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Alexander Strand - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the effect of economic conditions on the Disability Insurance program evidence from the great recession
Social Science Research Network, 2018Co-Authors: Nicole Maestas, Kathleen J Mullen, Alexander StrandAbstract:We examine the effect of cyclical job displacement during the Great Recession on the Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) program. Exploiting variation in the severity and timing of the recession across states, we estimate the effect of unemployment on SSDI applications and awards. We find the Great Recession induced nearly one million SSDI applications that otherwise would not have been filed, of which 41.8 percent were awarded benefits, resulting in over 400,000 new beneficiaries who made up 8.9 percent of all SSDI entrants between 2008-2012. More than one-half of the recession-induced awards were made on appeal. The induced applicants had less severe impairments than the average applicant. Only 9 percent had the most severe, automatically-qualifying impairments, 33 percent had functional impairments and no transferable skills, and the rest were denied for having insufficiently severe impairments and/or transferable skills. Our estimates imply the Great Recession increased claims processing costs by $2.960 billion during 2008-2012, and SSDI benefit obligations by $55.730 billion in present value, or $97.365 billion including both SSDI and Medicare benefits.
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the effect of Disability Insurance payments on beneficiaries earnings
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2017Co-Authors: Alexander M Gelber, Timothy Moore, Alexander StrandAbstract:Abstract A crucial issue is whether social Insurance affects work decisions through income or substitution effects. We examine this in the context of US Social Security Disability Insurance (DI), e...
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the effect of Disability Insurance payments on beneficiaries earnings
Research Papers in Economics, 2016Co-Authors: Alexander M Gelber, Timothy Moore, Alexander StrandAbstract:A crucial issue in studying social Insurance programs is whether they affect work decisions through income or substitution effects. We examine this in the context of U.S. Social Security Disability Insurance (DI), one of the largest social Insurance programs in the U.S. The formula linking DI payments to past earnings has discontinuous changes in the marginal replacement rate that allow us to use a regression kink design to estimate the effect of payment size on earnings. Using Social Security Administration data on all new DI beneficiaries from 2001 to 2007, we document a robust income effect of DI payments on earnings. Our preferred estimate is that an increase in DI payments of one dollar causes an average decrease in beneficiaries’ earnings of twenty cents. This suggests that the income effect represents an important factor in driving DI-induced reductions in earnings.
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the effect of Disability Insurance payments on beneficiaries earnings
Social Science Research Network, 2016Co-Authors: Timothy Moore, Alexander M Gelber, Alexander StrandAbstract:A crucial issue in studying social Insurance programs is whether they affect work decisions through income or substitution effects. We examine this in the context of U.S. Social Security Disability Insurance (DI), one of the largest social Insurance programs in the U.S. The formula linking DI payments to past earnings has discontinuous changes in the marginal replacement rate that allow us to use a regression kink design to estimate the effect of payment size on earnings. Using Social Security Administration data on all new DI beneficiaries from 2001 to 2007, we document a robust income effect of DI payments on earnings. Our preferred estimate is that an increase in DI payments of one dollar causes an average decrease in beneficiaries’ earnings of twenty cents. This suggests that the income effect represents an important factor in driving DI-induced reductions in earnings.Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.
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Disability Insurance and the great recession
Social Science Research Network, 2015Co-Authors: Nicole Maestas, Kathleen J Mullen, Alexander StrandAbstract:This paper reports research on the Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) program, which is designed to provide income to support workers who become unable to work because of a severe, long-lasting Disability. The research used administrative data to estimate the effect of labor market conditions, as measured by the unemployment rate, on the number of SSDI applications, the number and composition of initial allowances and denials, and the timing of applications relative to Disability onset. The authors analyzed the period of the Great Recession, and compare this period with business cycle effects over the past two decades, from 1992 through 2012. The analysis isolates the quantity and composition of applicants who are induced to apply for SSDI benefits when labor market opportunities decline, and therefore provides important new evidence about the group for whom SSDI application is a substitute for labor force participation, and their impact on the SSDI program.
Nicole Maestas - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the effect of economic conditions on the Disability Insurance program evidence from the great recession
Social Science Research Network, 2018Co-Authors: Nicole Maestas, Kathleen J Mullen, Alexander StrandAbstract:We examine the effect of cyclical job displacement during the Great Recession on the Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) program. Exploiting variation in the severity and timing of the recession across states, we estimate the effect of unemployment on SSDI applications and awards. We find the Great Recession induced nearly one million SSDI applications that otherwise would not have been filed, of which 41.8 percent were awarded benefits, resulting in over 400,000 new beneficiaries who made up 8.9 percent of all SSDI entrants between 2008-2012. More than one-half of the recession-induced awards were made on appeal. The induced applicants had less severe impairments than the average applicant. Only 9 percent had the most severe, automatically-qualifying impairments, 33 percent had functional impairments and no transferable skills, and the rest were denied for having insufficiently severe impairments and/or transferable skills. Our estimates imply the Great Recession increased claims processing costs by $2.960 billion during 2008-2012, and SSDI benefit obligations by $55.730 billion in present value, or $97.365 billion including both SSDI and Medicare benefits.
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Disability Insurance and the great recession
Social Science Research Network, 2015Co-Authors: Nicole Maestas, Kathleen J Mullen, Alexander StrandAbstract:This paper reports research on the Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) program, which is designed to provide income to support workers who become unable to work because of a severe, long-lasting Disability. The research used administrative data to estimate the effect of labor market conditions, as measured by the unemployment rate, on the number of SSDI applications, the number and composition of initial allowances and denials, and the timing of applications relative to Disability onset. The authors analyzed the period of the Great Recession, and compare this period with business cycle effects over the past two decades, from 1992 through 2012. The analysis isolates the quantity and composition of applicants who are induced to apply for SSDI benefits when labor market opportunities decline, and therefore provides important new evidence about the group for whom SSDI application is a substitute for labor force participation, and their impact on the SSDI program.
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Disability Insurance and health Insurance reform evidence from massachusetts
The American Economic Review, 2014Co-Authors: Nicole Maestas, Kathleen J Mullen, Alexander StrandAbstract:Abstract As health Insurance becomes available outside of the employment relationship as a result of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), the cost of applying for Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI)—potentially going without health Insurance coverage during a waiting period totaling 29 months from Disability onset —will decline for many people with employer-sponsored health Insurance. At the same time, the value of SSDI and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) participation will decline for individuals who otherwise lacked access to health Insurance. We study the 2006 Massachusetts health Insurance reform to estimate the potential effects of the ACA on SSDI and SSI applications.
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Disability Insurance and health Insurance reform evidence from massachusetts
Research Papers in Economics, 2014Co-Authors: Nicole Maestas, Kathleen J Mullen, Alexander StrandAbstract:As health Insurance becomes available outside of the employment relationship as a result of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), the cost of applying for Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) -- potentially going without health Insurance coverage during a waiting period totaling 29 months from Disability onset -- will decline for many people with employer-sponsored health Insurance. At the same time, the value of SSDI and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) participation will decline for individuals who otherwise lacked access to health Insurance. This paper studies the 2006 Massachusetts health Insurance reform to estimate the potential effects of the ACA on SSDI and SSI applications.
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Disability Insurance and healthcare reform evidence from massachusetts
Research Papers in Economics, 2013Co-Authors: Nicole Maestas, Kathleen J Mullen, Alexander StrandAbstract:As health Insurance becomes available outside of the employment relationship as a result of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), the cost of applying for Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI)—potentially going without health Insurance coverage during a waiting period totaling 29 months from Disability onset—will decline for many people with employer-sponsored health Insurance. At the same time, the value of SSDI and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) participation will decline for individuals who otherwise lacked access to health Insurance. We study the 2006 Massachusetts healthcare reform to estimate the potential effects of the ACA on SSDI and SSI applications.
Magne Mogstad - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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earnings disposable income and consumption of allowed and rejected Disability Insurance applicants
Social Science Research Network, 2015Co-Authors: Andreas Ravndal Kostol, Magne MogstadAbstract:Two key questions in thinking about the size and growth of the Disability Insurance program are to what extent it discourages work, and how valuable the Insurance is to individuals and families. These questions motivate our paper. We begin by describing the earnings, disposable income and consumption of awarded and rejected DI applicants, before and after the Disability onset and the allowance decision. Next, we discuss how these descriptive results can be interpreted through the lens of alternative empirical approaches. Our analysis uses a Norwegian population panel data set with detailed information about every individual and household.
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how financial incentives induce Disability Insurance recipients to return to work
The American Economic Review, 2014Co-Authors: Andreas Ravndal Kostol, Magne MogstadAbstract:Using a local randomized experiment that arises from a sharp discontinuity in Disability Insurance (DI) policy in Norway, we provide transparent and credible identification of how financial incentives induce DI recipients to return to work. We find that many DI recipients have considerable capacity to work that can be effectively induced by providing financial work incentives. We further show that providing work incentives to DI recipients may both increase their disposable income and reduce program costs. Our findings also suggest that targeted policies may be the most effective in encouraging DI recipients to return to work.
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how financial incentives induce Disability Insurance recipients to return to work
2012Co-Authors: Andreas Ravndal Kostol, Magne MogstadAbstract:Disability Insurance (DI) programs have long been criticized by economists for apparent work disincentives. Some countries have recently modified their programs such that DI recipients are allowed to keep some of their benefits if they return to work, and other countries are considering similar return-to-work policies. However, there is little empirical evidence of the effectiveness of programs that incentivize the return to work by DI recipients. Using a local randomized experiment that arises from a sharp discontinuity in DI policy in Norway, we provide transparent and credible identification of how financial incentives induce DI recipients to return to work. We find that many DI recipients have considerable capacity to work that can be effectively induced by providing financial work incentives. We also show that providing work incentives to DI recipients may both increase their disposable income and reduce program costs. Our findings also suggest that targeted policies may be the most effective in encouraging DI recipients to return to work.
Kathleen J Mullen - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the effect of economic conditions on the Disability Insurance program evidence from the great recession
Social Science Research Network, 2018Co-Authors: Nicole Maestas, Kathleen J Mullen, Alexander StrandAbstract:We examine the effect of cyclical job displacement during the Great Recession on the Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) program. Exploiting variation in the severity and timing of the recession across states, we estimate the effect of unemployment on SSDI applications and awards. We find the Great Recession induced nearly one million SSDI applications that otherwise would not have been filed, of which 41.8 percent were awarded benefits, resulting in over 400,000 new beneficiaries who made up 8.9 percent of all SSDI entrants between 2008-2012. More than one-half of the recession-induced awards were made on appeal. The induced applicants had less severe impairments than the average applicant. Only 9 percent had the most severe, automatically-qualifying impairments, 33 percent had functional impairments and no transferable skills, and the rest were denied for having insufficiently severe impairments and/or transferable skills. Our estimates imply the Great Recession increased claims processing costs by $2.960 billion during 2008-2012, and SSDI benefit obligations by $55.730 billion in present value, or $97.365 billion including both SSDI and Medicare benefits.
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Disability Insurance and the great recession
Social Science Research Network, 2015Co-Authors: Nicole Maestas, Kathleen J Mullen, Alexander StrandAbstract:This paper reports research on the Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) program, which is designed to provide income to support workers who become unable to work because of a severe, long-lasting Disability. The research used administrative data to estimate the effect of labor market conditions, as measured by the unemployment rate, on the number of SSDI applications, the number and composition of initial allowances and denials, and the timing of applications relative to Disability onset. The authors analyzed the period of the Great Recession, and compare this period with business cycle effects over the past two decades, from 1992 through 2012. The analysis isolates the quantity and composition of applicants who are induced to apply for SSDI benefits when labor market opportunities decline, and therefore provides important new evidence about the group for whom SSDI application is a substitute for labor force participation, and their impact on the SSDI program.
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Disability Insurance and health Insurance reform evidence from massachusetts
The American Economic Review, 2014Co-Authors: Nicole Maestas, Kathleen J Mullen, Alexander StrandAbstract:Abstract As health Insurance becomes available outside of the employment relationship as a result of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), the cost of applying for Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI)—potentially going without health Insurance coverage during a waiting period totaling 29 months from Disability onset —will decline for many people with employer-sponsored health Insurance. At the same time, the value of SSDI and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) participation will decline for individuals who otherwise lacked access to health Insurance. We study the 2006 Massachusetts health Insurance reform to estimate the potential effects of the ACA on SSDI and SSI applications.
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Disability Insurance and health Insurance reform evidence from massachusetts
Research Papers in Economics, 2014Co-Authors: Nicole Maestas, Kathleen J Mullen, Alexander StrandAbstract:As health Insurance becomes available outside of the employment relationship as a result of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), the cost of applying for Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) -- potentially going without health Insurance coverage during a waiting period totaling 29 months from Disability onset -- will decline for many people with employer-sponsored health Insurance. At the same time, the value of SSDI and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) participation will decline for individuals who otherwise lacked access to health Insurance. This paper studies the 2006 Massachusetts health Insurance reform to estimate the potential effects of the ACA on SSDI and SSI applications.
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Disability Insurance and healthcare reform evidence from massachusetts
Research Papers in Economics, 2013Co-Authors: Nicole Maestas, Kathleen J Mullen, Alexander StrandAbstract:As health Insurance becomes available outside of the employment relationship as a result of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), the cost of applying for Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI)—potentially going without health Insurance coverage during a waiting period totaling 29 months from Disability onset—will decline for many people with employer-sponsored health Insurance. At the same time, the value of SSDI and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) participation will decline for individuals who otherwise lacked access to health Insurance. We study the 2006 Massachusetts healthcare reform to estimate the potential effects of the ACA on SSDI and SSI applications.
Andreas Ravndal Kostol - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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earnings disposable income and consumption of allowed and rejected Disability Insurance applicants
Social Science Research Network, 2015Co-Authors: Andreas Ravndal Kostol, Magne MogstadAbstract:Two key questions in thinking about the size and growth of the Disability Insurance program are to what extent it discourages work, and how valuable the Insurance is to individuals and families. These questions motivate our paper. We begin by describing the earnings, disposable income and consumption of awarded and rejected DI applicants, before and after the Disability onset and the allowance decision. Next, we discuss how these descriptive results can be interpreted through the lens of alternative empirical approaches. Our analysis uses a Norwegian population panel data set with detailed information about every individual and household.
-
how financial incentives induce Disability Insurance recipients to return to work
The American Economic Review, 2014Co-Authors: Andreas Ravndal Kostol, Magne MogstadAbstract:Using a local randomized experiment that arises from a sharp discontinuity in Disability Insurance (DI) policy in Norway, we provide transparent and credible identification of how financial incentives induce DI recipients to return to work. We find that many DI recipients have considerable capacity to work that can be effectively induced by providing financial work incentives. We further show that providing work incentives to DI recipients may both increase their disposable income and reduce program costs. Our findings also suggest that targeted policies may be the most effective in encouraging DI recipients to return to work.
-
how financial incentives induce Disability Insurance recipients to return to work
2012Co-Authors: Andreas Ravndal Kostol, Magne MogstadAbstract:Disability Insurance (DI) programs have long been criticized by economists for apparent work disincentives. Some countries have recently modified their programs such that DI recipients are allowed to keep some of their benefits if they return to work, and other countries are considering similar return-to-work policies. However, there is little empirical evidence of the effectiveness of programs that incentivize the return to work by DI recipients. Using a local randomized experiment that arises from a sharp discontinuity in DI policy in Norway, we provide transparent and credible identification of how financial incentives induce DI recipients to return to work. We find that many DI recipients have considerable capacity to work that can be effectively induced by providing financial work incentives. We also show that providing work incentives to DI recipients may both increase their disposable income and reduce program costs. Our findings also suggest that targeted policies may be the most effective in encouraging DI recipients to return to work.
