The Experts below are selected from a list of 162252 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Wei Guan - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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The Role of Suppliers and Resellers : Cases of Timber Product Distribution Channels
2013Co-Authors: Wei GuanAbstract:This dissertation aims to explain the impacts of Distribution Channel developments on the roles of timber product Distribution Channel actors. The role of Channel actors in this dissertation is def ...
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Developments in Distribution Channels - A Case Study of a Timber Product Distribution Channel
2010Co-Authors: Wei GuanAbstract:This thesis describes and analyses the trends and developments of actors along Distribution Channel. In particular, the study focuses on resellers and manufacturer based on the empirical material f ...
Damien W Mather - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Country-of-origin and choice of food imports: an in-depth study of European Distribution Channel gatekeepers
Journal of International Business Studies, 2007Co-Authors: John G Knight, David K Holdsworth, Damien W MatherAbstract:Country-of-origin preferences of Distribution Channel gatekeepers when sourcing food imports were investigated using in-depth interviews in five European markets. Channel member perceptions of product-country image related more to specific issues of confidence and trust in integrity of production, certification and regulatory systems than to country image stereotypes. This study integrates these trust-determining factors with price-perceived value constructs in order to build a comprehensive model applicable to food Channel gatekeepers.
June Dong - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the closed loop supply chain network with competition Distribution Channel investment and uncertainties
Omega-international Journal of Management Science, 2013Co-Authors: Qiang Qiang, Trisha Anderson, June DongAbstract:In this paper, a closed-loop supply chain network is investigated with decentralized decision-makers consisting of raw material suppliers, retail outlets, and the manufacturers that collect the recycled product directly from the demand market. We derive the optimality conditions of the various decision-makers, and establish that the governing equilibrium conditions can be formulated as a finite-dimensional variational inequality problem. We establish convergence of the proposed algorithm that can allow for the discussion of the effects of competition, Distribution Channel investment, yield and conversion rates, combined with uncertainties in demand, on equilibrium quantity transactions and prices. Numerical examples are provided for illustration.
Duncan M Holthausen - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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price discrimination through a Distribution Channel theory and evidence
The American Economic Review, 1994Co-Authors: Eitan Gerstner, James D Hess, Duncan M HolthausenAbstract:Price-discrimination practices are common, but they typically are analyzed in a framework in which firms sell directly to end users (Louis Phlips, 1981; Richard Schmalensee, 1981; Hal Varian, 1985; Gerstner and Holthausen, 1986). This direct-Channel framework is valid for service industries such as entertainment and travel, where senior citizens buy reduced-price tickets to musical concerts, and children receive discounts on airfares and movietheater tickets. In the packaged-goods and durable-goods industries, however, manufacturers sell to retailers who sell to consumers. In indirect Channels like these, price discrimination occurs when manufacturers target "pull" discounts1 to price-conscious consumers in the form of coupons and rebates. Consumers who do not use these discounts pay higher net prices. Because manufacturers cannot dictate consumer prices to retailers, analysis of price discrimination ought to take into account the pricing behavior of retailers (Michael Katz, 1987; Gerstner and Hess, 1991). While some researchers have studied coupons as a means for price discrimination (William Levedahl, 1984; Chakravarthi Narasimhan, 1984), they have done so in a direct-Channel context and have ignored the role of retailers or other middlemen in the pricing and couponing process. In this paper we study price discrimination within a Channel of Distribution consisting of a single manufacturer and competitive retailers. In the model, the manufacturer pricediscriminates using a pull discount targeted at consumers with low reservation prices to reduce the net price these consumers pay for the product. Some consumers with higher reservation prices, who self-select not to use the discount, pay the full retail price for the product. The manufacturer chooses the wholesale price for the firm's product and the size of the price-discriminating pull discount, taking as given the markup percentage used by retailers. Joint determination of the manufacturer discount and retail markup is also considered. The paper's major finding is that a higher retail markup percentage influences the manufacturer to use price discrimination in a less intensive way (i.e., to reduce the size of the equilibrium pull discount as well as the wholesale price). The intuition behind this result is as follows. The greater the retail markup percentage, for a given wholesale price, the greater will be the retail price. The greater the retail price, the larger the pull discount will have to be to keep the low-reservation-price consumers in the market. But the manufacturer bears the entire cost of the discount, and a larger discount induces more nontargeted customers to use it. These two effects make price discrimination less profitable when markup percentage increases, so the manufacturer reduces its pull discount and in*Gerstner: Graduate School of Management, University of California, Davis, CA 95616, and Department of Economics, Haifa University, Haifa 31999, Israel; Hess: Department of Business Administration, University of Illinois, Champaign, IL 61820; Holthausen: Department of Economics, North Carolina State University, Box 7507, Raleigh, NC 27695. We thank Alastair Hall, Jeongwen Chiang, Randy Cooke, and Nick Ruotolo for their comments and assistance. 1Manufacturers who distribute products through retailers use "push" or "pull" techniques to increase sales. Under push, manufacturers offer inducements to retailers. When consumers shop for the product, the retailer has an incentive to promote the brand, thus pushing it through to consumers. Under pull, manufacturers offer incentives such as coupons or rebates directly to consumers. The manufacturers hope that demand will be pulled through the Channel by consumers asking retailers for the promoted brand.
Mehdi Zahaf - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Trust orientations in the organic food Distribution Channels: a comparative study of the Canadian and French markets
Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services, 2013Co-Authors: Leila Hamzaoui-essoussi, Lucie Sirieix, Mehdi ZahafAbstract:The objectives of this research are to (i) identify supply side factors that determine trust/mistrust in OF products, and (ii) determine the Distribution Channel strategies to increase trust in OF products. A total of 80 individual in-depth interviews were conducted in Canada and France with managers from superstores, specialty stores, farmers, markets, producers and certification bodies. Results show a clear distinction between the Canadian and French OF Distribution structures in terms of trust. Consequently, distributors have to adapt their strategies and tools in order to enhance trust in OF, in their Distribution Channel and in the overall food supply chain.
