The Experts below are selected from a list of 309 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Oliver E. Williamson - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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The Evolving Science of Organization
2016Co-Authors: Oliver E. Williamson, Karl LlewellynAbstract:The science of Organization that is herein described has progressively evolved through four successive stages. The first stage is associated with Ronald Coase and entails "informal" analysis. Stages two and three involve "preformai" and "semiformal" analysis and are associated with transaction cost Economics. A "fully formal" treatment of what transaction cost economies describes as "incomplete contracting in its entirety" completes the sequence. The paper then examines the requisites for a theory of good order and workable arrangements. This involves the combined study of law, Economics, and Organization. The object is to develop a symmetrical (comparative institutional) analysis of the powers and limits of each generic form of Economic Organization. (JEL: B25, B41)
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a comparison of alternative approaches to Economic Organization
2016Co-Authors: Oliver E. WilliamsonAbstract:The three different approaches to the study of Economic Organization with which the conference papers are concerned are property rights, agency theory/ mechanism design, and transaction costs. Each of these examines Economic Organization in contractual terms, whence all differ from the neoclassical theory of the firm which works out of a noncontractual (essentially technological) perspective. Section 1 sets out a general schema for describing alternative theories of firm and market Organization. Comparisons between property rights, agency, and transaction cost approaches are the subject of Section 2. Concluding remarks follow.
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the transaction cost Economics project the theory and practice of the governance of contractual relations
2013Co-Authors: Oliver E. WilliamsonAbstract:Contents: Acknowledgements Introduction Oliver Williamson PART I THEORY AND CONCEPTS 1. O.E. Williamson (2001), 'Hierarchies and Markets' 2. Oliver E. Williamson (1971), 'The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations' 3. Oliver E. Williamson (1979), 'Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations' 4. Oliver E. Williamson (1983), 'Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange' 5. Oliver E. Williamson (1991), 'Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives' 6. Oliver E. Williamson (1985), 'The Limits of Firms: Incentive and Bureaucratic Features' 7. Oliver E. Williamson (1991), 'Strategizing, Economizing, and Economic Organization' PART II PUBLIC POLICY 8. Oliver E. Williamson (1976), 'Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies - in General and with Respect to CATV' 9. Oliver E. Williamson (2009), 'Opening the Black Box of Firm and Market Organization: Antitrust' 10. Oliver E. Williamson (1988), 'Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance' 11. Oliver E. Williamson (2008), 'Corporate Boards of Directors: In Principle and in Practice' PART III INTERDISCIPINARY SOCIAL SCIENCE 12. Oliver E. Williamson (1993), 'Transaction Cost Economics and Organization Theory' 13. Oliver E. Williamson (1993), 'Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization' 14. Oliver E. Williamson (2005), 'Why Law, Economics, and Organization?' PART IV PERSPECTIVES 15. Oliver E. Williamson (2009), 'Pragmatic Methodology: A Sketch, with Applications to Transaction Cost Economics' 16. Oliver E. Williamson (2010), 'Transaction Cost Economics: The Natural Progression'
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transaction cost Economics an introduction
2007Co-Authors: Oliver E. WilliamsonAbstract:This overview of transaction cost Economics is organized around the "Carnegie Triple" - be disciplined; be interdisciplinary; have an active mind. The first of these urges those who would open up the black box of Economic Organization to do so in a modest, slow, molecular, definitive way, with the object of deriving refutable implications and submitting these to empirical testing. The second recommends that the student of Economic Organization be prepared to cross disciplinary boundaries if and as this is needed to preserve veridical contact with the phenomena. The injunction have an active mind is implemented by being curious and asking the question "What is going on here?" The paper concludes with a discussion of operationalization.
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examining Economic Organization through the lens of contract
Industrial and Corporate Change, 2003Co-Authors: Oliver E. WilliamsonAbstract:The lens of contract approach to the study of Economic Organization is partly complementary but also partly rival to the orthodox lens of choice. Specifically, whereas the latter focuses on simple market exchange, the lens of contract is predominantly concerned with the complex contracts. Among the major differences is that non-standard and unfamiliar contractual practices and Organizational structures that orthodoxy interprets as manifestations of monopoly are often perceived to serve economizing purposes under the lens of contract. A major reason for these and other differences is that orthodoxy is dismissive of Organization theory whereas Organization theory provides conceptual foundations for the lens of contract. Copyright 2003, Oxford University Press.
Peter G. Klein - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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opportunity discovery entrepreneurial action and Economic Organization
Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal, 2008Co-Authors: Peter G. KleinAbstract:This article reviews and critiques the opportunity discovery approach to entrepreneurship and argues that entrepreneurship can be more thoroughly grounded, and more closely linked to more general problems of Economic Organization by adopting the Cantillon-Knight-Mises understanding of entrepreneurship as judgment. The article begins by distinguishing among occupational, structural, and functional approaches to entrepreneurship and distinguishing among two influential interpretations of the entrepreneurial function—discovery and judgment. It turns next to the contemporary literature on opportunity identification and argues that this literature misinterprets Kirzner's instrumental use of the discovery metaphor and mistakenly makes opportunities the unit of analysis. The article then describes an alternative approach in which investment is the unit of analysis and link this approach to Austrian capital theory. I close with some applications to Organizational form and entrepreneurial teams. Copyright © 2008 Strategic Management Society.
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opportunity discovery entrepreneurial action and Economic Organization
2008Co-Authors: Peter G. KleinAbstract:This paper reviews and critiques the "opportunity discovery" approach to entrepreneurship and argues that entrepreneurship can be more thoroughly grounded, and more closely linked to more general problems of Economic Organization, by adopting the Cantillon-Knight-Mises understanding of entrepreneurship as judgment. I begin by distinguishing among occupational, structural, and functional approaches to entrepreneurship and distinguishing among two influential interpretations of the entrepreneurial function, discovery and judgment. I turn next to the contemporary literature on opportunity identification and argue that this literature misinterprets Kirzner's instrumental use of the discovery metaphor and mistakenly makes "opportunities" the unit of analysis. I then describe an alternative approach in which investment is the unit of analysis and link this approach to Austrian capital theory. I close with some applications to Organizational form and entrepreneurial teams.
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original and derived judgment an entrepreneurial theory of Economic Organization
Organization Studies, 2007Co-Authors: Kirsten Foss, Peter G. KleinAbstract:Recent work links entrepreneurship to the Economic theory of firm using the Knightian concept of entrepreneurship as judgment. When judgment is complementary to other assets, and these assets or their services are traded in well-functioning markets, it makes sense for entrepreneurs to hire labor and own assets. The entrepreneur’s role, then, is to arrange or organize the human and capital assets under his control. We extend this Knightian concept of the firm by developing a theory of delegation under Knightian uncertainty. What we call original judgment belongs exclusively to owners, but owners may delegate a wide range of decision rights to subordinates, who exercise derived judgment. We call these employees “proxy-entrepreneurs,” and ask how the firm’s Organizational structure — its formal and informal systems of rewards and punishments, rules for settling disputes and renegotiating agreements, means of evaluating performance, and so on — can be designed to encourage forms of proxy-entrepreneurship that increase firm value while discouraging actions that destroy value. Building on key ideas from the entrepreneurship literature, Austrian Economics, and the Economic theory of the firm we develop a framework for analyzing the tradeoff between productive and destructive proxy-entrepreneurship. We link this analysis to the employment relation and ownership structure, providing new insights into these and related issues in the Economic theory of the firm.
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original and derived judgment an entrepreneurial theory of Economic Organization
Organization Studies, 2007Co-Authors: Kirsten Foss, Nicolai J Foss, Peter G. KleinAbstract:Recent work links entrepreneurship to the Economic theory of the firm, using the concept of entrepreneurship as judgment introduced by Frank Knight. When judgment is complementary to other assets, it makes sense for entrepreneurs to hire labour and to own assets. The entrepreneur's role, then, is to arrange or organize the human and capital assets under his or her control. We extend this Knightian concept of the firm by developing a theory of delegation under Knightian uncetainty. What we call original judgment belongs exclusively to owners, but owners may delegate a wide range of decision rights to subordinates, who exercise derived judgment. We call these employees `proxy-entrepreneurs', and ask how the firm's Organizational structure — its formal and informal systems of rewards and punishments, rules for settling disputes and renegotiating agreements, means of evaluating performance and so on — can be designed to encourage forms of proxy entrepreneurship that increase firm value while discouraging acti...
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Organizational issues in the agrifood sector toward a comparative approach
Industrial Organization, 2004Co-Authors: Claude Menard, Peter G. KleinAbstract:This paper outlines a research program comparing the Economic Organization of agriculture in the United States and European Union. Both have highly developed agricultural sectors but their Organizational arrangements vary widely. Comparative analysis not only provides a broad set of firms and industries to compare, but also highlights the interaction between the institutional environment and the arrangements established to govern agricultural transactions. We first assess the common trend toward consolidation and vertical integration, turning next to the Economic Organization of formal and informal networks. While history and path dependence explain some of the variety among U.S. and European practices, other local conditions are important as well. We conclude by assessing the policy implications of recent changes in Economic Organization.
Kirsten Foss - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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original and derived judgment an entrepreneurial theory of Economic Organization
Organization Studies, 2007Co-Authors: Kirsten Foss, Peter G. KleinAbstract:Recent work links entrepreneurship to the Economic theory of firm using the Knightian concept of entrepreneurship as judgment. When judgment is complementary to other assets, and these assets or their services are traded in well-functioning markets, it makes sense for entrepreneurs to hire labor and own assets. The entrepreneur’s role, then, is to arrange or organize the human and capital assets under his control. We extend this Knightian concept of the firm by developing a theory of delegation under Knightian uncertainty. What we call original judgment belongs exclusively to owners, but owners may delegate a wide range of decision rights to subordinates, who exercise derived judgment. We call these employees “proxy-entrepreneurs,” and ask how the firm’s Organizational structure — its formal and informal systems of rewards and punishments, rules for settling disputes and renegotiating agreements, means of evaluating performance, and so on — can be designed to encourage forms of proxy-entrepreneurship that increase firm value while discouraging actions that destroy value. Building on key ideas from the entrepreneurship literature, Austrian Economics, and the Economic theory of the firm we develop a framework for analyzing the tradeoff between productive and destructive proxy-entrepreneurship. We link this analysis to the employment relation and ownership structure, providing new insights into these and related issues in the Economic theory of the firm.
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original and derived judgment an entrepreneurial theory of Economic Organization
Organization Studies, 2007Co-Authors: Kirsten Foss, Nicolai J Foss, Peter G. KleinAbstract:Recent work links entrepreneurship to the Economic theory of the firm, using the concept of entrepreneurship as judgment introduced by Frank Knight. When judgment is complementary to other assets, it makes sense for entrepreneurs to hire labour and to own assets. The entrepreneur's role, then, is to arrange or organize the human and capital assets under his or her control. We extend this Knightian concept of the firm by developing a theory of delegation under Knightian uncetainty. What we call original judgment belongs exclusively to owners, but owners may delegate a wide range of decision rights to subordinates, who exercise derived judgment. We call these employees `proxy-entrepreneurs', and ask how the firm's Organizational structure — its formal and informal systems of rewards and punishments, rules for settling disputes and renegotiating agreements, means of evaluating performance and so on — can be designed to encourage forms of proxy entrepreneurship that increase firm value while discouraging acti...
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the limits to designed orders authority under distributed knowledge
2003Co-Authors: Kirsten Foss, Nicolai Juul FossAbstract:We examine the argument, put forward by modern management writers and, in a somewhat different guise by Austrian economists, that authority is not a viable mechanism of coordination in the presence of “distributed knowledge” (which corresponds to Hayek’s treatment of the use of dispersed knowledge in society). We define authority and distributed knowledge and argue that authority is compatible with distributed knowledge. Moreover, it is not clear on theoretical grounds how distributed knowledge impacts on Economic Organization. An implication is that the Austrian argument that designed orders are strongly constrained by the Hayekian knowledge problem (Hayek, Kirzner, Sautet) is shaky. The positive flipside of this argument is that Austrians confront an exciting research agenda in theorizing how distributed knowledge impacts Economic Organization.
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the market process and the firm toward a dynamic property rights perspective
1998Co-Authors: Kirsten FossAbstract:We discuss the relations between alternative conceptualizations of the market process - neoclassical, Austrian and radical subjectivist/evolutionary - and alternative approaches to Economic Organization, for example, nexus of contract theory, Williamsonian transaction cost Economics and the dynamic transaction cost approach of Langlois and Robertson. We argue that there is a distinct need for more firmly grounding theories of Economic Organization in theories of the market process, and that key ideas of the more dynamic conceptualizations of the market are likely to substantially enrichen the theory of Economic Organization.
Photis M Panayides - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Economic Organization of intermodal transport
Transport Reviews, 2002Co-Authors: Photis M PanayidesAbstract:The paper considers in detail strategic changes occurring in the Organizational context of intermodal transportation and discusses the application of Economic approaches (primarily transaction-cost Economics) for assessing the effectiveness of the appropriate governance structure in organizing the intermodal transport Economic system. The paper reviews the developments in intermodal transportation, particularly in the context of logistics and supply chain management, and recognizes the trend for the formation of one-stop shopping megacarriers spurred by deregulation and market requirements. This culminates in the need to consider how companies should organize the Economic governance of the intermodal transport system. The main governance structures include market (subcontracting) or hierarchy (internal Organization). The transaction-cost Economics approach is reviewed and applied at a conceptual level to provide the core basis upon which the assessment of the optimal governance structure in intermodal transport can be based. The review of the core Economic principles indicates that the governance structure in intermodal transport is dependent on transaction costs, production costs and strategic considerations that a particular structure might entail and the policy implications thereof. The potential for empirical research in the application of the transaction-cost Economics approach to intermodal transport is discussed and detailed direction for further empirical research is provided as well as discussion of policy implications particularly with respect to competition and antitrust.
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Economic Organization of intermodal transport
Transport Reviews, 2002Co-Authors: Photis M PanayidesAbstract:The paper considers in detail strategic changes occurring in the Organizational context of intermodal transportation and discusses the application of Economic approaches (primarily transaction-cost Economics) for assessing the effectiveness of the appropriate governance structure in organizing the intermodal transport Economic system. The paper reviews the developments in intermodal transportation, particularly in the context of logistics and supply chain management, and recognizes the trend for the formation of one-stop shopping megacarriers spurred by deregulation and market requirements. This culminates in the need to consider how companies should organize the Economic governance of the intermodal transport system. The main governance structures include market (subcontracting) or hierarchy (internal Organization). The transaction-cost Economics approach is reviewed and applied at a conceptual level to provide the core basis upon which the assessment of the optimal governance structure in intermodal tra...
Robert M Townsend - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Economic Organization with limited communication
The American Economic Review, 2016Co-Authors: Robert M TownsendAbstract:This paper presents formal, stylized representations of communication-accounting systems: oral assignment, portable object, written message, and telecommunication systems are considered. The environments that allow this formalization are characterized by spatial separation, private information, and a need to keep track of past actions, transfers, and shocks. In environments that have spatial separation and private information, beneficial multilateral arrangements can depend critically on agents' ability to communicate to one another values of contemporary shocks and to keep track of histories of past transfers or past-announced shocks. This paper formalizes this idea and focuses on com
