The Experts below are selected from a list of 311751 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Michael S. Wilkins - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Internal Control Opinion Shopping and Audit Market Competition
The Accounting Review, 2015Co-Authors: Nathan J. Newton, Julie S. Persellin, Dechun Wang, Michael S. WilkinsAbstract:ABSTRACT This study examines the extent to which audit clients successfully engage in internal control opinion shopping activities and whether audit Market Competition appears to facilitate those activities. Regulators have long been concerned about the impact of both audit Market Competition and opinion shopping on audit quality. We adopt the framework developed in Lennox (2000) to construct a proxy to measure the tendency that clients engage in internal control opinion shopping activities. Our empirical results suggest that clients are successful in shopping for clean internal control opinions. In addition, we find evidence that internal control opinion shopping occurs primarily in competitive audit Markets. Finally, our results indicate that among auditor dismissal clients, opinion shopping is more likely to occur when dismissals are made relatively late during a reporting period and when audit Market Competition is high. Our findings have implications for the current policy debate regarding audit qual...
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Internal Control Opinion Shopping and Audit Market Competition
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2014Co-Authors: Nathan J. Newton, Julie S. Persellin, Dechun Wang, Michael S. WilkinsAbstract:This study examines the extent to which audit clients successfully engage in internal control opinion shopping activities and whether audit Market Competition appears to facilitate those activities. Regulators have long been concerned about the impact of both audit Market Competition and opinion shopping on audit quality. We adopt the framework developed in Lennox (2000) to construct a proxy to measure the tendency that clients engage in internal control opinion shopping activities. Our empirical results suggest that clients are successful in shopping for clean internal control opinions. In addition, we find evidence that internal control opinion shopping occurs primarily in competitive audit Markets. Finally, our results indicate that among auditor dismissal clients, opinion shopping is more likely to occur when dismissals are made relatively late during a reporting period and when audit Market Competition is high. Our findings have implications for the current policy debate regarding audit quality and audit Market Competition.
Nathan J. Newton - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Internal Control Opinion Shopping and Audit Market Competition
The Accounting Review, 2015Co-Authors: Nathan J. Newton, Julie S. Persellin, Dechun Wang, Michael S. WilkinsAbstract:ABSTRACT This study examines the extent to which audit clients successfully engage in internal control opinion shopping activities and whether audit Market Competition appears to facilitate those activities. Regulators have long been concerned about the impact of both audit Market Competition and opinion shopping on audit quality. We adopt the framework developed in Lennox (2000) to construct a proxy to measure the tendency that clients engage in internal control opinion shopping activities. Our empirical results suggest that clients are successful in shopping for clean internal control opinions. In addition, we find evidence that internal control opinion shopping occurs primarily in competitive audit Markets. Finally, our results indicate that among auditor dismissal clients, opinion shopping is more likely to occur when dismissals are made relatively late during a reporting period and when audit Market Competition is high. Our findings have implications for the current policy debate regarding audit qual...
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Internal Control Opinion Shopping and Audit Market Competition
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2014Co-Authors: Nathan J. Newton, Julie S. Persellin, Dechun Wang, Michael S. WilkinsAbstract:This study examines the extent to which audit clients successfully engage in internal control opinion shopping activities and whether audit Market Competition appears to facilitate those activities. Regulators have long been concerned about the impact of both audit Market Competition and opinion shopping on audit quality. We adopt the framework developed in Lennox (2000) to construct a proxy to measure the tendency that clients engage in internal control opinion shopping activities. Our empirical results suggest that clients are successful in shopping for clean internal control opinions. In addition, we find evidence that internal control opinion shopping occurs primarily in competitive audit Markets. Finally, our results indicate that among auditor dismissal clients, opinion shopping is more likely to occur when dismissals are made relatively late during a reporting period and when audit Market Competition is high. Our findings have implications for the current policy debate regarding audit quality and audit Market Competition.
Shahbaz A Sheikh - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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CEO inside debt, Market Competition and corporate risk taking
International Journal of Managerial Finance, 2019Co-Authors: Shahbaz A SheikhAbstract:Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of Market Competition on the relation between CEO inside debt and corporate risk-taking. Design/methodology/approach Ordinary least squares regressions are used to estimate the relation between CEO inside debt and firm risk. Additionally, instrumental variable (IV-GMM) regressions are used to check the robustness of the results. Findings The results of this paper indicate that CEO inside debt is negatively associated with the measures of future risk. However, this negative association is influenced by Market Competition. Specifically, CEO inside debt results in lower levels of firm risk when Market Competition is high. When Market Competition is low, inside debt has no effect on firm risk. Additional results show that CEOs with large inside debt tend to decrease R&D investments and financial leverage and increase firm cash holdings and working capital only when Market Competition is high. Overall, these results suggest that Market Competition significantly influences the effect of CEO inside debt on corporate risk-taking by changing the strength of incentives from inside debt. Practical implications CEO inside debt could be used to provide incentives to CEOs to manage corporate risk-taking. Social implications The empirical results in this paper provide a practical tool to the boards of corporations to manage corporate risk-taking. The results suggest that boards can reduce excessive risk-taking by increasing the level of debt type compensation incentives. However, this strategy is effective only when Market Competition is high because in such Markets inside debt provides the strongest incentives to reduce corporate risk. When Competition is low, incentives from inside debt are ineffective in managing corporate risk-taking. Originality/value This is the first study that shows that the negative association between CEO inside debt and corporate risk-taking critically depends on the intensity of Market Competition.
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CEO power, product Market Competition and firm value
Research in International Business and Finance, 2018Co-Authors: Shahbaz A SheikhAbstract:Abstract This study empirically investigates the effect of product Market Competition on the relation between CEO power and firm value. Using an index of power that encompasses structural, ownership and expert dimensions of CEO power and industry adjusted Tobin’s Q to measure firm value, I find that CEO power has a positive and significant effect on firm value. However, this effect is driven by product Market Competition as CEO power has a positive effect on firm value only in high Competition Markets and no effect on firm value in low Competition Markets. I also find that CEO power is positively associated with firm value in high Competition Markets when corporate governance is strong indicating that Competition and corporate governance are complements. Overall, the results indicate that product Market Competition motivates powerful CEOs to use their powers to make value increasing decisions.
Dechun Wang - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Internal Control Opinion Shopping and Audit Market Competition
The Accounting Review, 2015Co-Authors: Nathan J. Newton, Julie S. Persellin, Dechun Wang, Michael S. WilkinsAbstract:ABSTRACT This study examines the extent to which audit clients successfully engage in internal control opinion shopping activities and whether audit Market Competition appears to facilitate those activities. Regulators have long been concerned about the impact of both audit Market Competition and opinion shopping on audit quality. We adopt the framework developed in Lennox (2000) to construct a proxy to measure the tendency that clients engage in internal control opinion shopping activities. Our empirical results suggest that clients are successful in shopping for clean internal control opinions. In addition, we find evidence that internal control opinion shopping occurs primarily in competitive audit Markets. Finally, our results indicate that among auditor dismissal clients, opinion shopping is more likely to occur when dismissals are made relatively late during a reporting period and when audit Market Competition is high. Our findings have implications for the current policy debate regarding audit qual...
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Internal Control Opinion Shopping and Audit Market Competition
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2014Co-Authors: Nathan J. Newton, Julie S. Persellin, Dechun Wang, Michael S. WilkinsAbstract:This study examines the extent to which audit clients successfully engage in internal control opinion shopping activities and whether audit Market Competition appears to facilitate those activities. Regulators have long been concerned about the impact of both audit Market Competition and opinion shopping on audit quality. We adopt the framework developed in Lennox (2000) to construct a proxy to measure the tendency that clients engage in internal control opinion shopping activities. Our empirical results suggest that clients are successful in shopping for clean internal control opinions. In addition, we find evidence that internal control opinion shopping occurs primarily in competitive audit Markets. Finally, our results indicate that among auditor dismissal clients, opinion shopping is more likely to occur when dismissals are made relatively late during a reporting period and when audit Market Competition is high. Our findings have implications for the current policy debate regarding audit quality and audit Market Competition.
Julie S. Persellin - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Internal Control Opinion Shopping and Audit Market Competition
The Accounting Review, 2015Co-Authors: Nathan J. Newton, Julie S. Persellin, Dechun Wang, Michael S. WilkinsAbstract:ABSTRACT This study examines the extent to which audit clients successfully engage in internal control opinion shopping activities and whether audit Market Competition appears to facilitate those activities. Regulators have long been concerned about the impact of both audit Market Competition and opinion shopping on audit quality. We adopt the framework developed in Lennox (2000) to construct a proxy to measure the tendency that clients engage in internal control opinion shopping activities. Our empirical results suggest that clients are successful in shopping for clean internal control opinions. In addition, we find evidence that internal control opinion shopping occurs primarily in competitive audit Markets. Finally, our results indicate that among auditor dismissal clients, opinion shopping is more likely to occur when dismissals are made relatively late during a reporting period and when audit Market Competition is high. Our findings have implications for the current policy debate regarding audit qual...
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Internal Control Opinion Shopping and Audit Market Competition
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2014Co-Authors: Nathan J. Newton, Julie S. Persellin, Dechun Wang, Michael S. WilkinsAbstract:This study examines the extent to which audit clients successfully engage in internal control opinion shopping activities and whether audit Market Competition appears to facilitate those activities. Regulators have long been concerned about the impact of both audit Market Competition and opinion shopping on audit quality. We adopt the framework developed in Lennox (2000) to construct a proxy to measure the tendency that clients engage in internal control opinion shopping activities. Our empirical results suggest that clients are successful in shopping for clean internal control opinions. In addition, we find evidence that internal control opinion shopping occurs primarily in competitive audit Markets. Finally, our results indicate that among auditor dismissal clients, opinion shopping is more likely to occur when dismissals are made relatively late during a reporting period and when audit Market Competition is high. Our findings have implications for the current policy debate regarding audit quality and audit Market Competition.
