The Experts below are selected from a list of 12987 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Russell D. Roberts - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Government subsidies to private spending on public goods
Public Choice, 1992Co-Authors: Russell D. RobertsAbstract:This paper examines how the size of an efficient subsidy varies with the amount of free-riding and the presence of distorting Taxation. Ironically, the existence of free-riding, where some individuals make no voluntary contribution at all, reduces the size of an efficient subsidy and makes a subsidy more attractive compared to Direct Taxation. For the gain to be significant, the number of donors must be extremely few in number. Even when the gains from a subsidy relative to Direct Taxation are small, a subsidy may dominate Direct Taxation because it can reveal an efficient level of the public good. The analysis distinguishes between traditional public goods such as national defense, and what I call transfer public goods, where members of society care about the consumption of a particular group in society such as the poor. I generalize the Samuelson (1954) results to derive conditions for efficiency in providing transfer public goods.
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Government subsidies to private spending on public goods
Public Choice, 1992Co-Authors: Russell D. RobertsAbstract:This paper examines how the size of an efficient subsidy varies with the amount of freeriding and the presence of distorting Taxation. Ironically, the existence of free-riding, where some individuals make no voluntary contribution at all, reduces the size of an efficient subsidy and makes a subsidy more attractive compared to Direct Taxation. For the gain to be significant, the number of donors must be extremely few in number. Even when the gains from a subsidy relative to Direct Taxation are small, a subsidy may dominate Direct Taxation because it can reveal an efficient level of the public good. The analysis distinguishes between traditional public goods such as national defense, and what the author calls transfer public goods, where members of society care about the consumption of a particular group in society such as the poor. He generalizes the Samuelson (1954) results to derive conditions for efficiency in providing transfer public goods. Copyright 1992 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
Oliver Owen - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Direct Taxation and state society relations in lagos nigeria
Development and Change, 2018Co-Authors: Leah Gatt, Oliver OwenAbstract:Existing research suggests that external sources of finance, such as foreign aid and natural resource rents, allow states to generate revenue independently of their societies, disincentivizing them from forming close links with their citizens and severely problematizing the notion of a social contract. In Lagos, Nigeria's commercial capital, a series of personal income tax reforms have seen an increase in taxpayer compliance. Considering Lagosians’ perceptions of their relation with the state government, this study examines whether the state had to ‘earn’ its revenue by developing a closer relationship with its citizens, and whether citizens responded through a greater willingness to pay tax. It explores how citizens understand this relationship, what role they perceive themselves to fulfil, and what their expectations are for the future of state–society relations. The study shows how, through efforts to visibly link tax to service delivery, a social contract is emerging between Lagos State and its citizens — but that this relationship differs among groups, in that it is shaped by pre‐existing concepts of public organization and modes of political engagement.
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Direct Taxation and State–Society Relations in Lagos, Nigeria
Development and Change, 2018Co-Authors: Leah Gatt, Oliver OwenAbstract:Existing research suggests that external sources of finance, such as foreign aid and natural resource rents, allow states to generate revenue independently of their societies, disincentivizing them from forming close links with their citizens and severely problematizing the notion of a social contract. In Lagos, Nigeria's commercial capital, a series of personal income tax reforms have seen an increase in taxpayer compliance. Considering Lagosians’ perceptions of their relation with the state government, this study examines whether the state had to ‘earn’ its revenue by developing a closer relationship with its citizens, and whether citizens responded through a greater willingness to pay tax. It explores how citizens understand this relationship, what role they perceive themselves to fulfil, and what their expectations are for the future of state–society relations. The study shows how, through efforts to visibly link tax to service delivery, a social contract is emerging between Lagos State and its citizens — but that this relationship differs among groups, in that it is shaped by pre‐existing concepts of public organization and modes of political engagement.
Kai A. Konrad - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Union strategy and optimal Direct Taxation
Journal of Public Economics, 2006Co-Authors: Sebastian G. Kessing, Kai A. KonradAbstract:Restrictions on working hours are more important in countries with a large welfare state. We show that this empirical observation is consistent with the strategic effects of such restrictions in a welfare state in the context of optimal Direct Taxation in the tradition of Mirrlees (1971) [Mirrlees, J.A., 1971. An exploration in the theory of optimum income Taxation. Review of Economic Studies 38, 175–208]. Our results also apply to non-welfarist states that have income redistribution, but not in purely extortionary states
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Union strategy and optimal Direct Taxation
Journal of Public Economics, 2005Co-Authors: Sebastian G. Kessing, Kai A. KonradAbstract:Restrictions on work hours are more important in countries with a large welfare state. We show that this empirical observation is consistent with the strategic effects of such restrictions in a welfare state in the context of optimal Direct Taxation in the tradition of Mirrlees (1971). Our results also apply to non-welfarist states which have income redistribution, but not in purely extortionary states.
Leah Gatt - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Direct Taxation and state society relations in lagos nigeria
Development and Change, 2018Co-Authors: Leah Gatt, Oliver OwenAbstract:Existing research suggests that external sources of finance, such as foreign aid and natural resource rents, allow states to generate revenue independently of their societies, disincentivizing them from forming close links with their citizens and severely problematizing the notion of a social contract. In Lagos, Nigeria's commercial capital, a series of personal income tax reforms have seen an increase in taxpayer compliance. Considering Lagosians’ perceptions of their relation with the state government, this study examines whether the state had to ‘earn’ its revenue by developing a closer relationship with its citizens, and whether citizens responded through a greater willingness to pay tax. It explores how citizens understand this relationship, what role they perceive themselves to fulfil, and what their expectations are for the future of state–society relations. The study shows how, through efforts to visibly link tax to service delivery, a social contract is emerging between Lagos State and its citizens — but that this relationship differs among groups, in that it is shaped by pre‐existing concepts of public organization and modes of political engagement.
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Direct Taxation and State–Society Relations in Lagos, Nigeria
Development and Change, 2018Co-Authors: Leah Gatt, Oliver OwenAbstract:Existing research suggests that external sources of finance, such as foreign aid and natural resource rents, allow states to generate revenue independently of their societies, disincentivizing them from forming close links with their citizens and severely problematizing the notion of a social contract. In Lagos, Nigeria's commercial capital, a series of personal income tax reforms have seen an increase in taxpayer compliance. Considering Lagosians’ perceptions of their relation with the state government, this study examines whether the state had to ‘earn’ its revenue by developing a closer relationship with its citizens, and whether citizens responded through a greater willingness to pay tax. It explores how citizens understand this relationship, what role they perceive themselves to fulfil, and what their expectations are for the future of state–society relations. The study shows how, through efforts to visibly link tax to service delivery, a social contract is emerging between Lagos State and its citizens — but that this relationship differs among groups, in that it is shaped by pre‐existing concepts of public organization and modes of political engagement.
Sebastian G. Kessing - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Union strategy and optimal Direct Taxation
Journal of Public Economics, 2006Co-Authors: Sebastian G. Kessing, Kai A. KonradAbstract:Restrictions on working hours are more important in countries with a large welfare state. We show that this empirical observation is consistent with the strategic effects of such restrictions in a welfare state in the context of optimal Direct Taxation in the tradition of Mirrlees (1971) [Mirrlees, J.A., 1971. An exploration in the theory of optimum income Taxation. Review of Economic Studies 38, 175–208]. Our results also apply to non-welfarist states that have income redistribution, but not in purely extortionary states
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Union strategy and optimal Direct Taxation
Journal of Public Economics, 2005Co-Authors: Sebastian G. Kessing, Kai A. KonradAbstract:Restrictions on work hours are more important in countries with a large welfare state. We show that this empirical observation is consistent with the strategic effects of such restrictions in a welfare state in the context of optimal Direct Taxation in the tradition of Mirrlees (1971). Our results also apply to non-welfarist states which have income redistribution, but not in purely extortionary states.