The Experts below are selected from a list of 23808 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Robert J. Michaels - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Electricity Market Monitoring and the Economics of Regulation
Review of Industrial Organization, 2008Co-Authors: Robert J. MichaelsAbstract:Electricity markets, Electricity Regulation, Market monitoring,
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Electricity Market Monitoring and the Economics of Regulation
Review of Industrial Organization, 2008Co-Authors: Robert J. MichaelsAbstract:Restructuring of wholesale electricity markets in the U.S. has brought new institutions known as Regional Transmission Organizations (RTO) and Market Monitoring Institutions (MMI) that oversee competition in the energy markets that they operate. Both regulators and external observers have viewed MMIs as impartial observers whose intended to police these exchanges against the exercise of market power. The Economics of Regulation generally questions (but does not always reject) public interest interpretations on grounds that interest groups use politics and regulatory procedure to shape institutions to their advantage. MMIs in fact originated as a strategic initiative by California's large utilities in connection with that state's restructuring, intended to advantage them against competitors. The responses of MMIs to the economically efficient practice of "virtual bidding" in RTOs differed with the relative strengths of different interests in the governance of those organizations. As policy, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission should re-examine its endorsement of MMIs and consider centralizing their functions.
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Electricity Market Monitoring and the Economics of Regulation
Review of Industrial Organization, 2008Co-Authors: Robert J. MichaelsAbstract:Restructuring of wholesale electricity markets in the U.S. has brought new institutions known as Regional Transmission Organizations (RTO) and Market Monitoring Institutions (MMI) that oversee competition in the energy markets that they operate. Both regulators and external observers have viewed MMIs as impartial observers intended to police these exchanges against the exercise of market power. The Economics of Regulation generally questions (but does not always reject) public interest interpretations on grounds that interest groups use politics and regulatory procedure to shape institutions to their advantage. MMIs in fact originated as a strategic move by California’s large utilities in connection with that state’s restructuring, intended to advantage them against competitors. The responses of MMIs to the economically efficient practice of “virtual bidding” in RTOs differed with the relative strengths of different interests in the governance of those organizations. As policy, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission should re-examine its endorsement of MMIs and consider centralizing their functions.
Hersh Shefrin - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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prediction tools financial market Regulation politics psychology
The Journal of Risk Management, 2010Co-Authors: Shabnam Mousavi, Hersh ShefrinAbstract:Risk managers operate in the space of risk and returns, constrained by financial market Regulations. How can risk managers assess risk associated with changing regulatory structures, given that theories about the relationship between risk and return are much more developed than theories about the determinants of regulatory constraints? To help risk managers develop insight and predictive ability about the evolution of financial market Regulations, we present a systematic framework to analyze how financial market Regulation in the United States has developed in response to the global financial crisis. Our framework combines elements from game theory, political science, the Economics of Regulation, and behavioral finance. Notably, the model’s prediction for the legislation that came to be named the Dodd‐Frank Act turned out to be highly accurate.
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Prediction Tools: Financial Market Regulation, Politics & Psychology
The Journal of Risk Management, 2010Co-Authors: Shabnam Mousavi, Hersh ShefrinAbstract:Risk managers operate in the space of risk and returns, constrained by financial market Regulations. How can risk managers assess risk associated with changing regulatory structures, given that theories about the relationship between risk and return are much more developed than theories about the determinants of regulatory constraints? To help risk managers develop insight and predictive ability about the evolution of financial market Regulations, we present a systematic framework to analyze how financial market Regulation in the United States has developed in response to the global financial crisis. Our framework combines elements from game theory, political science, the Economics of Regulation, and behavioral finance. Notably, the model’s prediction for the legislation that came to be named the Dodd‐Frank Act turned out to be highly accurate.
Paul L. Joskow - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Alfred E. Kahn, 1917–2010
Review of Industrial Organization, 2013Co-Authors: Paul L. Joskow, Roger G. NollAbstract:Our introduction to this compendium reviews Alfred Kahn’s academic and policy interests, his activities as a regulator and advisor to governments and companies, and the interactions between these aspects of his life as an economist. Although best known for his research on the Economics of Regulation and his application of microeconomic principles in his role as a regulator and advisor, Kahn’s academic research portfolio was much more diverse. He wrote about patent policy, economic development, antitrust policy, and other topics, in addition to his work on Regulation and deRegulation. Even before becoming a regulator he was actively involved in applying economic principles to regulatory problems as an advisor and consultant. In all of his work Kahn recognized that markets were imperfect, but that policies aimed at improving market performance often made things worse. His experience as a regulator and consultant strengthened his recognition that the costs of imperfect Regulation had to be carefully balanced against the costs of imperfect markets. One had to search for the best that could be done in an imperfect world. Kahn was particularly fascinated by the challenges of designing and implementing policies to govern the transition from regulated monopoly or oligopoly to an industry that would ultimately rely primarily on competitive markets to govern firm behavior and performance. Fred Kahn was an extraordinary man who is missed greatly by his many friends and colleagues representing a wide range of political orientations and approaches to economic and public policy analysis.
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Incentive Regulation and Its Application to Electricity Networks
Review of Network Economics, 2008Co-Authors: Paul L. JoskowAbstract:This paper examines developments since the publication of The Economics of Regulation in the theory of incentive Regulation and its application to the Regulation of unbundled electricity transmission and distribution networks. Conceptual mechanism design issues that arise when regulators are imperfectly informed and there is asymmetric information about costs, managerial effort, and quality of service are discussed. The design and application of price cap mechanisms and related quality of service incentives in the UK are explained. The limited literature that measures the effects of incentive Regulation applied to electricity networks is reviewed.
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Incentive Regulation and Its Application to Electricity Networks
Review of Network Economics, 2008Co-Authors: Paul L. JoskowAbstract:This paper examines developments since the publication of The Economics of Regulation in the theory of incentive Regulation and its application to the Regulation of unbundled electricity transmission and distribution networks. Conceptual mechanism design issues that arise when regulators are imperfectly informed and there is asymmetric information about costs, managerial effort, and quality of service are discussed. The design and application of price cap mechanisms and related quality of service incentives in the UK are explained. The limited literature that measures the effects of incentive Regulation applied to electricity networks is reviewed.
Shabnam Mousavi - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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prediction tools financial market Regulation politics psychology
The Journal of Risk Management, 2010Co-Authors: Shabnam Mousavi, Hersh ShefrinAbstract:Risk managers operate in the space of risk and returns, constrained by financial market Regulations. How can risk managers assess risk associated with changing regulatory structures, given that theories about the relationship between risk and return are much more developed than theories about the determinants of regulatory constraints? To help risk managers develop insight and predictive ability about the evolution of financial market Regulations, we present a systematic framework to analyze how financial market Regulation in the United States has developed in response to the global financial crisis. Our framework combines elements from game theory, political science, the Economics of Regulation, and behavioral finance. Notably, the model’s prediction for the legislation that came to be named the Dodd‐Frank Act turned out to be highly accurate.
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Prediction Tools: Financial Market Regulation, Politics & Psychology
The Journal of Risk Management, 2010Co-Authors: Shabnam Mousavi, Hersh ShefrinAbstract:Risk managers operate in the space of risk and returns, constrained by financial market Regulations. How can risk managers assess risk associated with changing regulatory structures, given that theories about the relationship between risk and return are much more developed than theories about the determinants of regulatory constraints? To help risk managers develop insight and predictive ability about the evolution of financial market Regulations, we present a systematic framework to analyze how financial market Regulation in the United States has developed in response to the global financial crisis. Our framework combines elements from game theory, political science, the Economics of Regulation, and behavioral finance. Notably, the model’s prediction for the legislation that came to be named the Dodd‐Frank Act turned out to be highly accurate.
Roger G. Noll - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Alfred E. Kahn, 1917–2010
Review of Industrial Organization, 2013Co-Authors: Paul L. Joskow, Roger G. NollAbstract:Our introduction to this compendium reviews Alfred Kahn’s academic and policy interests, his activities as a regulator and advisor to governments and companies, and the interactions between these aspects of his life as an economist. Although best known for his research on the Economics of Regulation and his application of microeconomic principles in his role as a regulator and advisor, Kahn’s academic research portfolio was much more diverse. He wrote about patent policy, economic development, antitrust policy, and other topics, in addition to his work on Regulation and deRegulation. Even before becoming a regulator he was actively involved in applying economic principles to regulatory problems as an advisor and consultant. In all of his work Kahn recognized that markets were imperfect, but that policies aimed at improving market performance often made things worse. His experience as a regulator and consultant strengthened his recognition that the costs of imperfect Regulation had to be carefully balanced against the costs of imperfect markets. One had to search for the best that could be done in an imperfect world. Kahn was particularly fascinated by the challenges of designing and implementing policies to govern the transition from regulated monopoly or oligopoly to an industry that would ultimately rely primarily on competitive markets to govern firm behavior and performance. Fred Kahn was an extraordinary man who is missed greatly by his many friends and colleagues representing a wide range of political orientations and approaches to economic and public policy analysis.
