The Experts below are selected from a list of 11778 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Toshihide Arimura - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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is a voluntary approach an effective Environmental Policy Instrument a case for Environmental management systems
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 2008Co-Authors: Toshihide Arimura, Akira Hibiki, Hajime KatayamaAbstract:Abstract Using Japanese facility-level data from an OECD survey, we estimate the effects of implementation of ISO14001 and publication of Environmental reports on the facilities’ Environmental performance. While most previous studies focused on an index of emissions toxicity, this study examines three areas of impacts, none of which have been explored in the literature: natural resource use, solid waste generation, and wastewater effluent. The study is also unique in that the effectiveness of ISO14001 is considered in relation to Environmental regulations. Our findings are summarized as follows. First, both ISO14001 and report publication help reduce all three impacts; the former appears more effective in all areas except wastewater. Second, Environmental regulations do not weaken the effect of ISO14001. Third, assistance programs offered by local governments—a voluntary approach—promote facilities’ adoption of ISO14001. These findings suggest that governments can use command-and-control and voluntary approaches concurrently.
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is a voluntary approach an effective Environmental Policy Instrument a case for Environmental management systems
2007Co-Authors: Toshihide Arimura, Akira Hibiki, Hajime KatayamaAbstract:Using Japanese facility-level data from an Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development survey, we estimate the effects of implementation of ISO14001 and publication of Environmental reports on the facilities’ Environmental performance. While most previous studies focused on an index of emissions toxicity, this study examines three areas of impacts, none of which have been explored in the literature: natural resource use, solid waste generation, and wastewater effluent. The study is also unique in that the effectiveness of ISO14001 is considered in relation to Environmental regulations. Our findings are summarized as follows. First, both ISO14001 and report publication help reduce all three impacts; the former appears more effective in all areas except wastewater. Second, Environmental regulations do not weaken the effect of ISO14001. Third, assistance programs offered by local governments—a voluntary approach—promote facilities’ adoption of ISO14001. These findings suggest that governments can use command-and-control and voluntary approaches concurrently.
Donatella Porrini - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the impact of court errors on liability sharing and safety regulation for Environmental industrial accidents
Social Science Research Network, 2010Co-Authors: Marcel Boyer, Donatella PorriniAbstract:We focus in this paper on the effects of court errors on the optimal sharing of liability between firms and financiers, as an Environmental Policy Instrument. Using a structural model of the interactions between firms, financial institutions, governments and courts we show, through numerical simulations, the distortions in liability sharing between firms and financiers that the imperfect implementation of government policies implies. We consider in particular the role played by the efficiency of the courts in jointly avoiding Type I (finding an innocent firm guilty of inappropriate care) and Type II (finding a guilty firm not guilty of inappropriate care) errors. This role is considered in a context where liability sharing is already distorted (when compared with first best values) due not only to the courts’ own imperfect assessment of safety care levels exerted by firms but also to the presence of moral hazard and adverse selection in financial contracting. There is also not congruence of objectives between firms and financiers on the one hand and social welfare maximization on the other. Our results indicate that an increase in the efficiency of court system in avoiding errors raises safety care level, thereby reducing the probability of accident, and allowing the social welfare maximizing government to impose a lower liability [higher] share for firms [financiers] as well as a lower standard level of care.
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the impact of court errors on liability sharing and safety regulation for Environmental industrial accidents
Research Papers in Economics, 2010Co-Authors: Marcel Boyer, Donatella PorriniAbstract:We focus in this paper on the effects of court errors on the optimal sharing of liability between firms and financiers, as an Environmental Policy Instrument. Using a structural model of the interactions between firms, financial institutions, governments and courts we show, through numerical simulations, the distortions in liability sharing between firms and financiers that the imperfect implementation of government policies implies. We consider in particular the role played by the efficiency of the courts in jointly avoiding Type I (finding an innocent firm guilty of inappropriate care) and Type II (finding a guilty firm not guilty of inappropriate care) errors. This role is considered in a context where liability sharing is already distorted (when compared with first best values) due not only to the courts' own imperfect assessment of safety care levels exerted by firms but also to the presence of moral hazard and adverse selection in financial contracting. There is also not congruence of objectives between firms and financiers on the one hand and social welfare maximization on the other. Our results indicate that an increase in the efficiency of court system in avoiding errors raises safety care level, thereby reducing the probability of accident, and allowing the social welfare maximizing government to impose a lower liability [higher] share for firms [financiers] as well as a lower standard level of care. Nous considerons dans le present document les effets des erreurs judiciaires sur le partage optimal des responsabilites entre entreprises et financiers, comme un Instrument de politique environnementale. En utilisant un modele structurel des interactions entre les entreprises, les institutions financieres, les gouvernements et les tribunaux, nous montrons, au moyen de simulations numeriques, les distorsions dans le partage de responsabilites entre entreprises et financiers qu'implique la mise en uvre imparfaite des politiques gouvernementales. Nous considerons en particulier le role joue par l'efficacite des tribunaux a eviter les erreurs de type I (condamner une entreprise innocente de manquements a la securite) et de type II (ne pas condamner une entreprise coupable de manquements a la securite). Nous considerons un contexte ou le partage des responsabilites est deja altere (par rapport a l'optimum de premier rang), en raison non seulement des difficultes des tribunaux a observer correctement les efforts de prevention des entreprises mais aussi de la presence d'alea moral et selection adverse dans les contrats de financement. Il n'y a pas absence de congruence entre les objectifs des entreprises et financiers d'une part et la maximisation du bien-etre social d'autre part. Nos resultats indiquent qu'une plus grande efficacite du systeme judiciaire a eviter les erreurs entraine une hausse des activites de prevention d'accident et donc une baisse de la probabilite d'accident, et permet de reduire (d'augmenter) la part de responsabilite des entreprises (financiers) et de reduire le niveau requis de prevention.
Manuel F M Cabugueira - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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voluntary agreements as an Environmental Policy Instrument evaluation criteria
Journal of Cleaner Production, 2001Co-Authors: Manuel F M CabugueiraAbstract:Abstract As the resource to voluntary action grows wider, a question must be held on the factors that influence the performance of a Voluntary Agreement as an Environmental Policy Instrument. Our goal in this paper is to answer that question, outlining the main variables that make a Voluntary Agreement simultaneously efficient, effective and just. Using several articles on the subject of voluntary action, under the themes of “economic regulation” and of contracts under “asymmetric information”, as well as available reports on the Portuguese and European experience on the use of Voluntary Agreements, we will undertake this objective following three steps: (i) we begin by underlining the main factors that justify the private and public option for Voluntary Action. (ii) We then present an analysis of the co-regulation process under the requirements of the three E criteria: efficiency, effectiveness and equity. (iii) Finally we conclude by presenting an “evaluation table” that summarises the elements that we found to be the most important for the “performance” of the voluntary action in each one of those criteria.
Robert N Stavins - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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lessons learned from three decades of experience with cap and trade
Climate Change and Sustainable Development, 2016Co-Authors: Richard Schmalensee, Robert N StavinsAbstract:This essay provides an overview of the major emissions trading programs of the past thirty years on which significant documentation exists, and draws a number of important lessons for future applications of this Environmental Policy Instrument. References to a larger number of other emissions trading programs that have been implemented or proposed are included.
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the positive political economy of Instrument choice in Environmental Policy
1997Co-Authors: Robert N Stavins, Nathaniel O Keohane, Richard L ReveszAbstract:In the realm of Environmental Policy Instrument choice, there is great divergence between the recommendations of normative economic theory and positive political reality. Four gaps stand out. First, despite the advantages of market-based Policy Instruments, they have been used to a minor degree, compared with conventional, command-and-control Instruments. Second, pollution-control standards have typically been much more stringent for new than for existing sources, despite the inefficiency of this approach. Third, in the few instances in which market-based Instruments have been adopted, they have nearly always taken the form of grandfathered tradeable permits, rather than auctioned permits or pollution taxes, despite the advantages in some situations of these other Instruments. Fourth, the political attention given to market-based Environmental Policy Instruments has increased dramatically in recent years. We search for explanations for these four apparent anomalies by drawing upon intellectual traditions from economics, political science, and law. We find that all fit quite well within an equilibrium framework, based upon the metaphor of a political market. In general, explanations from economics tend to refer to the demand for Environmental Policy Instruments, while explanations from political science refer to the supply side. Overall, we find that there are compelling theoretical explanations for the four apparent anomalies, although these theories have yet to be empirically verified.
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the positive political economy of Instrument choice in Environmental Policy
1997Co-Authors: Nathaniel O Keohane, Robert N Stavins, Richard L ReveszAbstract:Abstract In the realm of Environmental Policy Instrument choice, there is great divergencebetween the recommendations of normative economic theory and positive political reality.Four gaps stand out. First, despite the advantages of market-based Policy Instruments, theyhave been used to a minor degree, compared with conventional, command-and-controlInstruments. Second, pollution-control standards have typically been much more stringent fornew than for existing sources, despite the inefficiency of this approach. Third, in the fewinstances in which market-based Instruments have been adopted, they have nearly always takenthe form of grandfathered tradeable permits, rather than auctioned permits or pollution taxes,despite the advantages in some situations of these other Instruments. Fourth, the politicalattention given to market-based Environmental Policy Instruments has increased dramatically inrecent years. We search for explanations for these four apparent anomalies by drawing uponintellectual traditions from economics, political science, and law. We find that all fit quite wellwithin an equilibrium framework, based upon the metaphor of a political market. In general,explanations from economics tend to refer to the demand for Environmental Policy Instruments,while explanations from political science refer to the supply side. Overall, we find that thereare compelling theoretical explanations for the four apparent anomalies, although thesetheories have yet to be empirically verified.JEL Classification Nos. : L51, H11, P16, K32, Q28
Marcel Boyer - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the impact of court errors on liability sharing and safety regulation for Environmental industrial accidents
Social Science Research Network, 2010Co-Authors: Marcel Boyer, Donatella PorriniAbstract:We focus in this paper on the effects of court errors on the optimal sharing of liability between firms and financiers, as an Environmental Policy Instrument. Using a structural model of the interactions between firms, financial institutions, governments and courts we show, through numerical simulations, the distortions in liability sharing between firms and financiers that the imperfect implementation of government policies implies. We consider in particular the role played by the efficiency of the courts in jointly avoiding Type I (finding an innocent firm guilty of inappropriate care) and Type II (finding a guilty firm not guilty of inappropriate care) errors. This role is considered in a context where liability sharing is already distorted (when compared with first best values) due not only to the courts’ own imperfect assessment of safety care levels exerted by firms but also to the presence of moral hazard and adverse selection in financial contracting. There is also not congruence of objectives between firms and financiers on the one hand and social welfare maximization on the other. Our results indicate that an increase in the efficiency of court system in avoiding errors raises safety care level, thereby reducing the probability of accident, and allowing the social welfare maximizing government to impose a lower liability [higher] share for firms [financiers] as well as a lower standard level of care.
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the impact of court errors on liability sharing and safety regulation for Environmental industrial accidents
Research Papers in Economics, 2010Co-Authors: Marcel Boyer, Donatella PorriniAbstract:We focus in this paper on the effects of court errors on the optimal sharing of liability between firms and financiers, as an Environmental Policy Instrument. Using a structural model of the interactions between firms, financial institutions, governments and courts we show, through numerical simulations, the distortions in liability sharing between firms and financiers that the imperfect implementation of government policies implies. We consider in particular the role played by the efficiency of the courts in jointly avoiding Type I (finding an innocent firm guilty of inappropriate care) and Type II (finding a guilty firm not guilty of inappropriate care) errors. This role is considered in a context where liability sharing is already distorted (when compared with first best values) due not only to the courts' own imperfect assessment of safety care levels exerted by firms but also to the presence of moral hazard and adverse selection in financial contracting. There is also not congruence of objectives between firms and financiers on the one hand and social welfare maximization on the other. Our results indicate that an increase in the efficiency of court system in avoiding errors raises safety care level, thereby reducing the probability of accident, and allowing the social welfare maximizing government to impose a lower liability [higher] share for firms [financiers] as well as a lower standard level of care. Nous considerons dans le present document les effets des erreurs judiciaires sur le partage optimal des responsabilites entre entreprises et financiers, comme un Instrument de politique environnementale. En utilisant un modele structurel des interactions entre les entreprises, les institutions financieres, les gouvernements et les tribunaux, nous montrons, au moyen de simulations numeriques, les distorsions dans le partage de responsabilites entre entreprises et financiers qu'implique la mise en uvre imparfaite des politiques gouvernementales. Nous considerons en particulier le role joue par l'efficacite des tribunaux a eviter les erreurs de type I (condamner une entreprise innocente de manquements a la securite) et de type II (ne pas condamner une entreprise coupable de manquements a la securite). Nous considerons un contexte ou le partage des responsabilites est deja altere (par rapport a l'optimum de premier rang), en raison non seulement des difficultes des tribunaux a observer correctement les efforts de prevention des entreprises mais aussi de la presence d'alea moral et selection adverse dans les contrats de financement. Il n'y a pas absence de congruence entre les objectifs des entreprises et financiers d'une part et la maximisation du bien-etre social d'autre part. Nos resultats indiquent qu'une plus grande efficacite du systeme judiciaire a eviter les erreurs entraine une hausse des activites de prevention d'accident et donc une baisse de la probabilite d'accident, et permet de reduire (d'augmenter) la part de responsabilite des entreprises (financiers) et de reduire le niveau requis de prevention.