The Experts below are selected from a list of 37920 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Adriana D Kugler - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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effects of employment protection on worker and job flows evidence from the 1990 italian reform
Labour Economics, 2008Co-Authors: Adriana D Kugler, Giovanni PicaAbstract:Abstract This paper uses the Italian Social Security employer-employee panel to study the effects of the Italian reform of 1990 on worker and job flows. We exploit the fact that this reform increased unjust Dismissal costs for businesses below 15 employees, while leaving Dismissal costs unchanged for bigger businesses, to set up a natural experiment research design. We find that the increase in Dismissal costs decreased accessions and separations for workers in small relative to large firms, especially in sectors with higher employment volatility, with a negligible impact on net employment. We also find some evidence suggesting that the reform reduced firms' entry rates and employment adjustments, but had no effect on exit rates.
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does employment protection reduce productivity evidence from us states
The Economic Journal, 2007Co-Authors: David H Autor, William R Kerr, Adriana D KuglerAbstract:Theory predicts that mandated employment protection may reduce productivity by distorting production choices. We use the adoption of wrongful-discharge protection by state courts in the US from 1970 to 1999 to evaluate the empirical link between Dismissal costs and productivity. Drawing on establishment-level data from the Census Bureau, our estimates suggest that wrongful-discharge protection reduces employment flows and firm entry rates. Moreover, plants engage in capital deepening and experience a decline in total factor productivity, indicative of altered production techniques. Evidence of strong contemporaneous growth in employment, however, leads us to view our findings as suggestive but tentative. An extensive literature explores the impact of Dismissal costs ‐ also frequently called firing costs or employment protection ‐ on the operation of labour markets. Beginning with the seminal work of Lazear (1990), much research has focused on assessing how Dismissal costs affect employment levels. Theory suggests, however, that Dismissal costs may have ambiguous effects on employment levels. Dismissal costs act as a tax on firing, which reduces Dismissals but also reduces hiring. The net effect of these offsetting factors is ambiguous, at least in the short run. It is perhaps not surprising therefore that the empirical literature has found widely varying effects of Dismissal costs on employment levels.
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do employment protections reduce productivity evidence from u s states
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2007Co-Authors: David H Autor, William R Kerr, Adriana D KuglerAbstract:Theory predicts that mandated employment protections may reduce productivity by distorting production choices. Firms facing (non-Coasean) worker Dismissal costs will curtail hiring below efficient levels and retain unproductive workers, both of which should affect productivity. These theoretical predictions have rarely been tested. We use the adoption of wrongful-discharge protections by U.S. state courts over the last three decades to evaluate the link between Dismissal costs and productivity. Drawing on establishment-level data from the Annual Survey of Manufacturers and the Longitudinal Business Database, our estimates suggest that wrongful-discharge protections reduce employment flows and firm entry rates. Moreover, analysis of plant-level data provides evidence of capital deepening and a decline in total factor productivity following the introduction of wrongful-discharge protections. This last result is potentially quite important, suggesting that mandated employment protections reduce productive efficiency as theory would suggest. However, our analysis also presents some puzzles including, most significantly, evidence of strong employment growth following adoption of Dismissal protections. In light of these puzzles, we read our findings as suggestive but tentative.
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effects of employment protection on worker and job flows evidence from the 1990 italian reform
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2005Co-Authors: Adriana D Kugler, Giovanni PicaAbstract:This paper uses the Italian Social Security employer-employee panel to study the effects of the Italian reform of 1990 on worker and job flows. We exploit the fact that this reform increased unjust Dismissal costs for firms below 15 employees, while leaving Dismissal costs unchanged for bigger firms, to set up a natural experiment research design. We find that the increase in Dismissal costs decreased accessions and separations for workers in small relative to big firms, especially in sectors with higher employment volatility. Moreover, we find that the reform reduced firms' employment adjustments on the internal margin as well as entry rates while increasing exit rates.
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How Do Firing Costs Affect Worker Flows in a World with Adverse Selection
Journal of Labor Economics, 2004Co-Authors: Adriana D Kugler, Gilles Saint-paulAbstract:This article provides theoretical and empirical analyses of a firing costs model with adverse selection. Our theory suggests that, as firing costs increase, firms increasingly prefer hiring employed workers, who are less likely to be lemons. Estimates of re-employment probabilities from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth support this prediction. Unjust-Dismissal provisions in U.S. states reduce the re-employment probabilities of unemployed workers relative to employed workers. Consistent with a lemons story, the relative effects of unjust-Dismissal provisions on the unemployed are generally smaller for union workers and those who lost their previous jobs due to the end of a contract.
Michael S. Wilkins - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Internal Control Opinion Shopping and Audit Market Competition
The Accounting Review, 2015Co-Authors: Nathan J. Newton, Julie S. Persellin, Dechun Wang, Michael S. WilkinsAbstract:ABSTRACT This study examines the extent to which audit clients successfully engage in internal control opinion shopping activities and whether audit market competition appears to facilitate those activities. Regulators have long been concerned about the impact of both audit market competition and opinion shopping on audit quality. We adopt the framework developed in Lennox (2000) to construct a proxy to measure the tendency that clients engage in internal control opinion shopping activities. Our empirical results suggest that clients are successful in shopping for clean internal control opinions. In addition, we find evidence that internal control opinion shopping occurs primarily in competitive audit markets. Finally, our results indicate that among auditor Dismissal clients, opinion shopping is more likely to occur when Dismissals are made relatively late during a reporting period and when audit market competition is high. Our findings have implications for the current policy debate regarding audit qual...
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Internal Control Opinion Shopping and Audit Market Competition
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2014Co-Authors: Nathan J. Newton, Julie S. Persellin, Dechun Wang, Michael S. WilkinsAbstract:This study examines the extent to which audit clients successfully engage in internal control opinion shopping activities and whether audit market competition appears to facilitate those activities. Regulators have long been concerned about the impact of both audit market competition and opinion shopping on audit quality. We adopt the framework developed in Lennox (2000) to construct a proxy to measure the tendency that clients engage in internal control opinion shopping activities. Our empirical results suggest that clients are successful in shopping for clean internal control opinions. In addition, we find evidence that internal control opinion shopping occurs primarily in competitive audit markets. Finally, our results indicate that among auditor Dismissal clients, opinion shopping is more likely to occur when Dismissals are made relatively late during a reporting period and when audit market competition is high. Our findings have implications for the current policy debate regarding audit quality and audit market competition.
Nathan J. Newton - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Internal Control Opinion Shopping and Audit Market Competition
The Accounting Review, 2015Co-Authors: Nathan J. Newton, Julie S. Persellin, Dechun Wang, Michael S. WilkinsAbstract:ABSTRACT This study examines the extent to which audit clients successfully engage in internal control opinion shopping activities and whether audit market competition appears to facilitate those activities. Regulators have long been concerned about the impact of both audit market competition and opinion shopping on audit quality. We adopt the framework developed in Lennox (2000) to construct a proxy to measure the tendency that clients engage in internal control opinion shopping activities. Our empirical results suggest that clients are successful in shopping for clean internal control opinions. In addition, we find evidence that internal control opinion shopping occurs primarily in competitive audit markets. Finally, our results indicate that among auditor Dismissal clients, opinion shopping is more likely to occur when Dismissals are made relatively late during a reporting period and when audit market competition is high. Our findings have implications for the current policy debate regarding audit qual...
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Internal Control Opinion Shopping and Audit Market Competition
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2014Co-Authors: Nathan J. Newton, Julie S. Persellin, Dechun Wang, Michael S. WilkinsAbstract:This study examines the extent to which audit clients successfully engage in internal control opinion shopping activities and whether audit market competition appears to facilitate those activities. Regulators have long been concerned about the impact of both audit market competition and opinion shopping on audit quality. We adopt the framework developed in Lennox (2000) to construct a proxy to measure the tendency that clients engage in internal control opinion shopping activities. Our empirical results suggest that clients are successful in shopping for clean internal control opinions. In addition, we find evidence that internal control opinion shopping occurs primarily in competitive audit markets. Finally, our results indicate that among auditor Dismissal clients, opinion shopping is more likely to occur when Dismissals are made relatively late during a reporting period and when audit market competition is high. Our findings have implications for the current policy debate regarding audit quality and audit market competition.
Hillary A Sale - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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what counts as fraud an empirical study of motions to dismiss under the private securities litigation reform act
Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 2005Co-Authors: Adam C Pritchard, Hillary A SaleAbstract:This article presents the findings of a study of the resolution of motions to dismiss securities fraud lawsuits since the passage of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) in 1995. Our sample consists of decisions on motions to dismiss in securities class actions by district and appellate courts in the Second and Ninth Circuits for cases filed after the passage of the Reform Act to the end of 2002. These circuits are the leading circuits for the filing of securities class actions and are generally recognized as representing two ends of the securities class action spectrum. Post-PSLRA, the Second Circuit applies the least restrictive pleading standard to securities claims and the Ninth Circuit applies the most restrictive. The Ninth Circuit's post-PSLRA reputation as being a tougher venue in which to win securities fraud class actions is borne out by a significantly higher Dismissal rate. The differences between the two circuits are also reflected in factors that correlate with Dismissal. For example, allegations of violations of accounting principles other than revenue recognition correlate negatively with Dismissal in the Second Circuit. This coefficient, however, is insignificant in our regressions for the Ninth Circuit. Allegations of revenue recognition violations are insignificant in both circuits, regardless of whether the issuer has been forced to restate those revenues. The circuits part ways on other factors as well: the Second Circuit is significantly less likely to dismiss cases with allegations of false forward-looking statements, a surprising result given the stringent standards for such statements imposed by the PSLRA. The Ninth Circuit is significantly less likely to dismiss complaints with allegations of ‘33 Act violations, and the Second Circuit is more likely to dismiss cases brought by the Milberg Weiss firm. When it comes to insider trading, however, both circuits are skeptical, and the allegations correlate with Dismissal in both circuits.
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what counts as fraud an empirical study of motions to dismiss under the private securities litigation reform act
Social Science Research Network, 2003Co-Authors: Adam C Pritchard, Hillary A SaleAbstract:This article presents the findings of a study of the resolution of motions to dismiss securities fraud lawsuits since the passage of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act in 1995. Our sample consists of decisions on motions to dismiss in securities class actions by district and appellate courts in the Second and Ninth Circuits for cases filed after the passage of the Reform Act to the end of 2001. These circuits are the leading circuits for the filing of securities class actions and are generally recognized as representing two ends of the securities class action spectrum. Post-PSLRA, the Second Circuit applies the least restrictive pleading standard to securities claims and the Ninth Circuit applies the most restrictive. We find some evidence that the Ninth Circuit's post-PSLRA reputation as being a tougher venue in which to win securities fraud class actions is born out by a significantly higher Dismissal rate. The differences between the two circuits are also reflected in factors that correlate with Dismissal. For example, allegations of violations of accounting principles other than revenue recognition correlate negatively with Dismissal in the Second Circuit. This coefficient, however, is insignificant in our regressions for the Ninth Circuit. Allegations of revenue recognition violations are insignificant in both circuits, whether or not the issuer has been forced to restate those revenues. The circuits part ways on other factors as well: the Second Circuit is significantly less likely to dismiss cases with allegations of false forward-looking statements, a surprising result given the stringent standards for such statements imposed by the PSLRA. The Ninth Circuit is significantly less likely to dismiss complaints with allegations of '33 Act violations and the Second Circuit is more likely to dismiss cases brought by the Milberg Weiss firm. When it comes to insider trading, however, the two circuits are both skeptical and the allegations correlate with Dismissal in both circuits.
Terry L Neal - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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audit committee characteristics and auditor Dismissals following new going concern reports
The Accounting Review, 2003Co-Authors: Joseph V Carcello, Terry L NealAbstract:One important role of audit committees is to protect external auditors from Dismissal following the issuance of an unfavorable report. We examine auditor Dismissals following new going‐concern reports that Big 6 firms issued between 1988 and 1999. Our findings suggest that audit committees with greater independence, greater governance expertise, and lower stockholdings are more effective in shielding auditors from Dismissal after the issuance of new going‐concern reports. In addition, we find that the relation between audit committee independence and auditor protection from Dismissal has grown stronger over time. Finally, independent audit committee members experience a significant increase in turnover rate after auditor Dismissals. These findings, coupled with those from Carcello and Neal (2000), suggest that when affiliated directors dominate the audit committee, management often can (1) pressure its auditor to issue an unmodified report despite going‐concern issues, and (2) dismiss its auditor if the a...
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audit committee characteristics and auditor Dismissals following new going concern reports
2002Co-Authors: Joseph V Carcello, Terry L NealAbstract:One important role of audit committees is to protect external auditors from Dismissal following the issuance of an unfavorable report. We examine auditor Dismissals following new going-concern reports that Big Six firms issued between 1988 and 1999. Our findings suggest that audit committees with greater independence, greater governance expertise, and lower stockholdings are more effective in shielding auditors from Dismissal after the issuance of new going-concern reports. In addition, we find that the relation between audit committee independence and auditor protection from Dismissal has grown stronger over time. Finally, independent audit committee members experience a significant increase in turnover rate after auditor Dismissals. These findings, coupled with those from Carcello and Neal (2000), suggest that when affiliated directors dominate the audit committee, management often can (1) pressure its auditor to issue an unmodified report despite going-concern issues, and (2) dismiss its auditor if the auditor refuses to issue an unmodified report.
