The Experts below are selected from a list of 294 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform

William Wheeler - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

Roger Boesche - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • tocqueville s road map methodology liberalism revolution and Despotism
    2006
    Co-Authors: Roger Boesche
    Abstract:

    Chapter 1 Why Could Tocqueville Predict So Well? Chapter 2 The Strange Liberalism of Alexis de Tocqueville Chapter 3 Tocqueville: The Tension Between Commerce and Citizenship Chapter 4 Why Did Tocqueville Think a Successful Revolution Was Impossible? Chapter 5 The Dark Side of Tocqueville: On War and Empire Chapter 6 Hedonism and Nihilism: The Predictions of Tocqueville and Nietzsche Chapter 7 The Prison: Tocqueville's Model of Despotism Chapter 8 Tocqueville and Arendt on the Novelty of Modern Tyranny Chapter 9 Le Commerce: A Newspaper Expressing Tocqueville's Unusual Liberalism

  • fearing monarchs and merchants montesquieu s two theories of Despotism
    Political Research Quarterly, 1990
    Co-Authors: Roger Boesche
    Abstract:

    lthough he did not invent the word Despotism, Montesquieu more than any other author established it in that lexicon of political and politicized words--words such as capitalism, socialism, individualism, and bureaucracyinvented in the last three centuries in response either to specific political necessities or to more general political goals. In this case, the opponents of Louis XIV's arbitrary uses of power apparently invented the French word Despotisme in the 1690s. The root of this word is, of course, Greek in origin, and in ancient Greek usage, a despot (despdtis) was technically a master who ruled in a household over those who were slaves or servants by nature. For Aristotle, however, the noun despot and the adjective despotic (despotikos) had political connotations, because such despotic rule was in a sense appropriate not only toward most servants and slaves within a household but toward all, such as barbarians, who were unable to be free. "For barbarians," wrote Aristotle, "being more servile in character than Hellenes, and Asiatics than Europeans, do not rebel against a despotic government" (Politics 1285al9-21). On occasion, Aristotle even used the words despotic and tyrannical interchangeably, but, when discussing the misuse of political power, Aristotle most often focused his attention on analyzing the political phenomenon of tyranny (tyrannus). The French word despotique first emerged when the pamphleteers for the Fronde attacked Cardinal Mazarin who was ruling in Louis XIV's name, but by the end of the seventeenth century, writers and again especially pamphleteers, were using such phrases as monarchie despotique, pouvoir despotique, puissance despotique, and gouvernement despotique in their protests against the extension of royal power. Although in 1704 Pierre Bayle apparently became the first writer of distinction to use the word Despotisme, the word had been coined in the 1690s. And now an old and altered Greek

Simon T Powers - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • can justice be fair when it is blind how social network structures can promote or prevent the evolution of Despotism
    arXiv: Populations and Evolution, 2018
    Co-Authors: Cedric Perret, Simon T Powers, Jeremy Pitt, Emma Hart
    Abstract:

    Hierarchy is an efficient way for a group to organize, but often goes along with inequality that benefits leaders. To control despotic behaviour, followers can assess leaders decisions by aggregating their own and their neighbours experience, and in response challenge despotic leaders. But in hierarchical social networks, this interactional justice can be limited by (i) the high influence of a small clique who are treated better, and (ii) the low connectedness of followers. Here we study how the connectedness of a social network affects the co-evolution of Despotism in leaders and tolerance to Despotism in followers. We simulate the evolution of a population of agents, where the influence of an agent is its number of social links. Whether a leader remains in power is controlled by the overall satisfaction of group members, as determined by their joint assessment of the leaders behaviour. We demonstrate that centralization of a social network around a highly influential clique greatly increases the level of Despotism. This is because the clique is more satisfied, and their higher influence spreads their positive opinion of the leader throughout the network. Finally, our results suggest that increasing the connectedness of followers limits Despotism while maintaining hierarchy.

  • an evolutionary model explaining the neolithic transition from egalitarianism to leadership and Despotism
    Proceedings of The Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 2014
    Co-Authors: Simon T Powers, Laurent Lehmann
    Abstract:

    The Neolithic was marked by a transition from small and relatively egalitarian groups to much larger groups with increased stratification. But, the dynamics of this remain poorly understood. It is hard to see how Despotism can arise without coercion, yet coercion could not easily have occurred in an egalitarian setting. Using a quantitative model of evolution in a patch-structured population, we demonstrate that the interaction between demographic and ecological factors can overcome this conundrum. We model the coevolution of individual preferences for hierarchy alongside the degree of Despotism of leaders, and the dispersal preferences of followers. We show that voluntary leadership without coercion can evolve in small groups, when leaders help to solve coordination problems related to resource production. An example is coordinating construction of an irrigation system. Our model predicts that the transition to larger despotic groups will then occur when: (i) surplus resources lead to demographic expansion of groups, removing the viability of an acephalous niche in the same area and so locking individuals into hierarchy; (ii) high dispersal costs limit followers' ability to escape a despot. Empirical evidence suggests that these conditions were probably met, for the first time, during the subsistence intensification of the Neolithic.

Manfred Kets F R De Vries - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • the spirit of Despotism understanding the tyrant within
    Human Relations, 2006
    Co-Authors: Manfred Kets F R De Vries
    Abstract:

    The objective of this article is to better understand the developmental history of despotic regimes and the existence of leadership by terror. To gain greater insight into this phenomenon, the unusual relationship between leaders and followers in despotic regimes is explored, and the self-destructive cycle that characterizes such regimes is examined. The price paid in the form of human suffering and the breakdown of the moral fabric of a society is highlighted. In this article, particular attention is paid to highly intrusive totalitarian regimes. The levers used by such regimes to consolidate their power base are discussed in detail. The role of ideology, the enforcement of mind-control, the impact of the media, the inception of the illusion of solidarity, and the search for scapegoats are part of the review. Finally, suggestions are made on how to prevent despotic leaders from gaining a hold on power. Observations are made about the newly founded International Criminal Court, a permanent international j...

Laurent Lehmann - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • an evolutionary model explaining the neolithic transition from egalitarianism to leadership and Despotism
    Proceedings of The Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 2014
    Co-Authors: Simon T Powers, Laurent Lehmann
    Abstract:

    The Neolithic was marked by a transition from small and relatively egalitarian groups to much larger groups with increased stratification. But, the dynamics of this remain poorly understood. It is hard to see how Despotism can arise without coercion, yet coercion could not easily have occurred in an egalitarian setting. Using a quantitative model of evolution in a patch-structured population, we demonstrate that the interaction between demographic and ecological factors can overcome this conundrum. We model the coevolution of individual preferences for hierarchy alongside the degree of Despotism of leaders, and the dispersal preferences of followers. We show that voluntary leadership without coercion can evolve in small groups, when leaders help to solve coordination problems related to resource production. An example is coordinating construction of an irrigation system. Our model predicts that the transition to larger despotic groups will then occur when: (i) surplus resources lead to demographic expansion of groups, removing the viability of an acephalous niche in the same area and so locking individuals into hierarchy; (ii) high dispersal costs limit followers' ability to escape a despot. Empirical evidence suggests that these conditions were probably met, for the first time, during the subsistence intensification of the Neolithic.