The Experts below are selected from a list of 15459 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform

Xavier Gabaix - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Executive Compensation a modern primer
    Journal of Economic Literature, 2016
    Co-Authors: Alex Edmans, Xavier Gabaix
    Abstract:

    This article studies traditional and modern theories of Executive Compensation, bringing them together under a simple unifying framework accessible to the general-interest reader. We analyze assignment models of the level of pay, and static and dynamic moral-hazard models of incentives, and compare their predictions to empirical findings. We make two broad points. First, traditional theories find it difficult to explain the data, suggesting that Compensation results from "rent extraction" by CEOs. However, more modern "shareholder value" theories, that arguably better capture the CEO setting, do deliver predictions consistent with observed practices, suggesting that these practices need not be inefficient. Second, seemingly innocuous features of the modeling setup, often made for tractability or convenience, can lead to significant differences in the model's implications and conclusions on the efficiency of observed practices. We close by highlighting apparent inefficiencies in Executive Compensation and additional directions for future research.

  • Executive Compensation a modern primer
    National Bureau of Economic Research, 2015
    Co-Authors: Alex Edmans, Xavier Gabaix
    Abstract:

    This article studies traditional and modern theories of Executive Compensation, bringing them together under a unifying framework. We analyze assignment models of the level of pay, and static and dynamic moral hazard models of incentives, and compare their predictions to empirical findings. We make two broad points. First, traditional optimal contracting theories find it difficult to explain the data, suggesting that Compensation results from "rent extraction" by CEOs. In contrast, more modern theories that arguably better capture the CEO setting do deliver predictions consistent with observed practices, suggesting that these practices need not be inefficient. Second, seemingly innocuous features of the modeling setup, often made for tractability or convenience, can lead to significant differences in the model's implications and conclusions on the efficiency of observed practices. We close by highlighting apparent inefficiencies in Executive Compensation and additional directions for future research.

Alexandra Niessen - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • public opinion and Executive Compensation
    Management Science, 2012
    Co-Authors: Camelia M Kuhnen, Alexandra Niessen
    Abstract:

    We investigate whether public opinion influences the level and structure of Executive Compensation. During 1992--2008, the negativity of press coverage of chief Executive officer (CEO) pay varied significantly, with stock options being the most criticized pay component. We find that after more negative press coverage of CEO pay, firms reduce option grants and increase less contentious types of pay such as salary, although overall Compensation does not change. The reduction in option pay after increased press negativity is more pronounced when firms, CEOs, and boards have stronger reputation concerns. Our within-firm, within-year identification shows the results cannot be explained by annual changes in accounting rules regarding Executive Compensation, stock market conditions, or pay mean reversion. This paper was accepted by Brad Barber, finance.

  • public opinion and Executive Compensation
    2010
    Co-Authors: Camelia M Kuhnen, Alexandra Niessen
    Abstract:

    We inquire whether public opinion influences Executive Compensation. During 1992-2008 the negativity of press coverage of CEO pay varied significantly, with stock options being the most discussed pay component. We find that after more negative press coverage of CEO pay firms reduce option grants and increase other Compensation including stock awards, overall reducing pay-to-performance sensitivity. The reduction in option pay after increased press negativity is more pronounced when firms and CEOs have stronger reputation concerns. Our within-firm, within-year identification shows the results cannot be explained by annual changes in accounting rules regarding Executive Compensation, stock market conditions, or pay mean-reversion.

Alex Edmans - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Executive Compensation a modern primer
    Journal of Economic Literature, 2016
    Co-Authors: Alex Edmans, Xavier Gabaix
    Abstract:

    This article studies traditional and modern theories of Executive Compensation, bringing them together under a simple unifying framework accessible to the general-interest reader. We analyze assignment models of the level of pay, and static and dynamic moral-hazard models of incentives, and compare their predictions to empirical findings. We make two broad points. First, traditional theories find it difficult to explain the data, suggesting that Compensation results from "rent extraction" by CEOs. However, more modern "shareholder value" theories, that arguably better capture the CEO setting, do deliver predictions consistent with observed practices, suggesting that these practices need not be inefficient. Second, seemingly innocuous features of the modeling setup, often made for tractability or convenience, can lead to significant differences in the model's implications and conclusions on the efficiency of observed practices. We close by highlighting apparent inefficiencies in Executive Compensation and additional directions for future research.

  • Executive Compensation a modern primer
    National Bureau of Economic Research, 2015
    Co-Authors: Alex Edmans, Xavier Gabaix
    Abstract:

    This article studies traditional and modern theories of Executive Compensation, bringing them together under a unifying framework. We analyze assignment models of the level of pay, and static and dynamic moral hazard models of incentives, and compare their predictions to empirical findings. We make two broad points. First, traditional optimal contracting theories find it difficult to explain the data, suggesting that Compensation results from "rent extraction" by CEOs. In contrast, more modern theories that arguably better capture the CEO setting do deliver predictions consistent with observed practices, suggesting that these practices need not be inefficient. Second, seemingly innocuous features of the modeling setup, often made for tractability or convenience, can lead to significant differences in the model's implications and conclusions on the efficiency of observed practices. We close by highlighting apparent inefficiencies in Executive Compensation and additional directions for future research.

Franck Moraux - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

Haibin Yang - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Executive Compensation in Asia: A critical review and outlook
    Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 2010
    Co-Authors: Sunny Li Sun, Xia Zhao, Haibin Yang
    Abstract:

    In this research we conduct a systematic and critical review of the literature on Executive Compensation in Asian countries. We discuss the particular characteristics of Executive Compensation in Asia in terms of pay criteria, contingency factors, and implications for performance and turnover. We thereby highlight the unique contributions of Asian studies to the mainstream Western research in Executive Compensation, and call for future research integrating agency theory and the institution-based view in examining pay variances across different institutions.