a suffering patient. This dyadic template grows out of the universal power of harm, and serves as a cognitive working model through which even atypical moral events are understood. Thus, all instances of immorality are perceived to involve both blameworthy agents (i.e., acts) and suffering victims (i.e., consequences). Because moral cognition simultaneously concerns acts and consequences, theories which focus primarily on acts (i.e., Deontology) or consequences (i.e., utilitarianism) do not accurately describe moral cognition. Indeed, the phenomenon of dyadic completion suggests that deontological and utilitarian concerns are not only simultaneously active, but also typically compatible and reinforcing: wrong acts have harmful consequences, and harmful consequences stem from wrong acts. The cognitive fusion of acts with consequences suggests that normative conflicts between Deontology and utilitarianism are not reflected in everyday moral judgment. This in turn suggests that empirical conclusions drawn from moral dilemmas that pit utilitarianism against Deontology—i.e., trolley problems—give an skewed account of moral cognition.
Irene Van Staveren - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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beyond utilitarianism and Deontology ethics in economics
Review of Political Economy, 2007Co-Authors: Irene Van StaverenAbstract:This article starts from a methodological position that fact and value are mutually related, both in the real world and in economic analysis. It then discusses deontological ethics. This approach is concerned with equality and dignity, as expressed in right and norms, and how these rights and norms constrain individual choices. Deontology is thus different from the utility maximisation of utilitarian ethics, where ethics appears in utility functions as moral preferences. The paper then argues that, although Deontology does better than utilitarianism in analysing ethics in economics, it has its own weaknesses. These weaknesses require another theory of ethics for economics, virtue ethics, which emphasises the interrelatedness of agents and commitment to shared values beyond the rules that a society has institutionalised. Virtue ethics internalises morality not as a preference or a constraint, but through the practices in which agents are related in their pursuit of value added.
Anthony Robert Booth - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Deontology in ethics and epistemology
Metaphilosophy, 2008Co-Authors: Anthony Robert BoothAbstract:In this article, I consider some of the similarities and differences between deontologism in ethics and epistemology. In particular, I highlight two salient differences between them. I aim to show that by highlighting these differences we can see that epistemic deontologism does not imply epistemic internalism and that it is not a thesis primarily about epistemic permissibility. These differences are: (1) deontologism in epistemology has a quasi-teleological feature (not shared with moral deontologism) in that it does not require that one abide by epistemic duties for the sake of (and not merely in accordance with) those very duties; and (2) in ethics, the relevant options we speak of are whether someone acts or does not act; in epistemology, we have an analogous further option: we can speak of whether someone believes that p, fails to believe that p, or withholds judgment about that p