The Experts below are selected from a list of 2460 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Harold C. Relyea - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Amendments: 109th Congress
2005Co-Authors: Harold C. RelyeaAbstract:Enacted in 1966, the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) was designed to enable any person -- individual or corporate, regardless of citizenship -- to request, without explanation or justification, presumptive access to existing, identifiable, unpublished, Executive Branch Agency records on any topic. The statute specified nine categories of information that may be permissibly exempted from the rule of disclosure. Disputes over the accessibility of requested records could be ultimately settled in court. The statute has become a somewhat popular tool of inquiry and information gathering for various quarters of American society. This report details the history of the Act, as well as relevant legislation and incidences and the efforts to amend the Act.
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Freedom of Information Act Amendments: 109th Congress
2005Co-Authors: Harold C. RelyeaAbstract:This report discusses the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), which was designed to enable any person — individual or corporate, regardless of citizenship — to request, without explanation or justification, presumptive access to existing, identifiable, unpublished, Executive Branch Agency records on any topic.
Jide Nzelibe - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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The Fable of the Nationalist President and Parochial Congress
UCLA Law Review, 2006Co-Authors: Jide NzelibeAbstract:One of the most widespread contemporary assumptions in the discourse of separation of powers is that while the President tends to have preferences that are more national and stable in nature, Congress is perpetually prone to parochial concerns. This deeply ingrained assumption not only pervades legal scholarly treatment of the administrative state, but it is also used to frame debates about the division of foreign relations powers and the proper scope of judicial review of Executive Branch Agency regulations. This Article examines the three explanations commonly given for the President's more national outlook and introduces institutional considerations that reveal them to be more myth than fact: (1) The President has a broader population and geographic constituency than members of Congress; (2) The fact that members of Congress are elected frequently means that they are more susceptible to special interest or parochial legislation than the President; and (3) The President tends to care more about the overall health of the national economy than Congress does. This Article shows that under the winner-take-all system of our Electoral College, the President will often have an incentive to cater to a narrower geographical and population constituency than that of the median member of Congress. Furthermore, this Article also contends that while the preferences of individual members of Congress may often be short-sighted and parochial, the collective wisdom of these parochial members of Congress will often produce policy outcomes that are more national and public-regarding than that of any single elected official. Finally, this Article critically analyzes the implications of debunking the fable in three areas of public law where it has been particularly pervasive: the unitary presidency, judicial deference to Executive Branch Agency decisions, and the allocation of international trade authority.
Cristina M. Rodríguez - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Constraint Through Delegation: The Case of Executive Control Over Immigration Policy
Duke Law Journal, 2010Co-Authors: Cristina M. RodríguezAbstract:This Article proposes recalibrating the separation of powers between the political Branches in the context of their regulation of immigration law’s core questions: how many and what types of immigrants to admit to the United States. Whereas Congress holds a virtual monopoly over formal decisionmaking, the Executive Branch makes de facto admissions decisions using its discretionary enforcement power. As a result of this structure, stasis and excessive prosecutorial discretion characterize the regime, particularly with respect to labor migration. Both of these features exacerbate pathologies associated with illegal immigration and call for a structural response. This Article contends that Congress should create an Executive Branch Agency, marked by indicia of independence, to set labor visa policy - an avenue increasingly contemplated by reformers.Though it may seem counterintuitive, delegation of greater authority can help constrain Executive power by substituting a transparent process, subject to monitoring, for decisionmaking that occurs hidden from view. Delegation can also help overcome limitations in the legislative process that contribute to the current regime’s limitations, making immigration policy more efficient and effective. The Refugee Act of 1980 provides a parallel helpful to thinking through what it would mean to delegate ex ante admissions power to the Executive.
Peter J. Balint - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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The Life Cycles of the Council on Environmental Quality and the Environmental Protection Agency - Life Cycle Models of Organizations
The Life Cycles of the Council on Environmental Quality and the Environmental Protection Agency, 2016Co-Authors: James K. Conant, Peter J. BalintAbstract:The Executive Branch departments and agencies of the national government have the key role in the implementation stage of the policy process. In the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) was assigned the task of providing an annual report on the condition of the nation’s environment, assessing the effects of national, state, and local governments’ efforts to protect the environment, and developing recommendations to improve environmental quality. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was given the primary responsibility for implementing the pollution control laws Congress created between 1970 and 1980, amendments to those laws, and new laws enacted during the next three decades. Some scholars have maintained that the process of implementing a public law is “removed from the hurry and strife of politics,” since the important political and substantive matters have been decided in the law itself. Other scholars, however, describe the implementation stage of the policy process as a continuation of the political struggle that occurred over the creation of the law. The competition between these two views of policy implementation is one factor that makes the study of the “life cycles” of Executive Branch departments and agencies so important. If the first view is correct, the implementation of a public law should be a relatively smooth process in which the leadership, managers, and professionals in agencies like the CEQ and the EPA carry out their assigned statutory duties. Likewise, the life cycle of the Executive Branch Agency should be relatively stable and long. Finally, absent serious flaws in the design of the policy itself, the prospects for successful implementation of the law might seem to be relatively high. If the alternative view of policy implementation is correct, however, the extent to which implementation of a public law actually occurs is likely to depend heavily on the health, vitality, and even survival of the implementing Agency. In turn, the health and vitality of the Executive Branch Agency is likely to depend on the leadership of the Agency and the resources that Congress and the president appropriate for it.
Amanda Driscoll - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Adjudicatory Oversight and Judicial Decision Making in Executive Branch Agencies
American Politics Research, 2012Co-Authors: Christina L. Boyd, Amanda DriscollAbstract:Adjudications are an important, though understudied, means through which administrative agencies create policies that have a lasting impact. We argue that Executive Branch Agency heads utilize their oversight of Agency adjudications to advance Agency goals. Relying on an original data set of adjudications appealed to the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Agency head’s adjudication delegee, our empirical results indicate a substantial positive effect on the probability that the Agency head will reverse an administrative law judge (ALJ) when he receives the appeal of an antiAgency ALJ decision. However, the Agency’s adjudication oversight is conditional on political constraints, including partisanship differences between an Agency and the litigated law and whether the case is being heard during a time of presidential transition. These results have clear implications for the use and effectiveness of Agency adjudications as a political tool.