The Experts below are selected from a list of 12225 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform

Christel Seguin - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • dalculus theory and tool for Development Assurance Level allocation
    International Conference on Computer Safety Reliability and Security, 2011
    Co-Authors: Pierre Bieber, Remi Delmas, Christel Seguin
    Abstract:

    The Development Assurance Level (DAL) indicates the Level of rigor of the Development of a software or hardware function of an aircraft. We propose a theory formalizing the DAL allocation rules found in the ARP4754a recommended practices. A tool implementing this theory was developed in order to assist the safety specialists when checking or optimizing a DAL allocation.

Pierre Bieber - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • dalculus theory and tool for Development Assurance Level allocation
    International Conference on Computer Safety Reliability and Security, 2011
    Co-Authors: Pierre Bieber, Remi Delmas, Christel Seguin
    Abstract:

    The Development Assurance Level (DAL) indicates the Level of rigor of the Development of a software or hardware function of an aircraft. We propose a theory formalizing the DAL allocation rules found in the ARP4754a recommended practices. A tool implementing this theory was developed in order to assist the safety specialists when checking or optimizing a DAL allocation.

Remi Delmas - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • dalculus theory and tool for Development Assurance Level allocation
    International Conference on Computer Safety Reliability and Security, 2011
    Co-Authors: Pierre Bieber, Remi Delmas, Christel Seguin
    Abstract:

    The Development Assurance Level (DAL) indicates the Level of rigor of the Development of a software or hardware function of an aircraft. We propose a theory formalizing the DAL allocation rules found in the ARP4754a recommended practices. A tool implementing this theory was developed in order to assist the safety specialists when checking or optimizing a DAL allocation.

Evgeny Neretin - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Development of safety requirements for tracking active pilot controls by signals from an automatic flight control system
    2019 International Conference on Control Artificial Intelligence Robotics & Optimization (ICCAIRO), 2019
    Co-Authors: Artem Savelev, Evgeny Neretin
    Abstract:

    In modern aircraft, pilot controls are increasingly becoming sidesticks instead of steering yokes. This causes a problem, such as the lack of tactile awareness of the crew about the operation of the autopilot. One of the promising ways to develop the aircraft industry today is to introduce active pilot controls into Integrated Flight Control System (which include Fly-by-wire System and Automatic Flight Control System). Currently, not a single certified large aircraft has the integration of active controls in the Integrated Flight Control System. The purpose of the work is to analyze the need to integrate the work of active pilot controls into the work of an Automatic Flight Control System and the available results in the world. For this, simplified schemes of classical Integrated Flight Control Systems with passive pilot controls and a perspective scheme of an Integrated Flight Control System with active pilot controls are presented. This function is called "Moving the sidestick from the autopilot." For this function, the following tasks are solved within the framework of this article: functional hazard assessment to determine the qualitative and quantitative requirements for the Development of a function. The second part of developing safety requirements is to use the Failure Tree Analysis tool and determine budgets according to the Item Development Assurance Level and quantitative requirements for the probability of failures. The methodology for conducting this safety analyzes is based on accepted international standards - ARP 4761 and ARP 4754A. The article concludes that it is necessary to introduce active pilot controls as an opportunity to provide tactile feedback to the pilot during automatic approaches to ICAO Category IIIb, and specific quantitative and qualitative safety requirements are formulated to ensure this function.

Simon, Donald L. - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Electrified Aircraft Propulsion Systems: Potential Failure Modes and Failure Mitigation Strategies
    2019
    Co-Authors: Connolly, Joseph W., Simon, Donald L.
    Abstract:

    Electrified aircraft propulsion (EAP) systems hold great potential for the reduction of aircraft fuel burn, emissions, and noise. Currently, NASA and other organizations are actively working to identify and mature technologies necessary to bring EAP designs to reality. A requirement for the Development of any civil aircraft and its systems is to ensure that potential hazards in the design are identified and appropriately mitigated to ensure that the system is safe. During aircraft Development, a system safety assessment that consists of a functional hazard assessment is conducted to identify all potential failure conditions of each function, and classify those failures according to the severity of their effects on the aircraft or its occupants. The more severe a function's failure condition classification, the greater the Development Assurance Level required for the function to ensure that the probability of the hazard is acceptably low. Today, aircraft engines and their control systems receive type certificate approval as a stand-alone system to signify their airworthiness. However, the complex coupling and distributed nature of EAP designs are expected to place added challenges on the certification of these systems. This presentation will provide an initial high-Level review of the potential failure modes and hazards posed by a generic EAP system along with potential mitigation strategies for those failures. The EAP system is assumed to be a hybrid design consisting of gas turbine engines, mechanical drives, electric machines, power electronics and distribution systems, energy storage devices, and motor driven propulsors. The functionality provided by each of these EAP subsystems will be discussed along with the potential failure modes they may encounter. This will include a discussion of coupled failure effects, where a fault in one EAP subsystem effects the operation of other subsystems in the architecture. Next, potential failure mitigation strategies are discussed including both software-based and hardware-based mitigation strategies. The presentation will conclude with an example evaluation of the potential failure modes and mitigation strategies for a concept EAP system proposed by NASA