The Experts below are selected from a list of 195 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Bryan S Graham - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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an optimal test for strategic interaction in social and Economic Network formation between heterogeneous agents
arXiv: Econometrics, 2020Co-Authors: Andrin Pelican, Bryan S GrahamAbstract:We introduce a test for whether agents' preferences over Network structure are interdependent. Interdependent preferences induce strategic behavior since the optimal set of links directed by agent i will vary with the configuration of links directed by other agents. Our model also incorporates agent-specific in- and out-degree heterogeneity and homophily on observable agent attributes. This introduces 2N+K^2 nuisance parameters (N is number of agents in the Network and K the number of possible agent attribute configurations). Under the null equilibrium is unique, but our hypothesis is nevertheless a composite one as the degree heterogeneity and homophily nuisance parameters may range freely across their parameter space. Under the alternative our model is incomplete; there may be multiple equilibrium Network configurations and our test is agnostic about which one is selected. Motivated by size control, and exploiting the exponential family structure of our model under the null, we restrict ourselves to conditional tests. We characterize the exact null distribution of a family of conditional tests and introduce a novel Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm for simulating this distribution. We also characterize the locally best test. The form of this test depends upon the gradient of the likelihood with respect to the strategic interaction parameter in the neighborhood of the null. Remarkably, this gradient, and consequently the form of the locally best test statistic, does not depend on how an equilibrium is selected. Exploiting this lack of dependence, we outline a feasible version of the locally best test. We present two illustrative applications. First, we test for whether nations behave strategically when choosing locations for overseas diplomatic missions. Second, we test for whether firms prefer to sell to firms with richer customer bases (i.e., whether firms value “indirect customers”). Some Monte Carlo experiments explore the size and power properties of our test in practice.
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an optimal test for strategic interaction in social and Economic Network formation between heterogeneous agents
Social Science Research Network, 2020Co-Authors: Andrin Pelican, Bryan S GrahamAbstract:We introduce a test for whether agents' preferences over Network structure are interdependent. Interdependent preferences induce strategic behavior since the optimal set of links directed by agent i will vary with the configuration of links directed by other agents. Our model also incorporates agent-specific in- and out-degree heterogeneity and homophily on observable agent attributes. This introduces 2N+K^2 nuisance parameters (N is number of agents in the Network and K the number of possible agent attribute configurations).Under the null equilibrium is unique, but our hypothesis is nevertheless a composite one as the degree heterogeneity and homophily nuisance parameters may range freely across their parameter space. Under the alternative our model is incomplete; there may be multiple equilibrium Network configurations and our test is agnostic about which one is selected. Motivated by size control, and exploiting the exponential family structure of our model under the null, we restrict ourselves to conditional tests. We characterize the exact null distribution of a family of conditional tests and introduce a novel Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm for simulating this distribution.We also characterize the locally best test. The form of this test depends upon the gradient of the likelihood with respect to the strategic interaction parameter in the neighborhood of the null. Remarkably, this gradient, and consequently the form of the locally best test statistic, does not depend on how an equilibrium is selected. Exploiting this lack of dependence, we outline a feasible version of the locally best test. We present two illustrative applications. First, we test for whether nations behave strategically when choosing locations for overseas diplomatic missions. Second, we test for whether firms prefer to sell to firms with richer customer bases (i.e., whether firms value “indirect customers”). Some Monte Carlo experiments explore the size and power properties of our test in practice. Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.
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an optimal test for strategic interaction in social and Economic Network formation between heterogeneous agents
Research Papers in Economics, 2020Co-Authors: Andrin Pelican, Bryan S GrahamAbstract:We introduce a test for whether agents' preferences over Network structure are interdependent. Interdependent preferences induce strategic behavior since the optimal set of links directed by agent $i$ will vary with the configuration of links directed by other agents. Our model also incorporates agent-specific in- and out-degree heterogeneity and homophily on observable agent attributes. This introduces $2N+K^2$ nuisance parameters ($N$ is number of agents in the Network and $K$ the number of possible agent attribute configurations). Under the null equilibrium is unique, but our hypothesis is nevertheless a composite one as the degree heterogeneity and homophily nuisance parameters may range freely across their parameter space. Under the alternative our model is incomplete; there may be multiple equilibrium Network configurations and our test is agnostic about which one is selected. Motivated by size control, and exploiting the exponential family structure of our model \emph{under the null}, we restrict ourselves to conditional tests. We characterize the exact null distribution of a family of conditional tests and introduce a novel Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm for simulating this distribution. We also characterize the locally best test. The form of this test depends upon the gradient of the likelihood with respect to the strategic interaction parameter in the neighborhood of the null. Remarkably, this gradient, and consequently the form of the locally best test statistic, does not depend on how an equilibrium is selected. Exploiting this lack of dependence, we outline a feasible version of the locally best test.
Otto Raspe - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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On the Economic Foundation of the Urban Network Paradigm: Spatial Integration, Functional Integration and Economic Complementarities within the Dutch Randstad:
Urban Studies, 2010Co-Authors: Frank Van Oort, Martijn Burger, Otto RaspeAbstract:Conceptually, the degrees of spatial and functional integration and urban complementarities in Economic Network relations are hypothesised to be important. In this paper, data on interfirm relations in the Dutch Randstad are used to test conditions for integration and the existence of Economic complementarities. A clear hierarchy is observed in the different types of spatial interdependencies in the Randstad, in which the central place model prevails. Furthermore, no evidence is found for the functional integration of municipalities in the Randstad. It is concluded that, at this moment, the Randstad does not function as a spatially and functionally integrated region and that spatial Economic policy can better focus on smaller regions within the Randstad. This also calls into question the applicability of the urban Network concept in general, as the Dutch Randstad is usually seen as a prime example of an Economically successful polycentric urban system.
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on the Economic foundation of the urban Network paradigm spatial integration functional integration and Economic complementarities within the dutch randstad
2009Co-Authors: Frank Van Oort, Martijn Burger, Otto RaspeAbstract:The current debate on polycentric urban development suggests that inter-firm relations are important for the creation and sustainment of urban Networks. Conceptually, the degrees of spatial and functional integration and urban complementarities in Economic Network relations are hypothesised to be important. However, the theoretical Economic rationale has not been convincingly tested. In this paper, we use data on inter-firm relations in the Dutch Randstad to test conditions for integration and the existence of Economic complementarities within this region. Contrary to the ‘polycentricity hypothesis’, we observe a clear hierarchy in the different types of spatial interdependencies in the Randstad, in which the central place model prevails. Furthermore, we do not find evidence for the functional integration of municipalities in the Randstad. We conclude that at this moment the Randstad does not function as a spatially and functionally integrated region, and that spatial Economic policy can better focus on smaller regions within the Randstad when urban Economic complementarities and integration are desired. This also calls into question the applicability of the urban Network concept in general, as the Dutch Randstad is usually seen as a prime example of an Economically successful polycentric urban system.
James Moody - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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moving beyond stylized Economic Network models the hybrid world of the indian firm ownership Network
American Journal of Sociology, 2014Co-Authors: Dalhia Mani, James MoodyAbstract:A central theme of Economic sociology has been to highlight the complexity and diversity of real world markets, but many Network models of Economic social structure ignore this feature and rely instead on stylized one-dimensional characterizations. Here, the authors return to the basic insight of structural diversity in Economic sociology. Using the Indian interorganizational ownership Network as their case, they discover a composite—or “hybrid”—model of Economic Networks that combines elements of prior stylized models. The Network contains a disconnected periphery conforming closely to a “transactional” model; a semiperiphery characterized by small, dense clusters with sporadic links, as predicted in “small world” models; and finally a nested core composed of clusters connected via multiple independent paths. The authors then show how a firm’s position within the mesolevel structure is associated with demographic features such as age and industry and differences in the extent to which firms engage in mul...
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moving beyond stylized Economic Network models the hybrid world of the indian firm ownership Network
2014Co-Authors: Dalhia Mani, James MoodyAbstract:A central theme of Economic sociology has been to highlight the complexity and diversity of real-world markets, but many Network models of Economic social structure ignore this feature and rely instead on stylized one-dimensional characterizations. Here, we return to the basic insight of structural diversity in Economic sociology. Using the Indian interorganizational ownership Network as our case, we discover a composite – or “hybrid” – model of Economic Networks that combines elements of prior stylized models. The Network contains a disconnected periphery conforming closely to a “transactional” model; a semi-periphery characterized by small, dense clusters with sporadic links, as predicted in “small world” models; and finally a nested core composed of clusters connected via multiple independent paths. We then show how a firm’s position within the meso-level structure is associated with demographic features such as age and industry, and differences in the extent to which firms engage in multiplex and high value exchanges.
Andrin Pelican - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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an optimal test for strategic interaction in social and Economic Network formation between heterogeneous agents
arXiv: Econometrics, 2020Co-Authors: Andrin Pelican, Bryan S GrahamAbstract:We introduce a test for whether agents' preferences over Network structure are interdependent. Interdependent preferences induce strategic behavior since the optimal set of links directed by agent i will vary with the configuration of links directed by other agents. Our model also incorporates agent-specific in- and out-degree heterogeneity and homophily on observable agent attributes. This introduces 2N+K^2 nuisance parameters (N is number of agents in the Network and K the number of possible agent attribute configurations). Under the null equilibrium is unique, but our hypothesis is nevertheless a composite one as the degree heterogeneity and homophily nuisance parameters may range freely across their parameter space. Under the alternative our model is incomplete; there may be multiple equilibrium Network configurations and our test is agnostic about which one is selected. Motivated by size control, and exploiting the exponential family structure of our model under the null, we restrict ourselves to conditional tests. We characterize the exact null distribution of a family of conditional tests and introduce a novel Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm for simulating this distribution. We also characterize the locally best test. The form of this test depends upon the gradient of the likelihood with respect to the strategic interaction parameter in the neighborhood of the null. Remarkably, this gradient, and consequently the form of the locally best test statistic, does not depend on how an equilibrium is selected. Exploiting this lack of dependence, we outline a feasible version of the locally best test. We present two illustrative applications. First, we test for whether nations behave strategically when choosing locations for overseas diplomatic missions. Second, we test for whether firms prefer to sell to firms with richer customer bases (i.e., whether firms value “indirect customers”). Some Monte Carlo experiments explore the size and power properties of our test in practice.
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an optimal test for strategic interaction in social and Economic Network formation between heterogeneous agents
Social Science Research Network, 2020Co-Authors: Andrin Pelican, Bryan S GrahamAbstract:We introduce a test for whether agents' preferences over Network structure are interdependent. Interdependent preferences induce strategic behavior since the optimal set of links directed by agent i will vary with the configuration of links directed by other agents. Our model also incorporates agent-specific in- and out-degree heterogeneity and homophily on observable agent attributes. This introduces 2N+K^2 nuisance parameters (N is number of agents in the Network and K the number of possible agent attribute configurations).Under the null equilibrium is unique, but our hypothesis is nevertheless a composite one as the degree heterogeneity and homophily nuisance parameters may range freely across their parameter space. Under the alternative our model is incomplete; there may be multiple equilibrium Network configurations and our test is agnostic about which one is selected. Motivated by size control, and exploiting the exponential family structure of our model under the null, we restrict ourselves to conditional tests. We characterize the exact null distribution of a family of conditional tests and introduce a novel Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm for simulating this distribution.We also characterize the locally best test. The form of this test depends upon the gradient of the likelihood with respect to the strategic interaction parameter in the neighborhood of the null. Remarkably, this gradient, and consequently the form of the locally best test statistic, does not depend on how an equilibrium is selected. Exploiting this lack of dependence, we outline a feasible version of the locally best test. We present two illustrative applications. First, we test for whether nations behave strategically when choosing locations for overseas diplomatic missions. Second, we test for whether firms prefer to sell to firms with richer customer bases (i.e., whether firms value “indirect customers”). Some Monte Carlo experiments explore the size and power properties of our test in practice. Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.
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an optimal test for strategic interaction in social and Economic Network formation between heterogeneous agents
Research Papers in Economics, 2020Co-Authors: Andrin Pelican, Bryan S GrahamAbstract:We introduce a test for whether agents' preferences over Network structure are interdependent. Interdependent preferences induce strategic behavior since the optimal set of links directed by agent $i$ will vary with the configuration of links directed by other agents. Our model also incorporates agent-specific in- and out-degree heterogeneity and homophily on observable agent attributes. This introduces $2N+K^2$ nuisance parameters ($N$ is number of agents in the Network and $K$ the number of possible agent attribute configurations). Under the null equilibrium is unique, but our hypothesis is nevertheless a composite one as the degree heterogeneity and homophily nuisance parameters may range freely across their parameter space. Under the alternative our model is incomplete; there may be multiple equilibrium Network configurations and our test is agnostic about which one is selected. Motivated by size control, and exploiting the exponential family structure of our model \emph{under the null}, we restrict ourselves to conditional tests. We characterize the exact null distribution of a family of conditional tests and introduce a novel Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm for simulating this distribution. We also characterize the locally best test. The form of this test depends upon the gradient of the likelihood with respect to the strategic interaction parameter in the neighborhood of the null. Remarkably, this gradient, and consequently the form of the locally best test statistic, does not depend on how an equilibrium is selected. Exploiting this lack of dependence, we outline a feasible version of the locally best test.
Frank Van Oort - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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On the Economic Foundation of the Urban Network Paradigm: Spatial Integration, Functional Integration and Economic Complementarities within the Dutch Randstad:
Urban Studies, 2010Co-Authors: Frank Van Oort, Martijn Burger, Otto RaspeAbstract:Conceptually, the degrees of spatial and functional integration and urban complementarities in Economic Network relations are hypothesised to be important. In this paper, data on interfirm relations in the Dutch Randstad are used to test conditions for integration and the existence of Economic complementarities. A clear hierarchy is observed in the different types of spatial interdependencies in the Randstad, in which the central place model prevails. Furthermore, no evidence is found for the functional integration of municipalities in the Randstad. It is concluded that, at this moment, the Randstad does not function as a spatially and functionally integrated region and that spatial Economic policy can better focus on smaller regions within the Randstad. This also calls into question the applicability of the urban Network concept in general, as the Dutch Randstad is usually seen as a prime example of an Economically successful polycentric urban system.
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on the Economic foundation of the urban Network paradigm spatial integration functional integration and Economic complementarities within the dutch randstad
2009Co-Authors: Frank Van Oort, Martijn Burger, Otto RaspeAbstract:The current debate on polycentric urban development suggests that inter-firm relations are important for the creation and sustainment of urban Networks. Conceptually, the degrees of spatial and functional integration and urban complementarities in Economic Network relations are hypothesised to be important. However, the theoretical Economic rationale has not been convincingly tested. In this paper, we use data on inter-firm relations in the Dutch Randstad to test conditions for integration and the existence of Economic complementarities within this region. Contrary to the ‘polycentricity hypothesis’, we observe a clear hierarchy in the different types of spatial interdependencies in the Randstad, in which the central place model prevails. Furthermore, we do not find evidence for the functional integration of municipalities in the Randstad. We conclude that at this moment the Randstad does not function as a spatially and functionally integrated region, and that spatial Economic policy can better focus on smaller regions within the Randstad when urban Economic complementarities and integration are desired. This also calls into question the applicability of the urban Network concept in general, as the Dutch Randstad is usually seen as a prime example of an Economically successful polycentric urban system.
