The Experts below are selected from a list of 19170 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Jeffrey Gramlich - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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accounting for the Environmental impacts of texaco s operations in ecuador chevron s contingent Environmental Liability disclosures
Accounting Forum, 2013Co-Authors: Stacie Buccina, Douglas G Chene, Jeffrey GramlichAbstract:This paper examines the disclosure of a contingent legal obligation that arose as a result of Texaco Inc.’s oil drilling and extraction activities in Ecuador. We examine Texaco's and, after Texaco'...
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accounting for the Environmental impacts of texaco s operations in ecuador chevron s contingent Environmental Liability disclosures
Social Science Research Network, 2012Co-Authors: Stacie Buccina, Douglas G Chene, Jeffrey GramlichAbstract:This paper examines the disclosure of a contingent legal obligation that arose as a result of Texaco Inc.’s oil drilling and extraction activities in Ecuador. We examine Texaco’s and, after Texaco’s acquisition by Chevron in 2001, Chevron’s financial reporting and SEC disclosures pertaining to a lawsuit claiming damages related to the Environmental effects of Texaco’s 30 years of operations in Ecuador. After a historical review of Texaco’s drilling and extraction activities in Ecuador, and the ensuing litigation that began in 1993, we consider U.S. accounting and reporting rules as they apply to Texaco and Chevron. Given these rules, we analyze the appropriateness and timing of Chevron’s disclosures related to the heretofore-unresolved litigation. The discussion employs legitimacy and stakeholder theories to explain Chevron’s disclosures.
Alfred Endres - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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it s all in the mix internalizing externalities with r d subsidies and Environmental Liability
Social Choice and Welfare, 2015Co-Authors: Alfred Endres, Tim Friehe, Bianca RundshagenAbstract:Extending previous “tales of two market failures”, we consider a setting in which firms generate Environmental externalities and may invest in Environmentally friendly technological advancement generating R&D spillovers. We analyze the joint use of Environmental Liability law and R&D subsidies to internalize the double externality. Two alternative Liability rules are considered: strict Liability and negligence. In a complete information scenario, the social optimum in terms of emission levels and technical progress may be induced by combining either Liability rule with an appropriate R&D subsidy. However, when the policy maker has incomplete information with respect to a firm’s productivity of R&D investments and non-discriminatorily sets a uniform Liability rule and a uniform subsidy, only the so-called “double negligence” rule that imposes both an emission and a technology standard can induce the social optimum (if any one). The double negligence rule dominates strict Liability with respect to the goal of minimizing social costs under modest conditions, also in cases in which none of the Liability rules is capable of inducing first-best behavior among firms. Somewhat counterintuitively, a non-discriminatory double negligence rule can even dominate a (simple as well as double) negligence rule with type-specific norms and compliance-contingent type-specific subsidies. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015
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incentives to diffuse advanced abatement technology under Environmental Liability law
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 2011Co-Authors: Alfred Endres, Tim FrieheAbstract:Polluting firms with advanced abatement technology at their disposal have incentives or disincentives to share this technology with other polluting firms. The ‘direction’ and extent of those incentives depends on the Liability rule applicable and the way technical change impacts marginal abatement costs. We establish that incentives for diffusion are socially optimal under strict Liability and socially suboptimal under negligence if technical change lowers marginal abatement costs for all levels of abatement. Negligence may, however, induce better diffusion incentives than strict Liability if technical change decreases (increases) marginal abatement costs for low (high) levels of abatement.
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r d and abatement under Environmental Liability law comparing incentives under strict Liability and negligence if compensation differs from harm
Energy Economics, 2011Co-Authors: Alfred Endres, Tim FrieheAbstract:Abstract This paper analyzes equilibrium R&D in pollution control and equilibrium pollution abatement by polluters who are subject to Environmental Liability law when the level of compensation differs from the level of Environmental harm. We contrast the performance of strict Liability with that of the negligence rule. Privately optimal levels necessarily deviate from socially optimal ones under strict Liability, whereas private decisions are first-best under negligence unless compensation is much smaller than harm. It is established that the way in which privately optimal R&D deviates from the first-best level depends on the kind of technical change in pollution abatement. Counterintuitively polluters might overinvest into R&D in pollution control if compensation falls short of harm, and may underinvest if compensation exceeds harm.
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the monopolistic polluter under Environmental Liability law incentives for abatement and r d
Research Papers in Economics, 2011Co-Authors: Alfred Endres, Tim FrieheAbstract:This paper analyzes the output, abatement, and investment decisions made by a monopolistic polluter under Environmental Liability law. The model applied considers both integrated and end-of-pipe abatement technologies. We find that in the case of fixed technology, in many instances negligence produces more favorable results than strict Liability in terms of social welfare. The reason is that output under strict Liability is always less than first-best output, whereas output under negligence is not similarly limited. However, this ranking of Liability rules may be reversed when technology is endogenous. Under such conditions investment in both integrated and end-of-pipe abatement technologies under negligence is guided by motives foreign to the social planner, whereas the polluter's calculus under strict Liability is similar to that of the social planner.
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Environmental Liability law and induced technical change the role of spillovers
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics-zeitschrift Fur Die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 2008Co-Authors: Alfred Endres, Bianca Rundshagen, Regina BertramAbstract:We investigate the incentives of Environmental Liability law to improve pollution control technology. It is shown that equilibrium choice of abatement technology and of the level of pollution reduction is socially optimal under very restrictive conditions. However, technological spillovers distort the incentives to innovate. The negligence rule turns out to be less sensitive to this problem than strict Liability if the due-care standard is set sufficiently close to the second-best level of care.
Tim Friehe - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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prevention and cleanup of dynamic harm under Environmental Liability
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 2017Co-Authors: Tim Friehe, Eric LanglaisAbstract:Abstract This paper explores incentives for accident prevention and cleanup when firms are subject to Environmental Liability. In our two-period setup, the level of Environmental harm in the second period depends on first-period harm when cleanup was incomplete. Under strict Liability, in the first period, firms with a positive probability of going out of business before the second period have inadequate prevention and cleanup incentives. The fundamental disconnect between private incentives and social optimality cannot be remedied by using a multiple of harm as the level of compensation. Under negligence with a causation requirement, incentive problems remain; however, under negligence without such a requirement, first-best incentives may emerge, and using a multiple of harm as the level of compensation can ensure the efficient solution.
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prevention and cleanup of dynamic harm under Environmental Liability
Research Papers in Economics, 2016Co-Authors: Tim Friehe, Eric LanglaisAbstract:This paper explores incentives for accident prevention and cleanup when firms are subject to Environmental Liability. In our two-period setup, the level of Environmental harm in the second period depends on first-period harm when cleanup was incomplete. Under strict Liability, in the first period, firms with a positive probability of going out of business before the second period have inadequate prevention and cleanup incentives. The fundamental disconnect between private incentives and social optimality cannot be remedied by using a multiple of harm as the level of compensation. Under negligence with causation requirement, incentive problems remain; however, under negligence without such a requirement, first-best incentives may emerge, and using a multiple of harm as level of compensation can ensure the efficient solution.
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it s all in the mix internalizing externalities with r d subsidies and Environmental Liability
Social Choice and Welfare, 2015Co-Authors: Alfred Endres, Tim Friehe, Bianca RundshagenAbstract:Extending previous “tales of two market failures”, we consider a setting in which firms generate Environmental externalities and may invest in Environmentally friendly technological advancement generating R&D spillovers. We analyze the joint use of Environmental Liability law and R&D subsidies to internalize the double externality. Two alternative Liability rules are considered: strict Liability and negligence. In a complete information scenario, the social optimum in terms of emission levels and technical progress may be induced by combining either Liability rule with an appropriate R&D subsidy. However, when the policy maker has incomplete information with respect to a firm’s productivity of R&D investments and non-discriminatorily sets a uniform Liability rule and a uniform subsidy, only the so-called “double negligence” rule that imposes both an emission and a technology standard can induce the social optimum (if any one). The double negligence rule dominates strict Liability with respect to the goal of minimizing social costs under modest conditions, also in cases in which none of the Liability rules is capable of inducing first-best behavior among firms. Somewhat counterintuitively, a non-discriminatory double negligence rule can even dominate a (simple as well as double) negligence rule with type-specific norms and compliance-contingent type-specific subsidies. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015
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incentives to diffuse advanced abatement technology under Environmental Liability law
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 2011Co-Authors: Alfred Endres, Tim FrieheAbstract:Polluting firms with advanced abatement technology at their disposal have incentives or disincentives to share this technology with other polluting firms. The ‘direction’ and extent of those incentives depends on the Liability rule applicable and the way technical change impacts marginal abatement costs. We establish that incentives for diffusion are socially optimal under strict Liability and socially suboptimal under negligence if technical change lowers marginal abatement costs for all levels of abatement. Negligence may, however, induce better diffusion incentives than strict Liability if technical change decreases (increases) marginal abatement costs for low (high) levels of abatement.
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r d and abatement under Environmental Liability law comparing incentives under strict Liability and negligence if compensation differs from harm
Energy Economics, 2011Co-Authors: Alfred Endres, Tim FrieheAbstract:Abstract This paper analyzes equilibrium R&D in pollution control and equilibrium pollution abatement by polluters who are subject to Environmental Liability law when the level of compensation differs from the level of Environmental harm. We contrast the performance of strict Liability with that of the negligence rule. Privately optimal levels necessarily deviate from socially optimal ones under strict Liability, whereas private decisions are first-best under negligence unless compensation is much smaller than harm. It is established that the way in which privately optimal R&D deviates from the first-best level depends on the kind of technical change in pollution abatement. Counterintuitively polluters might overinvest into R&D in pollution control if compensation falls short of harm, and may underinvest if compensation exceeds harm.
Michael Mason - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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civil Liability for oil pollution damage examining the evolving scope for Environmental compensation in the international regime
Marine Policy, 2003Co-Authors: Michael MasonAbstract:The civil Liability regime for ship-source oil pollution enables national victims of oil spill damage to make financial claims against domestic and non-domestic tanker owners and, in certain circumstances, the global oil cargo industry. This paper examines the evolving--and contested--parameters of Environmental Liability set by the international oil pollution Liability conventions, focusing on the admissibility of reinstatement costs and the geographical scope of compensation norms. It concludes that although the Liability regime can be applauded for its equitable consideration of Environmental claims, this is restricted by a narrow definition of damage and national boundaries of entitlement. Oil pollution harm to collective ecological interests represents a key challenge to the Liability framework.
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transnational compensation for oil pollution damage examining changing spatialities of Environmental Liability
LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, 2002Co-Authors: Michael MasonAbstract:The civil Liability regime for ship-source oil pollution stands at the forefront of rule development for transnational Environmental compensation, advancing private law remedies to enable national victims of oil spill damage to make financial claims against domestic and non-domestic tanker owners and, in certain circumstances, the global oil cargo industry. This rule formulation and implementation attests to the significance of legal norms in constituting new spaces of financial accountability for transboundary Environmental harm. I examine the evolving – and contested – parameters of Environmental Liability set by the international oil pollution Liability conventions, focusing on the admissibility of reinstatement costs and the geographical scope of compensation norms. A preliminary assessment of the extent to which the Liability regime meets the interests of affected (third) parties applauds its equitable consideration of Environmental claims, although this is restricted by a narrow definition of damage and national boundaries of entitlement. Oil pollution harm to collective ecological interests represents a key challenge to the Liability framework.
Barbara Cooreman - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the macondo oil spill blessing in disguise for an Environmental friendly future of european waters Environmental Liability for offshore oil drilling in the eu
Social Science Research Network, 2013Co-Authors: Barbara CooremanAbstract:The BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010 raised worldwide concerns about the safety and Liability of offshore drilling. The EU, having a significant number of offshore oil and gas drilling installations under a currently complex and fragmented legislative framework, was alerted. In the fall of 2011, the Commission proposed a new regulation on uniform high safety offshore standards. In the light of that proposal, this article examines the current regime for Environmental Liability for oil spills from offshore drilling activities at EU-level. The Environmental Liability Directive (ELD) and Waste Framework Directive will be discussed, as well as industry initiatives such as OPOL. Particular focus will be given to the strict Liability regime and financial security of operators. Indicated weaknesses are the limited territorial application of the directives; the lack of clear standards on financial capacity and security for operators of offshore facilities; and the exclusion of civil damages from the scope of the European Directives. The Commission proposal, while extending the territorial application of the ELD, failed to include the issues of civil Liability as well as financial capacity and security of operators – but will continue its analysis on these points. When it comes to a comprehensive Environmental Liability regime for offshore facilities, uniform standards are hence still to be awaited for.