The Experts below are selected from a list of 360 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Nora Lustig - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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fiscal policy income redistribution and poverty reduction in low and middle income countries
2017Co-Authors: Nora LustigAbstract:Using comparable fiscal incidence analysis, this paper examines the impact of fiscal policy on inequality and poverty in twenty-nine low and middle income countries for around 2010. Success in fiscal redistribution is driven primarily by redistributive efforts (share of social spending to GDP in each country) and the extent to which transfers are targeted to the poor and Direct Taxes targeted to the rich. While fiscal policy always reduces inequality, this is not the case with poverty. While spending on pre-school and primary school is pro-poor (the per capita transfer declines with income) in almost all countries, pro-poor secondary school spending is less prevalent, and tertiary education spending tends to be progressive only in relative terms (equalizing, but not pro-poor). Health spending is always equalizing except for in Jordan.
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fiscal policy income redistribution and poverty reduction in low and middle income countries working paper 448
2017Co-Authors: Nora LustigAbstract:Current policy discussion focuses primarily on the power of fiscal policy to reduce inequality. Yet, comparable fiscal incidence analysis for 28 low and middle income countries reveals that, although fiscal systems are always equalizing, that is not always true for poverty. In Ethiopia, Tanzania, Ghana, Nicaragua, and Guatemala the extreme poverty headcount ratio is higher after Taxes and transfers (excluding in-kind transfers) than before. In addition, to varying degrees, in all countries a portion of the poor are net payers into the fiscal system and are thus impoverished by the fiscal system. Consumption Taxes are the main culprits of fiscally-induced impoverishment. Net Direct Taxes are always equalizing and inDirect Taxes net of subsidies are equalizing in nineteen countries of the 28. While spending on pre-school and primary school is pro-poor (i.e., the per capita transfer declines with income) in almost all countries, pro-poor secondary school spending is less prevalent, and tertiary education spending tends to be progressive only in relative terms (i.e., equalizing but not pro-poor). Health spending is always equalizing but not always pro-poor. More unequal countries devote more resources to redistributive spending and appear to redistribute more. The latter, however, is not a robust result across specifications.
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income redistribution and poverty reduction in latin america the role of social spending and taxation in achieving development goals
Development, 2014Co-Authors: Nora LustigAbstract:How much do social spending and taxation contribute to achieving the goals of poverty reduction and expanding the access to education and health services among the poor? Standard fiscal incidence analyses applied to Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay using a comparable methodology yields the following results. Direct Taxes and cash transfers reduce inequality and poverty by non-trivial amounts in Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay but less so in Bolivia, Mexico, and Peru. In Bolivia and Brazil inDirect Taxes more than offset the poverty-reducing impact of cash transfers. When one includes the effect of in-kind transfers in education and health valued at government costs, they reduce inequality in all countries by considerably more than cash transfers. Spending on public education and health services is broadly pro-poor, with the exception of tertiary education and the health component of the social security system.
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the impact of Taxes and social spending on inequality and poverty in argentina bolivia brazil mexico peru and uruguay
Public Finance Review, 2014Co-Authors: Nora Lustig, Carola Pessino, John ScottAbstract:How much redistribution and poverty reduction is being accomplished in Latin America through social spending, subsidies, and Taxes? Standard fiscal incidence analyses applied to Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay using a comparable methodology yields the following results. Direct Taxes and cash transfers reduce inequality and poverty by nontrivial amounts in Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay but less so in Bolivia, Mexico, and Peru. While Direct Taxes are progressive, the redistributive impact is small because Direct Taxes as a share of GDP are generally low. Cash transfers are quite progressive in absolute terms, except in Bolivia where programs are not targeted to the poor. In Bolivia and Brazil, inDirect Taxes more than offset the poverty-reducing impact of cash transfers. When one includes the in-kind transfers in education and health, valued at government costs, they reduce inequality in all countries by considerably more than cash transfers, reflecting their relative size.
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the impact of Taxes and social spending on inequality and poverty in argentina bolivia brazil mexico and peru a synthesis of results
2012Co-Authors: Nora Lustig, Carola Pessino, John Scott, George Graymolina, Sean Higgins, Miguel Jaramillo, Wilson Jimenez, Veronica Paz, Claudiney Pereira, Ernesto YanezAbstract:We apply a standard tax and benefit incidence analysis to estimate the impact on inequality and poverty of Direct Taxes, inDirect Taxes and subsidies, and social spending (cash and food transfers and in-kind transfers in education and health). The extent of inequality reduction induced by Direct Taxes and transfers is rather small (2 percentage points on average) especially when compared with that found in Western Europe (15 percentage points on average). What prevents Argentina, Bolivia and Brazil from achieving similar reductions in inequality is not the lack of revenues but the fact that they spend less on cash transfers –especially transfers that are progressive in absolute terms--as a share of GDP. InDirect Taxes result in that net contributors to the fiscal system start at the fourth, third and even second decile on average, depending on the country. When in-kind transfers in education and health are added, however, the bottom six deciles are net recipients. The impact of transfers on inequality and poverty reduction could be higher if spending on Direct cash transfers that are progressive in absolute terms is increased, leakages to the nonpoor are reduced and coverage of the extreme poor by Direct transfer programs is expanded.
Alice Pirlot - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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don t blame it on wto law an analysis of the alleged wto law incompatibility of destination based Taxes
Florida Tax Review, 2020Co-Authors: Alice PirlotAbstract:The idea that corporations should be taxed in the jurisdiction where they make their sales or provide their services is getting more and more attention in the policy debate on international taxation. In 2016, U.S. House Speaker Paul Ryan proposed to introduce a destination-based cash flow tax (DBCFT) in order to reform the United States’ corporate income tax (CIT). Moreover, in the last few years, more and more countries have considered the adoption of new rules to tax the digital economy in the country where the users and/or the consumers are located. These proposals differ from traditional Direct Taxes imposed on corporations. They borrow from the tax design of inDirect Taxes, such as sales Taxes or value added Taxes. Consequently, it is difficult to predict whether these sui generis destination-based Taxes will fit in with superior legal provisions, in particular international tax and trade law. One recurring legal argument against destination-based Taxes is that they are likely to violate the law of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Using the DBCFT as a case study, this Article will assess the different conflicts that could arise between new types of destination-based Taxes and international trade law. Based on a critical approach informed by the analysis of the history and case law surrounding destination-based Taxes, this Article concludes that the likelihood that a DBCFT would be found incompatible with international trade law is much lower than past legal scholars have concluded. WTO law does not in itself prevent countries from adopting such Taxes. Since this conclusion could be extended by analogy to other, new types of destination-based Taxes, this Article could have important implications for policymakers who are willing to move towards taxation in the country of destination.
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don t blame it on wto law an analysis of the alleged wto law incompatibility of destination based Taxes
Social Science Research Network, 2019Co-Authors: Alice PirlotAbstract:The idea that corporations should be taxed in the jurisdiction where they make their sales or provide their services is getting more and more attention in the policy debate on international taxation. In 2016, U.S. House Speaker Paul Ryan proposed to introduce a destination-based cash flow tax (DBCFT) in order to reform America’s corporate income tax (CIT). Moreover, in the last few years, more and more countries have considered the adoption of new rules to tax the digital economy in the country where the users and/or the consumers are located. These proposals differ from traditional Direct Taxes imposed on corporations. They borrow from the tax design of inDirect Taxes, such as sales Taxes or value added Taxes. Consequently, it is difficult to predict whether these sui generis destination-based Taxes will fit in with superior legal provisions, in particular international tax and trade law. One recurring legal argument against destination-based Taxes is that they are likely to violate the law of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Using the DBCFT as a case study, this Article will assess the different conflicts that could arise between new types of destination-based Taxes and international trade law. Based on a critical approach informed by the analysis of the history and case-law surrounding destination-based Taxes, this Article concludes that the likelihood for a DBCFT to be found incompatible with international trade law is much lower than past legal scholars have concluded. WTO law does not in itself prevent countries from adopting such Taxes. Since this conclusion could be extended by analogy to other, new types of destination-based Taxes, this Article could have important implications for policy-makers who are willing to move towards taxation in the country of destination.
John Scott - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the impact of Taxes and social spending on inequality and poverty in argentina bolivia brazil mexico peru and uruguay
Public Finance Review, 2014Co-Authors: Nora Lustig, Carola Pessino, John ScottAbstract:How much redistribution and poverty reduction is being accomplished in Latin America through social spending, subsidies, and Taxes? Standard fiscal incidence analyses applied to Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay using a comparable methodology yields the following results. Direct Taxes and cash transfers reduce inequality and poverty by nontrivial amounts in Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay but less so in Bolivia, Mexico, and Peru. While Direct Taxes are progressive, the redistributive impact is small because Direct Taxes as a share of GDP are generally low. Cash transfers are quite progressive in absolute terms, except in Bolivia where programs are not targeted to the poor. In Bolivia and Brazil, inDirect Taxes more than offset the poverty-reducing impact of cash transfers. When one includes the in-kind transfers in education and health, valued at government costs, they reduce inequality in all countries by considerably more than cash transfers, reflecting their relative size.
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the impact of Taxes and social spending on inequality and poverty in argentina bolivia brazil mexico and peru a synthesis of results
2012Co-Authors: Nora Lustig, Carola Pessino, John Scott, George Graymolina, Sean Higgins, Miguel Jaramillo, Wilson Jimenez, Veronica Paz, Claudiney Pereira, Ernesto YanezAbstract:We apply a standard tax and benefit incidence analysis to estimate the impact on inequality and poverty of Direct Taxes, inDirect Taxes and subsidies, and social spending (cash and food transfers and in-kind transfers in education and health). The extent of inequality reduction induced by Direct Taxes and transfers is rather small (2 percentage points on average) especially when compared with that found in Western Europe (15 percentage points on average). What prevents Argentina, Bolivia and Brazil from achieving similar reductions in inequality is not the lack of revenues but the fact that they spend less on cash transfers –especially transfers that are progressive in absolute terms--as a share of GDP. InDirect Taxes result in that net contributors to the fiscal system start at the fourth, third and even second decile on average, depending on the country. When in-kind transfers in education and health are added, however, the bottom six deciles are net recipients. The impact of transfers on inequality and poverty reduction could be higher if spending on Direct cash transfers that are progressive in absolute terms is increased, leakages to the nonpoor are reduced and coverage of the extreme poor by Direct transfer programs is expanded.
U Shafi - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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romance and divorce between international law and eu law implications for european competence on Direct Taxes
Stanford Journal of International Law, 2015Co-Authors: Khan Niazi, U ShafiAbstract:This article investigates European constitutional competence to harmonize those provisions of Direct Taxes of Member States which are incidental to the functioning of the single European market. Explicitly, the EU law, since its inception to date, does not confer powers to the Union to harmonize income taxation of Member States. The sole express reference to income Taxes in EU law was an Article of the Treaty establishing the European Community (Article 293 EC) that was repealed during the Lisbon revision. The repealed provision urged the Member States to abolish double taxation by using tools of public international law, that is, outside the EU legal framework. The study explores the potential implications this repeal may have for EU tax mandate: (a) whether it implies an end to the EU tax powers at all in the realm of Direct Taxes? (b) Whether it is a neutral amendment with no consequences to what-so-ever EU tax authority was already put in place? Or, (c) whether the deletion of the sole income tax reference meant for Member States to proceed under the public international law in effect enhances implicit “federal” competence of the Union to intervene in national tax codes for establishment of a true European economic market? The article analyses the demise of the clause in a legal evolutionary paradigm at the interface of international law and EU law. In metaphor, I describe the changing evolutionary relationship between the European and international law regimes as a tale of romance and divorce. The two laws meet curiously during the 1950s; feelings grow and a bond develops between the two regimes; the romance between the two legal regimes attains its peak during the Maastricht phase; strains appear in their relationship after the Amsterdam revision; the split goes deeper after the Nice amendments and the two finally divorce at the Lisbon revision. Based on this ever-changing relationship framework between the two legal regimes, the article concludes (a) that the deletion of Article 293 EC indicates growing reliance of the integration project on European legal order rather than trusting inter-state treaties based on public international law and (b) an inherent growth in the European “federal” mandate to take broad-range actions to harmonize Direct Taxes in single market during the post-repeal period.
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romance and divorce between international law and eu law implications for european competence on Direct Taxes
Social Science Research Network, 2015Co-Authors: Khan Niazi, U ShafiAbstract:This article investigates European constitutional competence to harmonize those provisions of Direct Taxes of Member States which are incidental to the functioning of the single European market. Explicitly, the EU law, since its inception to date, does not confer powers to the Union to harmonize income taxation of Member States. The sole express reference to income Taxes in EU law was an Article of the Treaty establishing the European Community (Article 293 EC) that was repealed during the Lisbon revision. The repealed provision urged the Member States to abolish double taxation by using tools of public international law, that is, outside the EU legal framework. The study explores the potential implications this repeal may have for EU tax mandate: (a) whether it implies an end to the EU tax powers at all in the realm of Direct Taxes? (b) Whether it is a neutral amendment with no consequences to what-so-ever EU tax authority was already put in place? Or, (c) whether the deletion of the sole income tax reference meant for Member States to proceed under the public international law in effect enhances implicit “federal” competence of the Union to intervene in national tax codes for establishment of a true European economic market? The article analyses the demise of the clause in a legal evolutionary paradigm at the interface of international law and EU law. In metaphor, I describe the changing evolutionary relationship between the European and international law regimes as a tale of romance and divorce. The two laws meet curiously during the 1950s; feelings grow and a bond develops between the two regimes; the romance between the two legal regimes attains its peak during the Maastricht phase; strains appear in their relationship after the Amsterdam revision; the split goes deeper after the Nice amendments and the two finally divorce at the Lisbon revision. Based on this ever-changing relationship framework between the two legal regimes, the article concludes (a) that the deletion of Article 293 EC indicates growing reliance of the integration project on European legal order rather than trusting inter-state treaties based on public international law and (b) an inherent growth in the European “federal” mandate to take broad-range actions to harmonize Direct Taxes in single market during the post-repeal period.
Khan Niazi - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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romance and divorce between international law and eu law implications for european competence on Direct Taxes
Stanford Journal of International Law, 2015Co-Authors: Khan Niazi, U ShafiAbstract:This article investigates European constitutional competence to harmonize those provisions of Direct Taxes of Member States which are incidental to the functioning of the single European market. Explicitly, the EU law, since its inception to date, does not confer powers to the Union to harmonize income taxation of Member States. The sole express reference to income Taxes in EU law was an Article of the Treaty establishing the European Community (Article 293 EC) that was repealed during the Lisbon revision. The repealed provision urged the Member States to abolish double taxation by using tools of public international law, that is, outside the EU legal framework. The study explores the potential implications this repeal may have for EU tax mandate: (a) whether it implies an end to the EU tax powers at all in the realm of Direct Taxes? (b) Whether it is a neutral amendment with no consequences to what-so-ever EU tax authority was already put in place? Or, (c) whether the deletion of the sole income tax reference meant for Member States to proceed under the public international law in effect enhances implicit “federal” competence of the Union to intervene in national tax codes for establishment of a true European economic market? The article analyses the demise of the clause in a legal evolutionary paradigm at the interface of international law and EU law. In metaphor, I describe the changing evolutionary relationship between the European and international law regimes as a tale of romance and divorce. The two laws meet curiously during the 1950s; feelings grow and a bond develops between the two regimes; the romance between the two legal regimes attains its peak during the Maastricht phase; strains appear in their relationship after the Amsterdam revision; the split goes deeper after the Nice amendments and the two finally divorce at the Lisbon revision. Based on this ever-changing relationship framework between the two legal regimes, the article concludes (a) that the deletion of Article 293 EC indicates growing reliance of the integration project on European legal order rather than trusting inter-state treaties based on public international law and (b) an inherent growth in the European “federal” mandate to take broad-range actions to harmonize Direct Taxes in single market during the post-repeal period.
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romance and divorce between international law and eu law implications for european competence on Direct Taxes
Social Science Research Network, 2015Co-Authors: Khan Niazi, U ShafiAbstract:This article investigates European constitutional competence to harmonize those provisions of Direct Taxes of Member States which are incidental to the functioning of the single European market. Explicitly, the EU law, since its inception to date, does not confer powers to the Union to harmonize income taxation of Member States. The sole express reference to income Taxes in EU law was an Article of the Treaty establishing the European Community (Article 293 EC) that was repealed during the Lisbon revision. The repealed provision urged the Member States to abolish double taxation by using tools of public international law, that is, outside the EU legal framework. The study explores the potential implications this repeal may have for EU tax mandate: (a) whether it implies an end to the EU tax powers at all in the realm of Direct Taxes? (b) Whether it is a neutral amendment with no consequences to what-so-ever EU tax authority was already put in place? Or, (c) whether the deletion of the sole income tax reference meant for Member States to proceed under the public international law in effect enhances implicit “federal” competence of the Union to intervene in national tax codes for establishment of a true European economic market? The article analyses the demise of the clause in a legal evolutionary paradigm at the interface of international law and EU law. In metaphor, I describe the changing evolutionary relationship between the European and international law regimes as a tale of romance and divorce. The two laws meet curiously during the 1950s; feelings grow and a bond develops between the two regimes; the romance between the two legal regimes attains its peak during the Maastricht phase; strains appear in their relationship after the Amsterdam revision; the split goes deeper after the Nice amendments and the two finally divorce at the Lisbon revision. Based on this ever-changing relationship framework between the two legal regimes, the article concludes (a) that the deletion of Article 293 EC indicates growing reliance of the integration project on European legal order rather than trusting inter-state treaties based on public international law and (b) an inherent growth in the European “federal” mandate to take broad-range actions to harmonize Direct Taxes in single market during the post-repeal period.