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E. Fittipaldi - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • On Leon Petrażycki’s Critical Realism and Legal Realism
    Russian Legal Realism, 2018
    Co-Authors: E. Fittipaldi
    Abstract:

    The author shows that Petrazycki adopted a form of critical realism, and that, despite him never using the exact term “legal realism”, his approach to legal phenomena can be regarded as a form of legal realism—if understood as critical realism applied to legal phenomena. In the first part of the chapter, the author presents Petrazycki’s critical realism. Here, his theory of perception and his conceptualization of deduction/induction as a scientific method (akin to Popper’s method) is presented. In the second part of the chapter, the author shows that Petrazycki’s theory of law, as well as his legal Dogmatics and legal policy, should be all regarded as forms of legal realism. To this goal, after presenting Petrazycki’s distinction between objective-cognitive and subjective-relational sciences, the manner in which Petrazycki uses terms meaning “real”, “realist”, “realistic”, is examined. When reconstructing Petrazycki’s conception of legal Dogmatics, the author also draws on Lande’s writings—the most consistent developer of Petrazycki’s ideas.

  • theory of custom Dogmatics of custom policy of custom on the threefold approach of polish russian legal realism
    Ratio Juris, 2017
    Co-Authors: E. Fittipaldi, Elena Timoshina
    Abstract:

    Proceeding from the insights of Petrazycki, Polish-Russian legal realists (PRRs) distinguished legal theory, legal Dogmatics, and legal policy. Legal theory describes legal phenomena in a value-free way and formulates causal laws concerning those phenomena. Legal Dogmatics and legal policy are, by contrast, value-laden sciences involving the subject's—i.e., the scientist's—own attitudes toward existing or imagined phenomena: Dogmatics evaluates behaviors based on the subject's adoption of given normative sources (NSs) as binding, while legal policy evaluates the effects produced by given NSs based on causal laws and on the subject's goals (for Petrazycki, these goals come down to that of fostering love, or benevolence). PRRs then conceptualize custom as a representation of people behaving in a certain way (Rc): We have a custom on the threefold condition that (a) Rc is believed true by a given X, (b) Rc causes the existence of a given normative psychical experience (NPE) in X, and (c) X expressly refers to—or would refer—to Rc in justifying an NPE. PRRs use the term customary law to refer to legal experiences (i.e., NPEs involving a sense of entitlement) caused and justified by an Rc. From a theoretical perspective, both the subject's adoption of custom as a binding NS and its truth are irrelevant. It is only the presence of a customary NPE in the X under study that matters. From a dogmatic perspective, by contrast, what matters is (a) whether the dogmatician—qua subject—adopts custom as a binding NS, (b) whether it is true that people behave in a given way bw, and (c) whether bw resembles the behavior that is deontically qualified in the norm under dogmatic evaluation. Finally, from a legal-political viewpoint, PRRs hold that customary law in modern societies, owing to its conservative nature, should be eradicated for the goal of removing inequalities and fostering benevolence.

  • Theory of Custom, Dogmatics of Custom, Policy of Custom: On the Threefold Approach of Polish‐Russian Legal Realism
    Ratio Juris, 2016
    Co-Authors: E. Fittipaldi, Elena Timoshina
    Abstract:

    Proceeding from the insights of Petrazycki, Polish-Russian legal realists (PRRs) distinguished legal theory, legal Dogmatics, and legal policy. Legal theory describes legal phenomena in a value-free way and formulates causal laws concerning those phenomena. Legal Dogmatics and legal policy are, by contrast, value-laden sciences involving the subject's—i.e., the scientist's—own attitudes toward existing or imagined phenomena: Dogmatics evaluates behaviors based on the subject's adoption of given normative sources (NSs) as binding, while legal policy evaluates the effects produced by given NSs based on causal laws and on the subject's goals (for Petrazycki, these goals come down to that of fostering love, or benevolence). PRRs then conceptualize custom as a representation of people behaving in a certain way (Rc): We have a custom on the threefold condition that (a) Rc is believed true by a given X, (b) Rc causes the existence of a given normative psychical experience (NPE) in X, and (c) X expressly refers to—or would refer—to Rc in justifying an NPE. PRRs use the term customary law to refer to legal experiences (i.e., NPEs involving a sense of entitlement) caused and justified by an Rc. From a theoretical perspective, both the subject's adoption of custom as a binding NS and its truth are irrelevant. It is only the presence of a customary NPE in the X under study that matters. From a dogmatic perspective, by contrast, what matters is (a) whether the dogmatician—qua subject—adopts custom as a binding NS, (b) whether it is true that people behave in a given way bw, and (c) whether bw resembles the behavior that is deontically qualified in the norm under dogmatic evaluation. Finally, from a legal-political viewpoint, PRRs hold that customary law in modern societies, owing to its conservative nature, should be eradicated for the goal of removing inequalities and fostering benevolence.

Elena Timoshina - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • theory of custom Dogmatics of custom policy of custom on the threefold approach of polish russian legal realism
    Ratio Juris, 2017
    Co-Authors: E. Fittipaldi, Elena Timoshina
    Abstract:

    Proceeding from the insights of Petrazycki, Polish-Russian legal realists (PRRs) distinguished legal theory, legal Dogmatics, and legal policy. Legal theory describes legal phenomena in a value-free way and formulates causal laws concerning those phenomena. Legal Dogmatics and legal policy are, by contrast, value-laden sciences involving the subject's—i.e., the scientist's—own attitudes toward existing or imagined phenomena: Dogmatics evaluates behaviors based on the subject's adoption of given normative sources (NSs) as binding, while legal policy evaluates the effects produced by given NSs based on causal laws and on the subject's goals (for Petrazycki, these goals come down to that of fostering love, or benevolence). PRRs then conceptualize custom as a representation of people behaving in a certain way (Rc): We have a custom on the threefold condition that (a) Rc is believed true by a given X, (b) Rc causes the existence of a given normative psychical experience (NPE) in X, and (c) X expressly refers to—or would refer—to Rc in justifying an NPE. PRRs use the term customary law to refer to legal experiences (i.e., NPEs involving a sense of entitlement) caused and justified by an Rc. From a theoretical perspective, both the subject's adoption of custom as a binding NS and its truth are irrelevant. It is only the presence of a customary NPE in the X under study that matters. From a dogmatic perspective, by contrast, what matters is (a) whether the dogmatician—qua subject—adopts custom as a binding NS, (b) whether it is true that people behave in a given way bw, and (c) whether bw resembles the behavior that is deontically qualified in the norm under dogmatic evaluation. Finally, from a legal-political viewpoint, PRRs hold that customary law in modern societies, owing to its conservative nature, should be eradicated for the goal of removing inequalities and fostering benevolence.

  • Theory of Custom, Dogmatics of Custom, Policy of Custom: On the Threefold Approach of Polish‐Russian Legal Realism
    Ratio Juris, 2016
    Co-Authors: E. Fittipaldi, Elena Timoshina
    Abstract:

    Proceeding from the insights of Petrazycki, Polish-Russian legal realists (PRRs) distinguished legal theory, legal Dogmatics, and legal policy. Legal theory describes legal phenomena in a value-free way and formulates causal laws concerning those phenomena. Legal Dogmatics and legal policy are, by contrast, value-laden sciences involving the subject's—i.e., the scientist's—own attitudes toward existing or imagined phenomena: Dogmatics evaluates behaviors based on the subject's adoption of given normative sources (NSs) as binding, while legal policy evaluates the effects produced by given NSs based on causal laws and on the subject's goals (for Petrazycki, these goals come down to that of fostering love, or benevolence). PRRs then conceptualize custom as a representation of people behaving in a certain way (Rc): We have a custom on the threefold condition that (a) Rc is believed true by a given X, (b) Rc causes the existence of a given normative psychical experience (NPE) in X, and (c) X expressly refers to—or would refer—to Rc in justifying an NPE. PRRs use the term customary law to refer to legal experiences (i.e., NPEs involving a sense of entitlement) caused and justified by an Rc. From a theoretical perspective, both the subject's adoption of custom as a binding NS and its truth are irrelevant. It is only the presence of a customary NPE in the X under study that matters. From a dogmatic perspective, by contrast, what matters is (a) whether the dogmatician—qua subject—adopts custom as a binding NS, (b) whether it is true that people behave in a given way bw, and (c) whether bw resembles the behavior that is deontically qualified in the norm under dogmatic evaluation. Finally, from a legal-political viewpoint, PRRs hold that customary law in modern societies, owing to its conservative nature, should be eradicated for the goal of removing inequalities and fostering benevolence.

Jiao Bao-qian - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • On Some Problems in Dogmatics of Law
    Hebei Law Science, 2006
    Co-Authors: Jiao Bao-qian
    Abstract:

    Dogmatics of law, as a term colored with thick cultural and regional meanings, has seldom been used in domestic academic circle. The paper deals with the meaning of the term and its problems in translation firstly, and then exam the knowledge of Dogmatics of law in history. It should be noted that the understanding of Dogmatics of law undergo some change under influence of today's philosophy and social thoughts. Dogmatics of law comes more closely to social life because of its openness and practicality. Situated in a special role in knowledge of law, it should hamonize with other such as jurisprudence, philosophy of law.

Aulis Aarnio - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Reason and Authority: A Treatise on the Dynamic Paradigm of Legal Dogmatics
    1997
    Co-Authors: Aulis Aarnio
    Abstract:

    Part 1 Introductory remarks. Part 2 The paradigm of legal science. Part 3 Legal Dogmatics as an interpretive activity. Part 4 The change and progress in legal Dogmatics. Epilogue - legal science as social science.

  • On Rational Acceptability. Some Remarks on Legal Justification
    Law Interpretation and Reality, 1990
    Co-Authors: Aulis Aarnio
    Abstract:

    Legal Dogmatics is one of the several subtypes of legal science. The other ones are, for example, legal history, comparative study of law and legal sociology. Of the subtypes, legal Dogmatics is the oldest: traditionally, it has been defined as follows. It consists of two types of activities: interpretation of legal texts, especially the text of law, and systematization of legal norms. In the following, the focus of the analysis will be solely the interpretive task of legal Dogmatics. Although this limitation has been made, interpretation is internally related in several ways to systematization. The most important relation is the “feedback” phenomenon: the method of systematizing norms (systematizing theory) affects the contents of the interpretation.1

Matti Ilmari Niemi - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • The influence of jurisprudential theories on legal Dogmatics in Finland in the area of civil law
    2016
    Co-Authors: Matti Ilmari Niemi
    Abstract:

    Scandinavian legal realism and its influence on legal Dogmatics during 20 th century is a characteristic of Nordic jurisprudence. With the help of it and original legislation, Nordic countries have restrained the strong influence of German legal doctrine. Legal realism is a naturalistic approach to law: law is treated as a psychological phenomenon. On the level of legal Dogmatics, legal realism emancipated scholars to make fruitful analyses. Analysis of ownership is the most important example. Nordic functional?analytical legal Dogmatics has survived even though legal realism as its philosophical foundation has lost its credibility. The author of the paper states that such analyses can be made founded on different philosophical theories, even a theory who denies the ontological dimension of law.