The Experts below are selected from a list of 153 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform

Koren W. Wong-ervin - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Portfolio Licensing to Makers of Downstream End-User Devices: Analyzing Refusals to License FRAND-Assured Standard-Essential Patents at the Component Level
    The Antitrust bulletin, 2017
    Co-Authors: Jorge Padilla, Koren W. Wong-ervin
    Abstract:

    Competition agencies around the globe are investigating whether a standard-essential patent (SEP) holder’s choice to license to the makers of downstream End-User Devices, rather than to makers of the components of those Devices, violates competition laws. Some authorities have already reached that conclusion. While much has been written about FRAND-assured SEPs, the literature to date focuses largely on the appropriateness of seeking and obtaining injunctive relief on such patents or on the meaning of “fair and reasonable,” and has largely ignored the “nondiscriminatory” prong of FRAND (fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory). This article analyzes what we observe to be the common industry practice of licensing on a portfolio basis at the End-User Device level, and whether a patent holder’s refusal to license at only at the downstream End-User Device level, and not at other levels of the production chain, may constitute an antitrust violation. We conclude that (1) whether the “nondiscriminatory” prong of...

  • Portfolio Licensing at the End-User Device Level: Analyzing Refusals to License FRAND-Assured Standard-Essential Patents at the Component Level
    SSRN Electronic Journal, 2016
    Co-Authors: Jorge Padilla, Koren W. Wong-ervin
    Abstract:

    Competition agencies around the globe, including in India, Korea, and Taiwan, have recently initiated investigations involving a standard-essential patent (SEP) holder’s refusal to license patents at the component level. Other competition agencies, including in China and Japan, have recently issued revised final or draft guidelines that seem to increase scrutiny of such conduct. SEP holders usually commit to license on fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory (FRAND) terms. While much has been written about FRAND-assured SEPs, the literature to date focuses largely on the appropriateness of seeking and obtaining injunctive relief on such patents or on the appropriate royalty rate and the meaning of “fair and reasonable” (FR), and has largely ignored the “nondiscriminatory” (ND) prong of FRAND. This paper analyzes the common-industry practice of licensing on a portfolio basis at the End-User Device level and whether a refusal to license at all levels of the production chain may constitute an antitrust violation, concluding that: (1) whether the “ND” prong of FRAND requires licensing at the component level is a fact-specific inquiry that depEnds upon the specific standard-development organization’s (SDO’s) Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) Policy at issue; and (2) regardless, even if there is potential a failure to comply with a FRAND assurance, that alone does not constitute an antitrust violation. In addition, while U.S. antitrust agency practice and law highly disfavor imposing antitrust liability for refusals to license, such liability (including in Europe and elsewhere) would at the very least require a showing of anticompetitive harm such as foreclosure. Through a simple model, we show that due to the FRAND commitment and because most FRAND-assured SEP holders do not assert their patents at the component level, there is likely no foreclosure or exclusionary conduct or otherwise harm to competition. Our model features two SEP holders, one of which is vertically integrated with a component manufacturer, and a competing non-integrated component manufacturer. Some have alleged that, by refusing to license at the component level, the vertically integrated SEP holder allegedly bundles its component (the bundled product) with its SEP portfolio (the bundling product). While we disagree with this alleged theory of harm and characterization, we show that, even if the offer of the vertically integrated SEP holder could de facto be characterized as a bundle, its conduct will not lead to the foreclosure of the component market if (i) the vertically integrated SEP holder does not assert its patents at the component level, and (ii) it licenses its SEP portfolio to End-devise manufacturers on FRAND terms irrespective of whether they source components from its own subsidiary or from the non-integrated rival. Intuitively, when (i) and (ii) hold, the bundle offered by the vertically integrated SEP holder can be replicated competitively by End-Device manufacturers by mixing and matching the component sold by the non-integrated component supplier and the patent portfolio of the integrated SEP holder. Finally, we note that there are a number of legitimate business reasons for the common industry practice of licensing at the End-User Device level. One of the primary reasons is the nature of the technology, for e.g., many SEPs related to 2G, 3G, and 4G wireless cellular standards do not relate to components, but to the systems and networks whose functions and efficiencies these inventions are designed to optimize. Other reasons include avoiding patent exhaustion, reducing administrative costs, and ease of monitoring or verifying the number of units sold. These efficiency reasons motivate the decision of both vertically integrated and, tellingly, non-integrated SEP holders to license at the End-User Device level only.

Maarten Van Steen - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • a flexible middleware layer for User to User messaging
    Distributed Applications and Interoperable Systems, 2003
    Co-Authors: Janmark S Wams, Maarten Van Steen
    Abstract:

    There is growing trEnd to unify User-to-User messaging systems to allow message exchange, indepEndent of time, place, protocol, and End-User Device. Building gateways to interconnect existing messaging systems seems an obvious approach to unification. In this paper we argue that unification should take place at the level of the underlying messaging models. Such a unification results in one messaging model that has maximum adaptability, allowing one system to deliver the same messaging services that all currently existing messaging systems deliver, as well as hitherto impossible mixes of those services.

  • a flexible middleware layer for User to User messaging
    Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2003
    Co-Authors: Janmark S Wams, Maarten Van Steen
    Abstract:

    There is growing trEnd to unify User-to-User messaging systems to allow message exchange, indepEndent of time, place, protocol, and End-User Device. Building gateways to interconnect existing messaging systems seems an obvious approach to unification. In this paper we argue that unification should take place at the level of the underlying messaging models. Such a unification results in one messaging model that has maximum adaptability, allowing one system to deliver the same messaging services that all currently existing messaging systems deliver, as well as hitherto impossible mixes of those services. We present a novel unified messaging model that supports maximum adaptability. Our approach supports the same services that all current messaging models support, including those of e-mail, fax, SMS, ICQ, i-mail, USENET News, AIM, blog, MMS, and voicemail. To substantiate the claim that such a unified model can be implemented efficiently on a worldwide scale, we present the design of an accompanying highly adaptable and scalable messaging middleware system.

Jorge Padilla - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Portfolio Licensing to Makers of Downstream End-User Devices: Analyzing Refusals to License FRAND-Assured Standard-Essential Patents at the Component Level
    The Antitrust bulletin, 2017
    Co-Authors: Jorge Padilla, Koren W. Wong-ervin
    Abstract:

    Competition agencies around the globe are investigating whether a standard-essential patent (SEP) holder’s choice to license to the makers of downstream End-User Devices, rather than to makers of the components of those Devices, violates competition laws. Some authorities have already reached that conclusion. While much has been written about FRAND-assured SEPs, the literature to date focuses largely on the appropriateness of seeking and obtaining injunctive relief on such patents or on the meaning of “fair and reasonable,” and has largely ignored the “nondiscriminatory” prong of FRAND (fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory). This article analyzes what we observe to be the common industry practice of licensing on a portfolio basis at the End-User Device level, and whether a patent holder’s refusal to license at only at the downstream End-User Device level, and not at other levels of the production chain, may constitute an antitrust violation. We conclude that (1) whether the “nondiscriminatory” prong of...

  • Portfolio Licensing at the End-User Device Level: Analyzing Refusals to License FRAND-Assured Standard-Essential Patents at the Component Level
    SSRN Electronic Journal, 2016
    Co-Authors: Jorge Padilla, Koren W. Wong-ervin
    Abstract:

    Competition agencies around the globe, including in India, Korea, and Taiwan, have recently initiated investigations involving a standard-essential patent (SEP) holder’s refusal to license patents at the component level. Other competition agencies, including in China and Japan, have recently issued revised final or draft guidelines that seem to increase scrutiny of such conduct. SEP holders usually commit to license on fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory (FRAND) terms. While much has been written about FRAND-assured SEPs, the literature to date focuses largely on the appropriateness of seeking and obtaining injunctive relief on such patents or on the appropriate royalty rate and the meaning of “fair and reasonable” (FR), and has largely ignored the “nondiscriminatory” (ND) prong of FRAND. This paper analyzes the common-industry practice of licensing on a portfolio basis at the End-User Device level and whether a refusal to license at all levels of the production chain may constitute an antitrust violation, concluding that: (1) whether the “ND” prong of FRAND requires licensing at the component level is a fact-specific inquiry that depEnds upon the specific standard-development organization’s (SDO’s) Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) Policy at issue; and (2) regardless, even if there is potential a failure to comply with a FRAND assurance, that alone does not constitute an antitrust violation. In addition, while U.S. antitrust agency practice and law highly disfavor imposing antitrust liability for refusals to license, such liability (including in Europe and elsewhere) would at the very least require a showing of anticompetitive harm such as foreclosure. Through a simple model, we show that due to the FRAND commitment and because most FRAND-assured SEP holders do not assert their patents at the component level, there is likely no foreclosure or exclusionary conduct or otherwise harm to competition. Our model features two SEP holders, one of which is vertically integrated with a component manufacturer, and a competing non-integrated component manufacturer. Some have alleged that, by refusing to license at the component level, the vertically integrated SEP holder allegedly bundles its component (the bundled product) with its SEP portfolio (the bundling product). While we disagree with this alleged theory of harm and characterization, we show that, even if the offer of the vertically integrated SEP holder could de facto be characterized as a bundle, its conduct will not lead to the foreclosure of the component market if (i) the vertically integrated SEP holder does not assert its patents at the component level, and (ii) it licenses its SEP portfolio to End-devise manufacturers on FRAND terms irrespective of whether they source components from its own subsidiary or from the non-integrated rival. Intuitively, when (i) and (ii) hold, the bundle offered by the vertically integrated SEP holder can be replicated competitively by End-Device manufacturers by mixing and matching the component sold by the non-integrated component supplier and the patent portfolio of the integrated SEP holder. Finally, we note that there are a number of legitimate business reasons for the common industry practice of licensing at the End-User Device level. One of the primary reasons is the nature of the technology, for e.g., many SEPs related to 2G, 3G, and 4G wireless cellular standards do not relate to components, but to the systems and networks whose functions and efficiencies these inventions are designed to optimize. Other reasons include avoiding patent exhaustion, reducing administrative costs, and ease of monitoring or verifying the number of units sold. These efficiency reasons motivate the decision of both vertically integrated and, tellingly, non-integrated SEP holders to license at the End-User Device level only.

Janmark S Wams - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • a flexible middleware layer for User to User messaging
    Distributed Applications and Interoperable Systems, 2003
    Co-Authors: Janmark S Wams, Maarten Van Steen
    Abstract:

    There is growing trEnd to unify User-to-User messaging systems to allow message exchange, indepEndent of time, place, protocol, and End-User Device. Building gateways to interconnect existing messaging systems seems an obvious approach to unification. In this paper we argue that unification should take place at the level of the underlying messaging models. Such a unification results in one messaging model that has maximum adaptability, allowing one system to deliver the same messaging services that all currently existing messaging systems deliver, as well as hitherto impossible mixes of those services.

  • a flexible middleware layer for User to User messaging
    Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2003
    Co-Authors: Janmark S Wams, Maarten Van Steen
    Abstract:

    There is growing trEnd to unify User-to-User messaging systems to allow message exchange, indepEndent of time, place, protocol, and End-User Device. Building gateways to interconnect existing messaging systems seems an obvious approach to unification. In this paper we argue that unification should take place at the level of the underlying messaging models. Such a unification results in one messaging model that has maximum adaptability, allowing one system to deliver the same messaging services that all currently existing messaging systems deliver, as well as hitherto impossible mixes of those services. We present a novel unified messaging model that supports maximum adaptability. Our approach supports the same services that all current messaging models support, including those of e-mail, fax, SMS, ICQ, i-mail, USENET News, AIM, blog, MMS, and voicemail. To substantiate the claim that such a unified model can be implemented efficiently on a worldwide scale, we present the design of an accompanying highly adaptable and scalable messaging middleware system.

Koen Kok - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Collaboratively Optimizing Power Scheduling and Mitigating Congestion using Local Pricing in a Receding Horizon Market
    arXiv: Multiagent Systems, 2020
    Co-Authors: Cornelis Jan Van Leeuwen, Joost Stam, Arun Subramanian, Koen Kok
    Abstract:

    A distributed, hierarchical, market based approach is introduced to solve the economic dispatch problem. The approach requires only a minimal amount of information to be shared between a central market operator and the End-Users. Price signals from the market operator are sent down to End-User Device agents, which in turn respond with power schedules. Intermediate congestion agents make sure that local power constraints are satisfied and any potential congestion is avoided by adding local pricing differences. Our results show that in 20% of the evaluated scenarios the solutions are identical to the global optimum when perfect knowledge is available. In the other 80% the results are not significantly worse, while providing a higher level of scalability and increasing the consumer's privacy.