The Experts below are selected from a list of 24573 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform

Jaeyong Song - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

Arijit Mukherjee - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Joint Venture Instability Under Entry
    International Review of Economics & Finance, 2006
    Co-Authors: Shantanu Banerjee, Arijit Mukherjee
    Abstract:

    Many developing countries are liberalizing their economies to allow higher Equity Participation by the foreign firms. We argue that the possibility of joint venture can reduce the number of technology transfers. Hence, joint venture can reduce the welfare of a host-country by creating higher market-concentration. However, higher profit generation under joint venture encourages the foreign firm to transfer relatively better technology and may make the host-country and the firms better-off under joint venture than licensing. For sufficiently large efficiency-gain, the host-country allows fully owned subsidiary of the foreign firm.

  • Foreign Market Entry and Host Country Welfare: A Theoretical Analysis
    SSRN Electronic Journal, 2003
    Co-Authors: Arijit Mukherjee
    Abstract:

    Many developing countries are liberalizing their economies to allow higher Equity Participation by the foreign firms. We argue that the possibility of joint venture can reduce the number of technology transfers. Hence, joint venture can reduce the welfare of a host-country by creating higher market-concentration. However, higher profit generation under joint venture encourages the foreign firm to transfer relatively better technology and may make the host-country and the firms better-off under joint venture than licensing. For sufficiently large efficiency-gain, the host-country allows fully owned subsidiary of the foreign firm.

  • Technology Transfer under Asymmetric Information: The Role of Equity Participation
    Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 2001
    Co-Authors: Sugata Marjit, Arijit Mukherjee
    Abstract:

    Technological collaboration coupled with Equity Participation improves the quality of transacted technology relative to a situation characterised by a pure technology licensing agreement. Such a result is proved in a model of a signalling game with asymmetric information and threat of imitation. Different contractual arrangements involving Equity Participation with or without up-front fixed fee and/or output-based royalty payments are discussed.

  • Technology collaboration and foreign Equity Participation: a theoretical analysis
    Review of International Economics, 1998
    Co-Authors: Sugata Marjit, Arijit Mukherjee
    Abstract:

    Technology transfer to the developing nations has been predominantly characterized by technology collaborations between the multinationals and the local firms of these developing countries. When a multinational offers a new technology to a local firm, the firms may have different perceptions regarding the success rate of the technology in the local conditions. This paper discusses various types of contractual arrangements with Equity Participation by the multinational, which dominate pure technology collaboration agreements. Copyright 1998 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

  • technology collaboration and foreign Equity Participation a theoretical analysis
    1997
    Co-Authors: Sugata Marjit, Arijit Mukherjee
    Abstract:

    Technology transfer to the developing nations has been predominantly characterized by technology collaborations between the multinationals and the local firms of the developing countries. When a multinational offers a new technology to a local firm, both firms may have different perceptions regarding the success rate of the technology in the local conditions. We discuss different types of contractual arrangements with Equity Participation by the multinational which dominates pure technology collaboration type agreements.

Toby E. Stuart - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Network Effects in the Governance of Strategic Alliances
    Journal of Law Economics and Organization, 2006
    Co-Authors: David T. Robinson, Toby E. Stuart
    Abstract:

    We argue that the stock of prior alliances between participants in the biotechnology sector forms a network that serves as a governance mechanism in interfirm transactions. To test how this network substitutes for other governance mechanisms, we examine how Equity Participation and pledged funding in strategic alliances vary with two features of the way alliance participants are positioned in the network of past deals: proximity, or how close two firms are to one another in the network; and centrality, or how deeply a firm is embedded in the network. As centrality and proximity increase, Equity Participation (measured by size and propensity) diminishes, whereas pledged funding increases. Copyright 2007, Oxford University Press.

  • Network Eects in the Governance of Biotech Strategic Alliances
    2002
    Co-Authors: David T. Robinson, Toby E. Stuart, Fred G. Steingraber-a, T. Kearney
    Abstract:

    We argue that the stock of prior alliances between participants in the biotechnology sector forms a network that serves as a governance mechanism in inter-firm transactions. To test how this network substitutes for other governance mechanisms, we examine how Equity Participation and pledged funding in strategic alliances vary with two features of the way alliance participants are positioned in the network of past deals: (i) proximity, and (ii) centrality, which measures how deeply a firm is embedded in the network. As centrality and proximity increase, Equity Participation (measured by size and propensity) diminish, while pledged funding increases.

  • Financial Contracting in Biotech Strategic Alliances
    SSRN Electronic Journal, 2002
    Co-Authors: David T. Robinson, Toby E. Stuart
    Abstract:

    We analyze 125 strategic alliance contracts, all of which concern early-stage research at small biotechnology research and development companies. Staged investment is ubiquitous, but solutions to agency problems vary. The cycle of Equity Participation in alliances resembles what we observe in venture capital contracts: they involve convertible Equity and sometimes contain antidilution provisions, warrants, and board seats. Contracts rights vary explicitly with the size of the Equity stake. Contracts contain explicit provisions linking Equity Participation to subsequent initial public offerings and contain clauses designed to insulate both parties from multitasking problems. Contracts often specify provisions that are unobservable or difficult to verify, which suggests a role for expected litigation as an enforcement tool in contract design.

Weijian Shan - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

Milind Shrikhande - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Structuring International Cooperative Ventures
    Review of Financial Studies, 2002
    Co-Authors: Thomas H Noe, Michael J Rebello, Milind Shrikhande
    Abstract:

    We examine the effect of bargaining power and informational asymmetry on the design of international cooperative ventures in the presence of restrictions on Equity Participation and investment. When the bargaining advantage rests with the multinational, Equity Participation restrictions can increase the profits to domestic firms and encourage suboptimal investment policies. Overinvestment occurs when the multinational's bargaining advantage is reinforced by an informational advantage, while underinvestment occurs when the domestic firm possesses the informational advantage. In contrast, when the bargaining advantage rests with the domestic firm, Equity Participation restrictions do not affect investment levels. Copyright 2002, Oxford University Press.

  • structuring international joint ventures bargaining Equity Participation and private information
    2002
    Co-Authors: Thomas H Noe, Michael J Rebello, Milind Shrikhande
    Abstract:

    We examine the effect of bargaining power and informational asymmetry on the design of international cooperative ventures in the presence of restrictions on Equity Participation and investment. When the bargaining advantage rests with the multinational, Equity Participation restrictions can increase the profits to domestic firms and encourage sub-optimal investment policies. Overinvestment occurs when the multinational's bargaining advantage is reinforced by an informational advantage, while underinvestment occurs when the domestic firm possesses the informational advantage. In contrast, when the bargaining advantage rests with the domestic firm, Equity Participation restrictions do not affect investment levels.

  • Structuring International Joint Ventures: Bargaining, Equity Participation, and Private Information
    1995
    Co-Authors: Thomas H Noe, Michael J Rebello, Milind Shrikhande
    Abstract:

    We examine the role of bargaining power, informational asymmetry, and Equity Participation restrictions on the division of the gains from cooperation between multinational and domestic firms. When the bargaining advantage rests with the multinational, Equity Participation restrictions can increase the profits to domestic firms and encourage sub-optimal investment policies. Overinvestment occurs when the multinational's bargaining advantage is reinforced by an informational advantage, while underinvestment occurs when the domestic firm possesses the informational advantage. Equity Participation restrictions, however, do not affect investment policies or the division of gains from joint ventures when the bargaining advantage rests with the domestic firm.