The Experts below are selected from a list of 327 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Andrew Proctor - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
supporting a risk based anti money laundering approach through Enforcement Action
Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, 2005Co-Authors: Andrew ProctorAbstract:This paper sets out how the FSA intends to use Enforcement tools to support its financial crime strategy and reduce the risk that regulated firms are used to further money laundering. It reiterates that public Enforcement Action is only one of a wide range of regulatory tools that may be used when faced with money laundering failures and sets out the circumstances in which such Action is more likely to occur.
-
Supporting a risk‐based anti‐money laundering approach through Enforcement Action
Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, 2005Co-Authors: Andrew ProctorAbstract:This paper sets out how the FSA intends to use Enforcement tools to support its financial crime strategy and reduce the risk that regulated firms are used to further money laundering. It reiterates that public Enforcement Action is only one of a wide range of regulatory tools that may be used when faced with money laundering failures and sets out the circumstances in which such Action is more likely to occur.
Berdakh Utemuratov - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
Understanding and Improving Enforcement and Compliance with Drinking Water Standards
Water Resources Management, 2019Co-Authors: Christine J. Kirchhoff, Julia A. Flagg, Yan Zhuang, Berdakh UtemuratovAbstract:The quality of public drinking water poses a critical risk to public health, yet U.S. public water systems (PWSs) frequently produce water that violates drinking water standards. The causes of such violations and the effects of Enforcement Actions on reducing those violations remain poorly understood. We use a ten-year database of water quality violations across 2487 Connecticut (CT) water systems to test a novel analytical model that investigates drivers of water quality violations and explores the effects of Enforcement Actions by the state drinking water program (DWP) on the durations of violations. PWS characteristics associated with increased violations in CT include: state-ownership, groundwater dependence, and rural location. Non-transient, non-community (NTNC) systems committed fewer violations overall, but their violations lasted significantly longer than those committed by other PWS types. PWSs respond differently to formal versus informal Enforcement Actions, with informal Enforcement Actions (i.e. a letter and technical assistance) curbing duration of violations more effectively than the comparatively punitive, formal Enforcement Actions. Lastly, we find the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s Enforcement targeting tool (ETT) somewhat helpful for restoring PWS compliance in combination with informal Enforcement Action, but our analysis suggests the ETT is less effective in isolation. We demonstrate a novel analytical model that provides Actionable information to state DWPs charged with enforcing drinking water standards to protect the quality of public water supplies.
Dimitrios Xefteris - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
"What's the Use of Having a Reputation If You Can't Ruin It Every Now and Then?" Regulatory Enforcement Actions on Banks and the Structure of Loan Syndicates
Social Science Research Network, 2016Co-Authors: Manthos D. Delis, Maria Iosifidi, Sotirios Kokas, Steven Ongena, Dimitrios XefterisAbstract:A decrease in the reputation of a loan syndicate's lead arranger, caused by a regulatory Enforcement Action for non-compliance with laws and regulations, disincentivizes potential syndicate participants from co-financing the loan. We formally argue that in such cases, the lead arranger must increase his share of the loan in order to make the loan sufficiently attractive to potential participants. We provide strong empirical evidence to support our theoretical argument, using the full sample of Enforcement Actions enacted on U.S. banks from 2000 through 2010 as well as syndicated loan-level data.
-
Enforcement Actions and the Structure of Loan Syndicates
2016Co-Authors: Manthos D. Delis, Maria Iosifidi, Sotirios Kokas, Dimitrios XefterisAbstract:A decrease in the reputation of a loan syndicate’s lead arranger, caused by a regulatory Enforcement Action for non-compliance with laws and regulations, disincentivizes potential syndicate participants from co-financing the loan. We formally argue that in such cases, the lead arranger must increase his share of the loan in order to make the loan sufficiently attractive to potential participants. We provide strong empirical evidence to support our theoretical argument, using the full sample of Enforcement Actions enacted on U.S. banks from 2000 through 2010 as well as syndicated loan-level data.
Laura K. Bennett - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
2018 SEC Enforcement Actions reinforce the importance of effective supervision, policies, and procedures for broker-dealers and investment advisers
Journal of Investment Compliance, 2019Co-Authors: Alec Koch, Russell G. Ryan, Laura K. BennettAbstract:To provide analysis on several SEC Enforcement Actions of interest to broker-dealers and investment advisers.,The article is organized chronologically based on the dates of the SEC Enforcement Actions discussed.,The SEC Enforcement Actions discussed in the article demonstrate that broker-dealers and investment advisers must maintain and enforce compliance and supervision policies and procedures reasonably designed to detect and prevent violations of the securities laws. When firm personnel commit violations (either intentionally or inadvertently), the SEC will evaluate whether firms could have been more effective in detecting and preventing those violations.Some of these cases also serve to remind firms that the SEC will often take Enforcement Action even when there is no evidence of customer harm.,Practical guidance from experienced securities lawyers that consolidates and analyzes several recent SEC Enforcement Actions.
Christine Gray - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
peacekeeping and Enforcement Action in africa the role of europe and the obligations of multilateralism
Review of International Studies, 2005Co-Authors: Christine GrayAbstract:The duties, if any, of European states to participate in multilateral operations in Africa are currently a matter of some controversy. What are the obligations of European states with regard to the maintenance of international peace and security in Africa? How far is it legitimate for them to avoid the contribution of troops to UN peacekeeping operations in Africa? Does the reluctance of European and other developed states to participate in UN peacekeeping operations in Africa have significant legal consequences? This article will consider these issues in three main sections. The first provides an overview of UN peacekeeping in recent years at a time when there has been a substantial surge in demand for peacekeeping troops. It discusses the problems that the UN has faced in securing troops from developed member states, particularly for operations in Africa. The second section describes the pattern which has emerged in recent practice with regard to peacekeeping and Enforcement Action in Africa. Although developed states have generally been reluctant to provide troops for UN peacekeeping operations in Africa, they have undertaken Chapter VII operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Liberia and Cote d'lvoire as 'coalitions of the willing'. They have also provided assistance to certain African governments threatened with violent overthrow, such as the governments of Sierra Leone and Cote d'lvoire. They have turned to regional and sub-regional organisations to take the lead in certain conflicts: they have provided financial assistance, logistical support and military training for such organisations. The third section considers whether the reluctance of European and other developed states to participate in UN peacekeeping in Africa, and their preference that regional organisations should play the main role, leads to legal questions about the duties of member states and the nature of multilateralism. Could this recent practice even legitimate a reinterpretation of the UN Charter provisions in Chapter VII and VIII?
-
international law and the use of force
2001Co-Authors: Christine GrayAbstract:1. Law and Force 2. The Prohibition of the Use of Force 3. Invitation and Intervention: Civil Wars and the Use of Force 4. Self-defence 5. Collective Self-defence 6. The Use of Force against Terrorism: a New War for a New Century 7. The UN and the Use of Force 8. Security Council Authorization for Member States to Use Force 9. Regional peacekeeping and Enforcement Action
