The Experts below are selected from a list of 2058 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Beril L Toktay - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Extended Producer Responsibility for pharmaceuticals
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2021Co-Authors: Isil Alev, Atalay Atasu, Beril L Toktay, Can ZhangAbstract:Problem definition: We investigate the effectiveness of different Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) implementation models for pharmaceuticals. In particular, we study two viable and prevalent ...
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design implications of Extended Producer Responsibility for durable products
Management Science, 2019Co-Authors: Ximin Huang, Atalay Atasu, Beril L ToktayAbstract:We analyze product design implications of Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR)-based take-back legislation on durable goods. In particular, we observe that durable product design incentives under...
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a case discussion on market based Extended Producer Responsibility the minnesota electronics recycling act
Journal of Industrial Ecology, 2019Co-Authors: Isil Alev, Atalay Atasu, Ximin Huang, Beril L ToktayAbstract:In this article, we analyze the Minnesota Electronics Recycling Act to explore the benefits and potential drawbacks of a market‐based Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) legislation implementation with operational flexibility for manufacturers. Based on publicly available reports and stakeholder interviews, we find that the Minnesota Act attains two key goals of market‐based EPR (i.e., higher cost efficiencies and substantial landfill diversion); however, this may come at the expense of selective collection and recycling, an increased burden on local governments, and a loss of balance in contractual power between stakeholders. We observe that these concerns arise because of specific flexibility provisions afforded to manufacturers that allow them to operationalize their EPR compliance with a cost‐efficiency focus. Thus, we conclude that EPR goals must be carefully translated into operating rules in order to achieve goals while avoiding unintended consequences.
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design incentives under collective Extended Producer Responsibility a network perspective
Management Science, 2018Co-Authors: Luyi Gui, Atalay Atasu, Özlem Ergun, Beril L ToktayAbstract:A key goal of Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) legislation is to provide incentives for Producers to design their products for recyclability. EPR is typically implemented in a collective system, where a network of recycling resources are coordinated to fulfill the EPR obligations of a set of Producers, and the resulting system cost is allocated among these Producers. Collective EPR is prevalent because of its cost efficiency advantages. However, it is considered to provide inferior design incentives compared to an individual implementation (where Producers fulfill their EPR obligations individually). In this paper, we revisit this assertion and investigate its fundamental underpinnings in a network setting. To this end, we develop a new biform game framework that captures Producers’ independent design choices (noncooperative stage) and recognizes the need to maintain the voluntary participation of Producers for the collective system to be stable (cooperative stage). This biform game subsumes the net...
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design implications of Extended Producer Responsibility for durable products
Social Science Research Network, 2017Co-Authors: Ximin Huang, Atalay Atasu, Beril L ToktayAbstract:We analyze product design implications of Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR)-based take-back legislation on durable goods. In particular, we observe that durable product design incentives under EPR may involve an inherent trade-off that has not been explored to date: Durable goods Producers can respond to EPR by making their products either more recyclable or more durable, where the former will decrease the unit recycling cost whereas the latter will reduce the volume the Producer has to recycle. When these two design attributes do not go hand-in-hand, as is the case for many product categories, product design implications of EPR can be subtle. We find that seemingly similar EPR implementation levers, namely recycling and collection targets, may have opposing effects in driving Producers' design choices. Furthermore, more stringent legislative targets do not always guarantee improved product recyclability and durability. In particular, if the objective of EPR is to induce recyclable product designs, a low recycling target accompanied with a high collection target is preferred. On the other hand, if the objective of EPR is to induce durable product designs, a low collection target accompanied with a high recycling target is preferred.
Atalay Atasu - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Extended Producer Responsibility for pharmaceuticals
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2021Co-Authors: Isil Alev, Atalay Atasu, Beril L Toktay, Can ZhangAbstract:Problem definition: We investigate the effectiveness of different Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) implementation models for pharmaceuticals. In particular, we study two viable and prevalent ...
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Extended Producer Responsibility for Durable Products
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2020Co-Authors: Isil Alev, Vishal Agrawal, Atalay AtasuAbstract:Problem definition: We study how Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) legislation implementations for durable products should differ from those for nondurable products. Academic/practical relevan...
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operational perspectives on Extended Producer Responsibility
Journal of Industrial Ecology, 2019Co-Authors: Atalay AtasuAbstract:We revisit three important assumptions about Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) that originate from academia, policy, or practice: (1) A central objective of EPR should be to induce product designs for the environment; (2) collective EPR implementations mute incentives to design for the environment; and (3) more stringent EPR policy parameters will generate better environmental outcomes. We discuss the potential shortcomings of these assumptions from an operations perspective and their implications for academic and policy research.
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design implications of Extended Producer Responsibility for durable products
Management Science, 2019Co-Authors: Ximin Huang, Atalay Atasu, Beril L ToktayAbstract:We analyze product design implications of Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR)-based take-back legislation on durable goods. In particular, we observe that durable product design incentives under...
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a case discussion on market based Extended Producer Responsibility the minnesota electronics recycling act
Journal of Industrial Ecology, 2019Co-Authors: Isil Alev, Atalay Atasu, Ximin Huang, Beril L ToktayAbstract:In this article, we analyze the Minnesota Electronics Recycling Act to explore the benefits and potential drawbacks of a market‐based Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) legislation implementation with operational flexibility for manufacturers. Based on publicly available reports and stakeholder interviews, we find that the Minnesota Act attains two key goals of market‐based EPR (i.e., higher cost efficiencies and substantial landfill diversion); however, this may come at the expense of selective collection and recycling, an increased burden on local governments, and a loss of balance in contractual power between stakeholders. We observe that these concerns arise because of specific flexibility provisions afforded to manufacturers that allow them to operationalize their EPR compliance with a cost‐efficiency focus. Thus, we conclude that EPR goals must be carefully translated into operating rules in order to achieve goals while avoiding unintended consequences.
Luyi Gui - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Recycling Infrastructure Development under Extended Producer Responsibility in Developing Economies
Production and Operations Management, 2020Co-Authors: Luyi GuiAbstract:To tackle the severe pollution caused by electronic waste (e‐waste), several developing countries have introduced e‐waste legislation based on Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR). A major challenge to implement EPR in developing countries is the lack of formal recycling infrastructure. In this paper, we study if a collective form of EPR implementation where Producers may jointly invest in recycling facilities can promote their incentives to do so. We develop a Nash bargaining model that captures the decision dynamics underlying joint recycling facility investment. We show that despite its advantage in reducing Producers’ fixed investment costs, joint investment in the collective system may lead to a worse recycling infrastructure development outcome than independent investment in an individual system. This can particularly happen when the collective system involves products whose recycling costs are highly differentiated. We further show that cost sharing based on the principle of Individual Producer Responsibility (IPR) may undermine the recycling infrastructure development outcome in the collective system compared to simple proportional cost sharing rules. In practice, it is generally believed that IPR leads to better design incentives than proportional cost sharing rules. Accordingly, our result indicates that there exists a tradeoff between these two cost sharing rules, and promoting recycling infrastructure development via collective systems may come at the expense of design incentives and vice versa.
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design incentives under collective Extended Producer Responsibility a network perspective
Management Science, 2018Co-Authors: Luyi Gui, Atalay Atasu, Özlem Ergun, Beril L ToktayAbstract:A key goal of Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) legislation is to provide incentives for Producers to design their products for recyclability. EPR is typically implemented in a collective system, where a network of recycling resources are coordinated to fulfill the EPR obligations of a set of Producers, and the resulting system cost is allocated among these Producers. Collective EPR is prevalent because of its cost efficiency advantages. However, it is considered to provide inferior design incentives compared to an individual implementation (where Producers fulfill their EPR obligations individually). In this paper, we revisit this assertion and investigate its fundamental underpinnings in a network setting. To this end, we develop a new biform game framework that captures Producers’ independent design choices (noncooperative stage) and recognizes the need to maintain the voluntary participation of Producers for the collective system to be stable (cooperative stage). This biform game subsumes the net...
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Design Implications of Extended Producer Responsibility Legislation
Environmentally Responsible Supply Chains, 2016Co-Authors: Luyi Gui, Atalay Atasu, Ximin Huang, L. Beril ToktayAbstract:Take-back legislation based on Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) holds Producers responsible for proper end-of-life treatment of their products. In addition to diverting waste products from landfills, EPR legislation has the potential advantage of incentivizing eco-design of products. However, evidence suggests that product design outcomes of EPR legislation can be significantly influenced by its implementation. In this chapter, we survey the research on this topic, focusing on design impacts associated with several key operational considerations in supply chains. We show that intended design incentives under EPR legislation may be weakened, muted, or even negated as a result of operational factors such as design trade-off, market competition, and recycling resource sharing. Accordingly, we develop insights as to how the design potential of EPR legislation may be realized.
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efficient implementation of collective Extended Producer Responsibility legislation
Management Science, 2016Co-Authors: Luyi Gui, Atalay Atasu, Özlem Ergun, Beril L ToktayAbstract:Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) is a policy tool that holds Producers financially responsible for the post-use collection, recycling, and disposal of their products. Many EPR implementations are collective—a large collection and recycling network (CRN) handles multiple Producers’ products in order to benefit from scale and scope economies. The total cost is then allocated to Producers based on metrics such as their return shares by weight. Such weight-based proportional allocation mechanisms are criticized in practice for not taking into account the heterogeneity in the costs imposed by different Producers’ products. The consequence is cost allocations that impose higher costs on certain Producer groups than they can achieve independently. This may lead some Producers to break away from collective systems, resulting in fragmented systems with higher total cost. Yet cost efficiency is a key legislative and Producer concern. To address this concern, this paper develops cost allocation mechanisms that...
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efficient implementation of collective Extended Producer Responsibility legislation
Management Science, 2016Co-Authors: Luyi Gui, Atalay Atasu, Özlem Ergun, Beril L ToktayAbstract:Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) is a policy tool that holds Producers financially responsible for the post-use collection, recycling, and disposal of their products. Many EPR implementations are collective—a large collection and recycling network (CRN) handles multiple Producers’ products in order to benefit from scale and scope economies. The total cost is then allocated to Producers based on metrics such as their return shares by weight. Such weight-based proportional allocation mechanisms are criticized in practice for not taking into account the heterogeneity in the costs imposed by different Producers’ products. The consequence is cost allocations that impose higher costs on certain Producer groups than they can achieve independently. This may lead some Producers to break away from collective systems, resulting in fragmented systems with higher total cost. Yet cost efficiency is a key legislative and Producer concern. To address this concern, this paper develops cost allocation mechanisms that induce participation in collective systems and maximize cost efficiency. The cost allocation mechanisms we propose consist of adjustments to the widely used return share method and include the weighing of return shares based on processing costs and the rewarding of capacity contributions to collective systems. We validate our theoretical results using Washington state EPR implementation data and provide insights into how these mechanisms can be implemented in practice. This paper was accepted by Serguei Netessine, operations management.
Ximin Huang - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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design implications of Extended Producer Responsibility for durable products
Management Science, 2019Co-Authors: Ximin Huang, Atalay Atasu, Beril L ToktayAbstract:We analyze product design implications of Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR)-based take-back legislation on durable goods. In particular, we observe that durable product design incentives under...
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a case discussion on market based Extended Producer Responsibility the minnesota electronics recycling act
Journal of Industrial Ecology, 2019Co-Authors: Isil Alev, Atalay Atasu, Ximin Huang, Beril L ToktayAbstract:In this article, we analyze the Minnesota Electronics Recycling Act to explore the benefits and potential drawbacks of a market‐based Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) legislation implementation with operational flexibility for manufacturers. Based on publicly available reports and stakeholder interviews, we find that the Minnesota Act attains two key goals of market‐based EPR (i.e., higher cost efficiencies and substantial landfill diversion); however, this may come at the expense of selective collection and recycling, an increased burden on local governments, and a loss of balance in contractual power between stakeholders. We observe that these concerns arise because of specific flexibility provisions afforded to manufacturers that allow them to operationalize their EPR compliance with a cost‐efficiency focus. Thus, we conclude that EPR goals must be carefully translated into operating rules in order to achieve goals while avoiding unintended consequences.
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design implications of Extended Producer Responsibility for durable products
Social Science Research Network, 2017Co-Authors: Ximin Huang, Atalay Atasu, Beril L ToktayAbstract:We analyze product design implications of Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR)-based take-back legislation on durable goods. In particular, we observe that durable product design incentives under EPR may involve an inherent trade-off that has not been explored to date: Durable goods Producers can respond to EPR by making their products either more recyclable or more durable, where the former will decrease the unit recycling cost whereas the latter will reduce the volume the Producer has to recycle. When these two design attributes do not go hand-in-hand, as is the case for many product categories, product design implications of EPR can be subtle. We find that seemingly similar EPR implementation levers, namely recycling and collection targets, may have opposing effects in driving Producers' design choices. Furthermore, more stringent legislative targets do not always guarantee improved product recyclability and durability. In particular, if the objective of EPR is to induce recyclable product designs, a low recycling target accompanied with a high collection target is preferred. On the other hand, if the objective of EPR is to induce durable product designs, a low collection target accompanied with a high recycling target is preferred.
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Design Implications of Extended Producer Responsibility Legislation
Environmentally Responsible Supply Chains, 2016Co-Authors: Luyi Gui, Atalay Atasu, Ximin Huang, L. Beril ToktayAbstract:Take-back legislation based on Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) holds Producers responsible for proper end-of-life treatment of their products. In addition to diverting waste products from landfills, EPR legislation has the potential advantage of incentivizing eco-design of products. However, evidence suggests that product design outcomes of EPR legislation can be significantly influenced by its implementation. In this chapter, we survey the research on this topic, focusing on design impacts associated with several key operational considerations in supply chains. We show that intended design incentives under EPR legislation may be weakened, muted, or even negated as a result of operational factors such as design trade-off, market competition, and recycling resource sharing. Accordingly, we develop insights as to how the design potential of EPR legislation may be realized.
Özlem Ergun - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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design incentives under collective Extended Producer Responsibility a network perspective
Management Science, 2018Co-Authors: Luyi Gui, Atalay Atasu, Özlem Ergun, Beril L ToktayAbstract:A key goal of Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) legislation is to provide incentives for Producers to design their products for recyclability. EPR is typically implemented in a collective system, where a network of recycling resources are coordinated to fulfill the EPR obligations of a set of Producers, and the resulting system cost is allocated among these Producers. Collective EPR is prevalent because of its cost efficiency advantages. However, it is considered to provide inferior design incentives compared to an individual implementation (where Producers fulfill their EPR obligations individually). In this paper, we revisit this assertion and investigate its fundamental underpinnings in a network setting. To this end, we develop a new biform game framework that captures Producers’ independent design choices (noncooperative stage) and recognizes the need to maintain the voluntary participation of Producers for the collective system to be stable (cooperative stage). This biform game subsumes the net...
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efficient implementation of collective Extended Producer Responsibility legislation
Management Science, 2016Co-Authors: Luyi Gui, Atalay Atasu, Özlem Ergun, Beril L ToktayAbstract:Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) is a policy tool that holds Producers financially responsible for the post-use collection, recycling, and disposal of their products. Many EPR implementations are collective—a large collection and recycling network (CRN) handles multiple Producers’ products in order to benefit from scale and scope economies. The total cost is then allocated to Producers based on metrics such as their return shares by weight. Such weight-based proportional allocation mechanisms are criticized in practice for not taking into account the heterogeneity in the costs imposed by different Producers’ products. The consequence is cost allocations that impose higher costs on certain Producer groups than they can achieve independently. This may lead some Producers to break away from collective systems, resulting in fragmented systems with higher total cost. Yet cost efficiency is a key legislative and Producer concern. To address this concern, this paper develops cost allocation mechanisms that...
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efficient implementation of collective Extended Producer Responsibility legislation
Management Science, 2016Co-Authors: Luyi Gui, Atalay Atasu, Özlem Ergun, Beril L ToktayAbstract:Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) is a policy tool that holds Producers financially responsible for the post-use collection, recycling, and disposal of their products. Many EPR implementations are collective—a large collection and recycling network (CRN) handles multiple Producers’ products in order to benefit from scale and scope economies. The total cost is then allocated to Producers based on metrics such as their return shares by weight. Such weight-based proportional allocation mechanisms are criticized in practice for not taking into account the heterogeneity in the costs imposed by different Producers’ products. The consequence is cost allocations that impose higher costs on certain Producer groups than they can achieve independently. This may lead some Producers to break away from collective systems, resulting in fragmented systems with higher total cost. Yet cost efficiency is a key legislative and Producer concern. To address this concern, this paper develops cost allocation mechanisms that induce participation in collective systems and maximize cost efficiency. The cost allocation mechanisms we propose consist of adjustments to the widely used return share method and include the weighing of return shares based on processing costs and the rewarding of capacity contributions to collective systems. We validate our theoretical results using Washington state EPR implementation data and provide insights into how these mechanisms can be implemented in practice. This paper was accepted by Serguei Netessine, operations management.
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design incentives under collective Extended Producer Responsibility a network perspective
Georgia Tech Scheller College of Business Research Paper, 2015Co-Authors: Luyi Gui, Atalay Atasu, Özlem Ergun, Beril L ToktayAbstract:Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) legislation aims to create incentives for Producers to design products that are easier to recycle. In this paper, we study whether a collective EPR implementation, which is common in practice due to its cost efficiency advantage, can achieve this goal. In particular, we look for cost allocation mechanisms in a collective system that provide at least as effective design incentives as those induced by an individual system benchmark, while ensuring voluntary participation of Producers (i.e. satisfying group incentive compatibility). Based on a biform network game model, we show that a cost allocation mechanism that satisfies the above criteria exists only if the recycling infrastructure satisfies certain properties in terms of (i) how recycling costs change as a function of design choices and (ii) the processing capacity mix relative to the return volume. Otherwise, a cost allocation mechanism that leads to effective design incentives can only guarantee individual rationality but not group incentive compatibility. This indicates a critical tradeoff between Producers' design incentives and their voluntary participation in a collective system. That is, participation by enforcement may be required for a policy maker to induce superior designs and maintain a stable collective implementation (and therefore realize its cost efficiency advantage). If this is not feasible, then one needs to accept collective implementations as enablers of cost-efficiency at the expense of inferior design incentives, and find other means (i.e., other forms of regulatory intervention) besides cost allocation to provide design incentives.
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Extended Producer Responsibility for Pharmaceuticals
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2015Co-Authors: Isil Alev, Atalay Atasu, Özlem Ergun, L. Beril ToktayAbstract:We investigate the effectiveness of Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR)-based policies in addressing the pharmaceutical overage problem from an operational perspective. We posit that the consumable and perishable nature of pharmaceuticals allow for a narrow set of policy options. In particular, there are primarily two viable policies to operaxtionalize EPR for pharmaceuticals; (i) Source Reduction (SR), i.e., a form of fee imposed on Producers for their sales to limit the amount of dispensed pharmaceuticals (as implemented in British Columbia and Portugal), or (ii) End-of-Pipe Control (EC) where Producers establish and operate programs for collecting unused pharmaceuticals (as in Hungary and Belgium). We show that the pharmaceutical context may imply stronger preference for adopting the EC policy (over SR) when compared to other product categories for which EPR is prevalent. More specifically, we show EC works better for pharmaceuticals with (i) high social and environmental externalities; (ii) high collection costs (e.g. stringent collection requirements or standards); and (iii) moderate treatment impacts from usage. This suggests that the characteristics of specific to the pharmaceutical supply chain determine the effectiveness of EPR implementations for pharmaceuticals. Furthermore, we investigate the perspectives of pharmaceutical stakeholders on the policy choice to understand possible tensions and accordingly inform the policy-making. We find that aligning stakeholder preferences for effective EPR-based policy can be significantly harder in the pharmaceutical context when compared to other product categories. In sum, these results collectively suggest that the characteristics of the pharmaceutical supply chain and the associated dynamics within need to be carefully analyzed before undertaking any EPR-based policy decision.
