The Experts below are selected from a list of 27351 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Eitan Altman - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Revisiting Evolutionary Game Theory
2013Co-Authors: Ilaria Brunetti, Eitan AltmanAbstract:Evolutionary Game theory is a relatively young mathematical theory that aims to formalize in mathematical terms evolution models in biology. In recent years this paradigm has penetrated more and more into other areas such as the linguistics, economics and engineering. The current theory of Evolutionary Game makes an implicit assumption that the evolution is driven by selfishness of individuals who interact with each others. In mathematical terms this can be stated as "an individual equals a player in a Game model". This assumption turns out to be quite restrictive in modeling evolution in biology. It is now more and more accepted among biologist that the evolution is driven by the selfish interests of large groups of individuals; a group may correspond for example to a whole beehive or to an ants' nest. In this paper we propose an alternative paradigm for modeling evolution where a player does not necessarily represent an interacting individual but a whole class of such individuals.
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CDC - Revisiting Evolutionary Game theory
52nd IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, 2013Co-Authors: Ilaria Brunetti, Eitan AltmanAbstract:Evolutionary Game theory is a relatively young mathematical theory that aims to formalize in mathematical terms evolution models in biology. In recent years this paradigm has penetrated more and more into other areas such as the linguistics, economics and engineering. The current theory of Evolutionary Game makes an implicit assumption that the evolution is driven by selfishness of individuals who interact with each others. In mathematical terms this can be stated as “an individual equals a player in a Game model”. This assumption turns out to be quite restrictive in modeling evolution in biology. It is now more and more accepted among biologist that the evolution is driven by the selfish interests of large groups of individuals; a group may correspond for example to a whole beehive or to an ants' nest. In this paper we propose an alternative paradigm for modeling evolution where a player does not necessarily represent an interacting individual but a whole class of such individuals.
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From mean field interaction to Evolutionary Game dynamics
2009Co-Authors: Hamidou Tembine, Jean-yves Le Boudec, Rachid Elaouzi, Eitan AltmanAbstract:We consider evolving Games with finite number of players, in which each player interacts with other randomly selected players. The types and actions of each player in an interaction together determine the instantaneous payoff for all involved players. They also determine the rate of transition between type-actions. We provide a rigorous derivation of the asymptotic behavior of this system as the size of the population grows. We show that the large population asymptotic of the microscopic model is equivalent to a macroscopic Evolutionary Game in which a local interaction is described by a single player against an evolving population profile. We derive various classes of Evolutionary Game dynamics. We apply these results to spatial random access Games in wireless networks.
Karl Sigmund - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Evolutionary Game dynamics american mathematical society short course january 4 5 2011 new orleans louisiana
2011Co-Authors: Karl SigmundAbstract:Introduction to Evolutionary Game theory by K. Sigmund Beyond the symmetric normal form: Extensive form Games, asymmetric Games and Games with continuous strategy spaces by R. Cressman Deterministic Evolutionary Game dynamics by J. Hofbauer On some global and unilateral adaptive dynamics by S. Sorin Stochastic Evolutionary Game dynamics: Foundations, deterministic approximation, and equilibrium selection by W. H. Sandholm Evolution of cooperation in finite populations by S. Lessard Index
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Evolutionary Game Dynamics - Evolutionary Game dynamics
Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society, 2003Co-Authors: Josef Hofbauer, Karl SigmundAbstract:Evolutionary Game dynamics is the application of population dynamical methods to Game theory. It has been introduced by Evolutionary biologists, anticipated in part by classical Game theorists. In this survey, we present an overview of the many brands of deterministic dynamical systems motivated by Evolutionary Game theory, including ordinary differential equations (and, in particular, the replicator equation), differential inclusions (the best response dynamics), difference equations (as, for instance, fictitious play) and reaction-diffusion systems. A recurrent theme (the so-called `folk theorem of Evolutionary Game theory') is the close connection of the dynamical approach with the Nash equilibrium, but we show that a static, equilibrium-based viewpoint is, on principle, unable to always account for the long-term behaviour of players adjusting their behaviour to maximise their payoff.
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Evolutionary Game dynamics
Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society, 2003Co-Authors: Josef Hofbauer, Karl SigmundAbstract:Evolutionary Game dynamics is the application of population dy-namical methods to Game theory. It has been introduced by Evolutionary biologists, anticipated in part by classical Game theorists. In this survey, we present an overview of the many brands of deterministic dynamical systems motivated by Evolutionary Game theory, including ordinary differential equa-tions (and, in particular, the replicator equation), differential inclusions (the best response dynamics), difference equations (as, for instance, fictitious play) and reaction-diffusion systems. A recurrent theme (the so-called 'folk theo-rem of Evolutionary Game theory') is the close connection of the dynamical approach with the Nash equilibrium, but we show that a static, equilibrium-based viewpoint is, on principle, unable to always account for the long-term behaviour of players adjusting their behaviour to maximise their payoff.
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Evolutionary Game Theory
1995Co-Authors: Karl Sigmund, Martin A. NowakAbstract:This text introduces current Evolutionary Game theory--where ideas from Evolutionary biology and rationalistic economics meet--emphasizing the links between static and dynamic approaches and noncooperative Game theory. The author provides an overview of the developments that have taken place in this branch of Game theory, discusses the mathematical tools needed to understand the area, describes both the motivation and intuition for the concepts involved, and explains why and how the theory is relevant to economics.
Ann Nowé - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Evolutionary Game theory and multi-agent reinforcement learning
Knowledge Engineering Review, 2005Co-Authors: Karl Tuyls, Ann NowéAbstract:In this paper we survey the basics of reinforcement learning and (Evolutionary) Game theory, applied to the field of multi-agent systems. This paper contains three parts. We start with an overview on the fundamentals of reinforcement learning. Next we summarize the most important aspects of Evolutionary Game theory. Finally, we discuss the state-of-the-art of multi-agent reinforcement learning and the mathematical connection with Evolutionary Game theory.
Karl Tuyls - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Evolutionary Game theory and multi-agent reinforcement learning
Knowledge Engineering Review, 2005Co-Authors: Karl Tuyls, Ann NowéAbstract:In this paper we survey the basics of reinforcement learning and (Evolutionary) Game theory, applied to the field of multi-agent systems. This paper contains three parts. We start with an overview on the fundamentals of reinforcement learning. Next we summarize the most important aspects of Evolutionary Game theory. Finally, we discuss the state-of-the-art of multi-agent reinforcement learning and the mathematical connection with Evolutionary Game theory.
Ilaria Brunetti - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Revisiting Evolutionary Game Theory
2013Co-Authors: Ilaria Brunetti, Eitan AltmanAbstract:Evolutionary Game theory is a relatively young mathematical theory that aims to formalize in mathematical terms evolution models in biology. In recent years this paradigm has penetrated more and more into other areas such as the linguistics, economics and engineering. The current theory of Evolutionary Game makes an implicit assumption that the evolution is driven by selfishness of individuals who interact with each others. In mathematical terms this can be stated as "an individual equals a player in a Game model". This assumption turns out to be quite restrictive in modeling evolution in biology. It is now more and more accepted among biologist that the evolution is driven by the selfish interests of large groups of individuals; a group may correspond for example to a whole beehive or to an ants' nest. In this paper we propose an alternative paradigm for modeling evolution where a player does not necessarily represent an interacting individual but a whole class of such individuals.
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CDC - Revisiting Evolutionary Game theory
52nd IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, 2013Co-Authors: Ilaria Brunetti, Eitan AltmanAbstract:Evolutionary Game theory is a relatively young mathematical theory that aims to formalize in mathematical terms evolution models in biology. In recent years this paradigm has penetrated more and more into other areas such as the linguistics, economics and engineering. The current theory of Evolutionary Game makes an implicit assumption that the evolution is driven by selfishness of individuals who interact with each others. In mathematical terms this can be stated as “an individual equals a player in a Game model”. This assumption turns out to be quite restrictive in modeling evolution in biology. It is now more and more accepted among biologist that the evolution is driven by the selfish interests of large groups of individuals; a group may correspond for example to a whole beehive or to an ants' nest. In this paper we propose an alternative paradigm for modeling evolution where a player does not necessarily represent an interacting individual but a whole class of such individuals.
