The Experts below are selected from a list of 360 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform

N Chernenko - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • market power issues in the reformed russian Electricity Supply Industry
    Energy Economics, 2015
    Co-Authors: N Chernenko
    Abstract:

    Abstract The paper examines long-run and short-run levels of market power in the liberalised Russian Electricity market. We observe that despite potential for market power abuse, actual exercise of market power remained low. We attribute the result to the bid-at-cost rule implemented as a part of a special unit commitment procedure on the day-ahead market. We first look at the Industry restructuring and subsequent mergers and acquisitions. The M&A were undertaken in different market zones and did not seem to increase concentration although planned zone integration may worsen competition in the long run. We then examine short-run aspect of market power by estimating hourly price–cost mark-ups and assessing their dynamics in 2010 and 2011, a year preceding and following the market liberalisation, respectively. The hypothesis of actual market power abuse is tested, and rejected, using time series AR models. Further, a Tobit regression shows that the liberalisation decreased the mark-ups by about 1.66 percentage points.

  • the russian Electricity Supply Industry from reform to reform
    2013
    Co-Authors: N Chernenko
    Abstract:

    The paper looks at the development of the Industry in the post-Soviet Russia, starting from the early 1990s. The main focus is on the last reform 2003-11 and the relationship of cost, prices and investment. In particular, the author examines the new designs for the Electricity and capacity markets and their impact on incentives for short-run production and long-term planning and construction. The author defends the pro-competitive approach to the Electricity Industry reform in Russia and traces the roots of its success and failures.

  • market power issues in the reformed russian Electricity Supply Industry
    Research Papers in Economics, 2013
    Co-Authors: N Chernenko
    Abstract:

    The paper examines long—run and short—run levels of market power in the liberalised Russian Electricity market we observe that despite potential for market power abuse, actual exercise of market power as measured by Drice-cost markups remained low. we attribute the result to the bid-at--cost rule mplemented as a part of a special unit commitment procedure on the day-ahead market. we first look at the restructured Industry and discuss the mergers and acquisitions and their impact on competition in long term. The M&A were undertaken in different market zones and thus did not seem to increase concentration (HHI remains almost unchanged) although with future zone nteration competition in long run is put at risk, we then examine short run 1eve of market power by estimating hourly price cost mark-ups and assess my their dynamics in 2010 and 2011, a year preceeding and following the market liberalisation respectively. Using time series models (AR models) we reject hypotnesis of actual market power abuse Further, using a lob-it regression we find that the liberalisation decreased the mark-ups by about 1 66 percentage points.

Mark Winskel - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • autonomy s end nuclear power and the privatization of the british Electricity Supply Industry
    Social Studies of Science, 2002
    Co-Authors: Mark Winskel
    Abstract:

    Despite their obvious limitations as explanatory concepts, `technological autonomy' and `determinism' have often been associated with nuclear power. This paper reviews the persistency of notions of `autonomy' and `determinism' in the context of the British nuclear power programme. In the corporatist and technocratic setting of the nationalized British Electricity Supply Industry (ESI), the perceived imperatives of nuclear power technology were often allowed priority in policymaking, to the extent that an appearance of the technology's autonomy and determinism was maintained for 30 years. This had its conveniences: technical rationales disguised more contestable institutional and political interests supporting the programme. At the same time, senior politicians and scientists at times displayed a faith in the technology approximating a belief in its autonomy and deterministic power, particularly during geopolitical or industrial crises.ESI privatization was associated with the marginalization of nuclear po...

  • When Systems are Overthrown The `Dash for Gas' in the British Electricity Supply Industry
    Social Studies of Science, 2002
    Co-Authors: Mark Winskel
    Abstract:

    The privatization of the British Electricity Supply Industry (ESI) in the late 1980s and early 1990s was associated with a transformation in Electricity generation technology. In a sudden and unexp...

Tom Mcgovern - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • the genesis of the Electricity Supply Industry in britain a case study of nesco from 1889 to 1914
    Business History, 2017
    Co-Authors: Tom Mcgovern, Tom Mclean
    Abstract:

    A study of the Newcastle upon Tyne Electric Supply Company (NESCo) provides a micro-history of the emergence of the Electricity Supply Industry in Britain up to the First World War. This research examines the role of social capital in the establishment and growth of NESCo, the only financially successful British electric power company. Temporal bracketing was adopted to evaluate two distinct time periods: emergence from 1889 to 1899; and growth from 1900 to 1914. Family, business and social networks together with geographical and political factors secured the company’s dominant position. The structural relationship with Merz & McLellan contributed to growth through acquisitions, joint ventures, and access to new markets.

  • costing for strategy development and analysis in an emerging Industry the newcastle upon tyne electric Supply company 1889 1914
    British Accounting Review, 2017
    Co-Authors: Tom Mclean, Tom Mcgovern
    Abstract:

    This article examines the provision of strategic costing information in the context of the emergence and growth of the British electrical power Industry and its pre-eminent exemplar, the Newcastle Upon Tyne Electric Supply Company (NESCo). A detailed case study of NESCo's costing for strategy development and analysis is presented. This research finds that NESCo's adoption of systematic, formal considerations of strategy and its use of costing for strategy development and analysis were related to a combination of three factors: first, the novelty and complexity of the Electricity Supply Industry; second, the regulated environment of the Electricity Supply Industry; and third, the ability and drive of key individuals. The implications of this research for contemporary studies of strategic management accounting are considered.

  • deregulation and restructuring of the global Electricity Supply Industry and its impact upon power plant suppliers
    International Journal of Production Economics, 2004
    Co-Authors: Tom Mcgovern, C Hicks
    Abstract:

    Abstract This paper analyses the deregulation and restructuring of the global Electricity Supply Industry and its impact upon fuel usage, generation technologies and suppliers of power plant. Deregulation encouraged the growth of new independent power producers whose business requirements transformed the power plant Industry. The plant suppliers had to develop new capabilities and services to compete in the global market. Economies of scale and scope became crucial given the cost of developing the new technologies and providing the services required by the operators. This led to the global consolidation of the power plant Industry because only large-integrated power engineering companies had the necessary resources and capabilities to compete in the new global environment.

Gert Brunekreeft - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • regulation and third party discrimination in the german Electricity Supply Industry
    European Journal of Law and Economics, 2002
    Co-Authors: Gert Brunekreeft
    Abstract:

    Despite the monopolistic networks, the liberalized Electricity Supply Industry in Germany is unregulated; the network-access charges are only subject to competition law, not to ex-ante approval. This paper explores the consequences of this policy by analyzing empirical observation with the theory of vertical relations. It concludes that the authorities' focus should be on the level of the access charges and not on discriminatory behavior. Unregulated access charges imply that the integrated firms have different incentives as compared to the independent entrants with respect to the competitive markets. Thereby, the principle of a level playing field is violated.

  • negotiated third party access in the german Electricity Supply Industry
    ECONOMIA DELLE FONTI DI ENERGIA E DELL’AMBIENTE, 2001
    Co-Authors: Gert Brunekreeft
    Abstract:

    Negotiated Third-Party Access in the German Electricity Supply Industry (by Gert Brunekreeft) - ABSTRACT: This paper provides an overview and analysis of the institutional framework and developments of the Electricity Supply Industry in Germany. As the only EU member state, Germany opted for negotiated third-party access as the network-access regime. This implies a lack of sector-specific, ex-ante regulation; instead, control of the network-access charges is left to the cartel office. The authority of the cartel office mainly relies on the essential-facilities doctrine in the competition act. This doctrine requires access to be non-discriminatory and against a fair and reasonable charge. Despite quite spectacular price drops at the end of 1999, a closer look at the emerging picture casts doubts on the competitive developments in the sector. The access charges are indeed excessively high, the profit margins at the competitive stages are very small, leaving hardly any room for competitors, while the extent of third-party discrimination is (still) relatively minor. This picture fits theoretical analysis. The combination of vertical integration (between monopoly and competitive businesses) and insufficient regulation of the access charges violates a level-playing field. Recently, the cartel office shifted its attention from the aspect of non-discrimination towards the level of the access charges; this is likely to put some pressure on the access charges, but will at the same time enhance the incentive to discriminate against third parties.

  • the Electricity Supply Industry in germany market power or power of the market
    Utilities Policy, 2000
    Co-Authors: Gert Brunekreeft, Katja Keller
    Abstract:

    Abstract This paper analyses the Electricity Supply Industry in Germany, which was liberalized in April 1998. Noticeable aspects are the eligibility of all end-users, the lack of constraints on the vertical Industry structure and the option for negotiated third party access. There is no sector-specific regulation. This paper argues that the vertically integrated firms concentrate on excessive network access charges, whereas the stages generation and retail appear to be relatively competitive. Empirical evidence suggests that in Germany network access charges make up a significantly higher share of end-user prices than in the UK, which is used as regulation-benchmark.

  • the 1996 reform of the Electricity Supply Industry in the netherlands
    Utilities Policy, 1997
    Co-Authors: Gert Brunekreeft
    Abstract:

    Abstract This paper describes and assesses a proposal presented by the Dutch Department of Economic Affairs in July 1996 for structural reform of the Electricity sector. First, the reasons for reform are described. Second, the reform proposal itself is described. The main features are the creation of a dominant generation firm by merger of the current four generation firms and free entry at the stages generation and distribution-service. Confusingly, the sector will be structurally separated in intention, but not in ownership. Finally, a critical assessment concentrates on the dominant generation firm and the intentionally voluntary dispatch, and remaining regulatory issues.

  • the 1996 reform of the Electricity Supply Industry in the netherlands
    Research Papers in Economics, 1997
    Co-Authors: Gert Brunekreeft
    Abstract:

    This paper describes and assesses a proposal put forward by the Dutch Department of Economic Affairs in July 1996 for structural reform of the Electricity Industry. First, the reasons for the reform are described. Second, the reform proposal itself is described. Its main features are the creation of a dominant generating firm by merging the four current generating firms, and free entry at the generating and distribution-service stages. Confusingly, the sector will remain structurally separated, although not in ownership. Finally, there is a critical assessment of the proposal for a dominant generating firm and deliberately voluntary dispatch, and remaining regulatory issues.

David M Newbery - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • competition in the british Electricity spot market
    Journal of Political Economy, 1992
    Co-Authors: Richard Green, David M Newbery
    Abstract:

    Most of the British Electricity Supply Industry has been privatized. Two dominant generators Supply bulk Electricity to an unregulated "pool." They submit a Supply schedule of prices for generation and receive the market-clearing price, which varies with demand. Despite claims that this should be highly competitive, we show that the Nash equilibrium in Supply schedules implies a high markup on marginal cost and substantial deadweight losses. Further simulations, to show the effect of entry by 1994, produce somewhat lower prices, at the cost of excessive entry; subdividing the generators into five firms would produce better results.

  • competition in the british Electricity spot market
    1991
    Co-Authors: Richard Green, David M Newbery
    Abstract:

    The British Electricity Supply Industry has, with the exception of Nuclear Electric, now been privatized. Bulk supplies of Electricity are traded between two dominant generators and many suppliers in an unregulated `pool'. The generators submit a Supply schedule of prices for each generating set and receive the market clearing price, which varies with demand over time. It has been claimed that such Bertrand competition should be highly competitive, bit we show that the Nash equilibrium in Supply schedules implies a high mark-up on marginal cost and very substantial deadweight losses.