Technology Licensing

14,000,000 Leading Edge Experts on the ideXlab platform

Scan Science and Technology

Contact Leading Edge Experts & Companies

Scan Science and Technology

Contact Leading Edge Experts & Companies

The Experts below are selected from a list of 14679 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform

Xianpei Hong - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Dilemma of quality information disclosure in Technology Licensing
    European Journal of Operational Research, 2021
    Co-Authors: Xianpei Hong, Menghuan Zhou, Yeming Gong
    Abstract:

    Abstract This study investigates the Technology Licensing decision of an incumbent patentor with quality-improving Technology in duopoly model with heterogenous consumers, and quality information disclosure strategies of the patentor and the licensee that compete in quantity. A patentor is faced with a dilemma whether to disclose product quality information to consumers when Technology Licensing occurs and whether to encourage the licensee to disclose its quality information. While few scholars study the quality information disclosure in the background of Technology Licensing, these problems are of importance for the Technology Licensing because the disclosure decision can significantly influence the consumer belief about product quality and generate different effects on patentor's profitability. We find that the patentor can benefit from choosing information disclosure strategies. Under per-unit royalty Licensing, we show that the patentor may choose not to disclose its quality information but encourage the licensee to disclose quality information. However, we find, under fixed fee Licensing, when the disclosure cost is sufficiently low and quality difference is not large, only a large prior probability of the product being of high-quality can motivate the choice that the patentor disclose information and require the licensee to disclose. Interestingly, our results also suggest that per-unit royalty Licensing leads to more information disclosure and higher profits than fixed-fee Licensing. Our work identifies the optimal conditions under which the patentor can deal with the dilemma in quality information disclosure, proposes decision support tools in evaluating the values of quality information disclosure, and provides new management insights in quality disclosure strategy under Technology Licensing.

  • Knowledge structure of Technology Licensing based on co-keywords network: A review and future directions
    International Review of Economics & Finance, 2020
    Co-Authors: Huaige Zhang, Xianpei Hong
    Abstract:

    Abstract A wide array of scholars study Technology Licensing from different aspects but there is no review literature to summarize the research results. To conclude these literatures and reveal the intellectual structure which can let us clearly predict potential future research, we select 106 keywords from 3761 literatures available in the core collection of web of science in 2005–2016, and adopt k-core of social network analysis (SNA), and Multi-dimensional scaling (MDS) to analyze the co-occurrence words matrix and map the intellectual structure of Technology Licensing by the software Ucinet and Netdraw. Under hierarchical analysis and content analysis, the results show Technology Licensing research can be divided into four layers including nucleus layer, middle layer, detail layer and marginal layer, and there are four main topics contained basic theory, spectrum band Licensing, environment, and education and Technology. According to the map, we infer the possibility of adopting multi methods to develop Technology Licensing research and clearly predict potential future research.

  • quantity and collection decisions in a closed loop supply chain with Technology Licensing
    European Journal of Operational Research, 2017
    Co-Authors: Xianpei Hong, Kannan Govindan
    Abstract:

    Abstract Industry practice has shown that Technology Licensing has an important effect on the remanufacturing of patented products by third parties. Different Licensing methods significantly impact a supply chain member's production and collection decisions, and they also have influential effects on reverse channel performance. However, there is scant literature investigating the decision on Technology Licensing and its impact on a supply chain member's production and collection decisions. To address this gap, we consider a manufacturer, as the patent holder, who produces new and remanufactured products and, simultaneously, he and a remanufacturer (as the licensee, who by law can only produce remanufactured products) competitively collects used products from the market in a two-period closed-loop supply chain (CLSC). We investigate two Licensing patterns, fixed fee versus royalty, within the CLSC in a Cournot duopoly model. We find that royalty Licensing is dominated by fixed fee Licensing from the viewpoints of both the consumer surplus and environmental protection. Our result also shows that the manufacturer's optimal Licensing strategy is determined by a threshold of the fixed fee: when the fixed fee is below a threshold, it is better for the manufacturer to use a royalty Licensing, whereas fixed-fee Licensing should be used when the fixed fee is higher than a threshold.

  • Technology Licensing contracts with network effects
    International Journal of Production Economics, 2014
    Co-Authors: Dan Zhao, Xianpei Hong, Hongmin Chen, Jingfang Liu
    Abstract:

    We study the optimal Technology Licensing contracts with network effects and investigate the welfare implications when the product innovator is an insider that acts as a Stackelberg leader. We show that (i) the market is fully covered when relatively small network intensity matches quality differentiations that are sufficiently large; (ii) with regard to profit maximization, the optimal Licensing strategy varies from one of royalty Licensing to two-part tariff Licensing as network effects increase (not including fixed-fee Licensing); (iii) consumer surplus is optimal under non-Licensing conditions in comparison to other Licensing strategies, due to the covered market; (iv) depending on network effects, the preferred strategies to achieve social welfare maximization change from no-Licensing or fixed-fee Licensing to two-part tariff Licensing, and royalty Licensing is not preferred in this instance; (v) conflict does not always or necessarily occur between the goals of enterprise profit maximization and social welfare optimization. Two-part tariff Licensing is preferred both by the licensor and by society when the network effect is large.

Mark Schankerman - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • harnessing success determinants of university Technology Licensing performance
    LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, 2006
    Co-Authors: Sharon Belenzon, Mark Schankerman
    Abstract:

    We study the impact of incentive pay, local development objectives and government constraints on university Licensing performance. We develop and test a simple contracting model of Technology Licensing offices, using new survey information together with panel data on U.S. universities for 1995-99. We find that private universities are much more likely to adopt incentive pay than public ones, but ownership does not affect Licensing performance conditional on the use of incentive pay. Adopting incentive pay is associated with about 30-40 percent more income per license. Universities with strong local development objectives generate about 30 percent less income per license, but are more likely to license to local (in-state) startup companies. Stronger government constraints are ‘costly’ in terms of foregone license income and startup activity. These results are robust to controls for observed and unobserved heterogeneity.

  • Royalty Sharing and Technology Licensing in Universities
    Journal of the European Economic Association, 2004
    Co-Authors: Saul Lach, Mark Schankerman
    Abstract:

    Using data for 102 U.S. universities, we show that royalty-sharing arrangements (cash flow rights) vary substantially across universities and that they are largely unrelated to most observed university characteristics including faculty size, quality, research funding, Technology mix of the faculty, and size of the Technology Licensing office. However, higher inventors' royalty shares are associated with higher Licensing income at the university, controlling for other factors. The results suggest that monetary incentives from inventions have real effects in the university sector. (JEL: O31, O34, L3, L01)

Zongjun Wang - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Information sharing in a closed-loop supply chain with learning effect and Technology Licensing
    Journal of Cleaner Production, 2020
    Co-Authors: Yanting Huang, Zongjun Wang
    Abstract:

    Abstract The considerable economic and environmental benefits from remanufacturing has led growing interest in closed-loop supply chain management. Incorporating information sharing and learning effect plays a significant role in determining the efficiency and the benefit of supply chain. Therefore, this study investigates the interaction between information sharing and learning effect in a closed-loop supply chain by developing three remanufacturing modes including no-remanufacturing, original equipment manufacturer remanufacturing and third-party remanufacturer remanufacturing under Technology Licensing. The results demonstrate the information sharing and learning effect have a negative impact on the procurement price and procurement quantity. A higher procurement price would be achieved under information sharing scenarios compared to no information sharing scenarios when the retailer reveals a larger demand information to the manufacturer. Since the original equipment manufacturer can make more accurate pricing decisions based on the shared information, he can obtain more payoffs when he receives demand information from the retailer. Comparatively, the procurement price in third-party remanufacturer remanufacturing scenario is higher than that in original equipment manufacturer remanufacturing scenario if the learning effect factor is relatively large. Moreover, the learning effect can bring a payoff increase to the original equipment manufacturer because a higher learning effect factor can save more production cost. These results can help achieve an optimal approach of learning effect and information sharing in a closed-loop supply chain with Technology Licensing.

  • Information sharing in a closed-loop supply chain with Technology Licensing
    International Journal of Production Economics, 2017
    Co-Authors: Yanting Huang, Zongjun Wang
    Abstract:

    Abstract This paper analyzes the benefits of information sharing in a closed-loop supply chain with a manufacturer, a distributor and a third party under Technology Licensing. The distributor has access to private market demand information and decides whether to share information with the manufacturer. We investigate three kinds of remanufacturing scenarios, namely (1) the manufacturer taking the responsibility for remanufacturing, (2) the manufacturer Licensing the distributor to undertake remanufacturing, (3) the manufacturer Licensing the third party to conduct remanufacturing. We adopt Stackelberg game to obtain equilibrium decisions of each remanufacturing scenario with/without information sharing. We show that, regardless of whether Technology Licensing exists in remanufacturing models, information sharing always results in a profit increase to the manufacturer and the third party, whilst a profit loss to the distributor. Such profit loss of the distributor can be effectively reduced with the introduction of Technology Licensing in each remanufacturing model. As for the remanufacturing choice, if the distributor/the third-party saving unit cost is high enough, the manufacturer would prefer distributor/third-party remanufacturing mode with information sharing instead of manufacturer-remanufacturing mode as he could share more remanufacturing benefits by charging a Licensing fee from the distributor/the third party. Our study extends and complements prior research that has only examined remanufacturing mode combined with either Technology Licensing or information sharing.

Andrea Fosfuri - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • The Licensing Dilemma: Understanding the Determinants of the Rate of Technology Licensing
    SSRN Electronic Journal, 2006
    Co-Authors: Andrea Fosfuri
    Abstract:

    The Licensing of Technology entails a tradeoff: Licensing payments net of transaction costs (revenue effect) must be balanced against the lower price-cost margin and/or reduced market share implied by increased competition (profit dissipation effect) from the licensee. We argue that the presence of multiple Technology holders, which compete in the market for Technology, changes such a tradeoff and triggers more aggressive Licensing behavior. To test our theory, we analyze Technology Licensing by large chemical firms during the period 1986-96 for 107 chemical products. We find that the rate of Technology Licensing displays an inverted U-shaped relationship with the number of potential Technology suppliers and is negatively related to the licensor's market share and to the degree of Technology-specific product differentiation.

  • The Licensing dilemma: understanding the determinants of the rate of Technology Licensing
    Strategic Management Journal, 2006
    Co-Authors: Andrea Fosfuri
    Abstract:

    The Licensing of Technology entails a trade-off: Licensing payments net of transaction costs (revenue effect) must be balanced against the lower price–cost margin and/or reduced market share implied by increased competition (profit dissipation effect) from the licensee. We argue that the presence of multiple Technology holders, which compete in the market for Technology, changes such a trade-off and triggers more aggressive Licensing behavior. To test our theory, we analyze Technology Licensing by large chemical firms during the period 1986–96 for 107 chemical products. We find that the rate of Technology Licensing displays an inverted U-shaped relationship with the number of potential Technology suppliers and is negatively related to the licensor's market share and to the degree of Technology-specific product differentiation. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

  • wholly owned subsidiary versus Technology Licensing in the worldwide chemical industry
    Journal of International Business Studies, 2000
    Co-Authors: Ashish Arora, Andrea Fosfuri
    Abstract:

    This paper empirically analyzes the determinants of the choice between wholly owned subsidiary and Technology Licensing as a strategy for expansion abroad. We use a new and comprehensive database on worldwide plant level investments in the chemical industry during the 1981–1991 period. We find that both cultural distance and the presence of other potential licensors favor the use of Licensing as a strategy for expanding abroad, whereas, prior experience favors the choice of wholly owned subsidiary. An implication of this study is that competition in the market for Technology can foster the international diffusion of Technology through the use of arm's length agreements.

Ulrich Lichtenthaler - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • RETRACTED: Integrated knowledge exploitation: The complementarity of product development and Technology Licensing
    Strategic Management Journal, 2012
    Co-Authors: Ulrich Lichtenthaler, Holger Ernst
    Abstract:

    In light of increasing Licensing, we challenge the common assumption that product development and Technology Licensing are substitutes. We develop a resource-based framework, which distinguishes a firm's technological resource base and Technology exploitation processes. We further combine survey, patent, and financial data of 228 medium-sized and large industrial companies to examine the interactions of firms' product development processes and Technology Licensing processes in order to explain heterogeneity in new product revenues, Licensing performance, and firm performance. The results underscore that product development, which indicates innovative capacity, and Technology Licensing, which indicates desorptive capacity, are complements rather than substitutes in integrated knowledge exploitation in medium-sized and large firms. This complementarity is particularly pronounced in firms with an emphasis on cross-Licensing and with a strong patent portfolio. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

  • the evolution of Technology Licensing management identifying five strategic approaches
    R & D Management, 2011
    Co-Authors: Ulrich Lichtenthaler
    Abstract:

    Besides applying Technology in new products inside the organization, industrial firms may actively license Technology to external partners. There is anecdotal evidence that firms have increasingly licensed Technology in recent years in order to achieve monetary and non-monetary benefits. However, prior research into the evolution of Licensing activities and into the management of these activities is relatively limited. Therefore, we rely on an exploratory research design and collect unique data by means of 57 interviews in 25 industrial firms over a 5-year period. On this basis, we identify five different strategic approaches to Licensing management. In addition, we examine the relationship between the firms' Licensing management and Licensing activity. Finally, we analyze the development of the firms' Licensing management over the 5-year period. The results considerably deepen our understanding of Licensing management, and they provide new insights into interfirm differences in the success of active Licensing programs. The findings have major implications for research into Technology Licensing, knowledge exploitation, open innovation, and markets for Technology.

  • RETRACTED: Determinants of proactive and reactive Technology Licensing: A contingency perspective
    Research Policy, 2010
    Co-Authors: Ulrich Lichtenthaler
    Abstract:

    Industrial firms increasingly attempt to license their technologies apart from applying them in their own products. Because of the imperfections in Technology markets, an active approach towards Technology Licensing does not automatically result in Licensing transactions. To balance prior research, which has focused on Licensing transactions as the outcome of Licensing intentions, we take a contingency view to analyze how characteristics of a firm's innovation ecosystem determine different strategic types of Licensing. Specifically, we distinguish proactive Licensing, which refers to identifying recipients for Technology transactions, and reactive Licensing, which relates to offering licenses to infringers of a firm's intellectual property. Survey data show that environmental antecedents concerning appropriability, i.e., patent protection and technological turbulence, and determinants regarding Technology markets, i.e., transaction frequency and competitive intensity, have different effects on proactive and reactive Licensing. On this basis, the article has major implications for research into Technology Licensing, markets for Technology, and open innovation.

  • RETRACTION NOTICE: Technology Licensing strategies: the interaction of process and content characteristics:
    Strategic Organization, 2009
    Co-Authors: Ulrich Lichtenthaler, Holger Ernst
    Abstract:

    The article ‘Technology Licensing strategies: the interaction of process and content characteristics’ by Ulrich Lichtenthaler and Holger Ernst, published in STRATEGIC ORGANIZATION Vol 7(2): 183–221, DOI: 10.1177/1476127009102672, has been retracted at the author’s and editors’ request due to errors in reporting, for which the first author has claimed responsibility.

  • The impact of aligning Technology Licensing and product development : a contingency perspective
    2009
    Co-Authors: Ulrich Lichtenthaler, Johan Frishammar
    Abstract:

    The impact of aligning Technology Licensing and product development : a contingency perspective