The Experts below are selected from a list of 315 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform

Lamar Pierce - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Cleaning House: The Impact of Information Technology Monitoring on Employee Theft and Productivity
    Management Science, 2015
    Co-Authors: Lamar Pierce, Daniel Snow, Andrew Mcafee
    Abstract:

    This paper examines how firm investments in technology-based Employee monitoring impact both Misconduct and productivity. We use unique and detailed theft and sales data from 392 restaurant locations from five firms that adopt a theft monitoring information technology IT product. We use difference-in-differences models with staggered adoption dates to estimate the treatment effect of IT monitoring on theft and productivity. We find significant treatment effects in reduced theft and improved productivity that appear to be primarily driven by changed worker behavior rather than worker turnover. We examine four mechanisms that may drive this productivity result: economic and cognitive multitasking, fairness-based motivation, and perceived increases of general oversight. The observed productivity results represent substantial financial benefits to both firms and the legitimate tip-based earnings of workers. Our results suggest that Employee Misconduct is not solely a function of individual differences in ethics or morality, but can also be influenced by managerial policies that can benefit both firms and Employees. This paper was accepted by Serguei Netessine, operations management.

  • Cleaning House: The Impact of Information Technology Monitoring on Employee Theft and Productivity
    Academy of Management Proceedings, 2014
    Co-Authors: Lamar Pierce, Daniel Snow, Andrew Mcafee
    Abstract:

    This paper examines how firm investments in technology-based Employee monitoring impact both Misconduct and productivity. We use unique and detailed theft and sales data from 392 restaurant locations from five chains that adopt a theft monitoring information technology (IT) product. We use difference-in- differences models with staggered adoption dates to estimate the treatment effect of IT monitoring on theft and productivity. We find significant treatment effects in reduced theft and improved productivity that are driven by changed worker behavior rather than worker turnover. These findings are consistent with Employees under a pay-for-performance system increasing selling effort to compensate for lost theft income. We find substantial financial benefits to both firms and the legitimate tip- based earnings of workers. Our results suggest that Employee Misconduct is not solely a function of individual differences in ethics or morality, but can also be influenced by managerial policies that can benefit bo...

  • Cleaning House: The Impact of Information Technology Monitoring on Employee Theft and Productivity
    SSRN Electronic Journal, 2013
    Co-Authors: Lamar Pierce, Daniel Snow, Andrew Mcafee
    Abstract:

    This paper examines how firm investments in technology-based Employee monitoring impact both Misconduct and productivity. We use unique and detailed theft and sales data from 392 restaurant locations from five firms that adopt a theft monitoring information technology (IT) product. We use difference-in-differences (DD) models with staggered adoption dates to estimate the treatment effect of IT monitoring on theft and productivity. We find significant treatment effects in reduced theft and improved productivity that appear to be primarily driven by changed worker behavior rather than worker turnover. We examine four mechanisms that may drive this productivity result: economic and cognitive multitasking, fairness-based motivation, and perceived increases of general oversight. The observed productivity results represent substantial financial benefits to both firms and the legitimate tip-based earnings of workers. Our results suggest that Employee Misconduct is not solely a function of individual differences in ethics or morality, but can also be influenced by managerial policies that can benefit both firms and Employees.

  • Compensation and Employee Misconduct: the inseparability of productive and counterproductive behavior in firms
    Organizational Wrongdoing, 1
    Co-Authors: Ian Larkin, Lamar Pierce
    Abstract:

    Incentive systems play a fundamental role in organizations. Financial compensation represents the largest single cost for the average company (Gerhart, Rynes, and Fulmer 2009), and compensation is intimately tied to firm strategy and performance (Larkin, Pierce, and Gino 2012; Nickerson and Zenger 2008). Well-designed compensation systems allow firms to direct Employee effort toward productive activities that improve firm performance and survival. Just as importantly, compensation systems can play a key role in attracting and retaining the right types of Employees based on heterogeneous ability, motivation levels, and social connections. Although financial and other extrinsic incentives built into compensation systems are powerful tools for improving productivity, they also carry substantial risks. Compensation systems can generate perverse economic incentives as well as psychological and social responses that motivate a wide class of counterproductive behaviors ranging from lack of cooperation to explicitly illegal Misconduct. This chapter focuses on illuminating the holistic implications of multiple classes of compensation systems for Employee behavior. We focus on non-executive Employees for several reasons. First, an extensive literature in finance, strategy, and management covers executive compensation. Second, the key issues in executive compensation, such as motivating the appropriate level of risk and minimizing high-level corporate fraud, are quite different from the tradeoffs managers face when motivating non-executive Employees (Larkin et al. 2012). Finally, the pay of top executives typically accounts for only a few percentage points of total firm compensation costs (Whittlesey 2006). Incentive systems are fundamentally about motivating Employee behavior (Hall 2000). In this chapter, we focus on both productive behaviors and counterproductive Misconduct that are motivated by compensation systems. Productive behaviors are defined as those that contribute to the performance and ultimate success of the firm (as measured by profitability for most for-profit firms, but that can include other metrics). Misconduct includes several types of behaviors that are counterproductive to the firm: actions that are explicitly illegal, actions that violate formal organizational rules, actions that may not violate rules but are against the spirit of the rules, and actions that are counter-normative. Fundamentally, Employees engage in Misconduct because they believe it will increase their utility or happiness; Misconduct can generate higher extrinsic rewards, such as pay, promotion, or status, and can also increase psychological well-being.

John Sandoval - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • New Title VII Litigation in Disparate Impact Ex-Offender Employment Cases
    Social Science Research Network, 2016
    Co-Authors: John Sandoval
    Abstract:

    Employers that refuse to hire ex-offenders can be liable under federal and state law if unable to properly assess hiring risk. Employers that refuse to hire ex-offenders on the basis of criminal background risk violating anti-discrimination laws and employers that hire ex-felons risk liability for negligent hiring. In light of the legal restrictions that demand employers make decisions about conflicting goals over the inclusion and exclusion of ex-offenders and the lack of guidance provided in making such decisions, risk-averse employers are not prepared to make unbiased employment decisions. Case law, legislation, and reforms that address conflicts related to ex-offender employment provide protections to employers and ex-offenders that can ease the tension between employer liability and ex-offender employability. Several federal and state programs provide rehabilitation, certificates of relief, bonding insurance, and other provisions limiting employer liability for negligent hiring suits that reduce employers’ risks when hiring ex-offenders. Similarly, the reduction of employer hiring risk effected by such federal and state programs also serve to remove an employer’s litigation defense for business necessity under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Not only do the employer protections provide employers with incentives to hire ex-offenders without fear of economic repercussion, but they also facilitate the enforcement of anti-discrimination laws by removing the viability of the employers’ best litigation defense - business necessity. The courts can decide on a motion for summary judgment that the employer has no business risk that justifies denial of employment when employer protections are sufficient to show that there is no additional risk incurred in hiring an ex-offender as compared to hiring an average person.Although various laws in different state jurisdictions offer different protections, many states fail to provide one or more of a full set of legal protections that would ultimately help to remove employment barriers, reduce employer risk, and provide avenues of successful Title VII litigation. The following programs and legislative proposals could help resolve the mutual problems faced by employers and ex-offenders alike:1) Certificates of Employability - issuing certificates certifying an ex-offender’s rehabilitation including job types for which an individual’s criminal background would present low risk and which complies with business necessity; 2) Bonding Program - using the Federal Bonding Program or state counterparts that insure employer monetary losses due to Employee Misconduct for the duration of a job; 3) Exclusionary Rule/Limited Liability - limiting employer liability for those employers that hire certified and bonded ex-offenders by excluding the criminal record at trial or by precluding negligent hiring suits; and 4) Updating Ban-the-Box - updating Ban-the-Box to restrict searching or questioning an applicant’s criminal background until a conditional job offer that offers employment pending the results of a criminal background check is made. An appropriate expert body such as a parole board could properly assess job risk and an ex-offender’s rehabilitation certificate can provide guidance to employers. Limited liability laws and insurance programs could protect employers from resulting consequences of Employee Misconduct. Such legal protections reduce business risk. Under current case law, employers that discriminate on the basis of criminal background would be subject to Title VII when refusing to hire individuals that pose no business risk. Any laws that reduce employer risk in hiring ex-offenders, also provide a higher risk of legal liability if an employer wrongfully discriminates. The proposed legal protections, therefore protect employers and ex-offenders alike and also provide for a new avenue of Title VII litigation.

  • Practical Solutions for All: Disparate Impact in Ex-Offender Employment
    2015
    Co-Authors: John Sandoval
    Abstract:

    Employers are potentially liable under federal and state law for excluding ex-offenders from employment without making an assessment of hiring risks specific to the nature of the crime and the employer’s business interests. Employers refusing to hire ex-offenders risk violating discrimination law and employers that are overly inclusive in hiring ex-felons risk liability for negligent hiring. In light of the legal restrictions and the lack of guidance in making employment decisions, risk-averse employers are unable to make unbiased employment decisions. Legal reforms seeking to remove barriers to employment must therefore provide protections to ex-offenders, proper employer incentives, and guidance. I propose the following:1) Certificates of Employability- issuing certificates of ex-offender rehabilitation and a list of job classifications to which each individual’s criminal background presents a low risk in compliance with business necessity; 2) Federal Bonding Program- using the Federal Bonding Program to insure employer monetary losses from Employee Misconduct during the time of employment; 3) Exclusionary Rule- limiting employer liability for participating employers that hire certified and bonded ex-offenders by excluding an Employee’s criminal record at trial; and 4) Update Ban-the-Box- updating Ban-the-Box to restrict questions about criminal history until a job offer is made.Under such reforms, appropriate expert bodies will assess job risk, insure Employee honesty, and limit employer liability for negligence. As a result, employers limit liabilities and likewise lose any defense of business necessity under Title VII when hiring bonded and certified individuals. Employers would be more inclined to hiring of ex-felons. Any disparate impact cases filed on behalf of bonded and certified ex-offenders thereafter will be subject to summary judgment on a class basis.

Andrew Mcafee - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Cleaning House: The Impact of Information Technology Monitoring on Employee Theft and Productivity
    Management Science, 2015
    Co-Authors: Lamar Pierce, Daniel Snow, Andrew Mcafee
    Abstract:

    This paper examines how firm investments in technology-based Employee monitoring impact both Misconduct and productivity. We use unique and detailed theft and sales data from 392 restaurant locations from five firms that adopt a theft monitoring information technology IT product. We use difference-in-differences models with staggered adoption dates to estimate the treatment effect of IT monitoring on theft and productivity. We find significant treatment effects in reduced theft and improved productivity that appear to be primarily driven by changed worker behavior rather than worker turnover. We examine four mechanisms that may drive this productivity result: economic and cognitive multitasking, fairness-based motivation, and perceived increases of general oversight. The observed productivity results represent substantial financial benefits to both firms and the legitimate tip-based earnings of workers. Our results suggest that Employee Misconduct is not solely a function of individual differences in ethics or morality, but can also be influenced by managerial policies that can benefit both firms and Employees. This paper was accepted by Serguei Netessine, operations management.

  • Cleaning House: The Impact of Information Technology on Employee Corruption and Performance
    2014
    Co-Authors: J. Lamar Pierce, Daniel Snow, Andrew Mcafee
    Abstract:

    This paper examines how firm investments in technology-based Employee monitoring impact both Misconduct and productivity. We use unique and detailed theft and sales data from 392 restaurant locations from five firms that adopt a theft monitoring information technology (IT) product. We use difference-in-differences (DD) models with staggered adoption dates to estimate the treatment effect of IT monitoring on theft and productivity. We find significant treatment effects in reduced theft and improved productivity that appear to be primarily driven by changed worker behavior rather than worker turnover. We examine four mechanisms that may drive this productivity result: economic and cognitive multitasking, fairness-based motivation, and perceived increases of general oversight. The observed productivity results represent substantial financial benefits to both firms and the legitimate tip-based earnings of workers. Our results suggest that Employee Misconduct is not solely a function of individual differences in ethics or morality, but can also be influenced by managerial policies that can benefit both firms and Employees.

  • Cleaning House: The Impact of Information Technology Monitoring on Employee Theft and Productivity
    Academy of Management Proceedings, 2014
    Co-Authors: Lamar Pierce, Daniel Snow, Andrew Mcafee
    Abstract:

    This paper examines how firm investments in technology-based Employee monitoring impact both Misconduct and productivity. We use unique and detailed theft and sales data from 392 restaurant locations from five chains that adopt a theft monitoring information technology (IT) product. We use difference-in- differences models with staggered adoption dates to estimate the treatment effect of IT monitoring on theft and productivity. We find significant treatment effects in reduced theft and improved productivity that are driven by changed worker behavior rather than worker turnover. These findings are consistent with Employees under a pay-for-performance system increasing selling effort to compensate for lost theft income. We find substantial financial benefits to both firms and the legitimate tip- based earnings of workers. Our results suggest that Employee Misconduct is not solely a function of individual differences in ethics or morality, but can also be influenced by managerial policies that can benefit bo...

  • Cleaning House: The Impact of Information Technology Monitoring on Employee Theft and Productivity
    SSRN Electronic Journal, 2013
    Co-Authors: Lamar Pierce, Daniel Snow, Andrew Mcafee
    Abstract:

    This paper examines how firm investments in technology-based Employee monitoring impact both Misconduct and productivity. We use unique and detailed theft and sales data from 392 restaurant locations from five firms that adopt a theft monitoring information technology (IT) product. We use difference-in-differences (DD) models with staggered adoption dates to estimate the treatment effect of IT monitoring on theft and productivity. We find significant treatment effects in reduced theft and improved productivity that appear to be primarily driven by changed worker behavior rather than worker turnover. We examine four mechanisms that may drive this productivity result: economic and cognitive multitasking, fairness-based motivation, and perceived increases of general oversight. The observed productivity results represent substantial financial benefits to both firms and the legitimate tip-based earnings of workers. Our results suggest that Employee Misconduct is not solely a function of individual differences in ethics or morality, but can also be influenced by managerial policies that can benefit both firms and Employees.

Ernest H. O'boyle - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • The race discipline gap: A cautionary note on archival measures of behavioral Misconduct
    Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 2020
    Co-Authors: Sheryl L. Walter, Ernest H. O'boyle, Erik Gonzalez-mulé, Cristiano L. Guarana, Christopher M. Berry, Timothy T. Baldwin
    Abstract:

    Abstract Research on Employee Misconduct has increasingly adopted behavioral measures in field settings, such as archival organizational records, to circumvent potential issues of external validity and social desirability associated with laboratory experiments and self-reported surveys. However, similar to the issues facing the criminal justice and education systems, where racial disparities in punishment are well-documented, organizations face a difficult challenge in detecting and enforcing Misconduct. Even when organizations adopt seemingly objective policies for addressing Misconduct, it is still possible for certain groups to be disproportionately accused of Misconduct and/or disciplined. Drawing from social psychological theories of social identity and aversive racism, we examined the extent to which Black Employees (in contrast to White Employees) are more likely to have formal incidences of Misconduct documented in their employment records, even when there are no racial differences in the number of allegations of Misconduct. Across three datasets collected from the police departments of three major metropolitan areas (Chicago, Los Angeles, and Philadelphia), we identified the presence of a race discipline gap in archival organizational records of behavioral Misconduct. We discuss the implications of these findings and highlight the need for caution when researchers and practitioners use archival measures of behavioral Misconduct.

  • Contextual Undertow of Workplace Deviance by and Within Units: A Systematic Review
    Small Group Research, 2018
    Co-Authors: Martin Götz, Grégoire Bollmann, Ernest H. O'boyle
    Abstract:

    Within the constellation of Employee Misconduct, workplace deviance possesses the somewhat distinctive feature of violating organizational norms. Yet, the burgeoning research examining the social context surrounding workplace deviance typically fails to properly account for it. Interdisciplinary research has demonstrated that within organizations (a) multiple reference groups provide descriptive and injunctive norms about (in)appropriate behavior; (b) even when embedded within the organizational hierarchy, norms are not necessarily consistent across these groups; and (c) the immediate reference group often exerts a crucial influence. Against this background, we discuss prevalent conceptualizations of workplace deviance and systematically review the literature from 1995 to 2017. We present our findings according to external and organizational, leadership, and intraunit antecedents of workplace deviance by and within units, distinguishing, in particular, unit composition, processes and emergent states, climates, and norms. We conclude with a discussion of theoretical and methodological avenues for future research.

David B. Balkin - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.