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Robin Kundis Craig - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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The Public Health Aspects of Environmental Enforcement
Pittsburgh Journal of Environmental and Public Health Law, 2010Co-Authors: Robin Kundis CraigAbstract:Pollution is a public health problem, and hence Enforcement of Environmental statutes such as the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act serve fundamental public health goals as well as improving Environmental quality. Moreover, public health benefits can provide politically cognizant benefits for Environmental protection that balance the costs of Environmental regulation and compliance. Thus, it is worth examining the extent to which the EPA considers the public health in its Environmental Enforcement priorities and decisions. Focusing on the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act, this Article: (1) reviews those statutes’ connections to public health protection; (2) outlines the statutory connections between public health considerations and Environmental Enforcement; (3) examines EPA’s Enforcement priorities and guidance; and (4) discusses EPA’s presentation of its own Enforcement effectiveness over the last decade. This Article concludes that public health considerations do play a significant role in Environmental Enforcement policies and decisionmaking. However, EPA’s commitment to presenting the public health benefits of its Enforcement actions has varied considerably over the last decade. With the release of its FY2009 Enforcement assessment, however, EPA has both expanded its analysis of the connection between Environmental pollution Enforcement and public health benefits and created new tools to enhance the transparency of these benefits to the affected public.
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Valuing the Public Health Aspects of Environmental Enforcement: Qualitative Versus Quantitative Evaluations of Enforcement Effort
2009Co-Authors: Robin Kundis CraigAbstract:It would be difficult to contest the status of pollution as a public health problem. However, Environmental regulation by definition imposes limitations on private individuals and entities, and those limitations become most acutely obvious in the context of government Enforcement actions. As a result, there always has been and likely always will be resistance to Environmental regulation and Enforcement. In light of this resistance, pollution regulation's public health benefits offer strong rhetorical and political arguments in favor of such regulation and its effective Enforcement, especially during a flailing economy.Unfortunately, the public health benefits of pollution control law are not always obvious. Because of this potential obscurity, this Article argues that the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) annual Enforcement assessments and reports, prepared by its Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance (OECA), become important vehicles for communicating the public benefits of Environmental Enforcement to Congress and the American public. Since 2005, OECA has been reporting specifically on the public health benefits of its Clean Air Act Enforcement efforts. This new reporting metric demonstrates the rhetorical power of qualitative assessments of the public health benefits that pollution regulation and Enforcement provide. However, because OECA has been using it only for Clean Air Act Enforcement, the new public health metric also underscores the rhetorical anemia of the EPA's more traditional quantitative measures of Enforcement effort.This Article argues, most basically, that the rhetoric of Enforcement reporting matters. While acknowledging the difficulties of producing quantitative public health benefit calculations for all of the major federal pollution control statutes, this Article concludes that the EPA and OECA could beneficially strengthen the public health analyses of Enforcement by providing more and more prominent qualitative assessments of the value of certain kinds of Enforcement actions, across statutory regimes.
David M Konisky - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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regulatory competition and Environmental Enforcement is there a race to the bottom
American Journal of Political Science, 2007Co-Authors: David M KoniskyAbstract:This article examines several of the key hypotheses suggested by the race to the bottom theory in Environmental regulation. The research studies annual state-level Enforcement of federal air, water, and hazardous waste pollution control regulation, covering the period from 1985-2000. Specifically, the study estimates a series of strategic interaction models to examine whether a state’s Environmental regulatory behavior is influenced by the regulatory behavior of the states with which it competes for economic investment. While there is clear evidence of strategic interaction in state Environmental regulatory behavior, states do not respond in the asymmetric manner suggested by the race to the bottom theory.
Grant Pink - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Environmental Enforcement Networks: Their Role in Climate Change Enforcement
Climate Change from a Criminological Perspective, 2012Co-Authors: Grant Pink, James LehaneAbstract:Climate change regulation, like all forms of regulation, requires allegations of non-compliance to be investigated. Enforcing climate change law and regulations is already sufficiently challenging given a myriad of social, economic and Environmental issues. However, climate change regulation is further complicated due to cross-jurisdictional issues, transnational factors and its intersection with traditional and crossover crimes such as fraud and money laundering. It is anticipated that both non-compliant entities and organised criminal enterprises will challenge and frustrate the efforts of government regulators as they attempt to enforce climate change legislation. Therefore climate change regulators have much to learn from the experiences of other Enforcement and regulatory agencies that have cooperated and worked collaboratively through various Environmental Enforcement Networks to advance and maximise their Enforcement effort. This chapter considers the opportunities for cooperation, it recommends the establishment of a Climate Change Enforcement Network, and provides information for consideration if such a network was established.
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Environmental Enforcement Networks: Development of a Network Evaluation Matrix
2011Co-Authors: Grant Pink, James LehaneAbstract:Despite sharing relatively common purposes, Environmental Enforcement Networks are each unique. Part of this is because the circumstances vary under which they were established. A range of factors influence their development and ultimately determine their relative capability and potential maturity as a network.This paper postulates five possible phases of development through which Environmental Enforcement Networks may transition. Further, it suggests that the application of Capability Maturity Model processes, like those used as part of organizational assessments, is worthy of consideration by Environmental Enforcement Networks. The ability to determine the phase of development that an Environmental Enforcement Network is going through enables mapping the progression of the network through that phase.The authors consider that this conceptual model framework may assist and guide networks to reach their next level of maturity more effectively and efficiently. This paper proposes a Network Evaluation Matrix that has been informed by the foundational Capability Maturity Model framework.
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Assessing the Utility of Environmental Enforcement Networks: Maximising Benefits to Members
2011Co-Authors: Grant PinkAbstract:This paper provides a summary of the author’s recent study that assessed the utility of Environmental Enforcement networks. The study considered fourteen current and active Environmental Enforcement networks, at the sub-national, national, regional and global levels, from seven countries. The study established that there is utility in networks across the countries and networks studied. Further, the study identified a range of strategies and potential activities for Environmental Enforcement agencies to assist them in maximising the benefits they derive from their network engagement.
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Environmental Enforcement Networks: A Qualitative Analysis
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2010Co-Authors: Grant PinkAbstract:This study discusses the utility of Environmental Enforcement networks (networks). It considers the viewpoints of eight senior managers, from Environmental Enforcement agencies (EEAs), who represent seven countries and collectively are involved in fourteen networks.Using a predominantly qualitative approach the study examined questionnaire and interview data relating to; the utility of sub-national, national, regional and global networks, and the strategies used by EEAs in order to increase the benefits derived from networks.The study established that there is utility in networks across the countries and networks studied. It also identified that there are a range of strategies and activities used by EEAs to maximise the benefits of network engagement. The study concludes with a number of recommendations that network members and their respective governing bodies may consider in an effort to maximise network benefits.
Kathleen Segerson - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the influence of financial status on the effectiveness of Environmental Enforcement
Journal of Public Economics, 2012Co-Authors: Dietrich Earnhart, Kathleen SegersonAbstract:This paper analyzes the influence of financial status on the effectiveness of Environmental Enforcement. It considers multiple dimensions of both Enforcement and financial status. Regarding Enforcement, the paper considers both the likelihood of Enforcement, as captured by the likelihood of inspections conducted at regulated facilities, and the severity of Enforcement, as captured by the size of sanctions imposed on polluting facilities found violating their effluent limits. As indicators of corporate financial status, the paper considers measures of liquidity, solvency, and profitability [a proxy for corporate managerial skill], all of which can influence the likelihood that a firm faces liquidity and/or bankruptcy constraints. The paper first develops a theoretical model of optimal abatement in the presence of liquidity and bankruptcy constraints and uses the model to investigate the impact of financial status on optimal abatement and the effectiveness of Enforcement. Then the paper empirically examines the interactions between Enforcement and financial status using data on wastewater discharges from US chemical manufacturing facilities for the years 1995 to 2001. Empirical results suggest that the financial status dimensions considered here in general play an important role in determining the incentives created by Enforcement. As the most striking result, we show theoretically and empirically that, when financial dimensions are included in the analysis, the conventional wisdom regarding the effect of Enforcement likelihood on abatement no longer holds, i.e., increased Enforcement can actually lead to worse Environmental performance.
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On the Role of Fines as an Environmental Enforcement Tool
Journal of Environmental Planning and Management, 1998Co-Authors: Surabhi Kadambe, Kathleen SegersonAbstract:This paper provides a theoretical analysis of Enforcement and compliance decisions when the Enforcement process involves significant interaction between a source of violation and enforcer. We show that the comparative static effects of a fine on the probability of a violation consist of a direct effect, which refers to the effect of an increase in the fine on the expected cost of a violation holding the probabilities of Enforcementrelated decisions constant, and an indirect effect, which refers to the effect of the fine on the probability of a violation through its effect on the probabilities of Enforcement actions taken by the regulator. We show that, in the absence of the indirect effects, an increase in the fine unambiguously reduces the probability of a violation and hence should lead to lower pollution (as expected). However, if the indirect effects are positive and large, an increase in the fine can actually reduce the likelihood that a firm will comply with Environmentalregulations. Thus, the increased fines do not necessarily increase compliance incentives.
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the structure of penalties in Environmental Enforcement an economic analysis
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 1992Co-Authors: Kathleen Segerson, Tom TietenbergAbstract:The Enforcement of Environmental laws has undergone some rather dramatic changes over the last decade. Civil and criminal monetary penalties have been imposed more frequently on violators and the size of the penalties has increased.’ Individuals, both corporate employees and officers, have become more common targets for penalties.2 Finally, incarceration has not only become a more commonly imposed sanction,3 but the resulting jail sentences are longer.4 Despite this trend toward increased use of individual sanctions in the form of fines or incarceration, the efficiency implications of this trend have received little attention. The related work that has been published falls into two categories. The first considers the relative impacts or merits of holding firms liable for the actions of their employees, a principle known as “vicarious liability” [31, 32, 11, 29, 151. Arguments in favor of vicarious liability presume that the firm can sanction employee malfeasance internally through compensation schemes that are tied to
Dietrich Earnhart - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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The effect of Environmental Enforcement on labor: Environmental workers and production workers
Journal of Regulatory Economics, 2020Co-Authors: Zach Raff, Dietrich EarnhartAbstract:This study examines the effects of Environmental Enforcement on labor employed by regulated facilities. The empirical analysis uses panel data from an original survey of chemical manufacturing facilities regulated under the Clean Water Act. This study contributes to the literature in two ways. First, we distinguish between two types of labor employed by regulated facilities: labor dedicated to regulatory compliance (“Environmental labor”) and labor dedicated to production (“production labor”). Second, we estimate the effect of Environmental Enforcement on production labor. Environmental Enforcement seeks to induce compliance with Clean Water Act restrictions, i.e., discharge limits, by prompting greater Environmental management. However, Environmental labor and production labor play different roles regarding Environmental management. Consistent with this difference, our empirical analysis explores the two labor outcomes separately. Our study explores various forms of Enforcement, interpreted broadly to include monitoring inspections and Enforcement actions, e.g., fines (“government interventions”). In general, our empirical results reveal that government interventions do not affect Environmental labor, yet negatively affect production labor.
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the effects of clean water act Enforcement on Environmental employment
Resource and Energy Economics, 2019Co-Authors: Zach Raff, Dietrich EarnhartAbstract:Abstract This study explores the effects of Environmental Enforcement on the amount of Environmental labor employed by facilities regulated under the U.S. Clean Water Act. The study uses panel data from a unique survey of chemical manufacturing facilities operating between 1999 and 2001. Specifically, the analysis examines the influence of monitoring inspections and Enforcement actions, e.g., fines, on the number of employees allocated to Environmental management. Empirical results show that Environmental Enforcement negatively affects the amount of Environmental labor allocated by the sampled facilities. Specifically, increases in federal inspections, informal Enforcement actions, and monetary fines each lower Environmental employment. Extended model results provide evidence that these negative effects stem from the crowding out of facility managers’ intrinsic motivations.
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EFFECT OF COOPERATIVE Enforcement STRATEGIES ON WASTEWATER MANAGEMENT
Economic Inquiry, 2018Co-Authors: Zach Raff, Dietrich EarnhartAbstract:This paper examines the influence of the Environmental Enforcement approach on the effects of government interventions on corporate Environmental management. The paper contrasts a potentially innovative cooperative approach with the standard coercive approach. Empirical results show that the effectiveness of Enforcement at inducing better Environmental management depends on the overall regulatory Enforcement approach. For example, greater cooperation undermines the effectiveness of more severe Enforcement forms. Specifically, as the Environmental Enforcement approach becomes more cooperative, the effectiveness of federal inspections and monetary penalties decreases. These results generally demonstrate that a cooperative Enforcement approach proves less effective than a coercive approach. (JEL D22, K32, Q52, Q58)
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the influence of financial status on the effectiveness of Environmental Enforcement
Journal of Public Economics, 2012Co-Authors: Dietrich Earnhart, Kathleen SegersonAbstract:This paper analyzes the influence of financial status on the effectiveness of Environmental Enforcement. It considers multiple dimensions of both Enforcement and financial status. Regarding Enforcement, the paper considers both the likelihood of Enforcement, as captured by the likelihood of inspections conducted at regulated facilities, and the severity of Enforcement, as captured by the size of sanctions imposed on polluting facilities found violating their effluent limits. As indicators of corporate financial status, the paper considers measures of liquidity, solvency, and profitability [a proxy for corporate managerial skill], all of which can influence the likelihood that a firm faces liquidity and/or bankruptcy constraints. The paper first develops a theoretical model of optimal abatement in the presence of liquidity and bankruptcy constraints and uses the model to investigate the impact of financial status on optimal abatement and the effectiveness of Enforcement. Then the paper empirically examines the interactions between Enforcement and financial status using data on wastewater discharges from US chemical manufacturing facilities for the years 1995 to 2001. Empirical results suggest that the financial status dimensions considered here in general play an important role in determining the incentives created by Enforcement. As the most striking result, we show theoretically and empirically that, when financial dimensions are included in the analysis, the conventional wisdom regarding the effect of Enforcement likelihood on abatement no longer holds, i.e., increased Enforcement can actually lead to worse Environmental performance.